Why India cannot afford to give up Siachen

The strategic advantage accruing to India in Siachen should not be given up for apparent short-term political gains. Giving up Siachen as a gesture of friendship would also mean that its recapture would be extremely expensive to India in men and material, says Vikram Sood.


The venue: Badami Bagh, Srinagar , Headquarters of the Corps Commander 15 Corps, Lt Gen Prem Hoon

The year: 1983

The participants: The Corps Commander and the R&AW station chief.

The subject: Siachen and reported Pakistani activities in that region according to intelligence reports from across the LoC.


It would be untrue to suggest that this meeting led to the assault on the Soltoro Ridge which is actually west of the Siachen Glacier, but the fact is that the matter had assumed serious proportions and Indira Gandhi's government was deeply concerned.

The reports, that the Pakistanis were making probes ostensibly through tourism and mountaineering groups, were disturbing. The obvious aim of the Pakistanis appeared to be cross the Saltoro heights and head for the Karakoram Pass on the Jammu and Kashmir border with Tibet (China).

But why is this bleak part of the mountainous region so important to India that we are prepared to retain it all these years. The Saltoro Ridge is a formidable ridge that runs roughly north-west to south-east. It overlooks Gilgit and Baltistan to its west and has to be crossed by any one seeking access from Skardu in the Gilgit and Baltistan area through to the Karakoram Pass which enters Tibet. This is not to be confused with the Karakoram Highway which enters Xinjiang through the Khunjerab Pass. Any Pakistani location in Karakoram would be a threat to India in Ladakh from the north in addition to Chinese locations in Aksai Chin.

The genesis of the problem lies in the way India-Pakistan agreements were worked out in Karachi (1949) and Shimla (1972). The ceasefire line or later the Line of Control was left undemarcated from point NJ 9842, and stated that it would run north from this point. This means that north was defined as the true geographical north and not an extension of the line in the direction which would take the line to the Karakoram Pass, something the Pakistanis claimed, wanted and were willing to assert this claim with perhaps an approving Chinese nod. North of Point NJ 9842 meant north to the Siachen and not to Karakoram.

Siachen in the possession of Pakistan would have meant Pakistan would have access from Skardu through to the Karakoram near the Aksai Chin and eventual linking with Shahidullah on the Kashgar-Xigatse road that runs parallel to the Tibet- India border.

Obviously, and given the aggressive manner in which Pakistan had begun to interfere in India, among other things actively inciting Sikh extremists, India could not afford to become vulnerable on another front.

There was no option but to launch Operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984. The Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army with cover from the Indian Air Force reached the glacier to occupy two mountain passes at Bilafond La and Sia La while the Pakistan Army could only reach Gyong La. The battle zone was a triangle with point NJ9842 at the bottom, Indira Col due west and Karakoram Pass due east. Indian troops today control two thirds of the area and the world's highest motorable road at Khardung La with a helipad at a place called Sonam, at 21,000 feet. Pakistan overlooks the Nubra and Shyok valleys from the north. Saltoro lies almost exactly due north of Leh and north west of Kargil .

The Saltoro was attained at considerable loss of life, equipment apart from the expenses involved. There were many lives also lost to the harsh climate and the attrition rate was indeed very high in the early days of the campaign. Over time these shortcomings have been removed, the attrition rate is much lower, logistics are nowhere near as nightmarish as they used to be nearly thirty years ago.

Following the avalanche in Skardu which killed 150 Pakistani soldiers, there seems to be renewed talk that India should withdraw from the heights attained with so much sacrifice and at great cost to the nation. Siachen has recently been sneeringly described as 'A struggle of two bald men over a comb' or 'an ego problem between the two armies' and has elsewhere been described by some journalists as a futile war. Let it be said here that no war over one's own territory that is futile.

It is certainly less futile than the US campaign in Iraq. The United States, unable to solve its own problems in the region or for that matter anywhere else, and seeking an early exit from Afghanistan by obliging Pakistan, has offered to assist India and Pakistan in a dialogue. There are reports that the two defence secretaries will meet shortly to discuss Siachen and Sir Creek.

It seems that there is some great urgency to strike a deal and this is more than the usual periodic urge to concede something to Pakistan to look good. There are some Indian commentators who have even argued that India should now forget 26/11 and move forward. Nations that do not remember their past can have no future.

