A policy of denial and defiance

 

What is with Pakistan’s rulers? Have they made their state a state in denial or are they themselves in a state of denial? It was both interesting and disturbing to see speakers from Pakistan coming on Indian TV channels with only one slogan: Deny and Defy.

It was like playing one of those class 5 school cricket matches where the umpire was from the batting side. Instructions to him used to be that LBW was not out. A snick behind the stumps or a run out, could be a maybe; acceptable when there were no alternatives left. That is how the debate has been childishly denying wrongdoing, being petulant and insensitive, blaming the victim and then threatening with continued misbehaviour.

There was a time when many nostalgic Indians romanced about a Greater India. That romance evaporated long ago, no one thinks about this any more. The reality is that we are now two different nations on two different trajectories. Let us stay that way, happy or otherwise but reconciled to be being good, if not cordial, neighbours. Surely this should be attainable.

Pakistani Rangers and IBSF personnel perform the ‘flag-off’ ceremony at the Wagah Border Post on Jan 15, after the desecration of an Indian jawan’s body by Pak soldiers

There are however two main problems that negate this hope. One is the typical response to the Indian assertion that Pakistan harbours persons like Hafiz Saeed and Abdur Rehman Makki for terrorism against India is that there would be a thousand Hafiz Saeeds and Makkis if the Kashmir issue is not ‘settled’. Translated, this means that the Pakistan state will continue to nurture, train, equip and send these jehadis into Kashmir and this justifies the killing of innocent citizens and non-combatants. Pakistan cannot hold this threat of use of terrorists against India, say that these terrorists are not under the control of the state and then talk of peace.

The second issue is the core. The biggest threat that Pakistan’s ruling class fears to its own existence is not just the strength of the Indian armed forces or India’s growing economic clout. The main threat is that the Indian Muslim feels much safer in India than the Muslim in Pakistan. This negates the Two-Nation Theory and successive Pakistani rulers, especially from the armed forces who fancy that they are the guardians of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers, have been unable to reconcile themselves to this reality. More Muslims have been killed by Muslims in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world in the last 65 years.

Negotiations between sovereign nations can be long and arduous especially between countries such as India and Pakistan given their troubled history. This does not mean that Pakistan has the liberty to periodically target jehadi terrorism at India and expect to get away with it forever. Patience is running out particularly after the Mumbai Terror of November, 2008. Retaliation by India is now demanded by the people as a sovereign right. This is NOT escalation. It would be escalation if Pakistan were to respond to India’s legitimate retaliation with further violence.

Pakistan’s rulers will give up almost everything and endanger their own country but will not give up belligerence and animosity towards India. India’s rulers will give up everything including their credibility but will not give up acquiescence and appeasement. The tragedy of our region is that both will change only when it is too late.

Successive Indian Prime Ministers have tried to walk down the path of peace but Pakistani roadblocks have simply changed location. It is therefore time to try something different because the alternative to peace does not necessarily have to mean total war nor the response to belligerence have to be surrender. Preaching peace from the pulpit cannot be an end in itself.

Neither India nor Pakistan can relocate but India’s options are getting limited and if Pakistan really wants to move forward it cannot keep jumping back to 1947. Besides, in their paranoia, many Pakistanis give themselves too much credit when they say that we covet their territory. There is no such desire in India. Instead, the goal has to be interests and security of the nation and not sweet nothings. India can live without trade with Pakistan, without MFN status and without transit rights to Afghanistan.

The usual discourse that India must help strengthen democratic forces in Pakistan makes good after dinner conversation but is misplaced. Only Pakistanis can do this for themselves; maybe a process has begun and India should simply wait for this to happen.
 

This appeared in the Midday, Mumbai on January 24, 2013

Pakistan -US relations in a trough , but only for now

Towards the end of his last State of the Union address on January 24 President Obama said "One of my proudest possessions is the flag that the Seal Team took with them on the mission to get Bin Laden. On it are each of their names." This was viewed quite differently in Pakistan where the attack that killed Osama bin Laden took place a few miles away from the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul.

In fact, all of 2011 has been marked by incidents that have pushed US-Pakistan relations into an ever deepening trough.

The year started on a tense note when Raymond Davis, a former US Army soldier but employed in Pakistan with a private contractor and also with CIA, shot dead two supposedly unarmed men and one more died in January. This led to a furore that refused to die away despite interventions even by President Obama. Eventually Davis was released and flew home on March 16 after payment of US $ 2.4 million as blood money (diyya).

One day after Davis' release US resumed its drone attacks and 40 persons died in this attack in Datta Khel North Waziristan. This was on March 17. The Pakistan Army Chief, Gen Pervez Kayani reacted very strongly describing this action as intolerable and unjustified. More retaliations were to follow. In April 2011 Pakistan suspended supplies for three days through Pakistan for NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The US announcement on May 2 that Osama bin Laden had been killed in Abbottabad and that US had not been informed of OBL's whereabouts brought forward a multitude of reactions. The Pak Army notably was embarrassed, the civilian government showed its ineptitude and lack of control on the State, while the right wing was up in arms with a new display of virulent anti-Americanism. Meanwhile the Doctor who had assisted the US to help find Osama was taken into custody by the Pakistani authorities for being in touch with foreign intelligence agencies.

The terrorist attack on PNS Mehran Karachi (May 26) which destroyed two US AWCs was a retaliation of US action that killed Osama bin Laden. This was a setback to US-Pak relations and another embarrassment for the Pak Army.

Probably reacting to Pakistani attitudes and belligerence, Admiral Mullen reacted on 2 June saying that there would be a substantial cut in US forces in Pakistan followed by the US announcement on July 10 about the suspension, of military aid worth US $ 800 million.

September 11 - there was a massive truck bomb explosion on the outskirts of Kabul that injured 77 US soldiers and killed five Afghans. Two days later the US Embassy and NATO were both attacked by Taliban insurgents. Seven persons died along with 19 injured. This attack as a show of strength against the symbols of US and NATO power. On September 22, one week before he was to demit office, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff accused Pakistan of supporting Haqqani Network militant group in Afghanistan; from its bases in Pakistan. As expected Pakistan denied this.

In October, the by now famous or notorious Memogate that cost Pakistan Ambassador Haqqani his job in Washington surfaced, thanks to leaks by a US citizen of Pakistani origin, Mansoor Ijaz. The memo was supposed to have been delivered to Admiral Mullen earlier in May General Pasha the ISI chief had specially flown to London for a secret rendezvous with Ijaz and it appeared that there was an intelligence overhang to this.

At least 24 Pakistan troops killed when NATO forces fire over the border hitting an army check post in on November 26 in the Mohmand agency of FATA. In retaliation, General Kayani ordered that intruding drones be shot down and asked the US forces to vacate the Shamsi drone base in Balochistan, within a fortnight.

All this had left the Pakistan Army badly bruised. Its ego had been hit and it needed to take an apparently strident position against an increasingly impatient and even imperious US. In the US there were increasing signs of a re-evaluation of its relations with Pakistan with several think tanks discussing the best way of Pakistan and predicting a dismal future. But if one asks whether this will mark a permanent breach in relations between the two countries, then the answer has to be, No.

Over the years, obsessed with India and the desire to seek equality with India, Pakistan's leaders had perfected the art of handling the US, preserving and furthering its core interests, essentially by using the advantages that geography has provided. The Pakistan-US romance began in the tense years of the Cold War. Since then, though the ardour has cooled at times, it has renewed with fervour periodically.

While Pakistan has been consistently useful to the US in the protection of its global interests, the US has not minded if Pakistan occasionally had pot shots at its pro-Soviet neighbour. US and British diplomats and emissaries went out of their way in the 1960s to push India to a deal with Pakistan on Kashmir that was designed to favour its ally.

In the 1970s there was US anger during the 1971 war and again after the 1974 nuclear test without understanding Indian interests. The 1980s were the years of the Afghan jihad, during which period the US President repeatedly certified to Congress that Pakistan was not making the nuclear bomb. The 1990s were essentially Clinton years a period of indifference as far as the Americans were concerned while Pakistan had got its nuclear black market well organised.

Post Kargil, Pakistan was in trouble but only till September 11, 2001. Thereafter, once again, as in the case, recent sins were forgiven and Pakistan quickly became a stalwart ally of the allies. The relationship is at present at its lowest ebb in many years. This may not last long simply because Pakistan too has many limitations and despite the present bravado cannot do without the US.

The latest leaked US military and NATO report that the Taliban backed by Pakistan was poised to take charge of Afghanistan once foreign forces withdraw has other aspects to it. It mentions that Pakistan was aware that senior Taliban representatives, like Nasiruddin Haqqani lived in the vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad. The report also adds that 27000 interrogations of more than 400 captured Taliban, Al Qaeda and other terrorists establishes a clear link between the ISI and the Taliban. This may be the first authoritative revelation.

Sooner or later, Pakistan will make moves to seek normalcy with the US. Pakistan has for decades boxed above its weight by trying to militarily (including sub-conventional jihadi options) take on a larger, stronger India with a greater depth, militarily, economically and geographically. During the Cold War the US was willing to underwrite this confrontation. These kind of military oriented regimes and romances survive only so long as there is military congruity between the two powers.
Post 2001 and post economic reforms in India this equation has changed between Washington and Islamabad and between Washington and New Delhi.

