In the context of China’s protestations on Arunachal Pradesh, its hardening attitude on Jammu & Kashmir is reflected in the continuing visa row. This is to remind us that both the western and eastern portions of the India-China border remain disputed. Also, China is making its presence felt in the sub-continent as the next power to reckon with
Farooq Abdullah spoke with the usual fervour and passion when Parliament discussed Jammu & Kashmir on August 26. He pointed out that most Kashmiris wanted to solve their problems within India and not in Pakistan, China or America. This should not surprise anyone because Pakistan today looks a hopeless proposition to many Pakistanis too.
The former Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir made another very valid and important observation when he referred to parts of Kashmir under Pakistan’s occupation. He reminded the House of the Resolution passed several years ago saying that the entire State including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan were an integral part of India. He demanded that India should seek the return of these territories, including that which Pakistan had illegally handed over to China.
It was, however, disturbing to find that the Treasury benches and even other stalwarts from the Opposition were eloquent in their silence, something that has become part of an ominous trend in the last few years. In February 2007, the US Congressional Research Service put out a thoroughly incongruous map of India which showed Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as parts of Pakistan and Aksai Chin as merely an Indian claim, but we did not protest. When Baroness Emma Nicholson, the EU Rapporteur to Jammu & Kashmir in her report to the EU confirmed from historical evidence dating from 1909 that Gilgit-Baltistan were parts of the Riyasat of Maharaja Hari Singh, we only murmured modestly. It was perhaps awkward for us to assert our right lest Gen Pervez Musharraf, with whom we were working out some unknown deal, got upset. Clearly, we had put aside long term geostrategic interests or simply not read them.
Since the 1970s Pakistan has been nibbling away at Gilgit-Baltistan in an effort to detach it from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to make the region an integral part of the rest of Pakistan. The Karakoram highway is a strategic life line for both China and Pakistan. Ruthless suppression of the Shia Ismaili minority and demographic changes by sending in Sunni Pushtoon was the favoured tactic of the various dictators to tame this remote region that borders Afghanistan and China. Not satisfied with access to Xinjiang through the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram Highway, Gen Zia-ul Haq tried to enhance Pakistani and Chinese positions when he moved towards the Karakoram Pass across the Siachen glacier. Had this move succeeded, China would have had an alternative access to Pakistan through Tibet with immense permanent consequences for our security and geostrategic interests.
China has always been interested that Pakistan retains control over Gilgit-Baltistan. This not only ensured its own vital interests in Gwadar overlooking the Persian Gulf and its vital resources but also was another brick in the wall against India’s access to Central Asia. About three years ago, there were reports that China was incorporating the Gilgit-Baltistan area into Xinjiang’s logistic grid by widening the highway and exploring the possibilities of a Pakistan-China rail link, with the ultimate aim of securing a land route for its energy supplies.
Recent reports of the presence of 7,000 to 11,000 PLA troops in the region and a simmering revolt there would suggest that Pakistan has sought Chinese assistance to tackle this crisis. This is an addition to other no-go areas for the Pakistani administration, which include Balochistan and FATA. Besides we must not overlook that there are US bases west of Indus and more than 1,000 US Marines have landed in Pakistan, ostensibly for flood relief.
In the context of Chinese protestations on Arunachal Pradesh, their hardening attitude on Jammu & Kashmir is reflected in the continuing visa issue now that a serving Lt General of the Indian Army has been denied this. China has chosen this period in time to remind us that both the western and eastern portions of the India-China border remain disputed. This is as much a reflection of its unease about growing India-US relations as India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan nuclear deal. China has raised its profile in the Jammu & Kashmir region even though its relations with the US are tense in the South China Sea. All things considered, China is making its presence felt in the sub-continent as the next power to reckon with.
Now, more than any other time, and given the evolving situation to our disadvantage, it is necessary that we address our own problem in the Valley and get out of this endless cycle of protests, sops and promises. Winning hearts and minds does not begin or end with elections. Jammu & Kashmir has far better socio-economic indicators than many other parts of India. Its literacy rate is on par with the rest of the country; the State Government employs more than 35,0000 people while Rajasthan, which is five times the size of Jammu & Kashmir, employs only 60,0000 people; for the Tenth Five-Year-Plan, Jammu & Kashmir got a per capita allocation of Rs 14,399 compared to States like Bihar (Rs 2,536) and Odisha (Rs 5,177); the State’s per capita income of Rs 12,399 a few years ago was lower than the national average but considerably higher than States like Bihar (Rs 5,108) or Odisha (Rs 8,547).