One of the arguments being given is that the cost of retaining Siachen/Saltoro is prohibitive. This is rubbish. At approximately Rs two crores a day it means only Rs 730 crores annually out of a budget that is in the range of Rs 80,000 crores. Even if it were more than this, is there a fixed price for security and freedom? The loss of soldiers to harsh conditions has become minimal for the last many years and the hot war has long been over.

An agreement might have been possible but Pakistani refusal to sign the Agreed Ground Position Line on a specious argument only leads to the suspicion that they would want to alter the position at first dawn. General Pervez Musharraf's Kargil adventure in 1999 was Pakistan's last attempt to change the ground position militarily and politically and also to negate the advantage of Saltoro with India.

The continuing mindset is depicted not only in the rants of Lashkar-e-Tayiba chief Hafiz Saeed [ Images ] but also by what appears in the English press in Pakistan, which include songs in praise of The Hafiz. The Nation in an editorial on March 12 said "We must never lose sight of the fact that Kashmir is a left over issue of the Partition, gifted to us by the British. Unless it is settled in accordance with the Partition Plan, neither the division of India would be complete, nor would the state of Pakistan be complete."

There has not been any evidence of a change of heart in the Pakistan Army -- the institution that calls the shots in Pakistan especially on issues relating to India. Everyone knows that. Thus withdrawal from these strategic heights without any iron clad guarantees that do not extend beyond declarations of intent would be the height of folly. This strategic advantage in Siachen should not be given up for apparent short-term political gains.

The China factor cannot be ignored in this cockpit of the world. It was not so evident in 1984 although the Karakoram Highway had been built by the Chinese by then and Pakistan had illegally ceded a portion of the territory under their control, Shaksgam to them. Today, the Chinese footprint is much larger. In its own strategic interests in the region, China would be interested in greater Pakistani control over Gilgit and Baltistan.

It has been investing $150 million (abour Rs 750 crore) for widening the KKH from 10 metres to 30 metres, to be used by all weather heavy vehicles, the kind that brought strategic material for Pakistan through the Khunjerab.

A rail link was also planned, to be connected with Pakistan's main rail grid, and fiber optic cables were being laid in 2007. If China had a port in Gwadar that they could use, this would cut down the distance from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea to merely 2,500 km. Today Xinjiang is 4,500 km away from the east coast of China. Gas and oil pipelines through from Gwadar and Xinjiang make sense only if Gilgit and Baltistan is secured. It is not a question of a glacier in the Himalayan heights; it is a question of India's security.

The nation cannot afford to repeat the strategic mistakes of the past -- like halting our advance at Uri in 1948 or not capturing Skardu; or giving up Haji Pir in 1966; or returning 93,000 troops and territory in 1972.

Giving up Siachen as a gesture of friendship would also mean that its recapture would be extremely expensive to India in men and material. Today, as the other side continues to arm itself with newer nuclear weapons, has not called off its jehadi hordes and the only 'concession' it can offer us is an MFN at a future date or lunch at Lahore and dinner at Islamabad.

Pakistani hospitality is legendary but beware of the poisoned chalice.

Source : Rediff.com, 13th April 2012, Vikram Sood, former R&AW Chief

Put Siachen on the Table last , Not first

As the US gets into an Arab quagmire without extricating itself from the AfPak theatre there must also be pressure to find a foreign policy success in Washington DC, with election year approaching. Consequently, the discourse on AfPak has begun to change. The good and necessary war has become unnecessary and futile as it drains the US treasury and America suffers 500 casualties annually. Western experts and media now describe how unstable the situation in Pakistan has become and how radicalised that country is today. There is also grudging admission that Pakistan’s rulers have been following a dual if not a multilayered policy on hunting with the US in the effort in Afghanistan and supping with the terrorists of various hues simultaneously both on the western and eastern frontiers. Simultaneously, the subscript is getting more pronounced.

This subscript says that Pakistan is unable to fully co-operate because of its apprehension about Indian designs on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost all of the recent writings from the US or the UK – end up with the same final recommendation. India and Pakistan must sort themselves out on issues like Kashmir to enable Pakistan to stabilise and become a true ally to the US. The kind of gentle persuasion that was alluded to in the Wikileaks cables, must surely be continuing. India-Pakistan talks have recommenced and another dramatic but eventually pointless gesture to inconsequential entities has been made.

Recent writings from Pakistan suggest that among the issues that are considered easily solvable is the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachin glacier) and the UN is being inveigled into this. This is not so and anyone who sees the map of the region will understand this. Undoubtedly peace with Pakistan is desirable. However, to try and attain it through magnanimity will only trump realism.