Today Pakistan's economy is in a mess and it has few friends who will be able to take on the burden, not even China. Saudi Arabia too may not provide gratis assistance.his time around, Pakistani Generals may have overplayed their hand. In the last year, the US has been able to reduce its dependence on Pakistan for logistic support to NATO that was routed through Pakistan. It has also seen Pakistani double dealing and intransigence with regard to the US-led War on Terror. This is happening, at a time when Pakistan's chief USP was its willingness and ability to assist the US effort. The blackmail has gone too far and this will have to stop but it is election year in the US. This means that the US too will need to accommodate some of Pakistan's positions.

In fact, drone attacks have resumed and these are early signs. The US Pakistan relationship may not have a great future and may remain an arrangement of convenience.

This was written for ANI New Delhi, 2nd february 2012

Pakistan- The drama begins to unfold (Amended)

Until the last weekend there was surreal theatre in Pakistan with shadows boxing each other. The main players in the developing political confrontation were Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan with Pervez Musharraf an incongruous joker in the pack as they all expected to be sworn in as Prime Minister. Imran used the bad metaphor of Tsunami and as it now turns out there is indeed a tsunami sweeping the body politic of Pakistan.

The fog has now lifted and the spotlight has moved away from politics and it now on in on President Zardari, PM Gilani, the Army and the Supreme Court. Both the main alleged conspirators of Memogate - Husain Haqqani was in hiding in the Prime Minister's House as he feared his life was threatened and later Ejaz Mansoor declined to come to Pakistan as he feared for his own security. Today the fog has lifted and it is clear that the confrontation is now head-to-head between the civilian government led by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and the PPP led by Asif Zardari against the almighty Army, the ISI and joined by the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry.

While the Supreme Court investigates the Memogate it is rather strange that the memo was allegedly written in May it surfaces only in October when Mansoor Ijaz wrote about it. The point is why was this talked of months after writing and why was it referred to at all. Since then relations between the Pak Army and the PPP government have nose dived.

Gilani's midweek statement that the Army chief General Kayani and DG ISI Shuja Pasha had violated the Constitution by sending their reply direct to the Supreme Court instead of routing it through 'competent authorities'. Interestingly, Gilani had said this to the Peoples' Daily Online at a time when Gen Kayani was visiting China. Gilani had obviously used remarks by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry that an act by a government functionary without approval from the government was unconstitutional. Gilani specifically named General Kayani and Lt Gen Pasha.

The Army responded after Kayani's return, through a statement by its public relations outfit, the ISPR, saying that the allegations by Gilani against the Kayani and Pasha had "very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country."

It has also been pointed out that the reply was routed through the Defence Secretary and the Attorney General. The PM retaliated by sacking the Defence Secretary Gen Khaled Naeem Lodhi - the man who had earlier said that the Army was not under civilian control. A civilian, Nargis Sethi who is also Cabinet Secretary and Gilani's confidante will hold additional charge.

The Army has also appointed Brigadier Sarfaraz Ali as the Brigade Commander of 111 Brigade, Rawalpindi - commonly known as the 'Coup Brigade'. The Army has called a meeting of its Principal Staff Officers - all Lt Generals - tomorrow to assess the situation.

This public spat is the one absorbing Pakistan now. Some TV channels have been portraying the Army's case saying that they had sacrificed lives for the nation, fought in FATA and so on and that t was an insult to the sipaah salaar to treat him in this manner. The battle lines have been drawn.

The question uppermost in everybody's mind is: will there be a coup. In the past received wisdom has been that in any confrontation between the Army and the civilians the Army has won. The Supreme Court had earlier declared both PM Gilani and President Zardari as dishonest as it criticised the government's refusal to write to Swiss authorities in the alleged multi-million dollar money laundering case against Zardari.

The Supreme Court may not approve of or acquiesce to a military coup although some say that the Court's pursuit of the Zardari case and its enquiry into Memogate could lead to a judicial coup.

Gilani has been talking to other political parties about early elections; the PPP hopes to gain majority in the Senate and then agree to call for elections. This will happen after March but the crisis is here and now.

In an effort to undercut support to Imran Khan through persons like Shah Mahmood Qureshi who jumped off the PPP bandwagon after he was sacked as Foreign Minister, from Multan, Gilani has been talking about a new province, Seraiki in southern Punjab and also to assist his son who plans to contest from the seat vacated by Qureshi.

In a recent interview with GeoTV President Zardari also asserted that he was not going anywhere but then that is what all politicians say. There was a touch of defiance when asked about Kayani's absence at a Presidential dinner, Zardari said he did not care.

The props for a coup are in place but will it happen? In the past Pakistan has had to face US anger and sanctions following a coup, but circumstances have evolved in the past that converted Pakistan into a stalwart ally. The crisis this time has come at an awkward time for the US as President Obama gets into fighting re-election, needs to keep Afghanistan quiet as he pulls out.

Therefore events in Pakistan are unnecessary distraction for President Obama because a coup will bring in Congressional sanctions at a time when Pakistan is financially and economically broke and the US needs Pak Army's cooperation. Even Pakistan's chosen friends in the Arab world have declined to extend loans to help Pakistan tide over its financial problems.

In this case the US would secretly back the Army despite all the ill feeling in recent weeks while publicly supporting the civilian government. Probably the US would prefer that the PPP government be sacrificed in an early election, something the Army would appreciate and all is well with the world. There would have to be a backroom deal and one would watch out for visits to Qatar.

Attn: News Editors/News Desks: The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr.Vikram Sood, former Secretary R and AW. (ANI)

Manipulations and deals

It was in 1988 that a Pakistani dictator had to die before the country could have another chance at democracy.

Nearly twenty years later, another dictator had to be thrown out before the people of Pakistan could hope for another shot at democracy. Then, as now, these hopes seem to have been belied.
Then, as now, the Army rules supreme, by remote control most of the time, by manipulation at other times or by revealing its hand when necessary. The doctrine of necessity has been a wonderfully useful and abiding doctrine for the Pak Army. Today we have the President of Pakistan pitted against his Army Chief.

What is happening today in Pakistan borders on the bizarre? It hovers between a Greek tragedy and a march of folly where the protagonists know they are moving towards an abyss but are unable to stop themselves. A letter which is believed to be the handiwork of a maverick and a loose cannon and which any responsible leadership would have scoffed at has become the cause celebre.

The Pak Army, paranoid about most issues, has taken upon itself to convert this letter episode into a national security issue and challenge the civilian government for trying to keep the Army under control. The civilian government of Prime Minister Reza Shah Gilani has taken upon itself rather bravely to challenge the Army's supremacy.

PPP and Pak Army relations were strained ever since the time Z A Bhutto walked out on Field Marshall Ayub Khan in 1966 and formed the PPP. Bhutto's hanging by Zia set the seal on a frosty, mutually suspicious and hostile relationship between the Army and the PPP.
This hostility saw the Army's unsuccessful endeavour to prevent BB from attaining power in 1988. Nawaz Sharif was the Army's candidate then and this is the game the Army has played consistently since then. Having failed in preventing her election, it succeeded in overthrowing BB twice. This is being re- enacted again today.

'They' assassinated Benazir on December 27 and four years down the line the world still does not know who 'they' were and it seems, never will. Asif Ali Zardari who had inherited the PPP throne on behalf of his son Bilawal, installed Hussain Haqqani, an Army-hater and a Benazir acolyte as Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington DC. This was a bit in your face kind of thing although he did try to assuage the Army's feelings by giving both Gen Kayani and Gen Pasha three year extensions.

The political opportunism of Nawaz Sharif got the better of him when he failed to see the signals that the Army was playing one major party against the other. Instead of closing ranks with the PPP and with only the March Senate elections in mind, Nawaz Sharif thought he would go for the PPP jugular and filed a petition in the Supreme Court on the Memogate scandal. Maybe this was the result of some secret talks that PML(N)'s leadership believed to have had with a brigadier of the Intelligence. It is well known that the Supreme Court led by the Chief Justice Ifthikar Choudhry is not well disposed towards Asif Zardari.

Imran Khan is the new hope of many and who see him as the man who will save Pakistan. Other political fortune hunters have also begun to jump ship and members of the PPP and the PML(N) as well as die hard right wingers have sworn allegiance to Imran's Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf. If his latest rally in Karachi on December 25 is anything to go by, then the PPP and the PML(N) have something to worry about and the Army would begin to feel smug.

Earlier on December 18, the so-called Difa e Pakistan (Defence of Pakistan Council) rally in Lahore must have sent shivers down the spine of Pakistan's major political parties and the democratic forces. About 40-odd Islamist and jihadist parties had got together under the banner of Difa e Pakistan which was actually a show of force by the Jamaat ut Dawa (the cradle to which the Lashkar e Tayyaba belongs) threatened the US and NATO and India with jihad (with special reference to violent jihad in Kashmir) as that was an obligation upon all Muslims, that that there was no question of MFN status for India. This combination is presented both as a terrible alternative to Tehrik Insaf and a reworked version of either the IJI of Nawaz Sharif time or the MMA of Musharraf's time.

Everyone knows that the JuD is only a proxy for the military in Pakistan. And we still hear comments that the Pakistan military is on board for a more normal relationship with India. Or we take solace in the fact that the US is Pakistan's enemy number one, almost as if we are grateful to be let off the hook.

