Good fences make good neighbours or as the Economist of London once put it in the context of US-Mexico border, "good neighbours make fences". Yet India and China, the two most populous countries of the world, with the largest standing armies, growing economies in competition, and, with two nuclear weapon powers aligned against us in a higher-than-the-Himalayas friendship, we do not even have the 4,057-kilometre land frontier delineated. Demarcation is a long way off.
It is wishful thinking that the burgeoning trade between the two countries will compensate for any lack of political depth in our relationship despite all the talk of strategic partnerships, a joint mechanism on counter-terror and joint military exercises. The hope held out is that improving trade and economic ties will pave the way for future reconciliation. If it were that simple then the China-Japan political relationship would have been qualitatively different today. Despite the massive bilateral trade and despite massive Japanese investments in China, the underlying political suspicions and age-old animosities have not disappeared.
So also with India and China. We do not seem to have recovered from our 1962 trauma and China is determined to keep us that way, psychologically and strategically handicapped. Even before India began to grow economically, China was intent on keeping India boxed in within its national boundaries. And now with growing competition for markets and resources, there is greater Chinese need to restrict India's reach and influence as a possible alternative and successful model of growth and governance. For long, Pakistan has been a low cost hedge for Chinese policymakers and the recent US-India warmth may worry Beijing even though it will continue to pretend public disdain.
China can be expected to maintain this posture so long as the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue is not firmly solved in their favour. There are India China differences on Chinese nuclear, missile and military assistance to Pakistan. China will not give India the space it needs neither in the search for energy resources, markets or what India deems its rightful place on the High Table. Given the Chinese global position, its economic might and the US-Chinese interdependent relationship which neither will jeopardise for India's sake, the Chinese will not be in a hurry to resolve the boundary dispute.
It is India, therefore, that will have to set the pace. But this can only be done once there is a clear and honest appraisal of the nature of the problem, the issues involved and then think of possible solutions. This continued ambivalence sets in a lethargy that can be strategically self-defeating and India, therefore, needs a lasting solution. This is what Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh set out to do in their book India China Relations: the Border Issue and Beyond. The book is the result of a joint venture between the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Observer Research Foundation, and its main advantage is that it is lucid, objective and well-argued; and the authors succinctly state their argument in about 140 pages apart from the appendices.
Quite early in the book, the authors make the point that the crux of the problem is the Aksai Chin which the British eventually left un-demarcated after following various boundary delineations that were largely dependent on how they saw the advance of the Russian threat into Tibet and Asia. Arunachal Pradesh was a later add-on following Indian reluctance to discuss Aksai Chin with the Chinese. The Chinese inability to handle the Tibet issue and the effects of the Cold War in South Asia had heightened Chinese fears. Further, India forward policy without thinking this through militarily and strategically aroused Chinese suspicions. Nevertheless, the Chinese have accepted the McMohan Line with Burma and have reached agreements on land frontiers with its other neighbours except India and Bhutan.
Having laid out the Legacy of the Great Game where the authors show how 19th and 20th century London viewed problems differently from how New Delhi saw, much like Washington and New Delhi see things differently today, the discussion then revolves around Tibet, China and India, how India inherited fuzzy frontiers leading on to the debacle of 1962. But it is time to move on and follow what Zhou Enlai had said in 1960 and later Deng Xiao Ping had suggested in 1981 - a package proposal calling for concessions on both sides. The authors have a way forward, which includes Indianising Tawang much more systematically than at present.
A great deal would depend on Indian self-confidence and the authors recommend that India is making too much out of the so called string of pearls strategy of the Chinese. They argue that "New Delhi's assessments should critically evaluate the economic and military rationales behind such moves. Imputing solely the latter and assuming it to be directed primarily against India, is too narrow an interpretation, stimulating equally insular policy options." India needs to take advantage of the geo-economic options by gaining connectivity to new economic and resource centres. There is realisation in New Delhi that the Chinese have now begun to rely on "its non-coercive and 'remunerative power' to advance its influence'' and recommend that it would be good policy for India to integrate the South Asian periphery with the Indian economic system and simultaneously to increase its economic interaction with Beijing. If only that this was so simple. There is no exclusive non-coercive infrastructure. China has improved its strategic position with the development of Gwadar and all the rail road linkages into Xinjiang that will follow, the Gormu Lhasa rail link that would be developed into Kathmandu and Chinese infrastructure linkages from Yunnan into Burma. India has nothing remotely comparable to this, inside Indian territory or in our neighbourhood.