Appeasement is not the answer nor does the route lie via Pakistan. Additional economic or financial sops are not required; what is needed is a sense of fair play and justice seen to be delivered. If we need the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to remain then we must also ensure that the perpetrators of the Machhil monstrosity are brought to public trial soon. Leaders in jammu & Kashmir, across the political spectrum, must learn to accept that the practice of incessant political mismanagement and then blaming New Delhi, when the streets erupt, has to cease.
Jammu & Kashmir has a population of a little more than 10 million; only a section of the population in the Valley talks of self-determination. Surely this cannot hold a billion of us to ransom. As for this constant refrain of political problems, Jammu & Kashmir has its own Constitution, Article 370 and bounty for being troublesome. There is no ‘good boy bonus’ for the other States. When the US floods Pakistan with money and goodies, we complain that this is aiding terrorism. Are we not doing the same thing in Kashmir then?
A state has to be just, not soft; it has to be sympathetic, not indulgent. Jammu & Kashmir needs good governance in all its manifestations; so do we all. For those who talk of azadi, let it be said that we attained our independence in 1947. There is no greater independence than that.
Source : The Pioneer , 31st August 2010 ( Vikram Sood ,Former Secretary, Research & Analysis Wing.)
By Smita Prakash (ANI)
The recent spurt in violence in a few districts of the Kashmir Valley is being termed as an Intifada by many journalists. Perhaps because they perceive that the fight is popular and the street protestors are fighting a repressive regime.
Let us go back to see what exactly is an Intifada. In Arabic, the term means "shaking off". Webster defines the Intifada as an armed uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The first Intifada (1987-1993) and the second Intifada (2000-2004) led to the popularisation of the word and soon any revolt, armed or unarmed, by the Muslim people came to be termed as an Intifada.
The recent protests in the Kashmir Valley were first termed as an 'Intifada ' by The Kashmir Action Committee of Pakistan (KACP). This is a Lahore-based organisation, run by Justice Sharifuddin Bokhari, a retired Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court. Consisting mainly of some retired bureaucrats and ex-army men, it gets support from expatriate Pakistanis, who remain convinced that the so-called liberation of Kashmir is an issue supreme in the minds of ordinary Pakistanis.
This organisation, which though located hundreds of miles away from Srinagar, is miraculously aware of the minutest details of the recent uprising. This organisation decided that it was time to give the stone throwers of the Kashmir Valley an aura of respectability; so Intifada, they labeled it. It is no coincidence that this is a term that foreign journalists and American think tanks and publications are familiar with.
The term was duly picked up by the local media in Indian administered Kashmir and then by foreign correspondents that visited the Valley. Of course, a similar revolt in Balochistan, in Pakistan, has been termed by international media (NYT) as " a nationalist movement led by armed ethnic Baluch groups (that) has long sought greater provincial autonomy."
That the Baloch want secession from Pakistan goes unreported. The reason for the near black out of the civilian uprising in Balochistan is because the foreign media cannot enter the province. Why foreign, even domestic media in Pakistan, faces repression in the economic and backward province where, simmering hatred towards the Pakistani regime is beyond control now.
But it largely goes unreported, as it is much easier to cover the uprising in Srinagar than Balochistan. India allows free access to media, both Indian and foreign, in its part of Kashmir, like it does in any other part of the country. Incidentally, Pakistan administered Kashmir or POK is as inaccessible to media as Balochistan.
Despite the overt similarities in the recent visual images from Kashmir with the images from Palestine --- the stone throwing mobs, use of face masks, women and children being used on the frontlines of these mobs --- there are major differences between the two situations.
The Intifada was against the occupying forces of Israel. Palestinians had been thrown out of their land where they had lived for centuries.
India is not an occupying force in Kashmir, despite the sensational sound bites that are given by the ubiquitous boatman or a teen with a stone.
In 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh, the erstwhile ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, signed the instrument of accession like 500 other rulers, accepting its union with India. The accession to India was also publicly supported by the most popular Kashmiri leader of the time, Sheikh Abdullah.
Unlike the Palestinians, Kashmiris were not asked to vacate their lands so that "occupying forces" could occupy their land and homes. The immediate cause for the first Intifada in December 1987 was the incident in the Jabalya refugee camp when an Israeli army tank ran into a group of refugees, killing four and injuring seven. Do you see tanks ramming into civilians in Kashmir? This, despite the well documented fact that there are militants among stone pelters inciting and threatening them to throw stones and lynch policemen and burn down police stations.
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah termed stone pelting as an "industry" saying: "We have, in fact, been able to identify to a couple of big business houses, one in particular, who has used, through his network of dealers, to route money through."
The involvement of women and children in the 2010 uprising in Srinagar is said to be similar to the first Intifada, in which, women provided cover for men who pelted stones and hid behind skirts.
