Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 5, 2007

The Nuclear Deal: The Larger Picture


As the U.S. readies for the battles of the 21st century, India must not ignore the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China and the relevance of Iran. It must manage its relations with all these powers.

The India-United States nuclear deal that was supposed to be a path breaking agreement has run into stiff opposition in both countries where critics say that each has given too much for too little. For India, the deal was supposed to provide nuclear energy to make good the shortfall, access to hi-technology, be an economic bonanza for the future and grant legitimacy as a major power. For the U.S., it was part of a larger game plan. The deal was a means to cap India’ s strategic programme, provide access to India’s growing defence market, and become a strategic partner in U.S. foreign policy initiatives globally. One of the abiding primary bipartisan U.S. objectives has been to restrict, roll back and cap the Indian strategic deterrent. Bill Clinton tried it earlier when he wanted India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and announce a moratorium on fissile production. But critics in the U.S. fear that the deal has weakened the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
There have been different interpretations of the deal in the two capitals. New Delhi asserts that the agreement assures continued supply of fuel and that if there is any disruption, the U.S. would help find an alternative source. American officials do not agree and will help only in the case of technical or logistical difficulties. This means that there would be no assistance in case India violates some aspects of the agreement or tests a nuclear device or reprocesses U.S. origin fuel.

The 123 Agreement has been extensively commented upon by strategic analysts, experienced commentators and scientists. One of the arguments being that the Hyde Act suggests that India should work bilaterally with the U.S. for an early conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty instead of what India has wanted — a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangement. The Americans would want to rely on national technical means which would make the deal bilaterally intrusive. The deal does not give India access to reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water technologies or dual use components. In addition, the right of return of nuclear material, restrictions on reprocessing or building fuel reserves, verification and end-use monitoring, have been built into the agreement. This could restrict our strategic capabilities and options in the years ahead.

The deal was supposed to give India several benefits but the pressure to sign the deal by a specific deadline mostly came from the Americans, almost as if India was being hustled into this. The old principle of never ever signing anything in a hurry was abandoned. The Japanese, for instance, spent seven years discussing the deal before signing it. The China-U.S. 123 agreement of 1985 specifically states that both sides would observe the principle of international law under which neither party could invoke a domestic law to justify failure to perform a treaty. The India-U.S. 123 agreement does not have this safeguard.

It would be unreasonable to expect that the U.S. would give us a carte blanche on the business of testing and fissile material. But it was also unnecessary for us to have allowed what was a voluntary moratorium on testing become binding in a bilateral arrangement. It was also not necessary to agree to a U.S.-led fissile material cut off instead of a multilateral arrangement in Geneva. This is what we had agreed on July 18, 2005 and since then it has been a steady process downhill. In March 2006, we agreed to place 14 of our 22 reactors under safeguards and eventually shut down the Cirus reactor permanently. By voting in the manner in which we did at the IAEA on the Iran issue, we have set a precedent that may be difficult to live down. From now onwards, whenever we vote along with the U.S. or do any deal with it, opponents to this action will accuse the government of having become subservient to the U.S.

Unfortunately, the official response to the various criticisms or doubts has been dismissive and disappointingly inadequate. No one has bothered to sit down and explain that the various doubts and fears expressed were either incorrect or exaggerated. Instead, the response has been to depict criticism as a reflection of tunnel vision of cold war mindsets or nitpicking by ignoramuses. In the midst of this emotional debate, it was forgotten that dissent is also a form of patriotism. Protagonists of the deal have claimed that the 123 Agreement overrides the Hyde Act. This is incorrect because the 1954 Atomic Energy Act is the mother of all such Acts; the Hyde Act is a stringent enabling India-specific legislation for the 123 Agreement to be signed within the parameters of the Hyde Act. It has been suggested that in case the deal did not go through, Pakistan and China would collaborate for a similar deal. Surely this would have been factored in when the deal was being negotiated. It does not require any special clairvoyance to predict that whatever the outcome of the India-U.S. deal, Pakistan would want to seek a similar arrangement either with the U.S. and failing which, with China. In a high pitch drive, it has even been suggested that this deal would now open the doors for all sorts of hi-tech technologies. Conversely, should India be seen to be in violation of this deal, these technologies would be withdrawn from us followed by sanctions.

The Nick Burns statement in Washington on July 27 is a clear enunciation of what the U.S. expects from the deal. He said that the 123 Agreement “brings India … back into the nonproliferation mainstream in a way it was not before. And that is a tangible gain for India, as well as the U.S. and the rest of the world.” From then flow the rest of the arguments about the strategic consonance on Iran, reducing India’s dependency on countries like Iran for energy supplies. He also spoke of the advantages that American companies will have in selling the “finest nuclear technology” to India. Yet he did not mention that no American company has built a single reactor in the U.S. since 1979. Mr. Burns also hoped for greater defence co-operation between India and the U.S. leading to more exercises, training and defence sales. Both countries were already working together in South Asia on Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and “in trying to form a better functioning relationship between India and Pakistan.” He hoped that the two countries would form a global partnership and work together in East Asia and Africa. The India-U.S. nuclear deal is part of an overall plan which includes the Defence Framework Agreement, the Agriculture Deal and the Disaster Management Agreement. The idea is to engage India at all levels.

The U.S. has been pursuing a military basing policy extending globally as it prepares to take on a resurgent Russia and a powerful China. There are about 1000 bases of various descriptions and purpose strewn all over the globe and Chalmers Johnson points out in his book Nemesis, India has agreed to have a ‘lily pod’ base along with Thailand, Australia and the Philippines. (Pakistan already has four such bases with much larger facilities). These ‘lily pods’ e nable pre-positioning of weapons and munitions to which U.S. access has already been negotiated. This does not mean permanent U.S. presence but only in times of emergency. No wonder Washington is very keen that the two countries sign an Access and Cross Servicing Agreement which would allow logistic support to the U.S. from locations in India. A natural corollary to this would be the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) which would give U.S. troops immunity from violations of laws of the host country. U.S. joint exercises in and around India also make perfect U.S. military sense. There is a clear agenda and a pattern.

The Washington-based American Enterprise Institute is considered to be the unofficial headquarters of the neo-cons. Writing in the July 2003 issue of the AEI National Security Outlook, just a few months after U.S. troops had landed in Iraq, Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk spoke of U.S. military missions being transformed into a ‘global cavalry’ that would need a radical overhaul of America’s overseas force structure and creation of a worldwide network of frontier forts as well as a system of frontier stockades “necessary to win a long-term struggle against an amorphous enemy across the arc of instability.” This arc of instability extends from Morocco to the Philippines inclusive of Eurasia which is predominantly Muslim in the peripheries of Russia and China with India and Israel stuck in the middle.