The Pakistan military has been having problems in 2010 mostly connected with the war on Terror. The US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May, the terrorist attack on PNS Mehran in Karachi a few days later and the Mohmand attack in November by NATO forces that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers only heightened the image that the Army was incapable of performing its primary role - the defence of the nation. The image of the Army has to be refurbished once again. The PPP has to be finished forever through what is now called a soft quasi judicial coup that would bring in the likes of Imran Khan centre stage with the Army controlling events backstage.

And Islamabad must have a more amenable person leading the civilian government who is also acceptable in the West.

This may be part of a typical sand model exercise of the Army but there is nothing in politics that works according to sand models. (ANI)

Source: ANI , 27th December 2011, The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood

Pak is China's low hedge against India

It was a very perturbed Sardar Patel who wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on November 7, 1950, pointing out that by our silence at the UN we had accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.


In a forceful letter, the Sardar, not a man to mince words, warned that "The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention" but in fact "it is not a friend speaking in that language, but a potential enemy."


He then detailed ten steps that needed to be considered to strengthen our internal border security and defences, especially in the north-east. The tragedy is that this letter was apparently never discussed. Till 1950, India had borders with Tibet not with China and by accepting China's suzerainty we became direct neighbours. Also, this concession in effect gave China a border with Bhutan, Nepal, India and Pak-Occupied- Kashmir. China now had the potential to be a player in South Asia.

Forging selfish ties: China is using Pakistan as a stepping stone for
regional dominance and not as an end in itself

Mao's China was turbulent. The Korean War was followed by the disastrous experiments of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The revolt in Tibet in March 1959 leading to the Dalai Lama's flight to India added to China's paranoia. The Chinese thought it necessary to warn India through its Ambassador Pan Tzu-li in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru in May 1959, saying that China would make common cause with Pakistan. This would force India to face diplomatic and military pressure on two fronts. Therein lay the beginning of an all-weather affair that is deeper than the oceans and higher than the mountains.


1962 and 1965 were landmark years when India was involved in conflicts with both her neighbours. This provided an opportunity for Pakistan to get closer to China and the two have remained locked in a warm usually unquestioned embrace. For China, becoming Pakistan's largest arms supplier to match Indian acquisitions ” conventional, delivery systems and nuclear weaponry was a convenient hedge against India, and Pakistan thus strengthened by American indulgence and Chinese connivance felt emboldened to hone its assistance to terrorists as a low cost, highly effective foreign policy option.


Revived by Deng Xiaoping's four modernisations, China has used Pakistan's hostility towards India as a bridge for accessing West Asia not just as a counter to the US. It seeks geostrategic space and the rich mineral deposits of oil and gas, copper, gold, zinc, lead, iron-ore and aluminium in these countries including Afghanistan and Central Asia. There have been reports of a Saudi-Pakistan-China tie up on nuclear issues as well.


A Chinese official once told US officials that Pakistan was China's Israel. Pakistanis see China as an assured guarantor against India. The Deep State of Pakistan ” run by its military-jihadi combine, has to realise that the hard state of China is using Pakistan as a stepping stone for regional dominance and not as an end in itself.


Chinese ambitions extend beyond using Pakistan as a low cost secondary deterrent to counter India. Ayesha Siddiqa, one of Pakistan's better known analysts, makes a very valid observation when she says that China is an 'empire by stealth' which is "growing steadily without necessarily taking on the socio-political or economic liabilities of its client states." China will invest only in the extractive industries of Pakistan not in the country's development.


Gwadar on the Makran coast has significance and importance for China only if it has unimpeded access through Gilgit and Baltistan. There has been increased Chinese presence and activity in this region. The additional manpower is ostensibly meant for the several infrastructure projects in Gilgit-Baltistan.


Over time, as India has progressed, China's stance has hardened. It has played up issues ” like paper visas to residents of J&K or not granting visa to the Northern Army Commander and continued intrusions into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. It has continued with its concerted attempts to keep both Myanmar and Pakistan under its influence to cover both Indian flanks.


Had India heeded Sardar Patel's advice in 1950 we would not perhaps been in this state of feeling surrounded by China in our backyard and the prospect today that Pakistan could become China's Somalia instead of its Israel is no consolation to India.


Source : Mid-Day , 22nd December 2011

Pakistan : Life After Mohmand

When 9/11 happened, the Americans were livid and they descended on Islamabad, Rambo style, threatening General Musharraf with the famous "either you are with us or against us" threat.
Musharraf quickly acquiesced at that time, but played the game for the long haul.
Soon he had beguiled the Americans to airlift stranded Pakistani soldiers and ISI personnel in different parts of Afghanistan but chiefly from Kunduz, Northern Afghanistan. These Pakistanis were assisting the Taliban in final assault on Ahmed Shah Massoud's Tajik fighters of the Northern Alliance.

Musharraf's Pakistan became America's stalwart ally and a major non-NATO ally. The Americans poured in money and goodies for their newfound friend. But soon enough, the friendship began to sour. The U.S., unable to get a hold of Osama Bin Laden, also got diverted to Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre went backstage.

Over time, when the Americans returned, matters only became worse. Pakistan had consolidated with the Taliban in its quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan.

It was apparent to all that Pakistan remained duplicitous, although the U.S. went through its customary denial as it followed a policy of public approbation of the ally while there might have been private reprimand.

The strategic interests of the two countries were totally divergent and it was going to be a matter of time before the rupture became fairly open.

On the one hand, Pakistan saw U.S. engagement in the region as being guided by its 'selfish' interests of Afghanistan and terrorism, and suspected that the Americans have been chasing Pakistan's nuclear 'assets'.

On the other hand, Pakistan was equally selfish when it saw this engagement as an opportunity once again, for tackling only its primary enemy, India.

The last decade was symptomatic of a mutually suspicious, exasperating and hostile relationship where Pakistan consistently double-crossed its benefactor, the United States, and maintained a duality in its relations with the various terrorist factions on its soil and in Afghanistan.

Relations nose dived on May 2 this year after the heli-borne U.S. Navy Seals attacked Osama bin Laden's well protected hideout in Abbottabad, close to Pakistan's premier military training academy, Kakul. Osama was killed in the attack and quickly buried at sea, hundreds of miles away.

The attack left the Pakistan Army, which was barely recovering from the vicious and violent onslaught of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan in the heartland of the Punjab, looking silly and helpless. There was anger that the U.S. had cheated Pakistan by not trusting Pakistan about this attack on its soil. There was double embarrassment that Pakistan was caught out hiding the world's most wanted terrorist with red faces at the GHQ in Rawalpindi that the much vaunted Pakistan Army had been caught napping.

A frustrated and angry Pakistan Army reacted by arresting the doctor who was suspected of having given the information about Osama to the Americans, the TTP fundamentalists reacted by attacking the PNS Mehran Naval base and destroying two of the navy's PC-3 Orion aircraft.
The mutual bickering continued and many Americans were convinced after the OBL incident that Pakistan was consistently double crossing them.

Perhaps at this stage, sometime after May 2011, a decision was taken that the U.S. was on its own and that Pakistan was not a reliable partner.

The extent of duplicity is measured by the fact that Pakistan was using American money to arm terrorists and target US/NATO positions through the Haqqani Networks and sheltering the Afghan Shura, while allowing the use of Pakistan territory at the Shamsi air base to target terrorists - but only those that Pakistan thought were expendable.

The attack, about a mile inside the Mohmand Agency on Pakistan Army positions on November 26 that killed 28 Pak army soldiers, was partly a result of this exasperation in Washington D.C.
There were reports and complaints that in the past six months, Pakistan military positions had been shelling Afghan positions from Mohmand, Dir and Chitral. The targets were in Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, and according to reports, the shelling between May and August had killed 42 Afghans and wounded 48 others.

Afghan officials also claimed in mid-October that between September 1 and October 17, there were eight cross border incidents from Mohmand into Kunar.

Besides, the NATO/US dependence on Pakistani territory for logistic supplies to their forces in Afghanistan, has reduced over the last few months. Estimated to be down to about 30 percent, the calculation might have been that the possible reaction by Pakistan of closing the crossings from Khyber and Chaman, was a manageable risk.

The reaction from Pakistan has been predictable. The killing of OBL, the attack on the Mehran naval base, and now the attack in Mohmand has grossly undermined the image of the armed forces. There was anger in the rank and file of the Army, causing some concern to General Kayani, who had barely succeeded in restoring morale after the incidents in NWFP and Punjab.
The anger on the street probably forced Islamabad to ask the U.S. to vacate the Shamsi air base in Balochistan, close the border for NATO supplies, approach the UNSC and decided to stay away from the forthcoming Bonn conference on Afghanistan.

The other anger was among the Islamic extremists and, there have been reports of an attempted assassination last Tuesday of a very senior ISI official close to its headquarters in Aabpara, Islamabad.

Official angry responses at the violation of Pakistan sovereignty sits strangely on an administration that has violated these principles on both its neighbours for decades. The excessive display of response is partly for domestic consumption, to cover its own acts in the past and at being caught out as somewhat incompetent to defend the country.

The Muslim world is far too involved at this moment with its own problems to pay much attention to events in Pakistan.

Similarly, Europe is embroiled in an economic crisis and wants to vacate Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Apart from a proforma show of support from China, there would also be concern in Beijing about the growing instability in Pakistan while deteriorating U.S.-Pakistan relations would increase Pakistani dependence on China and the eventual thinning down of US presence in the region would leave a vacuum in South Asia. Given these future changes, China may eventually face a more difficult decision regarding how best to manage relations with Pakistan in order to ensure domestic and regional stability. The question is how.

