China does some chest thumping

China’s rulers have a problem. They are not sure if they can continue to portray the image of a country interested in a peaceful rise without this coming into direct conflict with a desire to reassert newly defined core interests. All of 2010 saw a more assertive Chinese foreign policy activity in its periphery, including India, reflecting possibly a tussle of some sorts in Beijing between an assertive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which may want a bigger role in foreign policy in the decade ahead, and a political leadership that is now going to be in transition as Mr Hu Jintao prepares to hand over power to his selected successor, Xi Jinping, by 2012? And therefore this exercise of display of assertiveness with each power centre, notably the PLA and the Party hierarchy, positioning themselves inside China and positioning themselves against the US where there will be presidential elections in end-2012.

China’s assertiveness and the recent reactions in the Chinese media to the visit of the Indian ship INS Airavat is only a reassertion of its position. China had taken umbrage at US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s July 2010 remarks in Hanoi on creating an international mechanism to resolve this issue, has been particularly visible in the past few weeks. Earlier Dai Bingguo conveyed to Ms Clinton in May 2010 that China regarded its claims to the South China Sea as a core national interest.

The Chinese carried out a live ammunition PLA Navy exercise in the South China Sea on July 26, 2010 followed by another exercise on August 3 along the Yellow Sea coast — the other area of contention. The Chinese conducted exercises there in April and June this year, and were now asserting that China opposed any foreign ships entering the sea or adjacent waters; they even vehemently opposed joint US-South Korean exercises there.

The message in these demarches to the US was in keeping with protecting China’s core interests in the adjacent seas and telling the US that the western Pacific was China’s sphere of interest and influence. It suggested a division of zones of influence between the Eastern and Western Pacific. The US and China have their own geostrategic rivalries to settle, and the Chinese may have assessed that their moment has come.

Its reaction to the visit of the Indian ship has to be seen in this context – it is part belief in its history, part knee jerk, part bullying, part worry about energy resources, and part suspicion about growing India-Vietnamese-US triangular relationship in the South China Sea. The influential Communist Party-managed newspaper the Global Times was somewhat hysterical when, in its editorial of September 16, it warned India that any deal with Vietnam would be ‘serious political provocation’ which could ‘push China to the limit’ and described the ONGC Vietnam deal as a reflection of Indian ambitions. The newspaper went on to say that while China was sincere about its peaceful rise it will not give up its right to use other means to protect its interest. China cherished its friendship with India but this did not mean that China valued this above all else. It referred to India’s intervention in the Dalai Lama issue and ends with the warning that ‘we should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development nor should we pursue the reputation of being a peaceful power,’... Clearly, there is a debate inside the sanctum sanctorum of the Chinese Communist Party.

China’s reaction is also a reflection of its concern for energy resources. China has only 1.1% of the world’s known energy reserves but consumes 10.4 % of the world’s oil production and 20.1 % of the total energy consumption in the world. The mismatch is obvious and will grow more in the years ahead. Naturally, China views the disputed South China Sea zone with its energy reserves with special interest. Some estimates state that the known reserves of the South China Sea are twice as much as China’s reserves of oil and there is plenty of gas too.

The Indian reaction to this charge by Beijing has been firm pointing out that India’s cooperation with Vietnam or with any other country ‘is always as per international laws, norms and conventions...’ India has also pointed out China’s role in the disputed part of POK under Pakistan occupation where China may be on the verge of using the territory for developing communication links with Afghanistan. Obviously, China is planning for a post-US phase in Afghanistan, access to its mineral resources, ultimately linking to Iran and the Gulf; it would not want the region to be solely India’s sphere of influence. India has also to keep its own vulnerabilities in Arunachal Pradesh in mind; even though outright war is unlikely we should expect economic cooperation and periodic tensions. China-India relations will not be determined by strict bilateral terms. As both countries rise, there will be competition in other spheres - for markets, resources and influence.

Yet China remains concerned with its intricate trade and financial links with the US, and also with the security of its trade and supply routes that transit the Malacca Straits. It has endeavoured to develop extensive land routes through Central Asia, but these are inadequate. It is a matter of time before China will make its presence more visible in the Indian Ocean. It has port facilities in Kyaukpyu, Hambantota and Gwadar, and a presence in the Arabian Sea as it battles Somali pirates. China has expanded its contacts with Iran and has developed strong ties with Burma.

It is of course entirely feasible that China would have reacted in this manner even if there were not the question of energy reserves of South China Sea. It would have had more to do with its own perception as zhongguo – the “Middle Kingdom” or the “Central Country” where the neighbouring countries were considered to be vassal states and who accepted the Emperor in Beijing as the supreme power in the region.