Asiya Andarabi of the Dukhtaran-e-Millat, a women's organisation championing the cause of "freedom", is at the forefront of this so-called women's movement in Kashmir. At her mildest best, Asiya "urges" women and children to abandon the safety of their homes and schools and get on to the streets to fight unarmed against security forces who have shoot-at-sight orders.
Rage has many manifestations, but, women and children coerced to go onto the streets to hurl stones, is the most despicable of them all.
And, the most pathetic, is to see the same women pleading with policemen to release the men who have been arrested, or mourning the dead who were caught in this vicious cross fire.
All this, while the so-called leaders of the "Intifada" sit in air-conditioned homes guarded by state security and travel in bullet proof SUVs.
Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Hurriyat Conference defended the action of stone pelters, saying: "I have been urging the youth to keep these protests peaceful, but due to the atrocities of the troopers, the situation has taken a serious turn."
But women in Srinagar are not on the streets because they believe in freedom, independence or any such esoteric cause. They are protesting against the overwhelming presence of security personnel on the roads, which is preventing them from walking their children to school or going about their daily chores. They have lost their children, husbands and brothers to bullets. They want the protests and bloodshed to end. This is markedly different from the two Intifadas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There, it was an Islamic struggle against a Jewish occupation. Here, in Kashmir, the very thought of throwing out religious minorities from Kashmir is alien to Kashmiris. It is a radical view thrust and shoved into their struggle by Pakistani infiltrators and their agents.
On a recent visit to a Palestine refugee camp, in the West Bank, a group of Indian journalists had the opportunity to meet with people who had witnessed both Intifadas. Most of those we spoke to admit that violence had achieved little. They would have preferred peace talks.
The deputy mayor of Bethlehem, a Fatah leader, said that everyone, from Osama bin Laden to the smallest terror group on earth, has used the Palestinian cause to further their own ends.
This, he admitted, had harmed the cause of the Palestinian people and painted them as a violent race.
The Intifadas gave no respite to ordinary Palestinians. There are electromagnetic fences that divide the Palestinians from the Israelis. The violence shows no signs of abating. We visited the town of Sderot in Israel that lies on the Gaza border.
This town has suffered thousands of rocket attacks. There are bomb shelters every few miles, which are painted in bright welcoming colours so that children are not scared to run to them when the missile warning goes off.
In a Palestinian refugee camp in Bethlehem, we saw a school with no windows. Glass windows could shatter during a missile attack and injure children so they study closeted in window-less classrooms.
Many of us draw parallels with the situation in Kashmir, thinking that the hardships that people face in conflict zones are almost similar. But the politics behind it is not. The Intifadas of Palestine are peculiar to that region. Not to Kashmir.
On 23rd August, shopkeepers at Peerbagh in Budgam district of Central Kashmir confronted separatists who were forcing them to shut shops and join the protests. The shopkeepers said their business was being affected and they could ill afford the daily shut down calls. The brave citizens then filed an FIR at the police station against the separatists who they said were violating the peace and harming their businesses.
The law enforcing agencies operating in the Valley are also now using non-lethal means of crowd control like pumping action shotguns. Tazer guns, rubber bullets and pepper balls will also be used, which should have been done as a matter of procedure right from the start of these protests.
Some commentators who have drawn an analogy between the Kashmir problem and the Palestinian conflict forebode that if the stone pelting incidents peter down or loose steam in the days ahead, it would only be a lull in the storm.
General Shankar Roychowdhury, a former Chief of Army Staff, writes "The Pakistan Army is attempting to co-opt Intifada into its own jihadi playbook, as a tactic of opportunity against India in the Valley. Keeping the history of Intifada in mind, it would be prudent to anticipate and prepare for possible increasing tempo of suicide bombing and fidayeen-type attacks in the country, both within and outside Jammu and Kashmir."
But this is where the separatists and their minders have been innovative. They have already gone through the suicide bombing, hijacking, and hostage taking tactics. It failed to win any public support in the state, in the country and internationally, and did not achieve their goal of "azadi".
Imran Nabi, a professor at the Islamic University of Kashmir recently commented, "We don't know what is Intifida, what is it, we don't have any clue who is running it? You must be knowing better, what you are seeing on the streets of Kashmir is the angry outburst against the indifferent government."
Stones, face masks and women protestors do not make an Intifada alone. Intifada, notwithstanding the superficial and misplaced use of the term to describe the recent protests in Kashmir, is an alien concept to India and will not work. Kashmiris know it. It is now time for commentators to realise it. By Smita Prakash (ANI)
Source : Yahoo News , http://bit.ly/9Pvszw, 25th August 2010
For decades China pretended to be modest and Deng Xiaoping’s successors followed him as they couched their ambitions in soft idioms. The “sons of heaven”, as the Chinese traditionally consider themselves, also consider those on their periphery as rebellious barbarians who had to be tamed or conquered. So the discourse was: “Tao guang yang hui” — variously translated, but which essentially means “hide brightness, nourish obscurity”. The exhortation was to keep a low profile when in an adverse situation and wait for a suitable opportunity to reverse fortunes. The other advice was “yield on small issues with the long term in mind”. All this has begun to change as China’s influence began to rise and the United States was perceived to be in decline. The US policy predicaments in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and Western economic crises in contrast to China’s steady growth is probably the reason for this change in attitude. There is an exuberance and global self-confidence accompanied by a global outreach that was not visible earlier.
