It has been said so often by so many but it still bears repetition that Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda has only one item on it — India. For pursuit of this obsession, Pakistan has followed policies in the region that allowed itself to be in a situation where US secretary of state Hillary Clinton rebuked Pakistan while in Pakistan recently. Those of us here who delude ourselves that this would galvanise Pakistan to now quickly change policy might do well to shed this delusion. The rest of us know that Pakistan will not change its policy and indeed it cannot afford to.
Pakistan’s quest for equality, if not supremacy over India, has rested on the tripod of the nuclear option, terrorism and strategic depth in Afghanistan. The China-Pakistan nexus was and is a valuable add-on to both because it continues to give Pakistan added muscle to take on India. Although Pakistan had taken the terror route much earlier, its missile and nuclear capability with a loudly proclaimed low threshold has impressed the West enough, leading to greater adventurism. If China found a low cost option in Pakistan’s ambitions and fears, the Pakistan Army found the terrorists useful and expendable cannon fodder. The nuclear and terrorist weapon provided the Pakistan Army security and primacy.
Pakistan intransigence in meeting US strategic interests along with its duplicity has hobbled US policy rendering it unable to deal with Pakistan either as an enemy or as an ally. Pakistan’s refusal to deal with the Haqqani group as demanded by the Americans indicates the extent to which the former is willing to go down the road on this one. The stoppage of military aid and the fear of a possible stoppage of funds have not deterred Pakistan. If Pakistan can throw out US objections or ignore its protests there is no reason to believe that Pakistan will change its stance on India. The terrorist option will not be scaled down nor will the nuclear option surrendered.
Thus flummoxed by Pakistan obduracy and exasperated by its duplicity, the Americans have been looking for escape clauses, one of them being pressuring India to raise Pakistan’s comfort level on bilateral (read Kashmir) issues so that Pakistan cooperates fully with the US. That is the US position, but that does not mean that this should be India’s position too. And even if it is accepted that talks will do no harm, unilateral concessions under the mistaken belief that we should be magnanimous are counterproductive.
That said, it is worth remembering that Pakistan does not really want to resolve the Kashmir issue because if it does, then the Pakistan Army will lose its most important cause celebre that allows it to retain ownership of Pakistan. There will be a huge problem of redeployment of the jihadi foot soldiers rendered unemployed after Kashmir is “solved”. We should not expect Pakistan to shut down the 42 training camps it has in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan to train its jihadis against India. Therefore, for us to be continually making concessions reveals a confused policy both with regard to Pakistan and internally with regard to Kashmir. In Kashmir we must learn that we need patience and the urge to do something for the sake of doing something is deeply flawed. Further, that political expediency in Kashmir or anywhere else will always be subsumed by national security considerations.
Take the case of the withdrawal of AFSPA from certain districts of Jammu and Kashmir, come what may. This may be needed to show some political results in the Valley and a measure of independence from New Delhi, and also to blunt the People’s Democratic Party opposition and hastily provide a positive gesture to Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s offer to talk to New Delhi. The issue of the withdrawal of the AFSPA has been discussed in various contexts in the country. The four main provisions of the AFSPA are authority to the Army to arrest, search, engage and destroy. It is only fair that if we expect our Army to counter insurgency within our borders we must provide it legal cover. These powers are much less than what the police has in the state.
Besides, one does not see the wisdom of withdrawing the AFSPA from the border districts knowing that the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Tayyaba is forever trying to infiltrate. Partial withdrawal also means that terrorists could commit terror acts in one district and run to the other for a safe haven. One also wonders if a chief minister can take unilateral decisions on such issues. If Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah is really interested in making progress on ensuring the withdrawal of the Army, then he could begin by withdrawing the Disturbed Areas Act, which is within his power. Meanwhile, it would be best not to play politics on such issues.
There was an air of inevitability about incidents in Kashmir on the Diwali eve. To suggest that the Army itself orchestrated this is a measure of the general negativity in the country that we are prepared to believe the worst about all our institutions. Mustafa Kamal’s outburst against the Army was irresponsible and unfortunate; subsequent recantations were received with amusement at best or cynicism at worst. We ought to also factor in that if there is peace and tranquillity in Kashmir, Pakistan ceases to be relevant. Pakistan will never want that situation and more, the Pakistan Army cannot afford this.
Eventually, the AFSPA will be withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir, maybe next year but that should happen as a result of a consensus among all those involved. Till then, we must work towards that consensus. It cannot be that one arm of governance can hold the Centre to ransom. It cannot be that we want to give concessions just to look good. Or shore up domestic political standing. Emotions run high in Srinagar from time to time, but decisions cannot be based on emotion and sentiment; instead there have to be reason and realism. Partial withdrawal of AFSPA is an idea whose time may not have come yet.
