Pakistan-Intrigues ,Manoeuvres , Aspirations and Turbulence : Memogate -Who Dunnit and Why

The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. But not in Pakistan, where things evolve in a convoluted and conspiratorial fashion. The replacement of Pakistan’s Ambassador Hussain Haqqani was not through a direct Prime Ministerial order but intrigue through a memo supposedly written by or on behalf of the country’s political leadership to American leadership seeking protection against its own Army and then leaked to seek the removal of those seeking assistance.

Here was a man representing his country’s sovereignty arraigned publicly and equated with a con man known for his propensity to drop names and fabricate information. Nothing indicates the mind of the powers that be in Pakistan than this equation and the eagerness to condemn and punish Haqqani. Surely, Haqqani knew of and about Mansoor Ijaz. Besides, it is indeed very strange that Haqqani should need Ijaz to deliver such a sensitive message. In fact such a memo would not even exist. Discussions of this kind would be only oral.

The contents of the memo are also odd. Five of the six offers are about giving comfort to the US on terrorism; unavoidably, as this has become Pakistan’s identity and chief export. That bit about India and 26/11 Mumbai was odd but designed to convince the Americans that they were serious about changing policy. The received wisdom on this is that this memo is an elaborate and a clumsy fake.

An Army that had been reeling under multiple embarrassments after the Osama bin Laden killing in May needed a come back. Their constant refrain that they did not know the whereabouts of OBL, was exposed. They had been caught harbouring the world’s most wanted terrorist and their most valuable strategic bargaining chip with the Americans. The US trusted the Army even less, loud proclamations notwithstanding. They were shown as incompetent by one section of the population that believed in the creed of OBL and untrustworthy by the rest.
The truth is that the Pak Army has been stalking Husain Haqqani even before he became his country’s representative in DC. He had earned the Army’s permanent enmity after he wrote the book “Pakistan: between mosque and military” in 2005. His appointment as Ambassador in 2008 had left the Army seething. There was no likelihood of Zardari agreeing to remove Haqqani, especially when he was delivering in Washington. There had to be recourse to subterfuge.

In few countries does the Army sit in on judgement about the behaviour of the country’s diplomatic representatives. In the end the Army reasserted its pre-eminence because Haqqani has been replaced by another Benazir acolyte, Sherry Rehman considered to be close to the Army. The difference is that while Hussain Haqqani was an avowed Army-hater, his equally suave successor belongs to the elite of Pakistan which survives through traditionally clever arrangements with the Army. They criticise the Army to show their freedom and independence but that is restricted up to very carefully defined red-lines. For instance, the policy on India will be laid down by the Army; that on Afghanistan similarly defined by GHQ Rawalpindi, currently Pakistan’s real capital. For every crime there has to be a motive and one looks for the obvious gainers. In this case it is the Army of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Jinnah Institute of which Sherry Rehman was the Chairman till her recent appointment had prepared a report along with the United States Institute of Peace had been released in September this year. The report, titled ‘Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’ seems to reflect the Army’s point of view.

The report identifies identify three main objectives which the “elite” considered necessary in Afghanistan:

· Pakistan’s interests were best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan and that persistent instability in Afghanistan would have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.

Pakistan should seek a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation which would necessarily require the main Taliban factions – particularly Mullah Omar’s “Quetta Shura” Taliban and the Haqqani network – to be part of the new political arrangement. This implies that the Taliban and all Pushtun are interchangeable.

· There was need to restrict Indian presence to development activities and participate in Afghanistan’s economic progress and prosperity. The elite view is that the present Indian engagement was going beyond strictly development. Greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives was needed.

It is believed that Sherry Rehman’s endorses this report. The report is that of the Pakistan’s foreign policy elite. And the elite in Pakistan has always taken care to remain close to the Army for therein lies its security and prosperity.

POLITICAL FORTUNES
The Army having emerged stronger in the latest bout, political parties like the PML (N) and PTI are making the appropriate overtures unlike the PPP which is handicapped by its past animosities with the Army. The PML(N)’s uncomfortable and tenuous honeymoon is over, and sees this as an opportunity to gain ground at the expense of the PPP and also wishes to consolidate against the new player, the PTI of Imran Khan. For this it is necessary to prove loyalties to the strongest force in the country –the Army. Nawaz Sharif has filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking a probe into the memogate. This follows his demand in Faisalabad on November 20 for a judicial enquiry into the episode with other party stalwarts describing the government as Zardari mafia and Imran Khan as a pawn of the Army.