As the U.S. readies for the battles of the 21st century, India must not ignore the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China and the relevance of Iran. It must manage its relations with all these powers. It needs to therefore pause and think about ways of smoothening the wrinkles in the nuclear deal. If the sense of the House is that there are reservations about the deal then the party in power must address them adequately, in keeping with the convention that India’s foreign policy is pursued through consensus. It should not be construed to be the handiwork of a tyranny of a minority in a minority.
Source : Hindu, 5th Sepetmber 2007

Friday, May 18, 2007

Patriot games

It was Frederick the Great of Prussia who said that he and his people had come to a mutually satisfactory agreement — they were free to say what they liked and he was free to do what he liked. Frederick obviously was an autocratic monarch who did not worry himself too much about the opinion of his subjects.
Present-day governments can hardly afford not to appear to care, so they do the next best thing. They mould opinions and perceptions, as do toothpaste sellers, fashion designers, car manufacturers or anyone else who can sell anything at profit. By doing this, governments try to ensure their perpetuity while the manufacturer does it for profit. Perception management by governments is called propaganda and psychological warfare (psy-war), while the private entrepreneur calls it advertising.
Psy-war is as old as history and an essential ingredient of Statecraft. It is the fourth arm of combat, usable all the time. Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s Art of War refer to this. The Nazis had their Lord Haw Haw trying to undermine the morale of the British forces, while in the 1965 India-Pak conflict we had the popular ‘Radio Jhoothistan’. The Iraqis had someone who the invading Americans called Baghdad Bob, as he tried to boost the morale of his people in 2003.
In the Cold War’s early days, psy-war and propaganda were used to keep communism at bay. Saving Europe from Stalin’s depredations was the rallying call for America. Noel Coward, Arthur Miller, Norman Mailer, Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, the Rockefellers and the Henry Fords were part of an endless list of an American Who’s Who involved in this. Eminent Europeans also joined the enterprise. The CIA led this multi-million dollar campaign operating on the principle of plausible deniability. For 17 years, a CIA officer, Michael Josselson, managed the campaign with almost fanatical zeal. At its height, this programme of cultural propaganda had spread to 35 countries under the umbrella of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Congress funded magazines, held art exhibitions, organised philharmonic orchestras, ran a radio station from Germany, which quickly acquired 29 other stations, and ran the Encounter magazine.
Sometimes, things do get out of hand leading to spine-chilling realities. The 1960s film, The Manchurian Candidate, was about an American soldier captured by the Soviets and taken to Manchuria for brainwashing into an assassin. While the film was a box-office sellout, the Americans did have their very own controversial project — MK-Ultra — for mind control. There were experiments on unwitting human guinea pigs to assess the effect of mind-altering drugs like LSD — all in the name of protecting freedom. Earlier, the Nazis had similarly experimented and so had the Russians. This was a quest for dominance at its sinister best, showing excessive zeal born of arrogance. The results of these experiments are still shrouded in secrecy.
The Cold War was won not just through ‘Star Wars’, military alliances, friendly dictators, proxy wars and the Afghan jehad that overstretched the Soviet empire. The Berlin Wall came down as much through sustained efforts of the cultural cold warriors who had prevented an exhausted post-war Europe from succumbing to communism. The 1980s Afghan jehad was as much a case of perception management as a campaign on the ground; so was the 1991 Iraq war when instant global TV came of age as did Indian TV during the 1999 Kargil war.
It is more a case of managing perceptions or creating images in peacetime. The more innocuous ones are the larger-than-life images of a minimally clad Lord Greystroke a.k.a. Tarzan swinging from tree to tree in the jungles of Africa saving the British empire from cousin Kaiser Wilhelm, or Superman saving the world from evil.
These days ‘spin doctors’ are an essential component of governance and indulge in George Orwell’s doublethink — the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, accepting them and being able to tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them. The current American concept of preemptive war really means that while war is undesirable, a war to prevent even a remotely perceived war is desirable.
Effective psy-war is to put forward and defend an idea or offer a better way of life. The ultimate test for a successful psy-war is when it appears not to have been carried out at all. The favoured tactic could be the ‘necessary lie’ based on some basic truth for it to be acceptable. It was this absence of any truth in the allegations that Saddam Hussein had acquired WMDs and was in cahoots with al-Qaeda that led to a catastrophic campaign.
In the Indian context, conducting a long-term psy-war campaign during peacetime requires unusual tenacity and hard work. We are dealing with an implacable foe, whose long-term objectives are at variance from current overt declarations, who cheats his benefactor habitually and connives at selling atomic secrets for ideological reasons. Under US pressure, Pakistan has made tactical adjustments without any change of heart. Benazir Bhutto’s disclosures in the revised edition of her autobiography, Daughter of the East, confirm this.
Besides, terrorists use modern communication systems for effective anti-State propaganda. Al-Qaeda leaders have used this from their hideouts in Waziristan. The ISI-backed Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has not only thousands of well-trained fighters, it has a huge propaganda network. Its main publication, Al Dawat, sells more than 80,000 copies at major bookshops across Pakistan.
The net has become the new medium for propaganda by terrorists or insurgent organisations. Easy and unregulated access and anonymity of communication has enabled organisations like the Lashkar, Hizbul Mujahideen and the LTTE to run websites. Nothing helps the terrorist more than having the media show mangled bodies and chaos that follow a terrorist attack. This is striking terror in the hearts of the people at no cost to the terrorist.
Since perception-building is a long haul, relying solely on the transient bureaucrat equipped with opinion but without expertise can leave the system stultified, dogmatic and even totalitarian. It is important for the credibility of such ventures that they are not required to support government policy in all aspects. It has become necessary to involve private entrepreneurs because they have the skills to act.
The Indian challenge is to make our presence felt abroad without this being seen as another boring government endeavour. A country that aspires to greater glory must have a credible voice. Image-building can be a collective national enterprise. Psy-war does not have to be a sinister venture. It is more about spreading the country’s soft power and its voice and influence, at least up to the range of Agni-III
Source : Hindustan Times 18th April 2007

The New solar system

The US National Security Strategy of March 2006 is an upgrade version of the 2002 version which had originated in the September 11 attacks. The present one seems to be a slight rethink of its predecessor but the essentials are the same. Introducing the new doctrine President Bush had declared rather grimly “America is at war.” He referred to a wartime national security strategy to counter the rise of terrorism and America had an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations of peace. Ironically, the day he spoke about bringing peace and democracy to Iraq, US aircraft were pounding that country in some of the biggest air raids in recent months.