Source : Asian Age , 28th October 2011
Balochistan, the forgotten province
By: Vikram Sood
Date: 2011-10-27
Abductions of Baloch nationals and their disappearances are now routine. In a matter of three days in October, nine mutilated bodies of Baloch missing persons were found from different parts of Balochistan like Khuzdar and Gwadar. This list is endless. The rest of the world is, however, far too involved with what is happening in the Arab world or Afghanistan- Pakistan.
The Baloch have had a long list of economic, political and social discrimination against Islamabad. There are a few courageous writers, and the diaspora that feeds the websites and Twitter. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its report, 'We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years: Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan,' says hundreds of people have disappeared since 2005 in Balochistan. The HRW has documented 45 cases of enforced disappearances and torture by Pakistani security forces in 2009 and 2010.
No one really gets to hear of what is happening in the padded cell. The largely forgotten and ignored Baloch however keep reminding the world that they are in the midst of their fifth war of independence against their Punjabi oppressor. Here in India too the Baloch issue is hardly noticed mostly because the western press has not commented on it for months.
This is despite the fact that we are routinely accused of interference in Balochistan and we even admitted to discussing this allegation. (Anyone remember the inglorious communiqu © at Sharm el Sheikh two years ago?) Balochistan has suffered not only from neglect by its own governments but also by the rest of the world.
The nationalists among them insist that Balochistan had declared its independence on August 11, 1947 and want a reversal of that. Their problem is that they are divided, the political structures are weak and that traditional leadership of the Mengals, Marris, Bizenjos and Bugtis has weakened, dispersed or been eliminated. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of the Bugti tribe was killed in August 2006.
Akbar Bugti's grandson escaped to Switzerland while Khair Bux's other sons Hyrbair, Mehran and Ghezen live overseas. Balaach Marri, the son of Nawab Khair Bux Marri who himself has campaigned for Baloch independence, was killed in Afghanistan in November 2007.
The Baloch believe that both Akbar Bugti and Balaach Marri were killed under orders from General Musharraf. Added to this have been the killings of Shias, carried out in recent times by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
These Sunni extremists, are possibly in league with the Taliban's Quetta Shura, adding to the confusion about what is happening in the province. Baloch nationalism is, as before, sought to be suppressed through the use of religious forces.
Balochistan always had a strategic relevance for the West. After Germany surrendered in May 1945, a reappraisal of the long term policy of interests of the British empire argued that Britain must retain its military connection with the subcontinent and that, if necessary, Balochistan should be detached from India.
As it turned out, all of Pakistan came under Anglo-American influence after independence. When the massive Baloch insurrection of 1974 broke out Zulfiqar Bhutto had to resort to the use of the Air Force. Peace was restored after General Zia assumed power in 1977. Since then, till today, the struggle has been intermittent but has never died down.
Balochistan has enormous reserves of gas, gold and copper, as well as untapped sources of oil and uranium. Its strategic importance is also as a prospective energy transit route. It adjoins the Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 per cent of the world's oil resources pass annually. The exploitation of these natural resources in combination with repressive and discriminatory state-run policies have led to armed uprisings in the province.
Logistic supplies to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan which land in Karachi are also routed through Balochistan. This explains why the US/NATO prefer to ignore events in Balochistan. This could, however, change once the US dependency on routes through Pakistan changes to the Northern routes.
Source: The Midday Mumbai, October 27, 2011
One was reasonably sure many years ago that Osama was hiding in Pakistan, most probably in the Abbottabad area. Pakistan authorities, however, consistently denied Osama's presence in their country.
But, as it embarrassingly turned out, Osama was living with his family, along with an entire terrorist and communication paraphernalia. This was despite the country's ubiquitous intelligence machinery with its close contacts with the terrorist underworld.
If Islamabad did not know, then its is clear that the terrorists there are running out of control. If Islamabad did know, then it obviously chose not to disclose the information and assist the US in its effort against terrorism. This was either a strategic decision of the rulers for use of assets later, or a tactical decision to keep the ultra radicals at bay. Both underscore a natural desire to play the terror card.
House of terror: Pakistan authorities had repeatedly denied Osama's
presence in their country, even as he lived a short distance away from
the country's capital.
Pakistan is to try Dr Afridi, who is suspected to have given information to the US, which led to the famous SEAL assault on May 2 and the subsequent death of Osama. Is it treason to help the US find the world's most wanted terrorist? It was rather a service that he did to the US and the world. Yet, the attitude is that not helping the US find Osama was an act of supreme loyalty by the ISI and the Pakistan Army.