It is useful to go back to January 20, 2009 — the day Barack Obama was sworn in as US President. This was also the day that the Chinese released their White Paper on National Defence (2008). Perhaps a coincidence, perhaps not. The White Paper covers issues like Taiwan, Tibet, the defence budget, diplomatic outreach and gives some details about how China would use its nuclear force. It is important to refer to some portions of the paper which underline the new philosophy. The preface mentions that historic changes were taking place between contemporary China and the rest of the world, and the Chinese had become an important part of the international system. China, it said, “could not develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.” The intention was to portray China as a participatory nation with huge responsibilities and its own indispensability in the new global order.
China’s international behaviour has been a mix of defiance — such as at the Copenhagen climate summit, when it sent junior functionaries to discussions with heads of state, or its dealings on the Iran nuclear issue or the nuclear deal with Pakistan. China has been assertive with India on Arunachal Pradesh by blocking the ADB loan, has been provocative by issuing “plain paper” visas to Indians born in Jammu and Kashmir and routinely shrill about the Dalai Lama, while increased border violations have been noticed in Arunachal Pradesh — which Chinese commentators call “Southern Tibet”. Chinese activities in our neighbourhood, its plans to dam the Brahmaputra and extend the Tibet rail link into Nepal are other aspects of continuing Chinese assertiveness. The Chinese PLA had recently transported combat readiness material to PLA and Air Force units in Tibet by rail for the first time. This would further enhance the military transportation capacity, apart from the construction of more airports in Tibet.
While some American experts like Prof. David Shambaugh describe this Chinese attitude as a sign of defensive nationalism — assertive in form but reactive in essence, the fact is that since about the middle of 2009 the Chinese have talking more and more about their “core interests”. As D.S. Rajan, director of the Centre for China Studies, Chennai, points out, Chinese leader Dai Bingguo said in July 2009 that “the PRC’s first core interest is maintaining its fundamental system and state security, the second is state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the third is the continued stable development of the economy and society”. Translated into specifics, it means protection of its interests in Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, the South China Sea and its strategic resources and sea trade routes.
China’s assertiveness about the South China Sea, its umbrage at US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s July 2010 remarks in Hanoi on creating an international mechanism to resolve this issue, has been particularly visible in the past few weeks. Dai Bingguo conveyed to Ms Clinton in May 2010 that China regarded its claims to the South China Sea as a core national interest. The Chinese have closely watched the growing US-Vietnamese ties, which includes an American offer of a civil nuclear deal to Vietnam on lines similar to the India deal. A triangular acrimony between the US, China and Vietnam has been growing for some time.
The Chinese carried out a live ammunition PLA Navy exercise in the South China Sea on July 26, followed by another exercise on August 3 along the Yellow Sea coast — the other area of contention. The Chinese conducted exercises there in April and June this year, and were now asserting that China opposed any foreign ships entering the sea or adjacent waters; they even vehemently opposed joint US-South Korean exercises there.
The message in these demarches to the US was in keeping with protecting China’s core interests in the adjacent seas and telling the US that the western Pacific was China’s sphere of interest and influence. It suggested a division of zones of influence between the Eastern and Western Pacific. The US and China have their own geostrategic rivalries to settle, and the Chinese may have assessed that their moment has come.
Yet China remains concerned with its intricate trade and financial links with the US, and also with the security of its trade and supply routes that transit the Malacca Straits. It has endeavoured to develop extensive land routes through Central Asia, but these are inadequate. It is a matter of time before China will make its presence more visible in the Indian Ocean. It has port facilities in Hambantota and Gwadar, and a presence in the Arabian Sea as it battles Somali pirates. China has expanded its contacts with Iran, more in competition with Russia than the US, it seeks mineral wealth in Afghanistan, its relations with Pakistan need no elucidation and it has developed strong ties with Burma. Thus while we may agonise over challenges across our land frontiers, we would be ignoring the new challenge in the Indian Ocean unless we plan countermeasures now.
Source : Asian Age , 25th August 2010
It is a cliché to say that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is complex and that Kashmir is burning. But this is true also. The situation today is the result of political mismanagement, indifference and lessons not learnt over past few years after the security forces had brought the situation under control.