It is more than just economics of course and Chinese scholars say that China sees India as what they call four in one with India falling into all four categories - of developing countries, neighbouring countries, rising powers and influential actors on the international stage. That being so there should be reason enough to settle the boundary problem. The 1914 Mcmahon Line is the natural non-negotiable Indian interest in the east just as the Aksai Chin is a similar non-negotiable Chinese interest in the western sector. The authors assert that the usual zero sum game is debilitating and counter-productive and recommend the broad acceptance of a de facto position as the de jure settlement is eminently doable. They have, therefore, suggested a way out of the logjam by accepting historical truths, ground realities and strategic requirements so that India does not miss the technological and economic revolution of the 21st century.
The main thrust of the book is that it is set in the present reality and prescribes a future course without letting the past be a burden. The book is forward-looking in its recommendations and it would be to our collective advantage to debate the issues they have raised.
Source : Asian Age , 30th March 2009 ( Book Review of the book titled " India-China Relations : The Border issues and Beyond , by Mohan Guruswamy & Zorawar Daulet Singh )
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Pervez Spoke In India To Be Heard In Pakistan
Pakistani performers – singers and musicians - unable to get a break in their own country would come to India. Ghulam Ali, Mehdi Hassan and Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan made it big once they had entertained and been appreciated by Indian audiences. It is here that their art flourished and only then were they recognised in their own country.
Gen. Musharraf was the latest of such performers. His goal though was different. He was here to impress his dwindling audiences back home with his belligerence on ‘enemy soil’ and regain relevance in Pakistani politics. One does not know whether this was audacity of hope or the harsh reality of a future imperfect of a floundering Pakistan that continues to seek enemies. After the usual bellicosity, meant for his hard line audience in Pakistan, he offered himself as the next President, provided he was made a ‘real’ president. This was a humble offer to serve the nation in any post so long as he could live in the Aiwan-e-Sadr.
Many do not know that the General has been a fan of Clint Eastwood but the difference is that the General shoots from the lip. That is why he got into all sorts of tangles during his marathon and excruciatingly boring session at the India Today Conclave. It was obvious that the General does not know how to answer awkward questions except by being offensive. After he gave his rambling and muddled world view (he did refer to South America to show his breadth of vision) he talked of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan.
When it was suggested to Gen Musharaf that Pakistan make a declaration of faith by handing over Dawood Ibrahim, a clearly flustered General and after the usual evasive tactics, said even if Dawood were handed over relations would not improve. This was a tacit admission of fact. His argument was that since India was supposed to be in touch with Brahmdag Bugti, this allowed Pakistan to harbour an international criminal. Unfortunately, no one then asked him about the various Sikh extremists like Lakhbir Singh Rhode of the International Sikh Youth Federation , who continue to live under Pakistan’s loving care in Lahore or Wadhawan Singh Babbar of Babbar Khalsa International and others whose well being is supervised by the retired Lt Gen Javed Nasir, a former Director General of the ISI.
Later, he elevated himself as an arbiter between India and Pakistan but also threatened more Kargils if Pakistan were not granted what they demand. A man cannot be a peacenik and also threaten war. However, the General assured that relations could improve if Kashmir were handed over to Pakistan. Justice thy name is Pervez Musharraf. The general also pretended injured innocence about how Bangladesh got its independence – alluding to Indian intervention but conveniently omitting the fact the Pakistan Army had killed three million innocent Bangladeshis before the Indian Army stepped in.
Other contradictions featured. For instance, according the General, the ISI and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are alike, and later said that the Army and the ISI were the centre of gravity in Pakistan. That is the core issue in Pakistan, the power of the Army as an institution and the pelf of the Pakistan Army officers. Surely, the General must know that in India neither the Army nor the RAW are centres of gravity. The people are the centre of gravity. Pervez Musharraf, imaginative with the truth, also said that terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed were born because of India. He did not add that weapons and training for the Lashkar came via the ISI and loads of Saudi money went into the Jamaat ut Dawa. The world knows this.
The one person who immediately understood what Musharraf was trying was Rajya Sabha MP Maulana Mahmood Madani. And he was quite forthright when he said that the General was beginning his career in Pakistani politics in India. Musharraf was livid with rage when the Maulana proceeded to tell the General that his gratuitous advice about how to handle problems was not only not needed it was detrimental to Muslims where the majority had defended them. A flustered angry and truculent Musharraf then accused the Maulana of hypocrisy. Yet the General’s Army and its terrorist surrogates has killed more Muslims in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan than any other country anywhere else in the world. And since it is still a work in progress, Pakistan ceased to have the right to be the Defender of the Faith a long time ago.