The new doctrine is a tacit admission of the failure of unilateral preemption and also a denial of the true reality in Iraq. It therefore gives a rallying call for the spread of democracy and freedom as a means for extending US influence and interests while also retaining the right for pre-emptive action to defend these objectives. The US “will seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”

Given the magnitude of potential harm that adversaries could cause with their choice of weapons the US could not let them strike first. The doctrine of pre-emption is intact. Iran is a major threat, tyranny has continued in parts of the world, Russia and China were not free enough and India was a country of growing importance willing to share its global responsibilities alongside the US.

This new doctrine of democracy and preemption is the result of some rethink in nuance in the State Department and the Pentagon in the aftermath of the failures in the last four years. Paradoxically, this very failure in Iraq means that the US has to stay on in the region, for withdrawal now would be construed as defeat in the Islamic world. This is another reason why regime change in Iran has to be attempted.

The US Department of Defence Quadrennial Review of 2006 released in February is a 20-year battle plan and speaks of the requirement to wage long wars. It pays particular attention to the growing military might of China and seeks to follow a policy of encouraging peaceful economic growth of China. Simultaneously, American forces should be ready to maintain forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.

The QDR takes into account the threat from international terrorism requiring complex operations of long duration that would involve the US military openly and clandestinely in multiple countries. The War on Terror became Global War on Terror and now The Long War. Thank you very much, says the military-industrial complex, for now the Long War can go on and on. Spending US $ 693 billion for US defence in the next budget is an example.

The Pentagon’s own new counter terrorism strategy requires that US Special Operations Forces be deployed in US embassies abroad. They would collect and act on intelligence relating to terrorist threats to US interests with a capacity to operate in dozens of countries simultaneously. They would also train foreign militaries.

Thus, while counter terrorism, tackling growing Islamic radicalism and preventing the spread of WMDs is a top Pentagon priority, “shaping the choices of countries at strategic cross roads” – like China and India remains an important US security interest. The Pentagon retains its position as the world’s largest spender on defence; its expenditure is more than the next eighteen biggest spenders including the EU, West Asia, Russia, India, China and Japan. The US policy is going to be increasingly Pentagon-driven.

According to Thomas P.M. Barnett (The Pentagon’s New Map) the world has a Functioning Core which is integrating into the world of globalisation and this includes India, China, Japan, Russia, the EU, North America, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Australia and New Zealand. The rest of the world -- the entire Islamic world, Africa, parts of Latin America and Central Asia—was a Non-Integrating Gap disconnected from the rest of the world and subject to instabilities. The thesis is that decreasing this disconnectedness and increasing connectivity in the Functioning Core of globalisation would ensure lasting peace.

This disconnectedness can be cured through deconstruction and reconstruction. This is the kind of thinking that has gone on in Washington as late as mid-2005. William Pfaff had disclosed in the July 4, 2005 issue of the American Conservative that “A new Bureau of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department is charged with organizing the reconstruction of countries where the United States has deemed it necessary to intervene in order to make them into market democracies. The bureau has 25 countries under surveillance as possible candidates for Defense Department deconstruction and State Department reconstruction. The bureau’s director is recruiting ‘rapid-reaction forces’ of official, nongovernmental, and corporate business specialists. He hopes to develop the capacity for three full-scale, simultaneous reconstruction operations in different countries”. The point is not whether this is feasible or serious but that such schemes are actually being thought about and worked at.

The Pentagon thesis of long wars and global reach is not really contrary to the policy of regionalism enunciated by Condoleezza Rice when in January this year she explained how US global policy would operate. She spoke of promoting democracy and greater US engagement in the emerging power centers in Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East in preference to Europe and US yet she singled out “good partners like Pakistan and Jordan” neither of which are democracies. The gap between intentions and practice continues.

The new US foreign policy of “transformational diplomacy” is not just about just reporting the world as it is but about replicating Nation-States into US clones. Post conflict multinational reconstruction and stability teams consisting of lawyers, engineers, economists will be deployed. It is more about access diplomacy. Arab analysts point out that US Embassy officials began to tour the corridors of government buildings in the countries to which they were posted on grounds to monitor the progress of irrigation, healthcare and other development projects sponsored and funded by US aid agencies. Soon there were whispers that American directives to local government agencies on purely sovereign concerns were being received.

There are many who believe that India’s path to greatness lies through Washington and that the US is going to help India become a major power. Similarly, they also believe when the US talks of new centres of power and balance of power she means balance of power with the US. Banish the thought. What this really means is that the US will remain the centre of the Universe while the others China, Russia, India, Japan and Brazil, will revolve around equidistant from the US. The US is the hub with the other powers revolving on the wheel and controlled by the US. These powers regional would ideally be balanced with each other that may require corrections through Pentagon or State Department interventions from time to time. No power should be weaker than the other and no power should be strong enough to challenge the US in this scheme of things.

The strategy of pre-emption and the conduct of a long war on terror along with a renewed urge to democratize the world is part of the ultimate goal of spreading economic globalisation, with the US undoubtedly as the leader. In the months, years ahead, the test of Indian diplomacy and strategists would be to maximise gains from proximity to the US and minimise loss of independence of policy that a partnership with the rich and powerful will inevitably threatens to bring.
Source : Hindustan times 25th marh 2006

Empire's new clothes

Believe it or not, US policy is driven by a voracious need for global supremacy

It was a single deft move in the 18th century that secured the British Empire in India so many advantages over the advancing Russians. By sending five English dray horses along with a blue velvet upholstered coach to Maharaja Ranjit Singh in Lahore upstream from Kutch, the British discovered that the Indus was navigable all the way up and were given access to Afghanistan through his territories by a grateful Maharaja. The irony is that the British were only returning a gift Ranjit Singh had sent King William IV! Not a single shot was fired but the Empire had gained.

The opening gambits for empire building at that time were to flatter, cajole, persuade and if this did not work, then coerce and control and finally, occupy. One hundred and seventy years later these tactics and aims – access to markets and resources -- have not changed although the new Empire has shown a greater propensity to violence as a first option. The wooing started a few years ago when opinions began to filter through about a new power rising in the east – democratic India. National Intelligence Estimates predicted a bright future for India. Others predicted that India would challenge China; that maybe India ought to be a member of the UNSC and of so many other exclusive power centres of the world; that India could be trusted with American weaponry and even given American civilian nuclear technology to help it meet its fast growing energy needs. We took the bait.

Nuclear experts and scientists like Matin Zuberi, Dr. A Gopalakrishnan and Bharat Karnad, strategic analysts like Brahma Chellaney and Siddharth Varadarajan have written extensively about their misgivings on the Indo-US agreement of July 18, 2005. Criticism is about what we have signed, how the agreement will be fulfilled and what India has gained. These experts have argued that India has derived no benefits from this deal, and at the same time there are those in the US, like Robert Einhorn, who do not want the deal to go through because this would dilute the NPT regime that is so close to US Foreign Policy beliefs. Having flattered and cajoled India to sign on the dotted line, US coercion was evident at the time of the Iran vote. Control of events is sought through the various steps that are now being spelt out that India must carry out before Americans try to deliver anything they have promised.