The troubles that erupted during the 2008 Amarnath yatra should have provided some lessons, but these were lost in the congratulatory mood that followed the largely successful state elections in early 2009. The fact that the separatist was alive was reflected in the low turnout in Anantnag, Sopore and Srinagar, but was glossed over. Hartals and infiltration increased immediately after the elections.
What is happening today is the result of political naivete, inexperience and indifference in Srinagar, accompanied by complacency and indecision in New Delhi, with Pakistan taking advantage of this without having to reveal its hand. Today it has become a people’s protest movement using stones, insults and anti-Indian slogans as weapons, with separatists operating alongside. The protest movement is not like Gandhian civil disobedience. It is against a constitutionally elected government and is not non-violent. Omar Abdullah, the young chief minister, is considered remote and aloof from his people, and thus unable to strike a chord with the ordinary Kashmiri. New Delhi has been reading the signals of increased tourist traffic and declining rates of terrorist attacks as a sign of an improving situation.
The basic lesson is that sometimes the number of terrorist attacks decline because the terrorists choose not to attack and not necessarily as a result of counter-terror efforts. Yet it was apparent that from early this year that the tactics had changed. Aware that terrorist tactics were becoming increasingly unacceptable in the West, a people’s revolt led by unarmed locals (with Pakistani agents provocateur lurking in the background) was the answer. This would bring the Kashmir issue back to the frontburner without resorting to terrorist violence.
Possibly the intention is to continue the protests until the government caves in and the CM has to go. Then the tactics would be repeated with the next CM, until the state becomes ungovernable. In many ways, we have a more sympathetic response from the West today on the issue of terrorism. But this needn’t necessarily translate into total support on how we handle the Kashmir issue. We must not forget that the United States needed Pakistan when it began its campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, and needs it more now that it plans to leave.
The questions then are: what next, and how?
New Delhi has to ensure the continuity of the present elected government, with the present CM in position. It must be seen to be supporting the CM to ensure that his authority or that of the State in Srinagar does not get eroded. Judging from the unhelpful attitude of the other main party in Kashmir, People’s Democratic Party, there is little hope that it will place long-term national interests above short-term narrow electoral gains.
The most difficult problem is how to douse the flames in the context of large angry protesting crowds. A mere show of force or its use will produce some results, but this is not the only solution. India cannot afford a Tiananmen Square. The protesters’ tactics must be turned against them. Their means of communication, propaganda and incitement should be disrupted. Take pre-emptive measures to prevent the assembly of large gatherings. It is a war of attrition that has to be fought, not simply one set-piece battle. And none of this is easy, nor can it be achieved overnight.
The battle for hearts and minds is very complicated and nuanced. The terrorists, who never fully went away from the Valley, have used ideology, fear and coercion to win support for their cause. The paradox is that for the security forces to win hearts and minds, there has to some stability and the area liberated of malcontents and insurgents. Force is required to restore order, which will inevitably draw am adverse reaction from the local population. This in turn will be exploited by the terrorists. This vicious circle needs to be broken now.
Force has to be used to control the situation in the short term, but there is no magic formula to determine exactly how much force is required. Much depends on the nature and availability of the force in question, on how well trained and equipped it is, and above all on the ingenuity of its leader. Troops coming face to face with angry mobs always mean a hair-trigger situation: the forces will only be able to answer with its weapons as it has no other mandate. Yet, having failed to control the situation itself, the political class and civil administration invariably seeks to blame the forces for the deaths that follow their deployment. Suspensions, transfers, courts of inquiry are announced in the heat of battle damage morale like nothing else can. It is far better at such moments to observe public solidarity and resort to private reprimand. Besides, an outside force will always have the disadvantage of lack of knowledge about the population, its customs and traditions. The state police is on the other hand usually far too frightened to take on locals for fear of reprisals.
Finally, we must treat Pakistan differently from how we treat Kashmiris. The latter perceive they have a problem while the former intrudes as the problem. Pakistan is the adversary, Kashmiris are not. Pakistan as a self-imposed interested party will seek to prolong and not solve the problem, just as it has not helped the Americans in Afghanistan. If we keep saying this is an internal matter, then we must engage Kashmir’s elected representatives in a continuous dialogue, listen to what they say and not just hear them out. We must make people like Ali Shah Geelani irrelevant, and refuse to give importance to those like Mirwaiz Omar Farooq who say openly on television that they are scared of the consequences of talking to New Delhi. Unless these elements are put to pasture, they will keep reinventing themselves under guidance from Pakistan.
There are no easy options and no quick solutions. Above all, what must be done is to restore the authority of the state government. It will not happen overnight; it will need a lot of patience, fortitude and luck to restore normality and then begin to address grievances — some real, and some not so real.