These are unfortunate directions Pakistan is taking, egged on by an increasingly intolerant section that is strident, violent, and at times vicious. Just looking at photographs of thousands of Islamists protesting against the sentencing of Salman Taseer's killer, juxtaposed with the news that 13 innocent Shias were taken off a bus, lined and killed in cold blood by Sunni radicals, has a chilling effect. It is not that radicalism spreads in one massive tsunami. It creeps in slowly and all it takes is a few good men to keep quiet for the virus to spread. It happens when a small child is accused of blasphemy for misspelling, when Ahmedi children are banned from attending school, or when religious laws that discriminate against women are espoused.
Why is it that Pakistan chooses to behave in a manner that has made it an international pariah with a broken economy and a rundown social structure that can't give its young the gift of modern education, but subjects them to the medieval obscurantism of many madrassas? Soon after its birth, Pakistan was naturally anxious to make its formation a success. Its mistake was to perennially seek equality with India. Since then it has boxed above its weight. It decided to play its locational card with the West. It offered its territory for US Cold War objectives, then for the Afghan jihad and then again, ostensibly against terrorism. Pakistan's leaders also learnt that delinquency could be rewarding, so they either played the victim or spread terror, assured protection by the country's status as a nuclear power.
The West, especially the US has continued its policy of coddling Pakistan. What were considered startling accusations by the outgoing American Chief of Joint Staff Admiral Mullen 10 days ago, are already being watered down. True, there are many Pakistani men and women who shudder at the direction their country is taking. It is also true that there are far more in Pakistan who believe in the ideology of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba that promises ultimate and global Islamic dominance.
The only thing they dislike is violence against Pakistanis. The main worry in India is not that Pakistan will use the nuclear bomb; the main worry is that it will continue to use militias like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba as a veritable arm of the Pakistan Army whose own motto is 'jihad f'isb illah' (jihad in the name of Allah). Our fear should be that hordes of militant believers could be let loose by their mentors. If a country's rulers can be duplicitous with their benefactor there is very little reason to believe they will not do likewise or worse with their 'sworn enemy'.
The writer is former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
Mid-day October 13, 2011, Mumbai
HAVE WE LEARNT ANY LESSONS
Whenever there is a terrorist incident in India we hear the same rhetoric and promises. The same repetitive promises to root out terrorism, about zero tolerance, promises of compensations to those killed or wounded, gory pictures on front pages, excited TV channels in competition to cover the horror in detail (just what the terrorist wants), experts’ panels on all channels showering wisdom, VIP visits to the scene throwing all other arrangements out of gear, politicians seeking vote banks and allegations of intelligence failure in a trial on the camera. That is until the next terrorist incident.
Terrorism or terrorist acts are about murder and killing innocents in pursuance to causes real, contrived or imagined, and counter terrorism can get ugly because there is no polite way of dealing with those willing to kill innocents or themselves. Further, terrorism is a cost effective weapon and the state response has to be cost-intensive and manpower intensive to the nth degree. In addition there are hidden costs calculated by Levitt and Dubner in their book Super Freakonomics. Even though the shoe bomber Richard Reid failed in his attempt, this forced the US authorities to introduce the practice of passengers having to remove shoes for inspection at airports. Levitt and Dubner calculated that this meant the loss of time equivalence of 14 lives per year in America.
Terrorism evolves and terrorists innovate as they have moved from individual acts of terror, hostage taking, IED attacks, suicide terrorism, attacks by assault teams of terrorists and then cyber terrorism and catastrophic terrorism. They have used all forms of terrorism as vehicles of their attacks, except naval/sea craft; the counter terrorist is worried about WMD terrorism. Yet whatever be the provocation, democratic governments are expected to react to terrorism with sensitivity to the cause and with determination to eliminate violence. In addition, the counter terrorist lumbers along circumscribed by its own principles of propriety and floundering in the massive bureaucratic labyrinth. Consequently nothing ever gets done, either adequately or in time.
What is wrong with us? Why is it that after 60 years we have not been able to root out terrorism or prevent terrorist attacks? What is it that we, as a country, as a people and as a government must do to rid ourselves of this problem and have failed to do all these years? Is it a lack of political will? Is it a poor set of priorities? It is true we cannot compare the Indian situation with the US or even Europe. The US does not have a neighbour like ours and we live in a tough neighbourhood.
Usually, the lament is that the state should be addressing the causes and grievances first. These require deeper and philosophical handling but the solution to the problem of acts of terrorism and their prevention lie in solving the problems themselves.