India has agreed to identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner; to place all its civilian nuclear sites under IAEA inspections; adhere to the rules of NSG and Missile Control technology regimes without being a member of these groups; adhere to IAEA’s Additional Protocol which will subject India’s entire civil nuclear fuel cycle to international monitoring something which the 5 nuclear weapon states do not allow for themselves. Finally, and this is very crucial also, to promise to continue the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests.

As for the process for all this, we say “you first” but Brothers Burns and Joseph, America’s pointsmen have repeatedly made it quite clear that we must jump through the hoop first. The US had to be able to see what was happening, understand what was going on, and, agree with what was going on. So said Nicholas Burns in his testimony to the US Congress. Translated, it means total control. Joseph clarified that the kind of arrangements the Nuclear Five had with IAEA would not be granted to India.

It is only when India, enticed by assistance for commercial nuclear power, has carried out a complete emasculation of its nuclear establishment and given proof of this, will the US Government be able to move the US Congress to amend its 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Convincing other members of control groups like the NSG is another problem because members like China and South Africa have expressed their opposition to allowing India access to the 200-odd hi-tech items.

The two main items on offer in this deal are access to US defence industry and the “permission” as it were to spend US $ 5 billion for this. The other is the offer to sell civilian nuclear technology for India’s energy requirements. GE, which built Tarapur, also a prototype, has not built another reactor in the last 30 years. They tried to sell reactors to China in 2004 but the Chinese baulked at the idea as they were looking for full technology and engineering.

The American writer on development issues, Patrick Doherty, recently made an interesting observation, when he said that as part of America’s new energy policy, nuclear energy was an important component and “the Bush administration has worked out an agreement with the Indian government to share civilian nuclear technology. That agreement, in effect, allows India to be America’s lab rat on which we will test the unproven next generation of nuclear technology.” Thus, it is quite a choice -- either outmoded technology that does not suit Indian conditions or new untested technology.

The argument in favour of closer ties with the US is based on the assumption that only the US can help us become what we want to be. We forget that years of democracy have not saved us from sanctions while dictatorships have been rewarded and strengthened by purveyors of democracy. Some of us are dreamy eyed with illusions of grandeur but without understanding the character of the US Empire.

The US has spent huge sums of money and effort to maintain global primacy. One has to be incredibly naïve to assume that the US will let any alternative pillar of power emerge. Indians must understand what US policies are not what we want them to be or dream they will be. Similarly, why should our policies suit other power interests. What we need to know and understand is that why America, that is so fixated on global dominance, known to be a hard bargainer and has made nuclear non-proliferation an article of faith, is today willing to dilute this 30-year stance. What is the US getting and what is it that we have promised? Surely the people are entitled to know.

As it is, the US worries about the rise of China and another power centre in Asia would create complications. If it were looking for India to challenge China then it would clearly do some of the following things. It would have supported India’s efforts to UNSC membership and India’s desire to join the Generation IV International Forum (to design the next generation commercial nuclear power reactors) or the nuclear-fusion consortium that is to build and run the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in France. Instead, it offers India outmoded weaponry and untested civilian nuclear technology in return for circumscribing, forever, India’s nuclear weapons programme through imposed restrictions, safeguards and restrictions of fuel supplies that do not apply to NWS.

There is, however, a problem and a hope. America has moved from the days of “bipartisan age of narcissism and hubris” as Walter Russell Mead describes the decade of euphoria after the Berlin Wall came down. Today, that hubris is leading to nemesis. The Colossus that strode the globe is now more like an angry Samson, maybe on his way to becoming a Goliath. The Presidency is beleaguered. In this situation, the US Congress, belligerent about various issues, may not give the US President what he wants. Therein lies our hope.

Surce : The Hindustan Times, December 7, 2005

Handle with care

India’s security interests demand that it star dealing with King Gyanendra

Nepal today is a crucible resting on a tripod. The King, the RNA and the elite constitute one leg, the political parties constitute the second and the Maoists the third. All three are bitterly antagonistic towards each other. The crucible has the most explosive contents -- the ambitions of the King, the divided political parties with their leaders with their outsized egos and the rebellious and violent Maoists. Watching these antagonists keenly are the Indians, the Chinese, the Pakistanis, the British and the Americans. India’s chief concern is to prevent this chemical reaction from reaching critical mass and it is in our long-term interest to ensure that Nepal is always friendly to India and at peace with itself.

Indian reactions in February and subsequently gave the impression that there was a certain amount of tentativeness. We seem to be caught in a time warp and quickly decry “set backs to democracy” in Nepal or Myanmar but do not mind supping with other dictators in the neighbourhood. Our statements did not give the impression of a confident regional power with global aspirations. Our public reprimand of the King could have been better substituted with a private rebuke. At least we need to acknowledge that the King was trying to fight the Maoists even though the methods were not the best. We ourselves might have been reluctant to take a strong stand against the Maoists because of coalition compulsions. It was unfair to hector the king and then expect him not to play the China card. It was as if Gyanendra expected the standard Indian response and was willing to gamble on this knowing that he could call the bluff.

The present king is more of an activist than his brother was. It is not surprising that King Gyanendra carried out his palace coup and it was never a question of “if”, only a question of “when” he would take over. Self-confident and contemptuous of politicians, he felt that they were incapable of solving Nepal’s problems and only he was ordained to deliver. Gyanendra’s game plan includes incarcerating the politicians from time to time or publicly humiliating them. Neither courses of action will serve him well for the future. He needs above ground political support to tackle the Maoists. If the Maoists are not strong enough yet to take on the RNA neither is the RNA in any position to wipe out the Maoists. A growing political vacuum will only lead to greater chances of a military coup should Nepal continue to slide down hill as it inevitably will if the King does not strengthen the politicians. He must himself keep an exit clause for himself for it is essential in Nepal that Kingship in some form should remain intact. There has to be a totem pole for the people who are multi-ethnic and multi religious. But it has to be a Benevolent Royal. A good role model could be the King of Bhutan.

Nepal’s politicians are themselves to blame for their present predicament. Equipped with little else than monumental egos, mutual suspicion, inexperience and covered in corruption they spent most of their 14 years of democracy squabbling endlessly in total disregard of the plight of their people. In all these years of democracy with 13 prime ministers, precious little was done to alleviate poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, feudalism and caste discrimination.

