The Pak state of general panic

Terror now stalks the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan - the Pakistan Army.

All is not well in Musharraf’s realm as the General faces multiple crises — of legitimacy, credibility and authority. The entire trans-border of Pakistan-Afghanistan is today a vast SEZ of International Terror Inc. International terrorists like Tahir Yuldashev (Islamic Movement of Turkestan), various factions of the Taliban with Baitullah Mehsud as the most important leader in South Waziristan, Abu Kasha, the Iraqi, and Najmuddin, the Uzbek, operate in North Waziristan along with the Al Qaeda and others. They conduct their business from these safe havens.

The pattern of terrorist violence after the Lal Masjid episode has changed. Twelve soldiers were killed in Dera Ismail Khan in a suicide attack, about 300 soldiers were kidnapped by the Taliban in Waziristan early in September, 12 policemen were kidnapped from Bannu, a "settled area" of NWFP, unlike the ungovernable FATA. A bomb blast in Rawalpindi in September killed 29 personnel, mostly from the ISI. On the day US deputy secretary of state John Negroponte was in Islamabad, a Pushtoon officer blew himself up killing 19 commandos of the SSG in Tarbela, south of Islamabad. Terror now stalks the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan — the Pakistan Army.

Meanwhile, helicopter gun ships were once again deployed this year in the Makeen area of South Waziristan. This was in retaliation against tribesmen who had repeatedly attacked a military post on the night of September 12, killing 124 security personnel. Artillery was used against tribesmen in Razmak and Datta Khel in North Waziristan.

It is not easy to kidnap 300 armed and trained personnel. It is not known whether these soldiers, surprised and overpowered by overwhelming force, had voluntarily surrendered without a fight, or had refused to fight. If they had surrendered, then they had no will to fight. But if they had refused to fight, possibly by saying that they were not trained to fight other Muslims, then this could only mean that the Pakistan Army has problems that are more serious than imagined.

Most of these incidents, especially the kidnapping, the bomb blasts in Rawalpindi against the ISI and the suicide attack in the high security SSG campus, mean that the attackers had accurate intelligence in each case. It also means that this intelligence emanated from within these set-ups. Recall that terrorists had perfect intelligence about Gen. Musharraf’s movements when they almost succeeded in assassinating him three years ago in Rawalpindi. In his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, Musharraf has mentioned that one of the conspirators was from the SSG. Musharraf just got lucky.

Earlier this year, Pakistani authorities disclosed that about 1,400 people had been killed in over 100 military operations in South and North Waziristan. Clashes between the tribesmen and the security forces have continued for some years now, but the frequency and the efficacy of the attacks on the security forces have increased. This is especially noticeable after the commando action in Lal Masjid in July 2007: 300 persons were killed, many of whom were Pushtoons and from the Waziristan area. A Pakistan ministry of interior document admitted that government forces had forfeited authority to the Taliban and their allies, and even places like Peshawar, Kohat and Nowshera were facing Talibanisation, that the security forces in NWFP and the tribal region had been outgunned and outnumbered. (There are about 80,000 to 100,000 troops in the region.)

It is apparent that Islamic radicals have been gaining in Pakistan and their strength worries even elected parties like the MMA in NWFP. The regime invariably handles the Taliban and religious extremists with kid gloves, for they are Islamic warriors, armed and dangerous, with sympathisers in high places. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif’s short lived homecoming was handled swiftly and more with bravado than self assurance. It was the act of a regime that is getting desperate to cling to power and panicking that nothing is working in its favour. Musharraf may have succeeded, in his own eyes, of having got rid of the "problem," but this is likely to come back to haunt him.

Sixty years ago, Pakistan had only one monopoly shareholder — the United Kingdom. Then the United States took over and today Pakistan is actually like a failed MNC with the major stake holders — the US, the UK and Saudi Arabia trying to shore up this failing company. The "Chief Executive" (that was what Musharraf called himself when he ousted Nawaz) has been underperforming, but has to be rescued. That is why there have been international managers like Messrs Boucher and Negroponte rushing into Islamabad to support the CEO in public and admonish him in private.