Despite the best intelligence and counter terror organisations terrorist attacks can take place simply because the terrorists got lucky . Normally, an individual terrorist attack is successful because of poor intelligence, inadequate and poor policing, imperfect communications. It is not enough that individual terrorist attacks be countered but the phenomenon has to be defeated, made at least costly, if not impossible, for the terrorist and his mentors.
In India, after every crisis the tendency has been to create new super-bodies to oversee existing ones or share their work, achieved mostly by cannibalising the older agencies. Today we have the existing intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing at the centre, supported by state structures. Add to this the Multi Agency Centre superseded by the National Counter Terrorism Centre assisted, supervised or coordinated by the top heavy cost intensive gargantuan National Intelligence Grid. Yet the NATGRID is only intended to be a gigantic clearing house of different data banks without any commensurate downstream arrangements. The National Investigation Agency is designed to investigate post event acts and is not a preventive mechanism and it seems in clash with state agencies who are expected to have better local intelligence.
It is true that sound and timely intelligence is the starting point of an effective counter intelligence effort. Maybe an improvement in HUMINT requires changed recruitment and training systems and revised policies for mid career corrections. We seem to have followed the US pattern in excessive reliance on TECHINT but there is no short cut to having sound HUMINT. Technology is a service an enabler not the main instrument of intelligence operations.
Action on the data accessed from NATGRID would be taken by the local police force. The poor state of these forces is common knowledge. The state police forces are hopelessly undermanned undertrained and under equipped. An all India average of policemen per 100000 people is 125 against the global average of 250. The country is deficit in police recruitment to about 2 million; this is in a country that has no shortage of manpower. The system of the beat constable is now dead and gone because either he is deployed on VIP security or busy pandering to the mafioso who owns the kholi in which he lives. There is thus very little possibility that this poor constable (admittedly no angel most of the time) can carry out his duties diligently.
Counter terrorism cannot be communalised or politicised with terrorism defined in terms of Hindu or Muslim origins. This not only affects investigations but also the communities. There is an enthusiastic attempt in the aftermath of a terrorist incident to acquire political capital. This is something we will have to live with but good ground intelligence and a reasonable data bank (not the overpowering kind imagined by the NATGRID) would help in keeping the counter terror effort as a neutral force.
There is also a feeling that there is very little awareness among the security personnel, both men and officers, about the changing dynamics of global terrorism, the impact of internet, the consequences of AfPak situation on India. There is little awareness about the way Indian terrorist/extremist groups have been evolving in the past ten years and their linkages with other insurgent/extremist/criminal groups operating across borders.
There is little interaction between the state agencies and think-tank community on issues of terrorism and violence. It is time that the state outsourced this expertise as it does not have the time or the manpower to handle this. The state could benefit from understanding the dynamics of terrorism, objectives and support bases of terrorist groups and the extent of state sponsorship of terrorism.
Repeats of terrorist attacks depend upon the efficacy and force of reactions of the state to each terrorist act. One is not sure if there have been adequate lessons learnt apart from constituting new organisations. The state must have and be seen to have, a quick and massive response capability, hostage negotiating and rescue capability, locally trained counter terrorist teams, well organised emergency responses (fire and hospitals) and an effective information management. All these were inadequate in during the Mumbai massacre and the most frequently heard comment was “paralysis” and “chaos”. One can only hope that we have learnt our lessons and this is not repeated the next time an attack occurs which one is reasonably sure will happen.
Mail Today New Delhi October 6, 2011
HAVE WE LEARNT ANY LESSONS
Whenever there is a terrorist incident in India we hear the same rhetoric and promises. The same repetitive promises to root out terrorism, about zero tolerance, promises of compensations to those killed or wounded, gory pictures on front pages, excited TV channels in competition to cover the horror in detail (just what the terrorist wants), experts’ panels on all channels showering wisdom, VIP visits to the scene throwing all other arrangements out of gear, politicians seeking vote banks and allegations of intelligence failure in a trial on the camera. That is until the next terrorist incident.
Terrorism or terrorist acts are about murder and killing innocents in pursuance to causes real, contrived or imagined, and counter terrorism can get ugly because there is no polite way of dealing with those willing to kill innocents or themselves. Further, terrorism is a cost effective weapon and the state response has to be cost-intensive and manpower intensive to the nth degree. In addition there are hidden costs calculated by Levitt and Dubner in their book Super Freakonomics. Even though the shoe bomber Richard Reid failed in his attempt, this forced the US authorities to introduce the practice of passengers having to remove shoes for inspection at airports. Levitt and Dubner calculated that this meant the loss of time equivalence of 14 lives per year in America.