At this stage, should the Supreme Court decide to hasten the NRO case against Zardari, his government will be under threat. Beleaguered in this fashion, the PPP will have to rely more and more on the Army. At the same time, the Army probably sees its best chance to finish PP for good. Other politicians like Mian Azhar, have started to hedge and have joined Imran Khan. Maybe they sense a snap election. Political uncertainties of this kind only help strengthen the Army’s stranglehold. In all this infighting and the question of survival of some, relations with India will take a back seat. We should forget about issues like MFN that we have been so eager about and cosmetics apart, there is hardly any likelihood of new breakthroughs in the immediate future.

THE STRANGE CASE OF TALKS WITH THE TALIBAN

The case of the on-off talks between the Government and the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is getting curious and curiouser. The Pakistan Taliban declared on November 21 that the talks had commenced, the next day there were denials by the Pak Army; thereafter even the Taliban – or sections of the Taliban also announced that there were no ceasefire talks. To prove their point, they attacked a police station in Dera Ismail Khan killing an officer at dawn on November 22 whereas another Taliban leader had asserted that there was going to be a ceasefire in the South Waziristan area, to allow the month old talks to go ahead. The received wisdom is that there are factions within the TTP with senior leaders close to Hakimullah Mehsud asserting that Mehsud was in favour of a ceasefire. What however, seems to have upset all arrangements is an attempted suicide attack on a very senior ISI officer on Tuesday November 22 near the ISI headquarters in Abpara, Islamabad. Obviously there is a strong faction within the TTP that is opposed to the peace overtures.

There has been a decline in the TTP activities since 2007-08, suggesting a division within the TTP and possibly this has led the government to adopt a harder stance against them. Interior Minister also declared that talks with the TTP were possible only if they were to lay down their arms. The Pushtun does not lay down his arms even in peacetime; to expect him to do so now is being very optimistic.

Peace deals with the TTP have never endured in the past and there has also been a feeling in the government circles that the TTP uses these opportunities to regroup. This scepticism about the present state of affairs is not without substance. It would be extremely difficult to get all the groups to agree to a peace deal and once agreed how long such a deal would last. The future here, which would be the Pakistan government’s first priority on the insurgency front, remains uncertain.

Source : 29th November 2011, Published in DNA Mumbai via ANI News

Assaults on India

The India Pakistan relationship in recent years has been to a pattern. They hit, we appease. The massive train bombing in Mumbai in 2006 was followed by the NAM Summit in 2007 where we lowered ourselves to Pakistan's level by agreeing that both countries faced the common threat of terrorism.

We ignored that India had suffered from Pakistani terrorism and innumerable killings for decades and Pakistan had just begun to suffer from Pakistani terrorism. Thereafter, the commonality ended. The carnage of Mumbai on November 26, 2008 -- something all of us watched in horror and anguish -- was really Gen Kayani's Kargil against us. It was a declaration of war.

In response we did not even formally suspend the Composite Dialogue. Instead, we had the sell out at Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2009 where we scored a number of own goals.

That has been the pattern since then, beginning with the Delhi fiasco of the Foreign Secretaries' meeting followed by the Islamabad fiasco of the Foreign Ministers' meeting interspersed with dreamy eyed hopes of building trust at Thimpu and ending with the latest foray in the Maldives. Our problem has been that we have made hope a principle of foreign policy and Pakistan has made terrorism a weapon of foreign policy and we are not able to see the futility of the first and the reality of the second.

The reality is harsh and frightening. The reality is that of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, its linkages with the Deep State of Pakistan embodied in the Pak Army and the ISI and the jihadi paraphernalia. They draw sustenance from each other. While the world is now waking up to the threat, we in India should by now have a clear idea of the kind of threat we face from this terrorist outfit masquerading as a social service NGO. We should be under no delusions about what the future entails as this organisation has the full support of the state.

Three years after Mumbai, despite all our entreaties and dossiers, there has been no joy from Pakistan. Instead we have the Pak Interior Minister suggesting that we hang Qasab, and thereby close the case implying quite clearly we are not going to get what we want from Pakistan. Three years after Mumbai the LeT has grown in strength and range of activities with a presence in at least 22 countries and making it a far more potent threat than any other terrorist organisation.

The LeT's vast terror network extends beyond Pakistan; its terror training establishment of military-jihadi expertise teaches an international alumni. Jihadi training schools are now a lucrative post retirement avenue for retiring Army officers and men who provide international consultancies and specialised training, like creating deep cover operatives. It is estimated that the LeT has over 2,500 offices, employing over 25,000 persons. While its main centre remains at Muridke, near Lahore where it has a sprawling campus, students' hostels, technical institutes, medical centres, its second major infrastructure facility is in Shahdodpur in Sindh.