In America, a survey conducted one day after the Mohmand attack, showed that 55 percent of those polled considered Pakistan as the enemy, and only seven percent considered it a friend. More Republicans (70 percent ) as compared to Democrats (47 percent) considered Pakistan is the enemy.

No wonder Pakistan watcher Bruce Riedel called his book on Pakistan the "Deadly Embrace"; this explains the idiom of the US-Pakistan relationship.

We ourselves are far too involved in our domestic crises to pay any great attention to Pakistan and, the danger for us is, a reaction by thinking out of the box in an absent minded sort of way. It must be lonely out there in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, but histrionics and bravado apart, there is not very much Pakistan can do for its economic survival today without U.S. benevolence.
It is difficult to believe that the NATO attack was an error or that NATO was misled by conniving Afghanis to settle old scores with the Pakistanis. Given the background of repeated attacks into Afghanistan after the May 2 killing of OBL, this was more likely to have been a punitive raid.

It is also likely that this will be ultimately shown as a mistake to provide a fig leaf for restoration of relations. Pakistan now wants a written agreement with guarantees about further co-operation with leaked suggestions that without this Pakistan would pull out of the war on terror, implying also pulling back troops from the western border.

Ultimately, a solution will have to be found and most likely, it will be blood money, a la Raymond Davis, although it will be couched in grand diplomatese. Latest statements from the Pentagon say that this was not a deliberate attack without indicating how the attack took place.

In the immediate short term, India will have to decide its role at the Bonn conference that Pakistan plans to boycott despite pleas from the U.S., Afghanistan and Germany.

It is true that without Pakistan, the Bonn conference will be stultified; at the same time, Pakistan would be reluctant to let India have a field day in Bonn.

Most probably, the West, anxious to have an early settlement and exit, would not still want India to run away with an agenda that does not suit them or Pakistan.

The U.S. wants a higher strategic relationship with India, which does not include agreeing with Indian views on Pakistan.

Our participation in the Bonn conference should bear this in mind.

Whatever happens on Pakistan's western front, nothing is expected to change for India on our border with Pakistan.

The estimated 2500 terrorists that Indian intelligence agencies say are waiting to cross over to India is an indication of the 'war preparedness' in Pakistan.

India is yet to receive voice samples of those who carried out Mumbai 26/11 three years ago.
The attitude of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, more than the speeches of politicians and diplomats, along with the protective attitude of the regime towards these groups, are true barometers of the attitude of the powerful Pakistan Army toward India.

Source : ANI , 2nd December 2011

Pakistan-Intrigues ,Manoeuvres , Aspirations and Turbulence : Memogate -Who Dunnit and Why

The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. But not in Pakistan, where things evolve in a convoluted and conspiratorial fashion. The replacement of Pakistan’s Ambassador Hussain Haqqani was not through a direct Prime Ministerial order but intrigue through a memo supposedly written by or on behalf of the country’s political leadership to American leadership seeking protection against its own Army and then leaked to seek the removal of those seeking assistance.

Here was a man representing his country’s sovereignty arraigned publicly and equated with a con man known for his propensity to drop names and fabricate information. Nothing indicates the mind of the powers that be in Pakistan than this equation and the eagerness to condemn and punish Haqqani. Surely, Haqqani knew of and about Mansoor Ijaz. Besides, it is indeed very strange that Haqqani should need Ijaz to deliver such a sensitive message. In fact such a memo would not even exist. Discussions of this kind would be only oral.

The contents of the memo are also odd. Five of the six offers are about giving comfort to the US on terrorism; unavoidably, as this has become Pakistan’s identity and chief export. That bit about India and 26/11 Mumbai was odd but designed to convince the Americans that they were serious about changing policy. The received wisdom on this is that this memo is an elaborate and a clumsy fake.

An Army that had been reeling under multiple embarrassments after the Osama bin Laden killing in May needed a come back. Their constant refrain that they did not know the whereabouts of OBL, was exposed. They had been caught harbouring the world’s most wanted terrorist and their most valuable strategic bargaining chip with the Americans. The US trusted the Army even less, loud proclamations notwithstanding. They were shown as incompetent by one section of the population that believed in the creed of OBL and untrustworthy by the rest.
The truth is that the Pak Army has been stalking Husain Haqqani even before he became his country’s representative in DC. He had earned the Army’s permanent enmity after he wrote the book “Pakistan: between mosque and military” in 2005. His appointment as Ambassador in 2008 had left the Army seething. There was no likelihood of Zardari agreeing to remove Haqqani, especially when he was delivering in Washington. There had to be recourse to subterfuge.

In few countries does the Army sit in on judgement about the behaviour of the country’s diplomatic representatives. In the end the Army reasserted its pre-eminence because Haqqani has been replaced by another Benazir acolyte, Sherry Rehman considered to be close to the Army. The difference is that while Hussain Haqqani was an avowed Army-hater, his equally suave successor belongs to the elite of Pakistan which survives through traditionally clever arrangements with the Army. They criticise the Army to show their freedom and independence but that is restricted up to very carefully defined red-lines. For instance, the policy on India will be laid down by the Army; that on Afghanistan similarly defined by GHQ Rawalpindi, currently Pakistan’s real capital. For every crime there has to be a motive and one looks for the obvious gainers. In this case it is the Army of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Jinnah Institute of which Sherry Rehman was the Chairman till her recent appointment had prepared a report along with the United States Institute of Peace had been released in September this year. The report, titled ‘Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’ seems to reflect the Army’s point of view.

The report identifies identify three main objectives which the “elite” considered necessary in Afghanistan:

· Pakistan’s interests were best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan and that persistent instability in Afghanistan would have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.

Pakistan should seek a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation which would necessarily require the main Taliban factions – particularly Mullah Omar’s “Quetta Shura” Taliban and the Haqqani network – to be part of the new political arrangement. This implies that the Taliban and all Pushtun are interchangeable.

· There was need to restrict Indian presence to development activities and participate in Afghanistan’s economic progress and prosperity. The elite view is that the present Indian engagement was going beyond strictly development. Greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives was needed.

It is believed that Sherry Rehman’s endorses this report. The report is that of the Pakistan’s foreign policy elite. And the elite in Pakistan has always taken care to remain close to the Army for therein lies its security and prosperity.

POLITICAL FORTUNES
The Army having emerged stronger in the latest bout, political parties like the PML (N) and PTI are making the appropriate overtures unlike the PPP which is handicapped by its past animosities with the Army. The PML(N)’s uncomfortable and tenuous honeymoon is over, and sees this as an opportunity to gain ground at the expense of the PPP and also wishes to consolidate against the new player, the PTI of Imran Khan. For this it is necessary to prove loyalties to the strongest force in the country –the Army. Nawaz Sharif has filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking a probe into the memogate. This follows his demand in Faisalabad on November 20 for a judicial enquiry into the episode with other party stalwarts describing the government as Zardari mafia and Imran Khan as a pawn of the Army.

At this stage, should the Supreme Court decide to hasten the NRO case against Zardari, his government will be under threat. Beleaguered in this fashion, the PPP will have to rely more and more on the Army. At the same time, the Army probably sees its best chance to finish PP for good. Other politicians like Mian Azhar, have started to hedge and have joined Imran Khan. Maybe they sense a snap election. Political uncertainties of this kind only help strengthen the Army’s stranglehold. In all this infighting and the question of survival of some, relations with India will take a back seat. We should forget about issues like MFN that we have been so eager about and cosmetics apart, there is hardly any likelihood of new breakthroughs in the immediate future.

THE STRANGE CASE OF TALKS WITH THE TALIBAN

The case of the on-off talks between the Government and the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is getting curious and curiouser. The Pakistan Taliban declared on November 21 that the talks had commenced, the next day there were denials by the Pak Army; thereafter even the Taliban – or sections of the Taliban also announced that there were no ceasefire talks. To prove their point, they attacked a police station in Dera Ismail Khan killing an officer at dawn on November 22 whereas another Taliban leader had asserted that there was going to be a ceasefire in the South Waziristan area, to allow the month old talks to go ahead. The received wisdom is that there are factions within the TTP with senior leaders close to Hakimullah Mehsud asserting that Mehsud was in favour of a ceasefire. What however, seems to have upset all arrangements is an attempted suicide attack on a very senior ISI officer on Tuesday November 22 near the ISI headquarters in Abpara, Islamabad. Obviously there is a strong faction within the TTP that is opposed to the peace overtures.

There has been a decline in the TTP activities since 2007-08, suggesting a division within the TTP and possibly this has led the government to adopt a harder stance against them. Interior Minister also declared that talks with the TTP were possible only if they were to lay down their arms. The Pushtun does not lay down his arms even in peacetime; to expect him to do so now is being very optimistic.

Peace deals with the TTP have never endured in the past and there has also been a feeling in the government circles that the TTP uses these opportunities to regroup. This scepticism about the present state of affairs is not without substance. It would be extremely difficult to get all the groups to agree to a peace deal and once agreed how long such a deal would last. The future here, which would be the Pakistan government’s first priority on the insurgency front, remains uncertain.