Terrorism evolves and terrorists innovate as they have moved from individual acts of terror, hostage taking, IED attacks, suicide terrorism, attacks by assault teams of terrorists and then cyber terrorism and catastrophic terrorism. They have used all forms of terrorism as vehicles of their attacks, except naval/sea craft; the counter terrorist is worried about WMD terrorism. Yet whatever be the provocation, democratic governments are expected to react to terrorism with sensitivity to the cause and with determination to eliminate violence. In addition, the counter terrorist lumbers along circumscribed by its own principles of propriety and floundering in the massive bureaucratic labyrinth. Consequently nothing ever gets done, either adequately or in time.
What is wrong with us? Why is it that after 60 years we have not been able to root out terrorism or prevent terrorist attacks? What is it that we, as a country, as a people and as a government must do to rid ourselves of this problem and have failed to do all these years? Is it a lack of political will? Is it a poor set of priorities? It is true we cannot compare the Indian situation with the US or even Europe. The US does not have a neighbour like ours and we live in a tough neighbourhood.
Usually, the lament is that the state should be addressing the causes and grievances first. These require deeper and philosophical handling but the solution to the problem of acts of terrorism and their prevention lie in solving the problems themselves.
Despite the best intelligence and counter terror organisations terrorist attacks can take place simply because the terrorists got lucky . Normally, an individual terrorist attack is successful because of poor intelligence, inadequate and poor policing, imperfect communications. It is not enough that individual terrorist attacks be countered but the phenomenon has to be defeated, made at least costly, if not impossible, for the terrorist and his mentors.
In India, after every crisis the tendency has been to create new super-bodies to oversee existing ones or share their work, achieved mostly by cannibalising the older agencies. Today we have the existing intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing at the centre, supported by state structures. Add to this the Multi Agency Centre superseded by the National Counter Terrorism Centre assisted, supervised or coordinated by the top heavy cost intensive gargantuan National Intelligence Grid. Yet the NATGRID is only intended to be a gigantic clearing house of different data banks without any commensurate downstream arrangements. The National Investigation Agency is designed to investigate post event acts and is not a preventive mechanism and it seems in clash with state agencies who are expected to have better local intelligence.
It is true that sound and timely intelligence is the starting point of an effective counter intelligence effort. Maybe an improvement in HUMINT requires changed recruitment and training systems and revised policies for mid career corrections. We seem to have followed the US pattern in excessive reliance on TECHINT but there is no short cut to having sound HUMINT. Technology is a service an enabler not the main instrument of intelligence operations.
Action on the data accessed from NATGRID would be taken by the local police force. The poor state of these forces is common knowledge. The state police forces are hopelessly undermanned undertrained and under equipped. An all India average of policemen per 100000 people is 125 against the global average of 250. The country is deficit in police recruitment to about 2 million; this is in a country that has no shortage of manpower. The system of the beat constable is now dead and gone because either he is deployed on VIP security or busy pandering to the mafioso who owns the kholi in which he lives. There is thus very little possibility that this poor constable (admittedly no angel most of the time) can carry out his duties diligently.
Counter terrorism cannot be communalised or politicised with terrorism defined in terms of Hindu or Muslim origins. This not only affects investigations but also the communities. There is an enthusiastic attempt in the aftermath of a terrorist incident to acquire political capital. This is something we will have to live with but good ground intelligence and a reasonable data bank (not the overpowering kind imagined by the NATGRID) would help in keeping the counter terror effort as a neutral force.
There is also a feeling that there is very little awareness among the security personnel, both men and officers, about the changing dynamics of global terrorism, the impact of internet, the consequences of AfPak situation on India. There is little awareness about the way Indian terrorist/extremist groups have been evolving in the past ten years and their linkages with other insurgent/extremist/criminal groups operating across borders.
There is little interaction between the state agencies and think-tank community on issues of terrorism and violence. It is time that the state outsourced this expertise as it does not have the time or the manpower to handle this. The state could benefit from understanding the dynamics of terrorism, objectives and support bases of terrorist groups and the extent of state sponsorship of terrorism.
Repeats of terrorist attacks depend upon the efficacy and force of reactions of the state to each terrorist act. One is not sure if there have been adequate lessons learnt apart from constituting new organisations. The state must have and be seen to have, a quick and massive response capability, hostage negotiating and rescue capability, locally trained counter terrorist teams, well organised emergency responses (fire and hospitals) and an effective information management. All these were inadequate in during the Mumbai massacre and the most frequently heard comment was “paralysis” and “chaos”. One can only hope that we have learnt our lessons and this is not repeated the next time an attack occurs which one is reasonably sure will happen.
Mail Today New Delhi October 6, 2011