Thus while New Delhi agonises over challenges across land frontiers, ignoring the new challenge in the Indian Ocean would be extremely hurt Indian interests. There is need to plan counter measures in China's periphery from now. Perpetual whining about China's grand designs will not help.

Source : Written for ANI, New Delhi on September 21, 2011

The Jihadi upper cut in Pakistan

The famous Pakistani bridge player, Zia Mahmood, in his engagingly written book “Bridge My Way” describes the perils of playing this card game in his native Pakistan in 1975. He wrote that a bridge club was opened in Lahore, but it lasted a week because that was how long it took for the religious groups of the area to have it closed. He adds that ‘simply visiting the club was nerve-racking with the constant worry that at any time violent neighbours might turn up with their own brand of eviction notice.’ And this was before General Zia ul Haq turned on the Islamic screws on the people. 35 years and more later, we hear of stories about Lahore’s growing Talibanisation when the woman curator of the city’s famous Nairang Gallery was harassed and assaulted by a senior police official for wearing improper clothes and describing the work of the Gallery as fahashi (vulgarity) during the rehearsal of a Bharatnatyam dance recital; the same moral brigade representative had earlier objected to a couple because they were sitting together. Those who tried to rescue the curator were beaten and when gallery owner’s son enquired about the incident, he was dragged away to the thana for being ‘hung upside down’. This cultural policing is a sign of what is clearly becoming the new ideology of Pakistan.

The assassination of Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer in January this year, by his own body guard because he opposed the Blasphemy Law is one part of the problem. All societies have such intolerant elements but what is worrying has been the reaction of the mullahs, the lawyers and even the state. There was reluctance to blame Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin, instead there was praise for his action. The state clearly indicated that it was not going to revise the Blasphemy Law. Perhaps it was not going to be able to revise or did not want to revise; one will never know.

Pakistan’s well-known political analyst and commentator, Dr Eqbal Ahmed had prophesied as far back as in 1998 in the Dawn newspaper (August 23,) that the costs of Islamabad’s Afghan policy— already unbearable in proliferation of guns, heroin and armed fanatics — would multiply in myriad ways. He had added that closeness with the Taliban would make these costs potentially catastrophic. Today, in this pursuit of strategic depth and seeking to avenge India for all the various imagined wrong doings, Pakistan’s rulers have become impervious to the logic of peace; only the logic of force is understood, inside Pakistan or in its neighbourood. Neither the Islam of the Taliban or the Lashkar e Tayyaba favours democracy; nor does the Pakistan Army.

Although Zia had been credited with the drive towards enforcing austere Islam, political leaders in Pakistan have also succumbed to pressure from religious forces or used religion for political ends. It might even be argued that had Zia or his successors been wiser they could have offered to wind down the jihad and its mujahideen, in return for largesse of all kinds from the Americans and the west, used it well and Pakistan today could have been a prosperous, strong and modernised state in the region, ahead of India perhaps. Instead the rulers retained the jihadi option and clichés of ‘a thousand year war’ and ‘we shall eat grass’ endured through successive governments that came after Zia

There was an inevitability of this process that the Pakistani rulers either did not see or refused to see; or worse, even encouraged this after sometime especially in India during the 1990s. . After years of close association with Islamic militancy either in Afghanistan or in India, Pak Army personnel were directly exposed to Islamic militancy and propaganda for an orthodox Islamic order for Pakistan. The important question today is how much and to what extent has the Pakistan Army been Islamicised and how has this affected the society or the elite which has always sided with the Army. In Pakistan the dilemma is that the society will have to see whether in the long term, the larger political battle is won by those who seek an Islamic theocratic state or by those who want a modern Islamic republic. True there are many brave and liberal thinkers and writers in Pakistan who see the dangers. Their writings appear in the English press frequently. But they also know that once a thinker crosses the rubicon, a fate similar to that of Daniel Pearl or Syed Saleem Shahzad is a strong possibility.

A society that teaches its young hatred for other religions and cultures, only suffocates and blinds them. This is the nature of the Pakistani state today. Those who wish to deal with Pakistan or need to deal with that country would do well to remember this. We cannot change this; only Pakistanis can, if they wish to. Indians just have to learn to deal with the reality.

The world does not stress on the Christianity of western countries while dealing with them. Similarly, one need not stress on Pakistan’s Islamic/Muslim character which is part of its two-nation theory and not India’s. Just deal with Pakistan as another country which would relieve us of having to constantly tailor our policies with our Muslims in mind. Our Muslims are as Indian as the rest of us with the same problems and aspirations and can no longer be treated as vote banks at election time.

Source : 12th September 2011