Years of misrule by the Ranas and the Kings and with no solace provided by democracy has enabled the Maoists today to control 68 of 75 districts of Nepal in varying degrees. The Maoists claim that they have already won their battle against the Nepalese Police, are now ready to take on the Nepalese Army and would finally take on the Indian Army. They want the monarchy out and a republican government installed for which they are willing to kidnap, kill and maim. India’s worry is that these Maoists are tied up with our Naxalites with their Revolutionary Corridor extending from Bihar through Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh down to Andhra Pradesh and beyond. 500 persons were killed in India last year because of Maoist-Naxalite violence whereas no one had been a victim of Kashmir related violence outside Kashmir the same year. So when we worry for Nepal we also worry for ourselves.

As the crackdown on the Maoists begins, their leaders and cadres have begun to seek shelter in districts bordering Nepal from Uttaranchal to West Bengal and Sikkim. On an average 2000 Nepalese were fleeing to India as a result of Maoist actions. This was before the crackdown. Now the exodus is because of fear of the King as well as the Maoists.

The threat from Nepal is not that the King is about to march into Bihar to capture Patna (no conquerors so far) but a victory for the Nepalese Maoists in Nepal through an armed struggle will only encourage their Indian counterparts. Nepal is the closest to us in many ways apart from treaties that highlight this. Stronger than that are family ties from royalty down to the common man; there are ties of religion, education, livelihood, residence and marriage. One third of Nepal’s population is of Indian origin. There are six million Nepali speakers in India.

It is far more important for India to have a friendly Nepal. It is less important if Nepal is ruled by an absolute monarch, a constitutional monarch, a parliamentary democracy or a peoples’ democracy so long as it has India’s security interests in mind. Assistance for economic development, trade and infrastructure development and security forces would be automatically axiomatic. Nepal sees itself sandwiched between two giants and it is natural for it to try to play one against the other. The point is does India have enough clout to tell the other powers that India and Nepal have a special relationship.

As it happens we have to learn to deal with the King. He is the only symbol of authority left and spurning him or staying aloof will not help. We need to get into some private consultancies and unequivocal messages. The King must understand that if he wishes to preserve monarchy he will have to voluntarily yield ground before it is snatched away from him. He will have to get real and accept the role of the political parties. He will also have to accept that instability in Nepal is a vital security risk for India just as much as it is in Bihar or Manipur. India’s security interests need to be safeguarded and – this is important -- that India will make every effort to ensure this. The King has to appreciate that India’s security is safeguarded by strengthening Nepal’s sovereignty not by undermining it.

The Maoists will have to be brought to the negotiating table and they will eventually accept a constitutional role. The Maoists must realise and accept that insurgencies, particularly in the 21st century, have chances of succeeding only if they have state support. In this case they have none in India. The politicians will somehow have to mature and grow out of their egos, think a little more of the people they represent – not that this is happening to any great extent elsewhere. They and the King have to work together.

If all this happens then one of the obstacles for the region to slip out of backwardness and poverty would have been removed. If not, India will remain tied down by troubles nearer home, forever described as a country with a bright future and forever unable to attain its potential.


Source : Hindustan Times 16th may 2005

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

On Hu's Visit

On Hu's Visit


The theme song almost everywhere these days is “Will India catch up with China”? The prominent French daily, Le Monde had a special 8-page supplement on “Chindia” in October this year. Eric Le Boucher predicted that by 2035 China would have overtaken the US and India would have the third largest economy. Even though there were going to be problems in both countries the 21st century would belong to them. Jean-Francois Huchet talked of the advantage the Chinese had with their access to energy sources while India had the advantage in its youthful population. The difference is that by 2035 India will be dependent up to 95% on imported energy while China’s dependency will be 75%. A country that is almost totally dependent on external sources of energy is obviously going to be at a disadvantage. There are also several predictions that while China may keep winning the sprints, India will win the marathon.

For those of us who are taken in by these rosy projections about the future, it would be useful to remember a few random statistics. The Chinese today produce thrice as much electricity than we do, their railways haul five times more freight traffic than ours do and their container traffic is fifteen times higher. Nearly half our roads are unpaved while 90% are paved in China. Their foreign exchange reserves are six times ours and manufacturing adds twice as much to the value to China’s GDP than in our case. China has a huge trade surplus, while India has had a continuous trade deficit for over 50 years. More than that, the Chinese produce major weapons systems that they then supply to their friends quite often at cut rate prices and use their deep pockets to buy influence globally. So, while there is a lot to exult about in India, the reality is that we have a long way to go. Mere aggregated GDP figures does not make for a major power usually defined as one whose voice is heard and reach felt across the globe.

China became a major power in a couple of decades because there was a tenacity of purpose, a clear long-term perspective uninhibited by contrary political pressures and their own world-view of their position in the world. Having decided what they wanted they went about it systematically; the state committed itself to health and education, reduced its size of governance and made foreign investment attractive. Rapid economic growth brings its problems. Shanghai today is China’s showpiece and has twice as many skyscrapers than in New York City. But it is also known that these modern day Potemkins hide the desolation of poverty and inequality in the interior.

The rise of China and India and the emergence of Japan as a ‘normal’ country is taking place at the same time for the first time in history. But this is happening amidst unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities accompanied by competition for new resources, markets and rising military expenditures. The transformation of Japan into a country capable of rapid militarisation along with an enhanced military and naval presence of the US from the Mediterranean to the western Pacific makes China want to break out and ensure its future. China sees the growing warmth in the India-US relations as a part of this encirclement.

Today China considers US as sinister and Japan as antagonistic but keeps its economic relations with both very strong. On the other hand, China treats India with some disdain, never willing to accept it as an equal and ensuring India does not have a seat on the High Table of international affairs. This is partly our fault for we revel in equality with Pakistan; Havana was just another landmark. China seeks to be treated with awe and respect. India, on the other hand, seeks approval and acceptance from the West while wanting to be loved and liked in the neighbourhood. China has exercised strategic military options with Pakistan and North Korea and strategic market options with India and Japan. Consequently, China has two nuclear allies in Pakistan and North Korea, having helped them to get there in the pursuit of its own big power ambitions and the West, for all its machismo has been unable and, at times, even unwilling to prevent this.

The Chinese have always believed that neighbouring states must be respectful and obedient. This may not cower India but the game to hem India to the Asian sub-continent remains part of Chinese policy. The tactics were simple, keep borders with India tranquil but do not solve the dispute; trade with India but arm Pakistan and wean away Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. As India retreated strategically from Tibet over the past sixty years, Han Chinese and missiles moved in -- the former to change the demography and the latter as an exhibition of Chinese muscle and future intent.