In his autobiography – In the Line of Fire – which is the same title as Clint Eastwood’s Academy award film about a psychopath wanting to assassinate the president, the General modestly describes himself as a statesman, qualities that were singularly absent when he answered questions about the Mumbai massacres. He did not have a single soft word of sympathy for the innocents who were killed; there was no condemnation of even the act of terrorism if not the terrorists. Instead, he launched into a tirade against the Indian media, the politicians and everyone else for this war ‘hysteria’ against Pakistan. But for decades now Pakistan has inculcated enmity and obscurantism by consistently teaching its young in madrassas and in mainstream schools jihad and hatred; leaders of various jihadi outfits have constantly spoken of the need to conquer and divide India; and, the General himself when in power had referred to India as the enemy.
Events seem to have upset the General’s ambitions to make a triumphant return to Pakistan politics as the now rejuvenated Supreme Court may want to ask a few awkward questions about the General’s unconstitutional orders in November 2007.
One wonders if he still has space in Neherwali Galli.
Source : Asian Age , 24th March 2009
Gen. Musharraf was the latest of such performers. His goal though was different. He was here to impress his dwindling audiences back home with his belligerence on ‘enemy soil’ and regain relevance in Pakistani politics. One does not know whether this was audacity of hope or the harsh reality of a future imperfect of a floundering Pakistan that continues to seek enemies. After the usual bellicosity, meant for his hard line audience in Pakistan, he offered himself as the next President, provided he was made a ‘real’ president. This was a humble offer to serve the nation in any post so long as he could live in the Aiwan-e-Sadr.
Many do not know that the General has been a fan of Clint Eastwood but the difference is that the General shoots from the lip. That is why he got into all sorts of tangles during his marathon and excruciatingly boring session at the India Today Conclave. It was obvious that the General does not know how to answer awkward questions except by being offensive. After he gave his rambling and muddled world view (he did refer to South America to show his breadth of vision) he talked of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan.
When it was suggested to Gen Musharaf that Pakistan make a declaration of faith by handing over Dawood Ibrahim, a clearly flustered General and after the usual evasive tactics, said even if Dawood were handed over relations would not improve. This was a tacit admission of fact. His argument was that since India was supposed to be in touch with Brahmdag Bugti, this allowed Pakistan to harbour an international criminal. Unfortunately, no one then asked him about the various Sikh extremists like Lakhbir Singh Rhode of the International Sikh Youth Federation , who continue to live under Pakistan’s loving care in Lahore or Wadhawan Singh Babbar of Babbar Khalsa International and others whose well being is supervised by the retired Lt Gen Javed Nasir, a former Director General of the ISI.
Later, he elevated himself as an arbiter between India and Pakistan but also threatened more Kargils if Pakistan were not granted what they demand. A man cannot be a peacenik and also threaten war. However, the General assured that relations could improve if Kashmir were handed over to Pakistan. Justice thy name is Pervez Musharraf. The general also pretended injured innocence about how Bangladesh got its independence – alluding to Indian intervention but conveniently omitting the fact the Pakistan Army had killed three million innocent Bangladeshis before the Indian Army stepped in.
Other contradictions featured. For instance, according the General, the ISI and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are alike, and later said that the Army and the ISI were the centre of gravity in Pakistan. That is the core issue in Pakistan, the power of the Army as an institution and the pelf of the Pakistan Army officers. Surely, the General must know that in India neither the Army nor the RAW are centres of gravity. The people are the centre of gravity. Pervez Musharraf, imaginative with the truth, also said that terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed were born because of India. He did not add that weapons and training for the Lashkar came via the ISI and loads of Saudi money went into the Jamaat ut Dawa. The world knows this.
The one person who immediately understood what Musharraf was trying was Rajya Sabha MP Maulana Mahmood Madani. And he was quite forthright when he said that the General was beginning his career in Pakistani politics in India. Musharraf was livid with rage when the Maulana proceeded to tell the General that his gratuitous advice about how to handle problems was not only not needed it was detrimental to Muslims where the majority had defended them. A flustered angry and truculent Musharraf then accused the Maulana of hypocrisy. Yet the General’s Army and its terrorist surrogates has killed more Muslims in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan than any other country anywhere else in the world. And since it is still a work in progress, Pakistan ceased to have the right to be the Defender of the Faith a long time ago.