Its financial resources are enormous -- both domestic from charity contributions, compensation/subsidy from the Army, global donations from Pakistanis abroad and from Saudi Arabia and UAE charities. There is enough money in the LeT coffers to enable purchase of new property worth US $ 6 million in Punjab and Sindh in 2003. Since 2001 a new centre, the Markaz Qadsiya was built in Lahore at a cost of US $9.5 million. All this and more can be found in Wilson John's book "The Caliphate's Soldiers," which is guaranteed to leave many of us very frightened.

Today the LeT is the world's most powerful trans-national, but essentially Punjabi, terrorist group enjoying unending state support. There are no signs that the Pakistani state has any intentions of either even disengaging from LeT's activities to say nothing of dismantling this group.

The fear that there could be a major terrorist attack in India by the LeT or its proxies, is very real. This threat will begin to recede only when the Deep State realises it has to pay a price for such activities. Mere threats to break dialogue, display of misplaced magnanimity or appeals to the international community are unlikely to impress the LeT or its mentors.


Source : Midday, Mumbai , November 24, 2011

Keep the flag flying

For a country like ours, situated in a tough neighbourhood with no hope of changing our neighbours, it is imperative that we remain prepared for the worst. There is no other choice. The Indian Air Force (IAF) must re-invent itself, not just to ward off threats but with the ability to carry the war into the adversary's camp, and retaliate with speed and massive fire power at targets that impose unacceptable damage. Only this would reflect the reach of a regional power.

The rise of China, the intransigence of Pakistan and India's rise have made it necessary that we prepare today to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Should there be an open conflict, it is more likely to be short, sharp and rely heavily on the use of aircraft, as other nations would want to prevent the escalation to a nuclear exchange. The nation that acquires an upper hand will naturally strike a better post-conflict bargain. The IAF has begun a serious attempt to modernise. India is to acquire six more of the versatile C130J transport aircraft, in addition to the six contracted in 2008. The IAF will induct 10 C17 Globemasters beginning mid 2013 and then acquire six more later. These acquisitions would enhance the IAF's logistic capabilities in the mountainous north and north-east where new air bases are being constructed. Equally important is our strike capability beyond the national frontiers.

There are three kinds of aircraft that seem to be or should be under consideration: the much talked about Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) at present being jointly manufactured by Russians and Indians the top of the range F35, which the Americans have now offered. What should be under consideration is the long range bomber that has the ability to strike deep.

The MRCA is now a choice between two aircraft — the French Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon — in a deal that could be much higher than the original figure of R42,000 crores. A strict comparison between the two is not realistic. The Rafale weighs 10,000 kg empty and has a maximum weight of 24,500 kg with a combat radius of 1,800 km. The Eurofighter weighs 11,000 kg empty, maximum weight of 23,500 kg with a combat radius of 1,400 km. Moreover, the latter has super cruise capability that allows it to fly at speeds greater than Mach 1 for longer periods. Other aircrafts can only attain this in short bursts during a dog fight or while evading missiles. But since Rafale is wholly French, technology transfer will be easier and the IAF, which has the Mirage on its inventory, presumably feels more comfortable with this kind of aircraft. The multi-nation Eurofighter does not have these advantages, as it is manufactured jointly by countries some of whom have strong embargo laws. One way or the other, a decision on the MRCA is expected to be taken shortly.

Since the MRCA is essentially a replacement for aging aircraft, in the process, it incorporates the natural upgrading of equipment and allows the air force to attain its optimum squadron levels in the future. Would this take care of all our future threats? Any future threat scenario must factor in that the Chinese air force, with its 2,900 fighter aircrafts, is numerically far superior to the IAF. Aircraft like the JH7 with an 1,800 km radius could be deployed from bases in Tibet to strike deep into India. This is apart from the missile deployments in Tibet. The IAF, even after the acquisition of the MRCA, will not have the capability to strike deep into the Han homeland in retaliation to a major strike in our heartland. A retaliatory strike has to make news as well. For this, the IAF would need the Russian TU-22 or SU-34 bomber. Deep penetration aircraft need two pilots in a pressurised cabin with a sleeping bay, a galley and toilet. Pilots on long flying missions need facilities to relax and stretch out. True, retaliation with the BrahMos missile is possible; but a strike by an aircraft deep inside the heartland of the adversary has a different connotation. Besides, the capacity to strike with long-range heavy bombers is a crucial part of any nuclear triad.