The recently inaugurated rail link from Qinghai to Lhasa is more than just a spectacular engineering marvel. It is an exhibition of Chinese determination and the rail-road will reach Xigatse near Nepal by 2010 and maybe up to Kathmandu. The road infrastructure along the entire India-Tibet border has strategic implications for India in the context of an unresolved border. The Chinese aim to use their ‘soft’ economic power to reach our northeastern states, Chittagong and Myanmar through these trade links via Nathu la. The lateral roads from China into Pakistan and Myanmar, along with access to the ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and possibly Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are designed to put India in pincers.

It can be argued that these so-called threats are really challenges and every challenge can be an opportunity. Since it does not make economic sense that Chinese freight trains and trucks that come to the border should go back empty the opportunity will be with Indian entrepreneurs. That is perfectly rational if one side views this as purely an economic venture and the other is ready to exploit this. The answer to both is - no.

President Hu’s visit to India may be a part of the India-China friendship year but it is also part of a four-leg tour that includes Vietnam, Laos, and finally Pakistan where at least 20 agreements will be signed at a time when more and more Pakistanis seem virulently anti-American. One would expect the border issue, trade and Tibet would be discussed when the Chinese leader is in India. There are no quick solutions to the first because the Chinese do not seem to be in a hurry. But if the Chinese want a consulate in Calcutta then surely the least we can expect is one in Lhasa.

All this hoop-la about growing trade misses the point that the Chinese are flooding our consumer markets with manufactured goods (some quite shoddy), while taking away our raw materials like iron ore and steel for their growth industry. We need to correct this. Tibet is also more than just a territorial and emotive issue. It concerns Asia’s environment as well. The Indus, the Sutlej and the Brahmaputra originate in Tibet. Should the Chinese decide to divert the Brahmaputra to feed their arid north and generate some 40,000 mw of electricity, all of our northeastern states will become dry. A river water agreement with China is perhaps more urgent for India than a border settlement. This issue, along with improving the quality of life for all Indians, rather than being led into a steeplechase with China, should be some of our major concerns.
Source : Hindustan Times 4th Nov 2006

Chewing over China

The theme song almost everywhere these days is “Will India catch up with China”? The prominent French daily, Le Monde had a special 8-page supplement on “Chindia” in October this year. Eric Le Boucher predicted that by 2035 China would have overtaken the US and India would have the third largest economy. Even though there were going to be problems in both countries the 21st century would belong to them. Jean-Francois Huchet talked of the advantage the Chinese had with their access to energy sources while India had the advantage in its youthful population. The difference is that by 2035 India will be dependent up to 95% on imported energy while China’s dependency will be 75%. A country that is almost totally dependent on external sources of energy is obviously going to be at a disadvantage. There are also several predictions that while China may keep winning the sprints, India will win the marathon.

For those of us who are taken in by these rosy projections about the future, it would be useful to remember a few random statistics. The Chinese today produce thrice as much electricity than we do, their railways haul five times more freight traffic than ours do and their container traffic is fifteen times higher. Nearly half our roads are unpaved while 90% are paved in China. Their foreign exchange reserves are six times ours and manufacturing adds twice as much to the value to China’s GDP than in our case. China has a huge trade surplus, while India has had a continuous trade deficit for over 50 years. More than that, the Chinese produce major weapons systems that they then supply to their friends quite often at cut rate prices and use their deep pockets to buy influence globally. So, while there is a lot to exult about in India, the reality is that we have a long way to go. Mere aggregated GDP figures does not make for a major power usually defined as one whose voice is heard and reach felt across the globe.

China became a major power in a couple of decades because there was a tenacity of purpose, a clear long-term perspective uninhibited by contrary political pressures and their own world-view of their position in the world. Having decided what they wanted they went about it systematically; the state committed itself to health and education, reduced its size of governance and made foreign investment attractive. Rapid economic growth brings its problems. Shanghai today is China’s showpiece and has twice as many skyscrapers than in New York City. But it is also known that these modern day Potemkins hide the desolation of poverty and inequality in the interior.

The rise of China and India and the emergence of Japan as a ‘normal’ country is taking place at the same time for the first time in history. But this is happening amidst unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities accompanied by competition for new resources, markets and rising military expenditures. The transformation of Japan into a country capable of rapid militarisation along with an enhanced military and naval presence of the US from the Mediterranean to the western Pacific makes China want to break out and ensure its future. China sees the growing warmth in the India-US relations as a part of this encirclement.

Today China considers US as sinister and Japan as antagonistic but keeps its economic relations with both very strong. On the other hand, China treats India with some disdain, never willing to accept it as an equal and ensuring India does not have a seat on the High Table of international affairs. This is partly our fault for we revel in equality with Pakistan; Havana was just another landmark. China seeks to be treated with awe and respect. India, on the other hand, seeks approval and acceptance from the West while wanting to be loved and liked in the neighbourhood. China has exercised strategic military options with Pakistan and North Korea and strategic market options with India and Japan. Consequently, China has two nuclear allies in Pakistan and North Korea, having helped them to get there in the pursuit of its own big power ambitions and the West, for all its machismo has been unable and, at times, even unwilling to prevent this.

The Chinese have always believed that neighbouring states must be respectful and obedient. This may not cower India but the game to hem India to the Asian sub-continent remains part of Chinese policy. The tactics were simple, keep borders with India tranquil but do not solve the dispute; trade with India but arm Pakistan and wean away Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. As India retreated strategically from Tibet over the past sixty years, Han Chinese and missiles moved in -- the former to change the demography and the latter as an exhibition of Chinese muscle and future intent.

The recently inaugurated rail link from Qinghai to Lhasa is more than just a spectacular engineering marvel. It is an exhibition of Chinese determination and the rail-road will reach Xigatse near Nepal by 2010 and maybe up to Kathmandu. The road infrastructure along the entire India-Tibet border has strategic implications for India in the context of an unresolved border. The Chinese aim to use their ‘soft’ economic power to reach our northeastern states, Chittagong and Myanmar through these trade links via Nathu la. The lateral roads from China into Pakistan and Myanmar, along with access to the ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and possibly Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are designed to put India in pincers.

It can be argued that these so-called threats are really challenges and every challenge can be an opportunity. Since it does not make economic sense that Chinese freight trains and trucks that come to the border should go back empty the opportunity will be with Indian entrepreneurs. That is perfectly rational if one side views this as purely an economic venture and the other is ready to exploit this. The answer to both is - no.

President Hu’s visit to India may be a part of the India-China friendship year but it is also part of a four-leg tour that includes Vietnam, Laos, and finally Pakistan where at least 20 agreements will be signed at a time when more and more Pakistanis seem virulently anti-American. One would expect the border issue, trade and Tibet would be discussed when the Chinese leader is in India. There are no quick solutions to the first because the Chinese do not seem to be in a hurry. But if the Chinese want a consulate in Calcutta then surely the least we can expect is one in Lhasa.