In his autobiography – In the Line of Fire – which is the same title as Clint Eastwood’s Academy award film about a psychopath wanting to assassinate the president, the General modestly describes himself as a statesman, qualities that were singularly absent when he answered questions about the Mumbai massacres. He did not have a single soft word of sympathy for the innocents who were killed; there was no condemnation of even the act of terrorism if not the terrorists. Instead, he launched into a tirade against the Indian media, the politicians and everyone else for this war ‘hysteria’ against Pakistan. But for decades now Pakistan has inculcated enmity and obscurantism by consistently teaching its young in madrassas and in mainstream schools jihad and hatred; leaders of various jihadi outfits have constantly spoken of the need to conquer and divide India; and, the General himself when in power had referred to India as the enemy.
Events seem to have upset the General’s ambitions to make a triumphant return to Pakistan politics as the now rejuvenated Supreme Court may want to ask a few awkward questions about the General’s unconstitutional orders in November 2007.
One wonders if he still has space in Neherwali Galli.
Source : Asian Age , 24th March 2009
Monday, March 9, 2009
Pakistan : US and Them
Terrorists and such have to be militarily defeated before states can sit across the table and deal with them; at best this can be started when the terrorists are on the run. What the Pakistanis have done in the Malakand division is inexplicable. They have not defeated the Islamic radicals militarily nor subdued them in any way. This deal was possible only because the Pak Army approved of this or actually encouraged it. This means that they have been either forced into this, wanted to do this anyway as they believed in it or the militants were so strong and the Army so weak that the militants could not be defeated.
In conceding ground to the radicals in FATA and Malakand as well as Kohistan in the Hazara Division, Islamabad has ceded sovereignty, although we may call it something else. There are fears that this maybe the tipping point for Pakistan’s eventual conversion into a Talibanised state.
Over the years Pakistan has come to believe that the world is beholden to it that it exists. This notion of indispensability allows them to be wild, delinquent and dangerous. Like the spoilt brat of a rich and doting parent, Pakistan either becomes petulant when it is not granted what it unjustifiably demands or becomes belligerent when it is granted that wish by its benefactor. Today, Pakistan is embellished by a begging bowl economy with terrorism as its main export, unending bitter unrest in Balochistan, sectarian violence in Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, a creaking law and order system and a judicial system that evokes little confidence.
There are many in India who are forever ready to give Pakistan another chance saying they are like us but the poor souls are stuck with rotten governments and they need our help to get them out of their predicament. It is incredibly naive of us to build policies for our future and security on fond nostalgia which is mostly one way. One has never heard any Pakistani leader talk lovingly of the India they left behind. And they teach their children mostly how to hate India with a warped form of history, even at the mainstream schools.
It is strange that we still keep saying to Pakistanis that we are all alike and have a common culture and so on. The truth is that they do not want to be like us and quite honestly, we have nothing in common with them. Not anymore. First of all, our minority population is more Indian than theirs is Pakistani and our majority too is different from theirs. Pakistanis have never understood, therefore never accepted, the concept of accepting and accommodating minorities. Not that we do it perfectly but we do a fairly good job. In Pakistan, you are either a Shia,Bohra or an Ismaili and worse -- an Ahmediya; being a woman, a Baloch, a Pushtun, a Sindhi or a Mohajir or a Hindu hari is a curse. Only a Sunni Punjabi is a true blue Punjabi. Arguments with minorities are settled with a bullet. It is difficult for a Pakistani to understand that minorities can also dominate and they are really minorities if you call them so. Our latest success story – the cricket team – symbolises our diversity. Pakistan does not have an equivalent of Bollywood and if they did, it would never be dominated by Hindus.
There are other fundamental differences. They deny history and even geography, we seek our roots in our civilisation. They say jihad in the name of God. We have room for all faiths at the Dargah in Ajmer Sharif, in Darbar Sahib (where the foundation stone was laid by Mian Mir), San Thome or Gyanvapi Temple. Fewer and fewer Pakistanis understand that it is easy or natural for an Indian to listen to Jafar Hussain Badayuni’s rendering of Amir Khusro’s Bahut Kathin Hai Dagar or Ek Pita Ekas Ke Hum Baarek by Bhai Maninder Singh and Bhai Jitender Singh or Jai Madhav Madan Murari by Jagjit Singh on any morning. This is what makes us unique in the world. God by any other name means the same and He does not seem to mind.