Source : Asian Age , 5th August 2010 , Vikram Sood , Former Head of the Research and Analysis Wing .
Former senator Habib Jalib Baloch, secretary-general of the Balochistan National Party-M, was shot dead on July 14, 2010 in Quetta. His murder was not an incident in isolation, nor was he killed by mistake...
"Awake my Punjab, Pakistan is ebbing away", Pakistan's revolutionary poet Habib Jalib wrote, "Our Dreams have faded now, Pakistan is ebbing away, / Sindh, Baluchistan, have been weeping for ages. / The people of Punjab are still lost, asleep."
The poet Jalib passed on in 1993. On July 14, 2010, his namesake, Central Secretary-General of the Balochistan National Party, was shot dead outside his brother’s shop on Sariab Road in Quetta. Ironically, barely twenty persons showed up to condole the lawyer- politician’s death in faraway Islamabad, a city rendered remote by its own siege and indifference. Was Punjab really losing interest in the rest of the country, troubled as it was with its terrorists?
Habib Jalib Balcoh's murder was not an incident in isolation, nor was he killed by mistake. His compatriot and colleague, Mir Maula Baksh Dashti, from the National Party also a former Chairman of the Baloch Students Organisation, had been gunned down only four days earlier, on July 10. Commentator Amir Mateen noted, in a report published on July 25, 2010, that there are, on average, two targeted killings in Balochistan every day; while official figures put this figure at 370 in the last ten months, others say the number would be closer to 600. Sardar Akhtar Mengal, president of the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and a former Chief Minister of the Balochistan, on July 31, also accused the Government and its functionaries of carrying out targeted killings, adding, "The State and its agents have deliberately created panic in Balochistan, but the BNP is not scared of anything, as the party has already scarified the lives of many of its leaders and workers."
Baloch nationalists like Malik Siraj Akbar Khan compare the killings of Habib and Dashti to the assassinations of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and Balach Marri. Yet, while the latter had united the Baloch, the unfortunate reality today is that the Baloch remain divided. There is a leadership vacuum in Balochistan, with most surviving iconic leaders no longer living in Quetta. Mir Khair Baksh Marri is in Karachi; Sardar Atuallah Khan Mengal is in Wadh (Khuzdar district), while his son, Akhtar, is in Dubai; Mir Hasil Bizenjo, Member of Pakistan’s National Assembly, operates from Karachi. Even an important secular Pashtun nationalist like Mahmood Khan Achakzai, leader of the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, is believed to be away, possibly in the United Kingdom.
An acute provincial xenophobia now targets the non-Baloch in the Province. Mateen says one-quarter of Quetta is a no-go area; half the city goes to sleep at sun down; and areas like Sariab Road and Arbab Karan Road are out of bounds for the non-Baloch even during daytime. Barring the Quetta Cantonment, which is heavily protected, all other areas, including pickets of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, are subject to attacks; local Police enter areas like Spiny Road and Samungli Road at their own peril. Mateen observes,
... the ordinary citizenry has been left to the butchery of a lethal mix of extremist nationalists, political separatists, religious fanatics, smugglers, drug dealers and the land mafia hand in glove with criminals, not to forget international terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies."
The Pushtun of Quetta have moved to safer areas of Nawankhali and Sraghurdhi, while Punjabi settlers, many of whom have lived in Quetta for generations, have been forced to leave for other Provinces. Doctors and surgeons have been intimidated and prevented from attending their clinics, so that they are not able to report incidents and casualties. About 1,600 Government officials have sought transfers out of Balochistan.
In the current cycle of violence, according to former Senator Sanaullah Baloch, between 2003 and December 2005, about 2,600 to 3,200 innocent people were killed in military operations, particularly in the Marri and Bugti areas. Islamabad frequently used air raids to subdue the Baloch tribals. About 80 to 85 per cent of those killed were women and children. During this phase, according to the United Nations’ December 2006 estimates, there were 84,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Balochistan without any relief or shelter; there was a total blockade of the Marri and Bugti areas; an estimated 8000 to 10,000 died in the exodus which caused malnourishment, disease and lack of shelter.
Violence in Balochistan has since been continuous. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was assassinated on August 26, 2006, and Mir Balach Marri, on November 21, 2007. The Baloch cannot forget the campaigns launched by General Musharraf against the Bugtis from 2005, when he rolled in tanks and brought in the Air Force to eventually kill the Nawab. Both these killings were accompanied by numerous others. There were only six reported incidents in 2005; the number rose to 44 the next year, accounting for 391 deaths, including 124 Security Force (SF) personnel. In 2007 there were 22 major incidents, with 199 fatalities. Since 2005, there have been 1,448 deaths, more than half of which were described as civilians; 404 were security personnel and 247 ‘terrorists’. In 2010, 97 civilians have been killed, as against 8 terrorists and 32 security personnel, thus far. While there have been a few sectarian killings, many targets have been the middle class – the educated and the professionals.