All this hoop-la about growing trade misses the point that the Chinese are flooding our consumer markets with manufactured goods (some quite shoddy), while taking away our raw materials like iron ore and steel for their growth industry. We need to correct this. Tibet is also more than just a territorial and emotive issue. It concerns Asia’s environment as well. The Indus, the Sutlej and the Brahmaputra originate in Tibet. Should the Chinese decide to divert the Brahmaputra to feed their arid north and generate some 40,000 mw of electricity, all of our northeastern states will become dry. A river water agreement with China is perhaps more urgent for India than a border settlement. This issue, along with improving the quality of life for all Indians, rather than being led into a steeplechase with China, should be some of our major concerns.

Source : Hindustan Times 13th Nov 2006

Friday, February 2, 2007

Allied to the problem

At the end of a French delegation's visit to Pakistan recently, the Pakistan Foreign Office put out its usual statement. It referred to Pakistan as an anchor of peace in the region and said that the leader of the French delegation, former Premier Senator (Francois) Poncet, had commended Pakistan's role in promoting peace and stability. One does not know if this is a reflection of Gaul indulgence, Pakistan's continued self-delusion or simply a Foreign Office sleight of hand. One thing it definitely is, is being elastic with the truth.

Soon after this, US State Department Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, on a visit to Pakistan, commended America's stalwart ally for arresting the maximum number of terrorists. But where else would you find the largest number of terrorists anyway? It is like showing surprise at finding kangaroos in Australia.

Since September 11, 2001, General Musharraf's policy of riding two horses simultaneously - the one for war on terror and the other for supporting jehad - has needed extraordinary equestrian skills. One of the horses is likely to gallop away soon. There are signs of impatience and doubt in the West. Think-tanks like the Carnegie Endowment for Peace have begun to doubt Musharraf's sincerity and feel that he is exploiting the war on terror for himself. It is not yet known whether the US has realised that Pakistan is part of the problem and not part of the solution. The more optimistic assumption is that there is realisation, but also helplessness, at the moment.

In today's Pakistan, there are three main harsh realities. First, that the Baloch struggle is not about the three main tribes, the Bugtis, Marris and the Mengals, fighting for the preservation of their Sardari system. The struggle is about basic rights - economic and political - because the revolt is all over Balochistan and not restricted to these three tribal areas. The second reality is that the Waziristan area in the Fata belt, which was the launching pad for many of the campaigns in the jehad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, is today prime Taliban country - and only growing in depth and area. Third, Pakistan is getting 'jehadised', ever so incrementally; one may not notice it, but it is.

In Balochistan, there were four incidents on a single day, April 6.Between January and March this year, there were nearly 60 incidents of rocket attacks all over the province and at least 1,600 rockets were fired. In February, gas pipelines were disrupted 21 times, affecting supplies to the rest of the country. Nawab Akbar Bugti is a fugitive in his own province and has not returned to Bugti Fort for months. Akhtar Mengal is constantly harassed and Nawab Khair Bux Marri, along with his two sons, has been slapped with an arms and ammunition case. This is despite the fact that these leaders have from time to time, along with harsh statements, also said that the present struggle is not yet about secession but about provincial rights.

Reactions from Islamabad have been on expected lines - use of indiscriminate and excessive force, artillery, helicopter gun-ships and aircraft included. And finding that an ordinary Baloch was willing to die for the long-standing grievances of greater autonomy, prevention of ethnic identity from being swamped by the Punjabi outsiders, for the removal of military cantonments and a greater share in revenue and development, Pakistani authorities have begun to blame external forces. Iranian authorities, fearing that the US would want to use Balochistan to destabilise their country, may seek to pre-empt that. Pakistan's military leaders are unable to admit that the hatred for Punjabi dominance is widespread and deep-rooted in the other three provinces. There have been suggestions for the trifurcation of Punjab around Bahawalpur, Multan and Rawalpindi. Thus, apart from solving Baloch problems, Punjab needs to be cut to size if Pakistan has to be saved.

The fear is that attempts to portray the present struggle as the selfish handiwork of a few misguided miscreants and attempts to destroy traditional Baloch society by abolishing the Sardari system without anything else in place, would leave the province in a vacuum to be filled by the Taliban alumni.

Waziristan, with its inhospitable terrain and warlike conservative tribes, the Waziris and Mahsuds, was the ideal launching pad in the jehad against the Soviets in the Paktia and Khost provinces across the border. Today, terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan have made south and north Waziristan their new Taliban country, using it to regroup and relaunch into Afghanistan. About two months ago, Tolo TV channel, run from Kabul by some liberal Afghans, had shown gruesome details of half a dozen bodies being dragged by a jeep through the streets of Mandrakhel. Another scene depicted severed heads and crowds chanting 'Long live Osama bin Laden', 'Long live Mullah Omar'.

The fear is that the Taliban mindset and influence have begun to spread to the 'settled areas' of the NWFP. Areas like Darra Adam Khel provide home-made weapons and can turn in upto 400 weapons of varying kinds and calibre in a day. The Taliban are able to move at ease from Karachi to Darra to Peshawar to Quetta and on to Kandahar or Helmund or Jalalabad. Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, the ISI's blue-eyed boy and now at peace with the Taliban, is back in business.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has more than once complained to Musharraf about Taliban's transgressions, but Pakistan's leaders continue to chase the dream of strategic depth in Afghanistan and are blinded to the fact that this is becoming their nightmare. Pushed to the wall, Pakhtoons of Afghanistan will claim that the Durand Line runs south from Attock along the Indus up to Dera Ismail Khan, while the Pakistanis would want to push this up to Kabul. Therein lie the seeds of future conflict.

Over the years, conventional wisdom has held that the NWFP and Balochistan were the more conservative societies and, therefore, more susceptible to religious fundamentalism, Punjab was the symbol of modernism. This is partially true and partially a myth perpetuated by the Punjabis. Both the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the rabid Sunni organisation, the Sipaha-e-Sahaba, have their birthplaces here. The largest number of blasphemy cases were reported from Punjab last year. Musharraf could not go to Lahore in March for the Basant celebrations because the mullahs declared the festival un-Islamic for its Hindu origins. Everyone blames the curriculum of the madrasas as being responsible for churning out jehadis in Pakistan. Yet mainstream schools continue to teach jehad to their students. Attacks on Christians and Ahmediyas have increased.

Waziristan is slipping out of control and of the 80,000 troops deployed earlier to control the situation, some have been diverted to Balochistan. US hi-tech surveillance systems and border teams helping in joint operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have been unable to pick up any important al-Qaeda operatives, but the locals move across freely. More troops are needed.