China, the fourth shareholder in Pakistan, is worried too as its citizens continue to be killed in Baluchistan or are taken hostage elsewhere. Further, Uighur Islamists from Xinjiang have been receiving training along with Uzbeks, Tajiks and Chechens in the Waziristan areas. Pakistani troops began hunting for Uighur Muslims in Waziristan along with their Uzbek and Tajik sympathisers. Hasan Mahsum, the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who was wanted by the Chinese authorities, was killed in a gunfight with Pakistani troops in October 2004. A week later, militants kidnapped two Chinese engineers from South Waziristan, a uranium rich area. Earlier this year, the Pakistan Army launched a massive attack against the Uzbeks and Uighurs in South Waziristan suspected by the Chinese to be carrying out subversion in Xinjiang. Very few survived this attack and the rest fled to North Waziristan.

Across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the situation in the Pushtoon areas of south and east Afghanistan remains grim for President Hamid Karzai. Nato forces have been unable to assert themselves and the Taliban have killed 300 Afghan policemen in recent months. The battle now seems to be more than a battle between the Taliban and foreign troops or Afghan troops. It has become a battle between the Pushtoon in Afghanistan versus the foreigners, and between the Pushtoon in Pakistan and the rest of the Pakistanis in Pakistan. This is happening in a country where the regime is wary of even renaming NWFP as Pakhtoonkhwa for fear that this may sow the seeds of Pushtoon nationalism.

The Pakistan Army in the last 60 years has begun to resemble the East India Company, acquiring prime land at privileged prices, managing all trade and industrial houses in the country, running the country’s logistic systems, constructing highways and playing politics, setting up the Mohajirs against the Punjabis and religious elements against the nationalists. The Pakistan Army has a country to exploit. This has made Pakistan a global rogue state but no one is willing to say so.

A regime that is running scared of unarmed politicians, and either connives with or appeases terrorists, and in the process violates every written statute, is staring at a bleak future. When leaders openly disregard laws and the Constitution, then the followers can only do worse. Gen. Vinod Sehgal in his book Restructuring Pakistan (2001) had five main worries about Pakistan. These were the Talibanisation of Pakistan, a civil war breaking out in the country, further spread of state sponsored terrorism from the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, the spread of nuclear materials from Pakistan and the spread of regressive Islam into the subcontinent. It seems all this is taking place. Maulana Abu Ala Mawdoodi was prophetic when seeing the bloodshed and the killings during the partition of India, he remarked that "the bloody birth pangs of Pakistan" were "predicting the birth of a monster and not a human being."

The worst is yet to be.

Source : Asian Age 24th Sep 2007

The Nuclear Deal: The Larger Picture

As the U.S. readies for the battles of the 21st century, India must not ignore the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China and the relevance of Iran. It must manage its relations with all these powers.

The India-United States nuclear deal that was supposed to be a path breaking agreement has run into stiff opposition in both countries where critics say that each has given too much for too little. For India, the deal was supposed to provide nuclear energy to make good the shortfall, access to hi-technology, be an economic bonanza for the future and grant legitimacy as a major power. For the U.S., it was part of a larger game plan. The deal was a means to cap India’ s strategic programme, provide access to India’s growing defence market, and become a strategic partner in U.S. foreign policy initiatives globally. One of the abiding primary bipartisan U.S. objectives has been to restrict, roll back and cap the Indian strategic deterrent. Bill Clinton tried it earlier when he wanted India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and announce a moratorium on fissile production. But critics in the U.S. fear that the deal has weakened the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

There have been different interpretations of the deal in the two capitals. New Delhi asserts that the agreement assures continued supply of fuel and that if there is any disruption, the U.S. would help find an alternative source. American officials do not agree and will help only in the case of technical or logistical difficulties. This means that there would be no assistance in case India violates some aspects of the agreement or tests a nuclear device or reprocesses U.S. origin fuel.