Source : 29th November 2011, Published in DNA Mumbai via ANI News

Imran Khan- Just landed or has he just arrived

Gurgaon, Nov.3 (ANI): The speech (at least on YouTube) lasted about 50 minutes, the mood euphoric, the crowd was raucous at times and the slogans were the usual eulogies ‘Pakistan Zindabad and Imran Khan Zindabad’ almost in the same breath.

The Doyen, Founder and Leader of the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf Party, Imran Khan, perhaps got carried away by the response of the 100000 strong crowd (some say 200000), and said that the only other person who refused to beg was the Qaid-e-Azam that is, apart from Imran himself, he modestly announced.

Imran, the latest political kid on the block, had just elevated himself to new heights. Speaking to the noisy crowd at the Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore on October 30, Imran claimed that what he was starting was not a movement, but a Tsunami that would sweep away corrupt and ineffective leaders.

The question some ask is whether Imran had in fact arrived or had merely landed; meaning that he had a long way to travel. Would Imran be able to overcome the threat from the entrenched feudal lords who run political parties in Pakistan, win electoral battles for his party, something he has not done so far, become a force to reckon with leave alone running the government.

Imran’s attacks on President Asif Zardari and Mian Nawaz, the PML(N) leader, brought the strongest approval from the crowd; anti-Americanism was popular of course, but when he mentioned Kashmir (after several promptings) did not evoke the kind of response politicians in earlier times were able to elicit. It was the economy and the corruption and the hope for change that brought the loudest applause.

A good deal of the response is because of the follies of the other two major parties in Pakistan who matter in Punjab – the PML (N) and the PPP. The PPP is involved in protecting its leader Asif Zardari with cases of corruption pending against him along with several of his close confidantes and cronies, and bolstering the other heir apparent, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari.

The other party, which is in power in Lahore, the PML (N) run by the Sharif brothers like a private fief is also bereft of ideas beyond trying to overthrow the PPP-led government from Islamabad. Ever since democracy was restored, in a manner of speaking, in 1988 after the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq, the longevity of civilian governments has been limited to two or three years.

The only government that lasted more than this was the military government of Gen Musharraf. The present Zardari-Gilani combine is now in its third year. Going by the law of precedence, the grace period for the present regime has run out, the people of Pakistan have run out of patience and they want change.

The powers that be in Rawalpindi, the omnipotent Pakistan Army have their own demons to handle. The US is doing a good deal of heavy breathing while showing sign of getting closer to enemy India, the Chinese are strangely ambivalent on a number of issues despite loud proclamations by Pakistani leaders, the terrorists are running amuck and the assets of Pakistan – the Haqqanis of Waziristan and the Taliban of Quetta are also under the microscope.

The Baloch are restive and sectarian violence continues unabated with Shias the main targets of Sunni groups. Continued instability in Pakistan and an ineffective government, a crumbling economy offers very little hope. The prospect of a military takeover is unthinkable for the present military leadership. Therefore, the facade of a civilian government has to be preserved.

Imran Khan not considered a serious option until recently, is suddenly emerging as the new messiah. But is that really so? One rally does not necessarily translate into electoral victory. Imran Khan has not even reached southern Punjab and Lahore is no longer Punjab.

His party, the PTI, has no standing against the entrenched parties in Sindh – the MQM in the urban areas and the PPP in the rural areas. The party has no presence in Balochistan and is unlikely to make any headway there.


The PTI may be successful in the PakhtoonKhwa-Khyber province largely due to the ineptitude of MMA and the ANP. Even in the Punjab, neither the PPP nor the PML (N) can be considered as washouts although the party could gain in urban areas.
Imran Khan had a dual image. One of a westernised Oxford educated playboy abroad which makes him acceptable outside and the other of an Urdu speaking pro-Islamic politician speaking at home which makes him acceptable to domestic audiences.
He was known to be close to the Jamaat e Islami chief Qazi Hussein Ahmed, was in favour of Islamic laws like the Hudood and Blasphemy laws. Those who have read his autobiography, feel that his comments have been restrained. But this might be an attempt at an image makeover with the western audience that may be willing to accept a man close to the Islamic groupings so long as he promised stability in a turbulent region. It is Imran’s views expressed in Urdu to domestic audiences that will remain more relevant.

It is too early to say if Imran Khan will be able to make a dent in the political structure of Pakistan. One rally in Lahore does not make a Tsunami. To use the cricketing analogies that Imran used in his speech, Pakistan’s best known cricketing legend is batting on a sticky wicket. It is always possible that the forthcoming matches have been fixed elsewhere in Rawalpindi and Abpara to ensure a favourable result. (ANI)

Source : Yahoo News , 3rd November 2011 .

The Jihadi upper cut in Pakistan

The famous Pakistani bridge player, Zia Mahmood, in his engagingly written book “Bridge My Way” describes the perils of playing this card game in his native Pakistan in 1975. He wrote that a bridge club was opened in Lahore, but it lasted a week because that was how long it took for the religious groups of the area to have it closed. He adds that ‘simply visiting the club was nerve-racking with the constant worry that at any time violent neighbours might turn up with their own brand of eviction notice.’ And this was before General Zia ul Haq turned on the Islamic screws on the people. 35 years and more later, we hear of stories about Lahore’s growing Talibanisation when the woman curator of the city’s famous Nairang Gallery was harassed and assaulted by a senior police official for wearing improper clothes and describing the work of the Gallery as fahashi (vulgarity) during the rehearsal of a Bharatnatyam dance recital; the same moral brigade representative had earlier objected to a couple because they were sitting together. Those who tried to rescue the curator were beaten and when gallery owner’s son enquired about the incident, he was dragged away to the thana for being ‘hung upside down’. This cultural policing is a sign of what is clearly becoming the new ideology of Pakistan.

The assassination of Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer in January this year, by his own body guard because he opposed the Blasphemy Law is one part of the problem. All societies have such intolerant elements but what is worrying has been the reaction of the mullahs, the lawyers and even the state. There was reluctance to blame Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin, instead there was praise for his action. The state clearly indicated that it was not going to revise the Blasphemy Law. Perhaps it was not going to be able to revise or did not want to revise; one will never know.

Pakistan’s well-known political analyst and commentator, Dr Eqbal Ahmed had prophesied as far back as in 1998 in the Dawn newspaper (August 23,) that the costs of Islamabad’s Afghan policy— already unbearable in proliferation of guns, heroin and armed fanatics — would multiply in myriad ways. He had added that closeness with the Taliban would make these costs potentially catastrophic. Today, in this pursuit of strategic depth and seeking to avenge India for all the various imagined wrong doings, Pakistan’s rulers have become impervious to the logic of peace; only the logic of force is understood, inside Pakistan or in its neighbourood. Neither the Islam of the Taliban or the Lashkar e Tayyaba favours democracy; nor does the Pakistan Army.

Although Zia had been credited with the drive towards enforcing austere Islam, political leaders in Pakistan have also succumbed to pressure from religious forces or used religion for political ends. It might even be argued that had Zia or his successors been wiser they could have offered to wind down the jihad and its mujahideen, in return for largesse of all kinds from the Americans and the west, used it well and Pakistan today could have been a prosperous, strong and modernised state in the region, ahead of India perhaps. Instead the rulers retained the jihadi option and clichés of ‘a thousand year war’ and ‘we shall eat grass’ endured through successive governments that came after Zia

There was an inevitability of this process that the Pakistani rulers either did not see or refused to see; or worse, even encouraged this after sometime especially in India during the 1990s. . After years of close association with Islamic militancy either in Afghanistan or in India, Pak Army personnel were directly exposed to Islamic militancy and propaganda for an orthodox Islamic order for Pakistan. The important question today is how much and to what extent has the Pakistan Army been Islamicised and how has this affected the society or the elite which has always sided with the Army. In Pakistan the dilemma is that the society will have to see whether in the long term, the larger political battle is won by those who seek an Islamic theocratic state or by those who want a modern Islamic republic. True there are many brave and liberal thinkers and writers in Pakistan who see the dangers. Their writings appear in the English press frequently. But they also know that once a thinker crosses the rubicon, a fate similar to that of Daniel Pearl or Syed Saleem Shahzad is a strong possibility.

A society that teaches its young hatred for other religions and cultures, only suffocates and blinds them. This is the nature of the Pakistani state today. Those who wish to deal with Pakistan or need to deal with that country would do well to remember this. We cannot change this; only Pakistanis can, if they wish to. Indians just have to learn to deal with the reality.

The world does not stress on the Christianity of western countries while dealing with them. Similarly, one need not stress on Pakistan’s Islamic/Muslim character which is part of its two-nation theory and not India’s. Just deal with Pakistan as another country which would relieve us of having to constantly tailor our policies with our Muslims in mind. Our Muslims are as Indian as the rest of us with the same problems and aspirations and can no longer be treated as vote banks at election time.

Source : 12th September 2011

Karachi -Pakistan's lifeline or City of Death

In recent times while the world's attention was on events in FATA and North Waziristan, another brutal battle has been raging in Karachi, which is a microcosm of Pakistan, even if the soul they say, is in the Punjabi Lahore.

In one brutal two-day spell, 21 people were killed and several injured in the second week of January this year is a reflection of the ethnic suspicion and hatred.

Both the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP) despite being in coalition with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led government in Sindh blamed each other for this rise in the killings.

According to the Citizens' Police Liaison Committee, 1247 persons were killed in 2010 - the highest since 1995 while more than the 801 who were similarly killed in 2009. The latest spree would suggest that the current year could be equally violent and brutal unless the governments in Islamabad and Karachi show considerable resolve in trying to stop this mayhem.