In Pakistan today we see images of black turbaned long haired mullahs leading a march to medievalism, in India we see the young and exuberant marching to the 21st century. We are still behind the rest of the privileged world but determined to catch up. Over there they wallow in their sense of victimhood and blame everyone else for their plight. Over here we exult in our rainbow culture. They put their women in abayas suspicious of them and diffident about their own ability to handle them. In India we are proud of our women (except, unfortunately, for the lunatic fringe). In Pakistan they shoot and kill journalists; here, we merely grimace. Over there the majority would want to destroy the minority within their own religion. Over here in my country, should a section of the majority deviate, as it does now and then, it is the rest of the majority that defends the rights of the minority.
Let us not forget that the largest number of Muslims that has ever lived in a democracy anywhere in the world for such a long time is in India. In Pakistan they are now saying that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The word secularism does not exist in the mullah’s vocabulary, not even in the minds of some self proclaimed moderates like General Musharraf. Let us remember that Pakistanis have killed more Muslims in East Pakistan (where at its height of barbarity, the Pakistan Army killed 6000 to 12000 Hindus and Muslims per day). They are still doing that in Balochistan, Sindh, the Frontier, what they call the Northern Areas, the Punjab and Afghanistan. Muslims are no longer safe in Pakistan.
So what do we have in common with them that we yearn for? The answer – nothing. We are two different countries with two different kinds of people on two different trajectories and we are happy with that. Our only request should be -- please do not mess with us and we promise we will not mess with your country.
Pakistan will do deals with Al Qaeda, will encourage Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to carry out raids in India and will appease the Taliban. They will take their country to medieval times. They will do anything to try and wrest Kashmir from India. It would seem that they have a death wish. It would be prudent for us to take measures now in case Pakistan’s wish is granted.
In conceding ground to the radicals in FATA and Malakand as well as Kohistan in the Hazara Division, Islamabad has ceded sovereignty, although we may call it something else. There are fears that this maybe the tipping point for Pakistan’s eventual conversion into a Talibanised state.
Over the years Pakistan has come to believe that the world is beholden to it that it exists. This notion of indispensability allows them to be wild, delinquent and dangerous. Like the spoilt brat of a rich and doting parent, Pakistan either becomes petulant when it is not granted what it unjustifiably demands or becomes belligerent when it is granted that wish by its benefactor. Today, Pakistan is embellished by a begging bowl economy with terrorism as its main export, unending bitter unrest in Balochistan, sectarian violence in Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, a creaking law and order system and a judicial system that evokes little confidence.
There are many in India who are forever ready to give Pakistan another chance saying they are like us but the poor souls are stuck with rotten governments and they need our help to get them out of their predicament. It is incredibly naive of us to build policies for our future and security on fond nostalgia which is mostly one way. One has never heard any Pakistani leader talk lovingly of the India they left behind. And they teach their children mostly how to hate India with a warped form of history, even at the mainstream schools.
It is strange that we still keep saying to Pakistanis that we are all alike and have a common culture and so on. The truth is that they do not want to be like us and quite honestly, we have nothing in common with them. Not anymore. First of all, our minority population is more Indian than theirs is Pakistani and our majority too is different from theirs. Pakistanis have never understood, therefore never accepted, the concept of accepting and accommodating minorities. Not that we do it perfectly but we do a fairly good job. In Pakistan, you are either a Shia,Bohra or an Ismaili and worse -- an Ahmediya; being a woman, a Baloch, a Pushtun, a Sindhi or a Mohajir or a Hindu hari is a curse. Only a Sunni Punjabi is a true blue Punjabi. Arguments with minorities are settled with a bullet. It is difficult for a Pakistani to understand that minorities can also dominate and they are really minorities if you call them so. Our latest success story – the cricket team – symbolises our diversity. Pakistan does not have an equivalent of Bollywood and if they did, it would never be dominated by Hindus.
There are other fundamental differences. They deny history and even geography, we seek our roots in our civilisation. They say jihad in the name of God. We have room for all faiths at the Dargah in Ajmer Sharif, in Darbar Sahib (where the foundation stone was laid by Mian Mir), San Thome or Gyanvapi Temple. Fewer and fewer Pakistanis understand that it is easy or natural for an Indian to listen to Jafar Hussain Badayuni’s rendering of Amir Khusro’s Bahut Kathin Hai Dagar or Ek Pita Ekas Ke Hum Baarek by Bhai Maninder Singh and Bhai Jitender Singh or Jai Madhav Madan Murari by Jagjit Singh on any morning. This is what makes us unique in the world. God by any other name means the same and He does not seem to mind.