The two-seater FGFA being planned with the Russians would have a combat radius of 1,500 km, and is expected to be inducted in 2017. The offer of the F35, a single-seater state of the art multi-role stealth aircraft, is being described as a measure of US confidence in India. The aircraft has three variants priced from $110 million to $140 million and not $65 million, as has been quoted elsewhere. This means that there will be extra/hidden charges. Apart from the initial cost of purchasing any aircraft system, the purchaser has to factor in almost a similar amount for maintenance and upgrade through the life of the machine, expected to last about 40 years. India will have to keep in mind the stringent US EUMA (End Use Monitoring Agreement) while negotiating with the US.

There is still some hesitation in New Delhi about such offers from the US. Pakistan is a US ally and China is America's main economic partner. It would be unwise to expect the US to ignore these interests in favour of India. The F35 may not be faulted on technical qualifications but political considerations would be an important factor. Somewhere in the strategic minds in DC and New Delhi, the ghost of the Cold War and its suspicions still lurk. The US looks for allies in the region as it lowers its profile, India can only offer friendship.

Vikram Sood is former secretary, Research & Analysis Wing. The views expressed by the author are personal.

Source : Hindustan Times , 21st November 2011http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/771820.aspx

National Security and Intelligence Reforms

National security and intelligence reforms
India's external intelligence service the Research and Analysis Wing was formed in 1968, and 43 years later, we are still trying to determine what sort of an organisation would best serve the national purpose. This is a sad reflection on our strategic mindset because although periodic reforms are necessary, we in India are still debating how the organisation should be manned. Some of the questions we should be asking are: What are the security threats that India would face in 2025 or 2030? What kind of an intelligence organisation would thus be needed either to protect our interests, prevent others from upstaging us or, if required, reversing the trend among our rivals. Does the present organisation have the ingredients to deliver? If not, what needs to be done so that we are not found wanting in 2025? In doing so, we have to evolve our own systems and not just copy other systems.Intelligence agencies can prevent wars but cannot by themselves win the wars. This has to be done by the armed forces, or if the threat is economic or technological (cyber, for instance) other experts are required. In India, reforms have been episodic, usually following a debacle and not based on periodic threat assessments. In house reviews have been about cadre reviews and career prospects fixing deputation quotas. Reform has to be more fundamental and far deeper. It must be borne in mind that intelligence agencies and reforms have to be done in the fullness of time and not when a crisis has begun to loom.National threats have changed. There are other transnational threats that no single agency or a single country can handle. Besides, there is no knowing how the new threats will evolve. The rapidly changing technological applications bring their own threats. Catastrophic terrorism, cyber terrorism, remote control missile attacks and virtual wars are the other new threats. International trade and commercial transactions have become faster and more intricate; banking transactions move at the speed of lightning. IT-driven globalisation also covers the criminal world. Interaction between narcotics smugglers, arms merchants, human traffickers and terrorists is that much easier, faster and safer. They all have access to sophisticated denial and deception techniques. Add to this, radical religious terrorists who are affecting India most dramatically and are supported by Pakistan in every way. Intelligence organisations need language skills, interrogation skills, ability to deal with hostages, area and issue expertise, apart from operational skills of a special kind. The normal civil servant, however bright, just does not have these skills or the aptitude. There is no option for the intelligence organisations in India, but to follow the pattern elsewhere --recruit from the open market through advertisements. The ideal of an intelligence organisation is that it has to be unique and is not like any other organisation, department or a ministry. It cannot exist without its mystic; a life of mirrors and masks. It is therefore a system with a mission which then becomes a crusade -- be it downsizing Pakistan, matching up to China or piggy backing on friendly powers. As the CIA used to say, "the secret of our success is the secret of our success"; there are no heroes and the medals are secret. What is the price the government is willing to pay a band of men and women who sacrifice their individuality for anonymity and go against the grain of human nature, is a question that needs to be asked and replied all the time. As with all institutions, intelligence organisations also occasionally face a decline -- for a number of reasons, -- bad internal leadership or disinterest by the political leadership. Robert Gates, who later headed the CIA, describes this well in a long memo he wrote to the then chief, Bill Casey in1981. He said that the CIA was "a case of advanced bureaucratic arteriosclerosis: the arteries are clogging up with careerist bureaucrats who have lost the spark." Any intelligence organisation that is manned by careerists, who are either too old to be moulded or are risk averse, is on a sharp downhill slope. Any government of the day must guard against this because faulty or inaccurate intelligence is far more dangerous than no intelligence.