The 123 Agreement has been extensively commented upon by strategic analysts, experienced commentators and scientists. One of the arguments being that the Hyde Act suggests that India should work bilaterally with the U.S. for an early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty instead of what India has wanted — a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangement. The Americans would want to rely on national technical means which would make the deal bilaterally intrusive. The deal does not give India access to reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water technologies or dual use components. In addition, the right of return of nuclear material, restrictions on reprocessing or building fuel reserves, verification and end-use monitoring, have been built into the agreement. This could restrict our strategic capabilities and options in the years ahead.

The deal was supposed to give India several benefits but the pressure to sign the deal by a specific deadline mostly came from the Americans, almost as if India was being hustled into this. The old principle of never ever signing anything in a hurry was abandoned. The Japanese, for instance, spent seven years discussing the deal before signing it. The China-U.S. 123 agreement of 1985 specifically states that both sides would observe the principle of international law under which neither party could invoke a domestic law to justify failure to perform a treaty. The India-U.S. 123 agreement does not have this safeguard.

It would be unreasonable to expect that the U.S. would give us a carte blanche on the business of testing and fissile material. But it was also unnecessary for us to have allowed what was a voluntary moratorium on testing become binding in a bilateral arrangement. It was also not necessary to agree to a U.S.-led fissile material cut off instead of a multilateral arrangement in Geneva. This is what we had agreed on July 18, 2005 and since then it has been a steady process downhill. In March 2006, we agreed to place 14 of our 22 reactors under safeguards and eventually shut down the Cirus reactor permanently. By voting in the manner in which we did at the IAEA on the Iran issue, we have set a precedent that may be difficult to live down. From now onwards, whenever we vote along with the U.S. or do any deal with it, opponents to this action will accuse the government of having become subservient to the U.S.

Unfortunately, the official response to the various criticisms or doubts has been dismissive and disappointingly inadequate. No one has bothered to sit down and explain that the various doubts and fears expressed were either incorrect or exaggerated. Instead, the response has been to depict criticism as a reflection of tunnel vision of cold war mindsets or nitpicking by ignoramuses. In the midst of this emotional debate, it was forgotten that dissent is also a form of patriotism. Protagonists of the deal have claimed that the 123 Agreement overrides the Hyde Act. This is incorrect because the 1954 Atomic Energy Act is the mother of all such Acts; the Hyde Act is a stringent enabling India-specific legislation for the 123 Agreement to be signed within the parameters of the Hyde Act. It has been suggested that in case the deal did not go through, Pakistan and China would collaborate for a similar deal. Surely this would have been factored in when the deal was being negotiated. It does not require any special clairvoyance to predict that whatever the outcome of the India-U.S. deal, Pakistan would want to seek a similar arrangement either with the U.S. and failing which, with China. In a high pitch drive, it has even been suggested that this deal would now open the doors for all sorts of hi-tech technologies. Conversely, should India be seen to be in violation of this deal, these technologies would be withdrawn from us followed by sanctions.

The Nick Burns statement in Washington on July 27 is a clear enunciation of what the U.S. expects from the deal. He said that the 123 Agreement “brings India … back into the nonproliferation mainstream in a way it was not before. And that is a tangible gain for India, as well as the U.S. and the rest of the world.” From then flow the rest of the arguments about the strategic consonance on Iran, reducing India’s dependency on countries like Iran for energy supplies. He also spoke of the advantages that American companies will have in selling the “finest nuclear technology” to India. Yet he did not mention that no American company has built a single reactor in the U.S. since 1979. Mr. Burns also hoped for greater defence co-operation between India and the U.S. leading to more exercises, training and defence sales. Both countries were already working together in South Asia on Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and “in trying to form a better functioning relationship between India and Pakistan.” He hoped that the two countries would form a global partnership and work together in East Asia and Africa. The India-U.S. nuclear deal is part of an overall plan which includes the Defence Framework Agreement, the Agriculture Deal and the Disaster Management Agreement. The idea is to engage India at all levels.