In Pakistan today we see images of black turbaned long haired mullahs leading a march to medievalism, in India we see the young and exuberant marching to the 21st century. We are still behind the rest of the privileged world but determined to catch up. Over there they wallow in their sense of victimhood and blame everyone else for their plight. Over here we exult in our rainbow culture. They put their women in abayas suspicious of them and diffident about their own ability to handle them. In India we are proud of our women (except, unfortunately, for the lunatic fringe). In Pakistan they shoot and kill journalists; here, we merely grimace. Over there the majority would want to destroy the minority within their own religion. Over here in my country, should a section of the majority deviate, as it does now and then, it is the rest of the majority that defends the rights of the minority.
Let us not forget that the largest number of Muslims that has ever lived in a democracy anywhere in the world for such a long time is in India. In Pakistan they are now saying that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The word secularism does not exist in the mullah’s vocabulary, not even in the minds of some self proclaimed moderates like General Musharraf. Let us remember that Pakistanis have killed more Muslims in East Pakistan (where at its height of barbarity, the Pakistan Army killed 6000 to 12000 Hindus and Muslims per day). They are still doing that in Balochistan, Sindh, the Frontier, what they call the Northern Areas, the Punjab and Afghanistan. Muslims are no longer safe in Pakistan.
So what do we have in common with them that we yearn for? The answer – nothing. We are two different countries with two different kinds of people on two different trajectories and we are happy with that. Our only request should be -- please do not mess with us and we promise we will not mess with your country.
Pakistan will do deals with Al Qaeda, will encourage Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to carry out raids in India and will appease the Taliban. They will take their country to medieval times. They will do anything to try and wrest Kashmir from India. It would seem that they have a death wish. It would be prudent for us to take measures now in case Pakistan’s wish is granted.
This article appeared in abridged form in Times of India on March 5 under the caption "No Love Lost"
Blood Brothers
The body of Major General Shakeel Ahmed, commander of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), was found on the second day of the mutiny — bullet-ridden and stabbed by the men of the force he commanded. From the manner in which BDR officers were hunted down, killed and buried in a mass grave; the use of mortars; and the snapping of communication links it is obvious that the massacre was pre-planned. All it needed was an occasion.
Several army officers are still missing, including Colonel Gulzar Ahmed who supervised the operation that led to the arrest and execution of Jamaat-ul Mujahedeen Bangladesh chief Sidiqul Alam (Bangla Bhai). It is not known if Ahmed was specially targetted or an accidental victim, but it is true that the fundamentalists were unhappy over the execution of Bangla Bhai and other jihadi leaders in 2007.
Bangladesh’s short history is steeped in blood, starting with the killing by the Punjabi army of West Pakistan of three million men, women and children. The countless rapes and torture left scars that have not yet healed in many cases. The assassination of Banga Bandhu in 1975 was meant to wipe out the entire family but the sisters, Hasina and Rehana, got away. Khandaker Mushtaque Ahmed, who became president after Mujib-ur Rahman’s murder, granted indemnity to the killers and General Zia-ur Rahman later incorporated this indemnity legislation in his constitution. Other leaders were similarly killed and the cult of violence ultimately led to the assassination of Zia-ur Rahman.
It was only 21 years after Mujib-ur’s assassination, after Sheikh Hasina Wajed won the elections in 1996, that a case for the murder was filed — indicating how entrenched interests had taken over early in Bangladesh’s life.
Sheikh Hasina’s announcement this January that the collaborators in the Bangladesh Liberation War would be tried has almost sent Pakistan scuttling for cover. Apart from misguided conviction about their cause, Islamabad cannot afford another slur now. Besides, the trial of right-wing fundamentalists would cause anger in Pakistan. The other announcement, that Anup Chetia, the ULFA leader, would be handed over to India, would embarrass the ISI by making public their links to the ULFA. So far under Khaleda Zia, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, an ISI clone, had been the loco parentis of the ULFA.
The man linked to these unsavoury deals is Salahuddin Qadir Choudhry who, it is believed, helped infiltrate the BDR with men from Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami, Al Badr and others owing loyalty to the Jamaat-e-Islami. This is ironic since the BDR had fought on behalf of the Bangla nationalists against the Razakars and the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami, and has known pro-Bangla credentials. Salahuddin also figures in the list of culprits involved in brutalities during the 1971 war; he is associated with the smuggling of arms and ammunition meant for Indian insurgents through Chittagong; he is also believed to be the conduit for funds from Pakistan. As a reward for services rendered, Khaleda Zia had proposed his name as secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, presumably at the behest of Islamabad. Now that Sheikh Hasina is in power, it is likely that Salahuddin will be brought to trial soon. She had to be stopped because Salahuddin apparently knows too much.