The reality is that India-Pakistan level of distrust remains very high despite the efforts of some dream merchants. Pakistan has not called an unequivocal and permanent end to using its jehadist weapon in India and it never will; its prevarication on issues related to investigation in the Mumbai 2008 terrorist attack is the sum and substance of this attitude.

The Indian Army climbed to the Saltoro Ridge in 1984 to cut off Pakistan’s plans to access beyond Saltoro to the Karakoram Pass. This would have enabled Pakistan access to Tibet and also threaten Ladakh. Pakistan and China would have access to each other through the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram Highway via Xinjiang and to Tibet through the Karakoram Pass. The Saltoro Ridge provided Indian forces with strategic heights looking into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. Such an advantage must not be given up for some obscure short-term political gain without a document to establish one’s credentials.

Pakistan’s unwillingness to sign any document that authenticates the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) could only mean that it would seek to break it at first dawn. There is neither a change of heart nor intentions. Kargil 1999 was the latest, and probably not the last, military attempt to alter the ground position in Kashmir in an effort to negate the advantage India had in Saltoro.

In recent years the geopolitical situation has changed. There is greater Chinese presence in Gilgit and Baltistan where apart from building other facilities the Chinese have been upgrading the Karakoram Highway since 2005. It is estimated that last August about 11000 Chinese were involved in infrastructure projects like the construction of dams, roads and bridges, dozens of tunnels and a high speed rail link. This would ultimately link with the Chinese aided port project at Gwadar shortening China’s route to the Persian Gulf from four weeks to 48 hours Simultaneously, the Chinese have been upgrading their own infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet north of the Himalayas.

India has repeatedly given up strategic advantages and conceded on the negotiating table what was won on the battlefield. In 1948, when the Pakistani forces were retreating, we did not secure Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli or Skardu. In 1966, we gave up Haji Pir, through which infiltrators keep coming into the Kashmir Valley even today. In 1972, we gave up territory and 93,000 PoWs for an agreement that Pakistan never intended to observe. And now Pakistan continues to drag its feet on the Mumbai 2008 issue.

The only way it would not be perceived as a retreat would be if the Pakistanis first agreed to delineate the AGPL in the Siachin sector, which is a part of the large Saltoro Ridge, authenticate this on maps that would then be signed and exchanged by commanders of the two countries. Pakistan would then project the AGPL in all its maps, making the AGPL an extension of the LoC from Point NJ-9842 that does not go towards the Karakoram Pass but due north along the Saltoro Ridge. After this, the two countries would work out the ground rules for demilitarisation. Only after this has been worked out should there be discussion on redeployment and demilitarisation of this sector. Anything short of this will be a sell-out.

The issue is far too important to be decided furtively or in a hurry. It is only fair that if we are to retreat, the people should know that this pullback is in the national interest. Siachin has to be last issue on the table and not the first one.

Source : Asian Age , 29th March 2011.