To put this into perspective, Balochistan has a population of 7.8 million, and there have been 1,448 fatalities. Pro rata, in the Punjab Province of Pakistan, with a population of more than 85 million, this would be equivalent to nearly 15,000 fatalities. Worse, UN reports claim that 8,000 Baloch have been missing since 2005; translated into Punjab equivalents, this would mean as many as 80,000. The truth is that there is no accurate figure of how many Baloch have died behind Pakistan’s Iron Curtain. The enormity of the casualties has been lost in the remoteness of the Province, and the seemingly ‘low’ absolute number of casualties spread over five years.
There are two versions about the ownership of these killings. Representatives of the Jamhoori Watan Party insist that the middle class was being targeted by the separatists, since the former believed in an unified Pakistan even as they struggled for a better deal for the Baloch. Others feel that the separatist movement draws its inspiration from Sardar Khair Bux Marri, who is believed to have said that violence was the only way to attain Baloch goals. Many, however, believe that this targeted killing of the political middle class is the handiwork of the ‘Agencies’ who wish to "knock out our political brains", according to Senator Manzoor Gichki. The Baloch also suspect that the so-called Baloch Massala Daffah Army (BDMA), which has claimed responsibility for the recent assassinations, is a front for the Agencies. The plan looks reasonable from the Agencies’ point of view. Having either killed or driven away the traditional leadership of the Baloch, it would be best to decimate the middle class leadership, which could be the source and inspiration for the other dissenting Baloch. Although there are many who believe that violence is the only way to attain Baloch rights, some nationalist leaders still believe that dialogue may yield results, which could include provincial autonomy and a greater say in the national affairs under the original terms of accession. This, however, is unlikely to be granted, though Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, on August 1, reiterated the old formula that the Government was ready for a dialogue with the Baloch leaders, whether they were in or out of the country, and that the Government wanted to bring Baloch leaders into mainstream politics.
The picture that emerges from Balochistan is of total lawlessness, with no one seemingly in control. A situation where various kinds of mafia – drugs, weapons, land and smuggling, anything, take control, and even the government of the day seems part of that mafia. With Chief Minister Aslam Raisani taking shelter in Dubai for half the month, nobody is really in charge. Local dissidents and objectors are routinely described as ‘terrorists’ and treated as such. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), for instance, has been seen to be increasingly anti-Punjabi in recent years. Its cadres consist of the educated class too, which includes doctors, engineers and lawyers, and this obviously means that this class too feels that their basic rights would not be available to them except through a violent struggle. Age-old grievances have not been addressed and new ones like the presence of the Chinese in Gwadar have been added.
The Baloch resent the fact that theirs has become a garrison province; that lucrative projects like the Saindak Copper Project and the Gwadar Port are being handled by the Chinese; that projects like the Sui Gas and Reko Dik Copper-Gold undertakings are exploited by Pakistan Petroleum Limited, and the Baloch get no share of the revenue. In November 2009, former Senator Sanaullah Baloch gave a detailed account of the extent of discrimination and deprivation that the Baloch face, speaking of "The centre’s endless desire to control the province’s natural wealth and its continued suppression of the people through ethnically-structured military and paramilitary forces..."
There is further resentment on issues such as the fact that Civil Armed Forces in the Province (numbering 50,000 personnel). The World Bank released the Balochistan Economic report 2009, which recounts a dismal story. During the period 1972-73 to 2005-06, Balochistan’s economy expanded 2.7 times compared to 3.6 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP, formerly the North West Frontier Province) and four times in Punjab. The report also pointed out that Balochistan had the worst social indicators for education, literacy, health, water and sanitation for 2006-07. The Human Development Index rate the resource-rich Dera Bugti as the worst District in Pakistan, at 0.285, compared to the best in the land of the powerful Jhelum District at 0.703. While rural poverty in Punjab decreased by four per cent, it increased by 15 per cent in Balochistan during the same period (other provinces, Sindh and KP, also grew poorer). Gas from Balochistan has been used primarily in the Punjab since 1964; Quetta got gas only in 1986. The Chaghai nuclear tests were carried out without the knowledge of the Baloch Government and, although many in the Province have suffered from the after effects of these tests, there has been no compensation.
Yet other grim statistics are
•92 percent of Balochistan’s districts are classified as ‘high deprivation’ areas, compared to 50 per cent in Sindh and 29 per cent in Punjab.
•Balochistan has the highest infant and maternal mortality rate in South Asia, caused mainly by malnutrition among 34 per cent of pregnant women.
•Infant mortality rates in Balochistan stand at 130 per thousand, against Pakistan’s national average of 70.