Midday, Mumbai November 10, 2011

Imran Khan- Just landed or has he just arrived

Gurgaon, Nov.3 (ANI): The speech (at least on YouTube) lasted about 50 minutes, the mood euphoric, the crowd was raucous at times and the slogans were the usual eulogies ‘Pakistan Zindabad and Imran Khan Zindabad’ almost in the same breath.

The Doyen, Founder and Leader of the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf Party, Imran Khan, perhaps got carried away by the response of the 100000 strong crowd (some say 200000), and said that the only other person who refused to beg was the Qaid-e-Azam that is, apart from Imran himself, he modestly announced.

Imran, the latest political kid on the block, had just elevated himself to new heights. Speaking to the noisy crowd at the Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore on October 30, Imran claimed that what he was starting was not a movement, but a Tsunami that would sweep away corrupt and ineffective leaders.

The question some ask is whether Imran had in fact arrived or had merely landed; meaning that he had a long way to travel. Would Imran be able to overcome the threat from the entrenched feudal lords who run political parties in Pakistan, win electoral battles for his party, something he has not done so far, become a force to reckon with leave alone running the government.

Imran’s attacks on President Asif Zardari and Mian Nawaz, the PML(N) leader, brought the strongest approval from the crowd; anti-Americanism was popular of course, but when he mentioned Kashmir (after several promptings) did not evoke the kind of response politicians in earlier times were able to elicit. It was the economy and the corruption and the hope for change that brought the loudest applause.

A good deal of the response is because of the follies of the other two major parties in Pakistan who matter in Punjab – the PML (N) and the PPP. The PPP is involved in protecting its leader Asif Zardari with cases of corruption pending against him along with several of his close confidantes and cronies, and bolstering the other heir apparent, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari.

The other party, which is in power in Lahore, the PML (N) run by the Sharif brothers like a private fief is also bereft of ideas beyond trying to overthrow the PPP-led government from Islamabad. Ever since democracy was restored, in a manner of speaking, in 1988 after the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq, the longevity of civilian governments has been limited to two or three years.

The only government that lasted more than this was the military government of Gen Musharraf. The present Zardari-Gilani combine is now in its third year. Going by the law of precedence, the grace period for the present regime has run out, the people of Pakistan have run out of patience and they want change.

The powers that be in Rawalpindi, the omnipotent Pakistan Army have their own demons to handle. The US is doing a good deal of heavy breathing while showing sign of getting closer to enemy India, the Chinese are strangely ambivalent on a number of issues despite loud proclamations by Pakistani leaders, the terrorists are running amuck and the assets of Pakistan – the Haqqanis of Waziristan and the Taliban of Quetta are also under the microscope.

The Baloch are restive and sectarian violence continues unabated with Shias the main targets of Sunni groups. Continued instability in Pakistan and an ineffective government, a crumbling economy offers very little hope. The prospect of a military takeover is unthinkable for the present military leadership. Therefore, the facade of a civilian government has to be preserved.

Imran Khan not considered a serious option until recently, is suddenly emerging as the new messiah. But is that really so? One rally does not necessarily translate into electoral victory. Imran Khan has not even reached southern Punjab and Lahore is no longer Punjab.

His party, the PTI, has no standing against the entrenched parties in Sindh – the MQM in the urban areas and the PPP in the rural areas. The party has no presence in Balochistan and is unlikely to make any headway there.


The PTI may be successful in the PakhtoonKhwa-Khyber province largely due to the ineptitude of MMA and the ANP. Even in the Punjab, neither the PPP nor the PML (N) can be considered as washouts although the party could gain in urban areas.
Imran Khan had a dual image. One of a westernised Oxford educated playboy abroad which makes him acceptable outside and the other of an Urdu speaking pro-Islamic politician speaking at home which makes him acceptable to domestic audiences.
He was known to be close to the Jamaat e Islami chief Qazi Hussein Ahmed, was in favour of Islamic laws like the Hudood and Blasphemy laws. Those who have read his autobiography, feel that his comments have been restrained. But this might be an attempt at an image makeover with the western audience that may be willing to accept a man close to the Islamic groupings so long as he promised stability in a turbulent region. It is Imran’s views expressed in Urdu to domestic audiences that will remain more relevant.

It is too early to say if Imran Khan will be able to make a dent in the political structure of Pakistan. One rally in Lahore does not make a Tsunami. To use the cricketing analogies that Imran used in his speech, Pakistan’s best known cricketing legend is batting on a sticky wicket. It is always possible that the forthcoming matches have been fixed elsewhere in Rawalpindi and Abpara to ensure a favourable result. (ANI)

Source : Yahoo News , 3rd November 2011 .