Alarmed at the trend of violence and, in the context of the Salman Taseer killing, the Daily Times of Lahore carried a number of editorials and articles variously captioned "Bloodbath in Karachi, Ethnic Strife in Karachi, Pakistan's Beirut-Karachi, Karachi Operation."

So, did other English language papers. The reasons are obvious is that the 16 million megapolis has attracted countless refugees and job hunters from the rest of the country. Mostly homeless, these hopefuls live in their own ethnic ghettoes. One might rightly say that Karachi's problems of crime, law and order and unemployment are no different from those of other similar cities the world over. If the local mafia in Malegaon could murder a civil servant, then Karachi or Mumbai are only magnified versions of the same problem.

The issues in Karachi are far more complicated where ethnic, religious, sectarian interests clash violently and merge with business vendettas by the all-pervasive and powerful crime mafia. Extortion, kidnappings (more than 100 last year), narcotics and gun running are the chief specializations, quite often with political patronage.

Political parties have their own hit men who are known to take shelter in the UAE when the trail gets too hot. The MQM which control 17 of the 19 National Assembly seats from Karachi, fears that the influx of Pushtun from the NWFP and later also from FATA not only alters the ethnic mix of the city but a large number of the newer refugees are Talibanised. Karachi with an estimated 3.5 million Pushtun population is the largest Pushtun city in Pakistan.

Karachi contributes nearly 70 percent of the revenue to the central government and 25 percent of the GDP. In recent years US military has been sending 75 percent of its supplies for the Afghan theatre through Karachi, which includes 40 percent of its fuel requirements. Karachi is Pakistan's jugular and NATO's vital logistics link. Any disruption in Karachi, which is savage or unending, will have grave consequences up country and on the economy.

One of the main problems has been that Karachi, like the entire country, has been allowed to be highly weaponised - eight years ago the number of unlicensed arms was 18 million. This figure would have grown since then.

All political parties and sectarian groups depend upon heavily armed supporters, and these include not only the MQM and the ANP, but also the MQM (Haqiqi), Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam, Sunni Tehreek, along with other Baloch and Sindhi groups. Karachi has seen Sunni-Shia violence as well.

In areas far removed from the elegant and up market Clifton, MQM and ANP have marked out their territories; the former control places like Orangi, Korangi and Azizabad which are no -go areas for others, the ANP dominates Al Asif Square and Sohrab Goth. The MQM has three fears.

It is concerned about not only losing out to the growing Pushtun numbers but also to increasing Talibanisation; it was Karachi's Binori Masjid that was a major Taliban centre in the early days and remains so today. The hold of the Deobandhis and the Wahhabis has been growing in Karachi.

Further, their relations with the Sindhis who have always perceived the Mohajirs as interlopers have remained hostile even when MQM and PPP are in the same government.

It will take years of sustained effort to overcome this and to restore the writ of the state in parts of Karachi. A cash strapped country, more concerned with building its defence apparatus has allowed its infrastructure and socio-economic services to weaken to the extent that the Jamaat-ut-Dawa, the mother of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, is believed to have the best ambulance service in the country.

A dismal economic outlook for 2011 has been aggravated by the devastating floods of last year which had affected one-fifth of Pakistan and the number of people affected exceeded those affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, the Pak Occupied Kashmir earthquake of 2005 and the Haiti earthquake of 2010.

This has led to even more rapidly growing urbanisation causing further demographic and ethnic pressures on cities like Karachi and fertile ground for recruits to the Islamic parties. Karachi today is like a pressure cooker with a mal-functioning safety valve.

Pakistanis believe that the Americans use them periodically and then walk away. This time if they do, then the elite will be left to face the Islamic radicals who have the government cowering and unable to even amend the Blasphemy Law.

Given Pakistan's dependence on doles and a poor economic outlook for 2011, the main worry in Rawalpindi would be US disinterest in Pakistan after the draw down of forces in Afghanistan begins.

A decline in the handouts would further limit the ability of Islamabad to help Karachi. With the present turmoil in the Arab world, Pakistan will slip down further on the US radar. Stephen Cohen, the American scholar on South Asia described Pakistan, as a "house under water" in an interview on January 6, 2011 adding that "Except for its territory, which is strategically important, there is not much in Pakistan that is of benefit to anyone." That then is the state of play today. (ANI)


Source : Yahoo.com , 41st January 2011 ,The words expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood.
http://in.news.yahoo.com/karachi-pakistans-lifeline-city-death-20110130-211643-552.html

Pakistan Multiple Crises

Two to three years has been the average life span of elected governments in Pakistan ever since Z A Bhutto was PM from 1973 to 1977. His daughter Benazir alternated with her rival Nawaz Sharif from 1988 till 1999 when the Mian Sahib was overthrown by yet another saviour in Khaki, General Pervez Musharraf. And both former Prime Ministers were forced into exile.

Thus, going by past precedents the present combine of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani would now seem to have run out of its allotted time. Several crises confront the PPP led government and there are no easy solutions, quite a few outside the range of the PPP leadership's capabilities to solve them.

The Commissar and the General

Apart from the ongoing turmoil in FATA and the tussle between the US and the Pak Army over North Waziristan is well known. An exasperated US administration finds itself unable to push the Pakistan Army led by Gen Kayani into launching operations in North Waziristan as it prepares for its draw down of forces later in the year. Each time the Americans press this issue or launch their drone attacks they slip in their popularity rating among the Pakistanis and each time Gen Kayani stonewalls he shines as a patriot.

The General has been driving a hard bargain with the Americans successfully as he silently strengthens his hold both on the system and the armed forces. Quite obviously, General Kayani has an agenda that goes beyond just refurbishing the image of the Army with generous assistance from the US. A professional Army does not need three year extensions in service to its Chief beyond the stipulated term unless the agenda is wider and political or ominously, even military and strategic.

Setting aside the economic crisis that engulfs Pakistan, there are two other crises that are brewing a political crisis in Islamabad and an ethnic-religious crisis in Karachi of grave dimensions that no one really wants to talk about.

A Political Crisis Unfolds

Zardari and Gilani are resigned to having to deal with an over bearing Army since this is the way of political life in Pakistan. But they have other disadvantages compared to their main political rival, Mian Nawaz Sharif and his PML (N) or even their ally the MQM led by Altaf Hussain both of who command personal loyalties and have strong cadre based parties.

Nawaz controls the Punjab, while Altaf controls Karachi. Gilani and Zardari are comparative lightweights in the PPP and do not command that kind of respect that these two do within their parties and people. Nawaz is a Punjabi, has close links with the Saudis and the Jamaat Islami, which has a following in the Pak Army. He himself has strong right wing religious leanings, which endears him to a section of the Army and the religious parties. Yes his attempts to manipulate the Army in the past despite being originally a protigi of the Army, and his religious leanings would make him unacceptable to the Army and the US.

In a free and fair election, Nawaz could possibly sweep Punjab and he who wins Punjab rules Pakistan. This is possibly Kayani's threat to the Americans at this juncture a few months before they plan their pull out. In the present crisis, perhaps Nawaz himself would not want to take over the reins of office so it suits him to see the government further weakened. He would rather wait it out unless an election is thrust upon him.

The MQM's Complaints

The MQM crisis is somewhat different. While the world's attention has been focused on the war in FATA against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the NWFP (Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa) ethnic and religious violence has been increasing alarmingly in Karachi. The MQM has for years complained and feared that the ingress of Pushtuns from the frontier many of whom are Talibanised would tilt the balance away from them while the activities of religious parties like the Deobandi parties like Lashkar e Jhangvi would further erode its hold in urban Sindh especially Karachi and Hyderabad. There is another complication in that politically the Mohajirs support the MQM, the Sindhis support the PPP and the Pushtun support the Awami National Party. The latter two invariably combine against the MQM.

Politically motivated targeted killings in Karachi have been increasing alarmingly. The Daily Times of Lahore reported that last year about 780 people were killed in ethnic, religious and political violence in Karachi which is similar to the suicide killings in the NWFP (797) and more than in the rest of the country (427). While the MQM may have its own political objectives in complaining to Gilani about the worsening law and order situation in Karachi the fact is that the metropolis has become a hot bed of rivalries between various competing and conflicting interests with strong overtones of a Talibanised culture and MQM fears it may have to cede ground to Wahhabi-Salafi beliefs brought in by more and more Pushtun leaving their homes for Karachi. Islamabad's failure to redress the MQM's complaints is the real reason for the threat of MQM to walk out although it is camouflaged in economic demands to bring in support from the Sindhis as well. To make matters worse for the MQM, its leaders have been trading insults with the PML (N) leadership. Consequently, the political situation looks very uncertain and the PPP looks extremely weak. And enter General Kayani centre stage?

The Assassination and the Islamic Fundamentalist Fervour

There is another development that could make the Army even more indispensible to the situation in today's Pakistan - the assassination of Salman Taseer the Punjab Governor and a close ally and friend of President Zardari, by one of his own guards for his opposition to Blasphemy Laws. It is not the first time that the religious right has resorted to punish those opposed to its creed. While Pakistan's liberal elite may mourn Taseer's death a wide section of the religious right has actually approved the killing.

The comments that were visible on Twitter and Facebook supporting the assassin were a chilling indicator of the direction Pakistan had taken in recent years. Killing for religion is frightening enough but the reaction that has been visible is even more frightening. The diktat by the Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan that no Muslim should attend Taseer's funeral sends a chill down every liberal spine.