•Balochistan has only one vocational institute for women. Punjab has 111.
•23 per cent of girls in rural Balochistan have access to primary schools. The figure for Punjab is 46 per cent.
•Punjab has 486 polytechnic, computer science and women’s vocational institutes, as well as commercial and law colleges, while Baloch have just nine.
•The Social Policy Development Centre report of 2005 stated that the percentage of population living in a high degree of deprivation was 88 per cent in Balochistan, compared to 25 per cent in Punjab.
Such statistics are endless, but all confirm the acute discrimination and deprivation that Balochistan faces. Deprived of political, economic and social rights, the Baloch have no faith that the federal government will ever deliver on the various promises it has made in the past. This is the sentiment that underpins their struggle for self-determination. Islamabad, on the other hand, feels it has an inalienable right to exploit the resources of Balochistan, and feels no necessity to assuage the feelings of the rebellious Baloch.
Comparisons between the present situation in Balochistan and East Pakistan in 1971 are not just tempting, they are, in many ways, accurate. The Bengalis had suffered decades of neglect and discrimination, which the Punjabi rulers in Islamabad/Rawalpindi fobbed off as ‘external intervention’, sustaining the argument that nothing needed to be done to alleviate the local grievances. When the Bengalis reacted by launching a movement for separation, the response was brutal, indeed, genocidal, use of force. In Balochistan, four previous uprisings have been suppressed through brute force, and nothing has been done to remove the sense of injustice, alienation and deprivation. In a recent interview to a Sindhi newspaper, Khair Bux Marri declared, "The British only laid the foundation of our slavery but the Punjabis bathed us in blood and kept us slaves. What would we do in such circumstances? Obviously, we would retaliate."
There are other complications in Balochistan. The foremost is the presence of the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar, and divergent US and Pakistani interests in the future of this Shura, as well as the Pushtun response to this in Balochistan. US involvement in the intricate and seemingly hopeless war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda with the dubious assistance of Pakistan and its surrogates in Balochistan, will inevitably bring the Province on to the front page. The activities of the Jundullah, a Sunni Wahhabi organization, from bases in Balochistan, have already attracted Iranian ire and the suspicion in Tehran that the movement is meant to detach the predominantly Sunni Sistan-Balochistan. Already feeling surrounded by Sunni regimes, fearing a Talibanised Afghanistan on its northern borders and the Centcom Forces in the area that have indulged in periodic sabre-rattling, the Iranian leaders have reason to be paranoid.
Further, the concept of reconfiguring the region has been doing the rounds for some time. Among these, Ralph Peters, in his article "Blood Borders – How a better Middle East would look", argued that since there have been arbitrary and distorted borders in Africa and the Middle East, it was necessary to mend this. His redrawn map leaves a reconfigured Iran, Afghanistan and a much reduced Pakistan. Peters does not say how this would be achieved and his argument remains no more than a hypothesis.
In July 2010, former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and geopolitical journalist Michael Hughes, explored the idea of re-configuration of the region again. Blackwill’s essay "A de facto partition of Afghanistan" is more about how the US could exit Afghanistan and stay there as well: "De facto partition is clearly not the best outcome one can imagine for the United States in Afghanistan. But it is now the best outcome that Washington can achieve consistent with vital national interests and US domestic politics." Though he refers more to the Pushtun belt in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the Pushtun belt in KP and Balochistan would remain unaffected by this plan. A domino effect is quite likely.
Hughes’ essay, "Balkanising Pakistan: A collective national Security Strategy – Breaking Pakistan to Fix It" argues that,
…as a result of flawed boundaries combined with the nexus between military rule and Islamic extremism, Pakistan now finds itself in rapid descent toward certain collapse and the country’s leaders stubbornly refuse to do things required to change course. But before allowing Pakistan to commit state suicide, self-disintegrate and further destabilise the region, the international community can beat them to the punch and deconstruct the country less violently.
Hughes admits that Balkanisation did seem to be an extreme step, but adds, "after considering Pakistan’s historic and current relationship with al Qaeda – it becomes easy to justify." More than just strategic justification, one can discern a serious undertone of exasperation and disillusionment with Pakistan in the emerging western discourse, which the Wikileaks exposures will only exacerbate.
It is only natural that all Pakistanis would find this kind of discourse about their country extremely abhorrent. But they must also realise that the biggest existential threat to them comes from the policies followed by their political and military leaders these past sixty years, with little hope that this will change. The implications of all this go beyond Balochistan, even beyond Pakistan, and the region and the world cannot be passive spectators.
Source : South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) , 3rd August 2010 ,Volume 9, No. 4, August 2, 2010;
Also appeared in Outlook, 3rd August 2010
Vikram Sood , Former Head of Research and Analysis Wing .