It is difficult to re-construct the entire drama but maybe the calculation was that the army would react violently to the killing of its of ficers, chaos would result and the Awami League would have to be jettisoned as incompetent.
But it seems that Sheikh Hasina did not blink, the army did not react (some say even General Moeen’s U Ahmed’s life was threatened) and the immediate crisis has passed.
Source : Hindustan Times , 8th March 2009
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Pak Terrorised by Demons it Created
The message to the Pak govt is that terrorists can strike at will
EVENTS in Lahore on Tuesday morning are in many ways just another link in a long chain of events after the Pakistanis used Afridi and Waziri tribesmen as a policy option in Kashmir in 1947. Since then, it has been a downhill journey to bigotry and intolerance where Pakistan is now a victim of the demons it created.
Since then, Pakistani rulers have used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, extra-constitutional means to rule over its own people and lied to and cheated its main benefactors to draw financial and armament support. Pakistan is a victim of human transgression of the natural, right order of things and the arrogance that causes it: Nemesis, the Greek Goddess of Retribution.
When they are not killing each other, Pakistanis weave conspiracy theories. The Lahore attack is being described by some of these theorists as a conspiracy by the President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari after he had dismissed the Nawaz Sharif government, as he feared a backlash and was seeking to prevent the Long March from Lahore to Islamabad.
Another theory is that the army wants to discredit Zardari and get the nation ready for an army take over. Yet another is that Sharif and his party are trying to discredit Zardari. And the expected theory is to try and draw similarities between the Mumbai massacre and the Lahore attack. The idea would be to establish that Pakistan and India are victims of the same terrorists and draw sympathy. Worse, it will be also insinuated, especially in the jihadi press, that Lahore and Mumbai attacks were an Indian conspiracy to malign Pakistan. But Pakistan cannot go far with this theory since all evidence available clearly show that there is a Pakistani hand in the Mumbai massacre.
There are obviously going to be two or three main questions. Who did it? And why the Sri Lankans? Why not the Pakistani cricketers? Almost certainly, we will never know the truth and most likely, this attack is either a Talibantype attack, or maybe a splinter group of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba or the Jaishe- Mohammed. The Sri Lankan team was an easy target. They had come to Pakistan after being assured that they would be given full security. The attack shows that the Pakistan government cannot ensure this — not even in Lahore. The message to the Pakistani government is that the terrorists can strike at will. The state is losing control.
Besides, Sri Lankans make acceptable targets in the narrow world of the radicals as they are idol worshippers and therefore, infidels. Alongside the rise of the Taliban of different Shuras in Pakistan — Quetta, Waziristan and Malakand — there have been terrorist attacks in recent months in Islamabad, Sargodha, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rawalpindi. Now that the terrorists have struck in Lahore, the heart of Punjab, the battle for Pakistan’s soul is that much closer. Will it be Wahabi Islam or will it be Sufi liberal? Most certainly, the former.
Western discourse still concentrates on terrorism that originates in the Arab world but ground zero is in Pakistan. That country is far more fragile today than it ever was. We are now facing a Talibanised Pakistan and after the creation of Bangladesh, they do not now have a fallback.
We need to seriously think of our future policy options and not make the same mistakes that Pakistan made by suborning its foreign policy to those of the US or China. We have to work out policies that look at a restructured Pakistan — and restructured in our interests.
Source : Mail Today , 4th March 2009
Monday, March 2, 2009
Delhi needs to help, not smother Hasina
The revolt by the poorly paid troops of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) began on February 25 morning at their Pilkhana headquarters in Dhaka and by the time the 33-hour standoff was over, 76 bodies of Bangladesh Army officers had been found while another 60 or so were missing. The surprise element seemed obvious and the revolt spread to some other cities. But the ferocity of the attack and the high rate of casualties was the most frightening part. Ill-treated and deprived of some of the basic amenities, the troops just could not take it anymore. Their chief had promised to have their grievances attended to but made no mention of these problems when Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed visited BDR headquarters the day before. By the time the mutiny was over the director-general of the force, Maj. Gen. Shakil Ahmed, had been killed by the mutineers.