The JASP is the largest body of the Barelvi group and considerate moderate in comparison to the Deobandhi-Wahhabi-Salafi Sunnis. Gen Zia's dream has become Pakistan's nightmare. The message to the liberal elite is - shut up and put up. The comment by the well known Pakistani commentator Cyril Almeida that, "Conservative forces are not just on a roll in Pakistan, they're pretty dominant. And liberal forces are not just on the back foot, but, really, they are extinguished," sums up the despondency and the gravity.

This is not the first time that a prominent Pakistani leader has been assassinated by suspected Islamic hardliners or attempts have been made. Benazir was killed by three years ago at the second attempt. They almost succeeded in killing Gen Musharraf in 2003 when he turned his back to the Taliban and some religious extremists in response to American demands. Then there were several attacks on the symbols of Pak power since September 11, 2001 including the Army and obviously the rot had set in but all this was swept away in the larger interest of preserving the peace and fighting the larger American war.

Teacher's Pets

In the midst of all this one would continue to have doubts about Pakistani leadership's commitment to fight terror. It is believed that, the well-known senior Pakistani terrorist Qari Saifullah Akhtar from the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami with links to both the ISI and Al Qaeda was released from custody in early in December 2010. He had been taken into custody in August 2010 for trying to recruit five Americans for Al Qaeda when they had visited Pakistan in November 2009.

Qari Akhtar has a colourful jihadi history. Qari and the HUJI have been very close to the Taliban and Al Qaeda; he was involved along with some jihadi Army officers in an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Gen Abdul Waheed Kakkar in 1995 and over throw the government in 1995. Released in 1996, Akhtar fled to Afghanistan and then plotted the assassination of General Musharraf in 2003; he fled again to the UAE, deported in 2004 and released from custody again in 2007; was suspected to have been involved in the abortive attempt on Benazir in October 2007; detained in February 2008 and released in June 2008; and he was one of the main conspirators in the attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad in September 2008.

The ease with which Akhtar has been able to change residence only adds to suspicions that when the trail gets too hot the Pakistani establishment pulls in its assets for the trail to go cold and then release them when it is considered safe. This happens ever so often to Lashkar e Tayyaba leader Hafiz Saeed and the Jaish e Mohammed leader Maulana Masood Azhar.

Indian reactions

Some of us worry that this could have an adverse reaction in India. There is an overreaction in some sections about intolerance in India. We must learn to trust the Indian Muslim instead of assuming he will be influenced by events and thought processes or ideologies in Pakistan. In so doing we challenge his intelligence and doubt his loyalties. In Pakistan they demanded the funeral of Taseer be boycotted because he was a liberal, in India the Indian Muslim leaders refused to allow the killers of Mumbai 26/11 be buried on Indian soil because they were terrorists. That is the difference between them and us.

True there is a fringe element in India as in most democratic societies but it does not endanger the state in the manner it has in Pakistan where it is no longer a fringe element but may well have become mainstream. In fact, extreme belief has been state sponsored in Pakistan; not so in India. The trick is to marginalise the extreme fringe but not to frighten the mainstream. Reaction here tends to lose touch with Indian realities and creates more discord. Careless off the cuff remarks are more responsible for this sort of thing and do not make for responsible commentary. By Vikram Sood(ANI)



Source : The views expressed in the above article are those of Mr. Vikram Sood ( ANI ) 6th January 2011

Night of the Generals

This is not the first time that a Pakistan Army Chief has decided to stay on beyond his scheduled date of departure. The version that the civilian government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani granted Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani this extension is a myth that very few believe. In fact, speculation and justifications for his extension were making the rounds in Islamabad in early summer this year.

By May 2010, there were articles, sponsored undoubtedly, suggesting that Gen. Kayani had become indispensable to the scheme of things in Pakistan; that Pakistan was passing through a critical phase and continuity as the Army Chief was essential; that Gen. Kayani would not seek extension but would gracefully accept if invited to serve the country for a little while longer.

Pakistani analyst Ayesha Siddiqa had earlier commented that a decision to extend the term would depend upon three factors — an agreement within the GHQ, a nod from the United States and support of the government. With the Zardari-Gilani government perennially on the backfoot, there would have been very little resistance from the political setup. It is true that the US would like continuity and Gen. Kayani became the preferred option, as he was perceived to be able to deliver on US objectives.

In the immediate future, Gen. Kayani will have to keep the war on terror against selected sections going, keep the US at arm’s length when it relates to the Pakistan Army’s other strategic assets considered vital to its perceived aims in Afghanistan and India without any stoppage of funds from the US. He will also have to make some arrangements for those who will feel they have been deprived of the top slot because of this extension. For instance, at least 16 lieutenant-generals — some of whom are now corps commanders — are due to retire after November 23, 2010 and before Gen. Kayani’s extended term expires in November 2013. This includes Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha, Gen. Kayani’s successor as ISI chief and who is already on a year’s year extension. Gen. Pervez Musharraf had not extended the terms of his generals but accommodated them in civilian assignments.

Increasing numbers of Pakistani military officers who will now be due for promotions as major-general and lieutenant-general or equivalent will be those recruited during Gen. Zia-ul Haq’s days of excessive Islamisation.

The Pakistan Army — with its ultimate control on policies relating to India, Afghanistan and the nuclear button — has shown remarkable tactical brilliance in enhancing its position in its own country but has left the country with very little resilience to tackle its major internal socio-economic problems. Outsiders see the march of folly of a nation with a crumbling economy, dwindling exports and the sole source of dollars being handouts by the US and the International Monetary Fund, with terrorists knocking at various doors even in Punjab. Yet it continues to convince its people that “enemy” India is still trying to undo Pakistan. In the process, Pakistan has been involved in a two-front jihad, has punched above its weight and thus finds itself in the middle of a crippling and tragic blowback. Caught in the brinkmanship of its rhetoric, Pakistan’s rulers are unable to retreat from the cul de sac into which they have pushed their country.

Pakistan’s tragedy has been that its civil society is today under siege from Islamic radicals and the Army, and these radicals and terrorists have been raised by the Army. With all other systems of law and order collapsing, civil society is dependent on the same Army for its own security and well-being. That is why at various moments in the history of Pakistan whenever the Army has been seen to take over the reins upfront, there have been many from within this liberal society who actually showered accolades on the Army.

The invisible hand of Rawalpindi was patently visible in the fiasco of the recent talks in Islamabad. Now that we have Gen. Kayani in charge of policy towards India and Afghanistan for the next three years, we should expect some hardening of attitudes. Pakistan’s tactics in Jammu and Kashmir have already begun to change. Terrorist violence in the Valley has diminishing returns for Pakistan under the present circumstances; it wins Pakistan no new friends and attracts adverse attention from the US. We take solace behind encouraging statistics, but they tell only a part of the story. Stone-throwing tactics in the Valley portrayed as a people’s movement in the new tactic where the state is made to look increasingly helpless and vicious.

Pakistan’s postures on India are not going to be affected by the recent disclosures by WikiLeaks. Despite the usual exultation in India forever looking for Western approval, the leaks do not say anything new. They are more about the US. The speed with which US national security adviser James Jones supported the Pakistan government immediately after the disclosures, confirming US commitment to deepening partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan, the manner in which AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrooke certified Pakistan was part of the solution in Afghanistan and the timing of the release of $500 million during Hillary Clinton’s Islamabad visit (where she called on Gen. Kayani) — these only confirm the desperation of America’s Afghan situation. Besides, Gen. Kayani’s and the ISI chief’s closeness to the Haqqani networks, their close liaison and protection of the Quetta Shura impinge directly on the US effort in Afghanistan. Pakistan has strengthened its assets in Afghanistan by inducting Lashkar-e-Tayyaba terrorists into Afghanistan.

Pakistan carefully assessed the limitations of US military power and Indian decibel. The Americans had needed Pakistan to launch into Afghanistan in 2001; nine years later they need Pakistan to come to an honourable arrangement in Afghanistan, whatever that might be. Given the paranoia that affects Punjabi officers in the Pakistan Army along with the desire to avenge 1971, there is need for India to prepare for the future and strengthen its defence and intelligence capabilities substantially — in quality and quantity. We face multiple fronts — Pakistan, China, terrorism and the unguarded sea.

While India-Pakistan talks may become desirable at some future date under suitable circumstances, they are neither irreversible nor uninterruptable. India must dispel the impression that there is no option except to talk to Pakistan and lose on the negotiating table what we have won on the battlefield. Therefore, between the option to talk and total war there are several options that can be exercised and we should be prepared for the long haul.

Source : Asian Age , 29th July 2010 , Former head of the Research and Analysis Wing

Pakistan -Us and Them

Terrorists and such have to be militarily defeated before states can sit across the table and deal with them; at best this can be started when the terrorists are on the run. What the Pakistanis have done in the Malakand division is inexplicable. They have not defeated the Islamic radicals militarily nor subdued them in any way. This deal was possible only because the Pak Army approved of this or actually encouraged it. This means that they have been either forced into this, wanted to do this anyway as they believed in it or the militants were so strong and the Army so weak that the militants could not be defeated.

In conceding ground to the radicals in FATA and Malakand as well as Kohistan in the Hazara Division, Islamabad has ceded sovereignty, although we may call it something else. There are fears that this maybe the tipping point for Pakistan’s eventual conversion into a Talibanised state.