The U.S. has been pursuing a military basing policy extending globally as it prepares to take on a resurgent Russia and a powerful China. There are about 1000 bases of various descriptions and purpose strewn all over the globe and Chalmers Johnson points out in his book Nemesis, India has agreed to have a ‘lily pod’ base along with Thailand, Australia and the Philippines. (Pakistan already has four such bases with much larger facilities). These ‘lily pods’ e nable pre-positioning of weapons and munitions to which U.S. access has already been negotiated. This does not mean permanent U.S. presence but only in times of emergency. No wonder Washington is very keen that the two countries sign an Access and Cross Servicing Agreement which would allow logistic support to the U.S. from locations in India. A natural corollary to this would be the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) which would give U.S. troops immunity from violations of laws of the host country. U.S. joint exercises in and around India also make perfect U.S. military sense. There is a clear agenda and a pattern.

The Washington-based American Enterprise Institute is considered to be the unofficial headquarters of the neo-cons. Writing in the July 2003 issue of the AEI National Security Outlook, just a few months after U.S. troops had landed in Iraq, Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk spoke of U.S. military missions being transformed into a ‘global cavalry’ that would need a radical overhaul of America’s overseas force structure and creation of a worldwide network of frontier forts as well as a system of frontier stockades “necessary to win a long-term struggle against an amorphous enemy across the arc of instability.” This arc of instability extends from Morocco to the Philippines inclusive of Eurasia which is predominantly Muslim in the peripheries of Russia and China with India and Israel stuck in the middle.

As the U.S. readies for the battles of the 21st century, India must not ignore the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China and the relevance of Iran. It must manage its relations with all these powers. It needs to therefore pause and think about ways of smoothening the wrinkles in the nuclear deal. If the sense of the House is that there are reservations about the deal then the party in power must address them adequately, in keeping with the convention that India’s foreign policy is pursued through consensus. It should not be construed to be the handiwork of a tyranny of a minority in a minority.

Source : Hindu, 5th Sepetmber 2007

Caught in the middle

China is encircling India by reaching out to our neighbours

At the last G-8 Summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to China as India’s greatest neighbour. There is no disputing this observation but if any one expected the Chinese to reciprocate this with something remotely similar they were disappointed. The Chinese media did not even refer to the meeting between the two leaders. In keeping with the Chinese view of their position in the world they accepted this statement as a factual narration.

An insight of how the Chinese let slip their view of India in their scheme of things is given by the official China handouts (China 2006) that are available in New Delhi. While describing their relations with major powers, the Chinese handout mentions China’s relations with the US, Russia, the EU and Japan. India is listed, en passant, in the portion "Other Asian countries".

We heaved a national sigh of relief when China stopped showing Sikkim as a separate entity on its maps. Yet, we say nothing when China mentions in its handouts that China has a boundary with India, Kashmir. In 1963 China and Pakistan ceded Shaksgam, a portion of Jammu and Kashmir territory in Pakistan’s occupation, to China. The agreement at that time said that this would be finally settled once the question of the status of Jammu and Kashmir is decided. Yet nowadays Chinese officials refer to this, sotto voce, as being a part of the Northern Areas. The implication is that the Northern Areas are a part of Pakistan and not part of Jammu and Kashmir. And, periodically the issues of Arunachal Pradesh and settled areas, figure in the China-India discourse while the boundary talks drag on.

Meanwhile, the two leaderships speak of cooperation not confrontation. India speaks of there being enough space for the two to grow, China speaks of its harmonious rise while seeking containment through engagement. In search of an assured energy supply and safe routes so essential for its 10 per cent annual economic growth and regime stability, China has been working on securing its interests around the Indian Ocean littoral. Strategists have begun to refer to this as a ‘string of pearls’ which has an air of innocence and desirable about it. Indian strategists, however, have woken up to the realisation that an iron necklace was being cast around the Indian neck.