Height of folly

Strategic advantage in Siachen can’t be given up for short-term
political gains

THE STORY doing the rounds in Delhi is that in another exhibition of generosity, India is about to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachen Glacier) in the interest of peace, but without securing the country’s strategic interests.
Search for peace is indisputably desirable but to try and attain it through magnanimity will only trump realism. Peace is usually possible when there is so much mutual trust that agreements are a natural corollary, or when one of the antagonists is so totally vanquished that the victor can make him sign practically anything, or if both the antagonists are completely exhausted and there is a realisation that the only answer is peace.
In the India-Pakistan context, the level of distrust remains very high despite the efforts of some nostalgic dream merchants. Pakistan has not called an unequivocal and permanent end to using its jehadist weapon in India. Worse, it is spreading its use to the rest of India. There is also collusion with Bangladeshi jehadists.
It was this distrust of Pakistan’s intentions that led the Indian Army to occupy the Saltoro Ridge in 1984. Saltoro was attained by our soldiers after considerable sacrifice and at huge costs to the nation. One of the spins currently given to support calls for withdrawal is that the expenses and the loss of life are unbearable. Neither is correct. The army claims it is now down to zero weather- and terrain-related casualty. An expenditure of Rs 2 crore a day out of a budget of Rs 80,000 crore is small change. To give up territory just because there is no habitation there or it is expensive is to let sacrifices go in vain and keep yourself open to repeat intrusions later.
The lay of the land is such that any vacation of this territory without iron-clad guarantees would enable Pakistan to occupy the ridge with comparative ease. Reoccupation by Indian forces would then be virtually impossible and we would have to open another front elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine how this could be achieved as international pressure on India not to retaliate would be immediate and massive. We all know how much pressure was brought upon us following the attack on Indi an Parliament on December 13, 2001.
The Indian Army had climbed to the Saltoro Ridge for a distinctly military objective. This was to cut off Pakistan’s access to areas that would enable it to reach the Karakoram Pass and link with China and be able to threaten Ladakh; the Saltoro Ridge provided Indian forces with strategic heights looking into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. Strategic advantage cannot be given up for some obscure short-term political advantage without a document to establish one’s credentials. Withdrawal from the Saltoro heights without any exchange of authenticated documents and carefully delineated positions would be the height of all follies, tantamount to retreat.
Pakistan’s unwillingness to sign any document that authenticates the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) could only mean that it would seek to break it at first dawn. There is neither a change of heart nor intentions. Kargil 1999 was the latest military attempt to alter the ground position in Kashmir and particularly to negate the advantage India had in Saltoro.
India has the dubious distinction of being the only country to give up strategic advantages repeatedly. In 1948, when the Pakistani forces were retreating, we did not secure Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli or Skardu. In 1966, we gave up Haji Pir, through which infiltrators keep coming into the Kashmir Valley even today. In 1972, we gave up territory and 93,000 PoWs for an agreement that Pakistan never intended to observe.
Are we now about to repeat more of this sorry history? One is afraid that this may be so. The problem is that we seem to be eager to give up strategic advantage for short-term political gains and to look good internationally. There is little reason for India to accept an unfavourable arrangement today when our position is much stronger than in the Nineties. It is logical to ask if we are now willing to accept this unfair arrangement with a regime that has not given up its primary goal of creating caliphates in India.
There were times between 1989 and 1992 when it appeared that a settlement on the Saltoro issue was about to be clinched. By then, the Pakistan army was getting ready to redeploy its jehadi army, demobilised from the Afghan theatre to the Kashmir front, and an agreement on Saltoro did not fit into the scheme of things. Boastful Pakistani diplomats even claimed that they would have an ‘agreement’ favourable to Pakistan on Kashmir by 1991. Frustration at the ability of the Indian-State to withstand this ruthless campaign led to the Kargil misadventure in 1999. But by mid-2001, Musharraf had bounced back post-Agra, only to be deflated by an angry America in September 2001.
It is an insecure Musharraf who has to keep reminding Pakistanis that he is the boss when he proclaims all corps commanders are his boys, and the rest of the world that he is no Bush poodle. Washington continues to champion Musharraf as the indis pensable frontline ally and wants to give something to Musharraf so that he can transfer troops facing India to do battle in Pakistan’s turbulent west. But these troop transfers have to be done in an atmosphere of triumph for Musharraf, when he can claim that he got the Indians out of Siachen. Caeser must return to Rome in glory.
It is only then that Musharraf hopes his troops will fight other Muslims in revolt in Waziristan and Balochistan. The US has a requirement to keep Musharraf in position. After all, he heads Pakistan’s strongest, best equipped and financially endowed political party — the Pakistan army. But that is not our requirement. India is not obliged to let Musharraf continue in perpetuity. Any concession to him now will ensure him a life beyond 2007. And beyond 2007, even Bush does not care; his time will have begun to run out. One can understand American anxiety to reward their favourite in their askewed global war on terror and secure Pakistani help to tackle Iran but one cannot understand India’s anxiety to please the Americans.
The only way it would not be perceived as a retreat would be if the Pakistanis first agreed to delineate the AGPL in the Siachen sector, which is a part of the large Saltoro Ridge, authenticate this on maps that would then be signed and exchanged by commanders of the two countries. Pakistan would then project the AGPL in all its maps, making the AGPL an extension of the LoC from Point NJ-9842. After this, the two countries would work out the ground rules for demilitarisation. Only after this has been worked out will there be discussion on redeployment and demilitarisation of this sector. Anything short of this will be a sell-out.
Nothing need be agreed to furtively. There is no need to have deals signed in a hurry under the cloak of darkness. We need to debate this openly, and in our Parliament, without the inane recourse to disruptions and walkouts that negate any debate. We are all stakeholders in the peace process but we need to know why we are agreeing to retreat. One does not become a war-mongering cold warrior simply because one wants doubts cleared. Patriotism is not the right of only peaceniks.

Source : Hindustan Times 11th may 2006