Over the years Pakistan has come to believe that the world is beholden to it that it exists. This notion of indispensability allows them to be wild, delinquent and dangerous. Like the spoilt brat of a rich and doting parent, Pakistan either becomes petulant when it is not granted what it unjustifiably demands or becomes belligerent when it is granted that wish by its benefactor. Today, Pakistan is embellished by a begging bowl economy with terrorism as its main export, unending bitter unrest in Balochistan, sectarian violence in Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, a creaking law and order system and a judicial system that evokes little confidence.

There are many in India who are forever ready to give Pakistan another chance saying they are like us but the poor souls are stuck with rotten governments and they need our help to get them out of their predicament. It is incredibly naive of us to build policies for our future and security on fond nostalgia which is mostly one way. One has never heard any Pakistani leader talk lovingly of the India they left behind. And they teach their children mostly how to hate India with a warped form of history, even at the mainstream schools.

It is strange that we still keep saying to Pakistanis that we are all alike and have a common culture and so on. The truth is that they do not want to be like us and quite honestly, we have nothing in common with them. Not anymore. First of all, our minority population is more Indian than theirs is Pakistani and our majority too is different from theirs. Pakistanis have never understood, therefore never accepted, the concept of accepting and accommodating minorities. Not that we do it perfectly but we do a fairly good job. In Pakistan, you are either a Shia,Bohra or an Ismaili and worse -- an Ahmediya; being a woman, a Baloch, a Pushtun, a Sindhi or a Mohajir or a Hindu hari is a curse. Only a Sunni Punjabi is a true blue Punjabi. Arguments with minorities are settled with a bullet. It is difficult for a Pakistani to understand that minorities can also dominate and they are really minorities if you call them so. Our latest success story – the cricket team – symbolises our diversity. Pakistan does not have an equivalent of Bollywood and if they did, it would never be dominated by Hindus.

There are other fundamental differences. They deny history and even geography, we seek our roots in our civilisation. They say jihad in the name of God. We have room for all faiths at the Dargah in Ajmer Sharif, in Darbar Sahib (where the foundation stone was laid by Mian Mir), San Thome or Gyanvapi Temple. Fewer and fewer Pakistanis understand that it is easy or natural for an Indian to listen to Jafar Hussain Badayuni’s rendering of Amir Khusro’s Bahut Kathin Hai Dagar or Ek Pita Ekas Ke Hum Baarek by Bhai Maninder Singh and Bhai Jitender Singh or Jai Madhav Madan Murari by Jagjit Singh on any morning. This is what makes us unique in the world. God by any other name means the same and He does not seem to mind.

In Pakistan today we see images of black turbaned long haired mullahs leading a march to medievalism, in India we see the young and exuberant marching to the 21st century. We are still behind the rest of the privileged world but determined to catch up. Over there they wallow in their sense of victimhood and blame everyone else for their plight. Over here we exult in our rainbow culture. They put their women in abayas suspicious of them and diffident about their own ability to handle them. In India we are proud of our women (except, unfortunately, for the lunatic fringe). In Pakistan they shoot and kill journalists; here, we merely grimace. Over there the majority would want to destroy the minority within their own religion. Over here in my country, should a section of the majority deviate, as it does now and then, it is the rest of the majority that defends the rights of the minority.

Let us not forget that the largest number of Muslims that has ever lived in a democracy anywhere in the world for such a long time is in India. In Pakistan they are now saying that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The word secularism does not exist in the mullah’s vocabulary, not even in the minds of some self proclaimed moderates like General Musharraf. Let us remember that Pakistanis have killed more Muslims in East Pakistan (where at its height of barbarity, the Pakistan Army killed 6000 to 12000 Hindus and Muslims per day). They are still doing that in Balochistan, Sindh, the Frontier, what they call the Northern Areas, the Punjab and Afghanistan. Muslims are no longer safe in Pakistan.

So what do we have in common with them that we yearn for? The answer – nothing. We are two different countries with two different kinds of people on two different trajectories and we are happy with that. Our only request should be -- please do not mess with us and we promise we will not mess with your country.

Pakistan will do deals with Al Qaeda, will encourage Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to carry out raids in India and will appease the Taliban. They will take their country to medieval times. They will do anything to try and wrest Kashmir from India. It would seem that they have a death wish. It would be prudent for us to take measures now in case Pakistan’s wish is granted.

Source : Times of India , 23rd February 2009

Setting their house in Order

Its Punjabi heartland is at stake . pakistan must tackle its demons without being selective.

When two extreme Organsiations (Islami Jamaat Tulaba and Tulaba Jamaat-Ud-Dawa) compete , the result can only be increased Radicalisation as each in competing to establish its Islamic Credentials.

When the topic of terrorism-related threats is discussed, most of us think of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The scene of activity is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are visions of Predators stalking the region to search and kill. When this is not the scene, then it is the threat to the US from the likes of Times Square wannabe-bomber Faisal Shahzad, their mindsets and their mentors.

When an angered and frightened US speaks of retaliation to this, it speaks of the wrath of America the next time around. Pakistan’s rulers pretend anger and insult, and they let loose their leg men on the streets shouting ‘Death to America!’. The Americans are in a dilemma. They cannot attack their favourite ally and justify to Congress that they need to give more arms and financial assistance to it. Pakistan’s rulers feel they have a winning game — of threatening to lose the match and country if they are not given steroids. Pakistan’s battle is not only on its western frontiers; it is now in the Punjabi heartland.

Since the Lal Masjid episode in Islamabad in 2007, the murderous terrorist attacks on the Marriot Hotel, the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Special Service Group establishments as well as the police show the reach of the terrorists. The twin attacks on the Garhi Shahu and Model Town Ahmadiya masjids in Lahore on Friday, May 28, the attack on Jinnah Hospital on the night of May 31 and the June 9 attack on the Nato convoy outside Islamabad are manifestations of a virus that is radicalising Pakistani society faster and deeper than we realise — or Pakistan’s rulers care to admit. The recent ban on social websites YouTube and Facebook by the Pakistani government indicates its nervousness in dealing with radicals.

True, there is a section of Pakistani society that finds events like violence in the name of religion, or medieval practices foisted upon it by self-styled guardians of the faith, abhorrent. The other truth is that these hordes have muscle power, are financially well-endowed and — what has become increasingly evident — there is either benign neglect by the State or active connivance most of the time. One does not have to go too far back to the Zia years to see what has been happening to Punjabi society even in the post-Zia years.

President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq had left in place not only the madrasa system of obscurantist education, but he had also mainstreamed this. So while the ISI diverted its experience and jihadi hordes from the Afghan front to the Kashmir one, Pakistan’s military rulers also created new terrorist outfits in the 1990s for specific action in Jammu and Kashmir. These were all Punjabi in origin and base. Recruitment has continued for the ‘jihad’ from various parts of Pakistan, notably from southern Punjab.

All these terrorist organisations have become interlinked and inter-dependent and an estimated 3,000-8,000 Punjab-based jihadis do service jointly alongside the Punjabi Taliban in Fata and Punjab. The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) are also suspected to be linked with al-Qaeda. Politicians being politicians, the Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif brothers have been flirting outrageously with the SSP in Punjab to queer the pitch for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Sheikh Akram, an opposition MP from Jhang, fears that there could be ten Swats in Punjab if the extremists are not checked.

So, today, we have a situation in which powerful terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), the JeM and others, along with Sunni sectarian outfits like the SSP and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), have recruits from the same village, district or area. Recruits for the mostly Punjabi Pakistani army also come from the same region and possibly from the same madrasas. Punjab is also the province that has many of Pakistan’s formidable troop concentrations against India — and it is here that all of Pakistan’s vital nuclear facilities are located.

Should Punjab get destabilised by Islamic radicals, this will have devastating consequences for Pakistan. Many wonder how the young and educated are getting affected by jihadi philosophy. Even today the curriculum established during the Zia years for the mainstream schools has not changed. In the Punjab University campus too, there is greater stress on Islamic tenets. The Daily Times, in its column ‘Campus Window’ (April 11, 2007), noted that while the world “heads towards modernisation and scientific knowledge, Punjab University, which is one of the oldest educational institutions in South Asia, is rapidly turning into a hub of Islamism”.

There are innumerable examples of attempts to introduce extreme religious ideologies in the discourse and in outward symbolism. These range from some very regressive and muscular moral policing on the campus to the downright ridiculous — like seeking to ban Alexander Pope’s poem ‘The Rape of the Lock’, as the title was considered vulgar.

Leading the campaign so far has been the students’ wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islami Jamaat Tulaba, a rabid Sunni organisation. Its monopoly is now being challenged by an equally rabid students’ organisation, the new Tulaba Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the students’ wing of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the mentor of the LeT. When two extreme organisations compete, the result can only be increased radicalisation, as each is competing against the other to establish its Islamic credentials.

What has been apparent for long to many of us here — but is clearly emerging now — is that Afghanistan will have a chance at peace only if the virus in Pakistan is eradicated. The next few months are going to be a major challenge for Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, if the declared intention is to take military action against the SSP, the JeM and the LeJ. Pakistan must fight its own demons urgently and not selectively. This will depend upon how long Pakistan’s rulers remain in denial about the home-grown existential threat to them and their country.

Source : Hindustan Times , 16th June 2010