Unable to protect sea-lanes because of an inadequate navy, the Chinese needed alternative routes for energy supplies. Chinese assistance for the development of Gwadar, close to the vital Straits of Hormuz and located on Pakistan’s Balochistan coast, began at a feverish pace in 2002. The port will have an exclusive SEZ for China and will eventually be linked through Khunjerab Pass to Kashgar with a network of roads, rail links and gas pipelines. Kashgar is linked to Xigatse, which will soon have a rail link with Lhasa. The road continues to run parallel to the Sino-Indian border and then south to Kunming from where a network of river, rail and road links lead to Sittwe in Western Myanmar and Thilawa near Rangoon on the Bay of Bengal. These will be the entry points for energy supplies to China avoiding the Straits of Malacca. In the 20th century, Xinjiang was the New Territory and Tibet was the New Treasure. In the 21st century, Pakistan is the New Territory and Myanmar is the New Treasure. In addition, China has offered assistance for development of Hambantota harbour in southern Sri Lanka. None of this is India specific by design but India’s encirclement will be complete and India’s influence restricted to its national boundaries. In recent years, Chinese leaders have made several statements in their internal deliberations that indicate their worries. Commenting on China’s periphery after September 11, 2001, Hu Jintao said that the US had strengthened its military positions in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthened its alliance with Japan and strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam and established a pro-American regime in Afghanistan. He also referred to the extended outposts — possibly referring to the 737 (some calculate this may be 1,000) military bases around the globe — and that America had placed pressure points on China’s east, west and south. Premier Wen Jiabao also predicted that US military focus would shift from Europe to Asia-Pacific.

China has other ambitions although but will not challenge the US directly in the foreseeable future. It sees the US stuck in a strategic stalemate in Iraq which, for a superpower is really a strategic defeat, and sees this as an opportunity to move in to a perceived vacuum in the Eurasian region. Apart from the various energy tie-ups that Beijing has worked out with Kazakhstan, Russia and other Central Asian states, it will now build 12 new highways connecting Xinjiang to major Central Asian cities. When completed by 2010, these roads will connect Urumqi with Tashkent, Mashad in Iran and Istanbul to reach Europe eventually. China would like to position itself, not as a successor but possibly as an eventual competitor just as it has endeavoured to ease out the US from various arrangements in South East Asia.

It is in this context that the association of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation led by China with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation led by Russia assumes significance. Both Russia and China participated in week long joint military exercises in Siberia that ended on August 17 and were watched by leaders of all the participating SCO countries. Peace Mission-I would bring SCO and CSTO closer. Many view this as the Russian and Chinese response to the eastward expansion of Nato into Asia. Paradoxically, while the two powers worry about the presence of the US in Eurasia and West Asia, they also fear that should the Americans go away from Afghanistan, instability may spread to Russia’s periphery in Central Asia and China.

The high-voltage stability of the bipolar world has now been replaced by the uncertainty of evolving multi-linear multi-polarities with the US still the primary power. Inter-state relations are now going to be more carefully calibrated and sophisticated with no clearly demarcated power blocs operating. Various triangulations are being configured, many of which exclude the US. Russia, India and China have been talking to each other trilaterally and Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin referred to India during their recent meeting in Moscow. There could even be an Iran, Russia and China arrangement that effectively bottles up the energy rich Eurasian region or there could be a Russia, Iran and India arrangement.

At the same time, no country, including India, China and Russia would want to jeopardise its relationship with the US for the sake of its new partners. Indians surely understand that China and the US will not sacrifice their relationship with each other for India’s sake.

India’s relationship with the US is still evolving with several agreements having been worked out. A strategic partnership between the two will mostly be one-sided with the US far too powerful and India somewhat wary of being either overwhelmed or becoming an appendage. Since common ideals do not necessarily assure common adversaries, India will continue to look at Iran and Myanmar from its own geo-strategic perspective, just as the US has its perspective on Pakistan. India did not have to make a choice during the Cold War but in this age of multi-polarity, it might have to do so as the battle ground shifts from Europe to closer home.

Source : Hindustan Times, 5th Sep 2007