The Pakistani excuse to the Americans is that it cannot divert more troops from the eastern border given the situation with India. The only way this can be done is if Indo-Pak problems from Siachen to Sir Creek are solved, enabling Pakistan to disengage and re-deploy. In the interim, if the US could at least nudge the Indians to at least demilitarise Siachen and Kashmir, it could help in the war on terror.

Source: Hindustan Times, April 11, 2006

Thursday, February 1, 2007

Allied to the problem

At the end of a French delegation's visit to Pakistan recently, the Pakistan Foreign Office put out its usual statement. It referred to Pakistan as an anchor of peace in the region and said that the leader of the French delegation, former Premier Senator (Francois) Poncet, had commended Pakistan's role in promoting peace and stability. One does not know if this is a reflection of Gaul indulgence, Pakistan's continued self-delusion or simply a Foreign Office sleight of hand. One thing it definitely is, is being elastic with the truth.
Soon after this, US State Department Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, on a visit to Pakistan, commended America's stalwart ally for arresting the maximum number of terrorists. But where else would you find the largest number of terrorists anyway? It is like showing surprise at finding kangaroos in Australia.
Since September 11, 2001, General Musharraf's policy of riding two horses simultaneously - the one for war on terror and the other for supporting jehad - has needed extraordinary equestrian skills. One of the horses is likely to gallop away soon. There are signs of impatience and doubt in the West. Think-tanks like the Carnegie Endowment for Peace have begun to doubt Musharraf's sincerity and feel that he is exploiting the war on terror for himself. It is not yet known whether the US has realised that Pakistan is part of the problem and not part of the solution. The more optimistic assumption is that there is realisation, but also helplessness, at the moment.
In today's Pakistan, there are three main harsh realities. First, that the Baloch struggle is not about the three main tribes, the Bugtis, Marris and the Mengals, fighting for the preservation of their Sardari system. The struggle is about basic rights - economic and political - because the revolt is all over Balochistan and not restricted to these three tribal areas. The second reality is that the Waziristan area in the Fata belt, which was the launching pad for many of the campaigns in the jehad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, is today prime Taliban country - and only growing in depth and area. Third, Pakistan is getting 'jehadised', ever so incrementally; one may not notice it, but it is.
In Balochistan, there were four incidents on a single day, April 6.Between January and March this year, there were nearly 60 incidents of rocket attacks all over the province and at least 1,600 rockets were fired. In February, gas pipelines were disrupted 21 times, affecting supplies to the rest of the country. Nawab Akbar Bugti is a fugitive in his own province and has not returned to Bugti Fort for months. Akhtar Mengal is constantly harassed and Nawab Khair Bux Marri, along with his two sons, has been slapped with an arms and ammunition case. This is despite the fact that these leaders have from time to time, along with harsh statements, also said that the present struggle is not yet about secession but about provincial rights.
Reactions from Islamabad have been on expected lines - use of indiscriminate and excessive force, artillery, helicopter gun-ships and aircraft included. And finding that an ordinary Baloch was willing to die for the long-standing grievances of greater autonomy, prevention of ethnic identity from being swamped by the Punjabi outsiders, for the removal of military cantonments and a greater share in revenue and development, Pakistani authorities have begun to blame external forces. Iranian authorities, fearing that the US would want to use Balochistan to destabilise their country, may seek to pre-empt that. Pakistan's military leaders are unable to admit that the hatred for Punjabi dominance is widespread and deep-rooted in the other three provinces. There have been suggestions for the trifurcation of Punjab around Bahawalpur, Multan and Rawalpindi. Thus, apart from solving Baloch problems, Punjab needs to be cut to size if Pakistan has to be saved.
The fear is that attempts to portray the present struggle as the selfish handiwork of a few misguided miscreants and attempts to destroy traditional Baloch society by abolishing the Sardari system without anything else in place, would leave the province in a vacuum to be filled by the Taliban alumni.
Waziristan, with its inhospitable terrain and warlike conservative tribes, the Waziris and Mahsuds, was the ideal launching pad in the jehad against the Soviets in the Paktia and Khost provinces across the border. Today, terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan have made south and north Waziristan their new Taliban country, using it to regroup and relaunch into Afghanistan. About two months ago, Tolo TV channel, run from Kabul by some liberal Afghans, had shown gruesome details of half a dozen bodies being dragged by a jeep through the streets of Mandrakhel. Another scene depicted severed heads and crowds chanting 'Long live Osama bin Laden', 'Long live Mullah Omar'.
The fear is that the Taliban mindset and influence have begun to spread to the 'settled areas' of the NWFP. Areas like Darra Adam Khel provide home-made weapons and can turn in upto 400 weapons of varying kinds and calibre in a day. The Taliban are able to move at ease from Karachi to Darra to Peshawar to Quetta and on to Kandahar or Helmund or Jalalabad. Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, the ISI's blue-eyed boy and now at peace with the Taliban, is back in business.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has more than once complained to Musharraf about Taliban's transgressions, but Pakistan's leaders continue to chase the dream of strategic depth in Afghanistan and are blinded to the fact that this is becoming their nightmare. Pushed to the wall, Pakhtoons of Afghanistan will claim that the Durand Line runs south from Attock along the Indus up to Dera Ismail Khan, while the Pakistanis would want to push this up to Kabul. Therein lie the seeds of future conflict.
Over the years, conventional wisdom has held that the NWFP and Balochistan were the more conservative societies and, therefore, more susceptible to religious fundamentalism, Punjab was the symbol of modernism. This is partially true and partially a myth perpetuated by the Punjabis. Both the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the rabid Sunni organisation, the Sipaha-e-Sahaba, have their birthplaces here. The largest number of blasphemy cases were reported from Punjab last year. Musharraf could not go to Lahore in March for the Basant celebrations because the mullahs declared the festival un-Islamic for its Hindu origins. Everyone blames the curriculum of the madrasas as being responsible for churning out jehadis in Pakistan. Yet mainstream schools continue to teach jehad to their students. Attacks on Christians and Ahmediyas have increased.
Waziristan is slipping out of control and of the 80,000 troops deployed earlier to control the situation, some have been diverted to Balochistan. US hi-tech surveillance systems and border teams helping in joint operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have been unable to pick up any important al-Qaeda operatives, but the locals move across freely. More troops are needed.
The Pakistani excuse to the Americans is that it cannot divert more troops from the eastern border given the situation with India. The only way this can be done is if Indo-Pak problems from Siachen to Sir Creek are solved, enabling Pakistan to disengage and re-deploy. In the interim, if the US could at least nudge the Indians to at least demilitarise Siachen and Kashmir, it could help in the war on terror.
Source: Hindustan Times, April 11, 2006