While inquiries in Bangladesh would endeavour to get at the truth, it does appear that the discontent against the officers was channelled by someone, the spark was then ignited and there was someone guiding the men to the targets — all Army officers. Conspiracy theories abound, alleging the foreign hand (Inter-Services Intelligence) and money, that the mutiny had been pre-planned, and there are accusations that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was involved and that the problems of the BDR were not really so acute. One aspect is, therefore, important: Was there an intelligence failure or was there suppression of intelligence? If it was the former, it’s incompetence and complacency; if it’s the latter, then it is far more sinister and Sheikh Hasina has a much bigger problem on her hands. She may find that she has to rely on the conspirators to discover the conspirators.
It is also well-known that the relationship between the Awami League and the Army has been uneasy, somewhat like the Pakistan People’s Party-Pakistan Army relationship. It was conventional wisdom prior to the elections last December that if the Bangladesh Army, led by Gen. Moeen Ahmed, actually handed over charge of governance to an elected body they would do so only after managing the results. If this argument is correct then presumably the 2008 elections were as surprising for the Army as the 1954 elections which had resulted in the decimation of the Muslim League, and the 1970 elections which eventually led to the liberation of Bangladesh. Having received universal accolades for holding free and fair elections, it was just not conceivable that the Army could withdraw their gift to the people of Bangladesh.
The Awami League victory was simply too overwhelming; the youth and the women were the X-factors in an election in which the main issues were appallingly poor economic governance and corruption; neither India nor Mujibur Rahman were the issues. It is doubtful, though, that the Army would have deliberately had more than a hundred of its officers killed just to prove, in a convoluted and expensive way, that it is still relevant to the Awami League. Nevertheless, the Hasina government will have to depend more on the Army to handle the crisis, assuage growing anger in the Army which can be dangerous, provide immediate relief to the BDR, be seen to be fair and punish the mutineers. Unless this is done quickly, it will create the very real fear of reprisals and an enduring animus between the higher echelons of the Army and the BDR troops.
One of the long-standing promises of Sheikh Hasina has been that the Awami League would prosecute the collaborators of the 1971 war of liberation, in which the East Pakistan Rifles (now BDR) had fought against the Pakistan Army. These collaborators have friends in high places in Islamabad, some, in fact, are leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami and have close ties with Pakistan. The Bangladesh Army and its directorate-general of forces intelligence are considered to be clones of the Pakistan Army and the ISI. Neither of these Army establishments want the trial of collaborators and a worried Pakistan government had despatched a special envoy, Zia Ispahani, to advise against implementing the resolution to try the collaborators.
Meanwhile, the announcement that the Bangladesh government had decided to hand over Anup Chetia to India would have sent cold shivers down the collective spines of his handlers in Dhaka.
It would appear that elitism among the Bangladesh Army officers deployed to the BDR and their administrative indifference to the plight of the other ranks would have been the cause of the feeling of deprivation and discrimination among the troops. This would have provided fertile ground for those wanting to suborn the troops against the system, pit the BDR against the Army. It might have been calculated that the Awami League government should be tested in its early days before it settled down. The party may have won a massive mandate but somewhere the cries of "Bangladesh hobe Taliban" still resonate. Jamaat-e-Islami representation in Parliament may have gone down remarkably but the essential votebank is intact.
Apart from the usual suspects — failure of intelligence or deliberate suppression of intelligence — there was obviously a total failure of command. There is just no explanation for the deaths of so many Army officers and that too so brutally in many cases.
Trouble arises in uniformed and highly disciplined forces when the troops find that their officers do not identify themselves with the force, nor empathise with them. If the officers are on short-term assignments and have not grown with the force, the distance between them and the troops they command usually widens, sometimes to the point of breakdown. This is what apparently happened at Pilkhana.
It is politically and diplomatically correct for India to say that this episode is an internal matter for the Bangladesh government. But it is also true that India as a neighbour would be concerned, not just because there was a mutiny, but about the source and scale of the revolt. A friendly government now holds the reins of power in Dhaka; we cannot and must not smother it with love and affection. Instead, we need to strengthen that government because the alternative, as we can imagine, is far too dangerous. What we need to do is to quietly convey our security red lines stressing our political neutrality, and promise economic and financial generosity. Indo-Bangladesh dealings have to be lifted beyond the bureaucratic rigidities that endlessly seek equal concessions leaving no room for large-heartedness.
Source : Asian Age , 3rd March 2009
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