Tawang China's fixation

New Delhi, April 30 (ANI): "At 14,000 feet above the sea, the presence of a certain mystery can be felt, like having stepped into heaven..." is how a "In Search of Greener Pastures" - a touristy blog run by two enterprising Indians, describes Sela, the pass that eventually leads the traveller to the Tawang Monastery.

Sitting atop a 10,000 foot mountain, the Galden Namgey Lhatse Monastery (Celestial Paradise in a Clear Night) is exactly that - serene and sublime. According to another legend Tawang also means Chosen by Horse.

But there is a rude reality to this Shangri-La, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama and coveted by China might be destroyed one day. This is how this might happen.

Two countries with the largest populations, two of the largest armies, armed with nuclear weapons and missiles and having two of the fastest growing economies in the world, face each other across an undemarcated border that extends 4,057 km across the Himalayas.

Burgeoning trade and tranquility on the border without a political settlement will prevent the full realisation of a relationship. This has something that has bedeviled the China-India relationship for the past 50 years.

At the heart of the problem lies the issue of Tibet or Xi Zang, which is the Chinese name for Tibet meaning "Western Treasure House", literally and figuratively.

It is estimated that Tibet holds 40 percent of China's mineral resources that include coal, iron, cobalt, copper, gold, lithium and probably one of world's largest deposits of uranium.

Added to this is the fact that ten of Asia's largest rivers including the Brahmaputra, Ganga, Indus, Yellow, Yangtze, Irrawaddy, Salween and the Mekong.

Eleven countries in South Asia and South East Asia including China and India are dependent on the river water flows from these rivers. The Tibetan Plateau thus becomes a vital source not only for water for China, but also gives that country a potential leverage of controlling or diverting the water from these rivers.

There have been reports of Chinese studies to divert waters from the south to the arid north and of harnessing the Brahmaputra. Water thus becomes a threat multiplier and assumes geo-strategic dimensions. There being no international law to ensure rights of downstream riparians, diversion of the Tibetan origin waters would directly impinge on all downstream nations, including India. This becomes all the more relevant in the India-China situation where the boundary is disputed, and China now claims Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet as part of its unfinished agenda of liberation of Tibet.

The other issue in the India-China relations is the status of Tibet and the role of the Dalai Lama. Over the years, the Indian position on the status of Tibet has altered.

Till the take over of China by Mao's CCP in 1949, India considered Tibet to be "an independent country."

Chinese regimes were too involved saving themselves and Imperial Britain too strong to allow a serious Chinese protest against this definition.

We accepted Chinese "suzerainty" till 1954, and then, till 1988 we accepted Chinese "sovereignty" over Tibet. During Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988, we described "Tibet as an autonomous region of China."

The final definition came during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpeyee's visit in 2003 when we recognised "Tibet as part of China."

Despite this dilution of the Tibet card that India might have had, the Chinese paranoia about the Dalai Lama has not abated. His Holiness is routinely described as an Indian puppet, and the Chinese have frequently demanded that India shut down "the Dalai shop."

Increasingly, China sees the continued Western support for Dalai Lama and India's closer relationship with the U.S. as a possible threat to it in Tibet. The Chinese have consistently seen duplicity in the Indian stand of stating their position on Tibet and continuing to give shelter to the "splittist" clique of the Dalai Lama.

Chinese belligerence in and about Arunachal Pradesh and even on Kashmir in recent years is partially explained by this fear. Beijing is convinced that the March 2008 uprising in Tibet when there was a worldwide campaign was the result of a conspiracy between the Dalai Lama, India and some Western countries. There were several 'admonitions' delivered to India in 2008 , urging India "not be evil" and several Chinese think-tanks carried assessments that were in reality a reflection of Beijing's anger at the events in Tibet.

In October 2009, there were statements from the Chinese Communist Pay that India was colluding with the Dalai Lama to split China. There have been increasing references in Chinese writings, including those of the PLA, of the need to recover the resource rich lands of "Southern Tibet" from the illegal possession of India and that the magnanimity of 1962 should be rectified and mistakes of the past should not be repeated.

The ideal solution would be recovery of the entire area, Chinese authoritative journals like Wen Wei Po argued, but a compromise was possible except that China must have Tawang.

It is in two contexts that the Tawang Monastery in the western most district of Arunachal Pradesh becomes most important. The monastery lies South of the McMahon Line that China does not accept and is in not willing to concede this to India, claiming that the monastery has historical and traditional significance to Tibetans as the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.

For India there is a strategic relevance also. Tawang has another symbolic significance to the Chinese because this is where the Dalai Lama paused for ten days when he fled from Lhasa in March 1959.

The Se La (Pass) in the south of the district leads to Bomdi La further south and then unimpeded to the Assam Plains. Both the passes have to be defended for the safety of North East India. Extending this further, as any military strategist might want to, access to this could also threaten the Siliguri Corridor. India's defence preparedness would be the result of any war-gaming that would have been done in South Block starting from the worst case scenario.

It is well known that over the years China has strengthened its logistic and military capability in Tibet which puts it at a much better advantage over India considering that it enjoys terrain advantage to begin with.

PLA forces can reach the border in much less time and much less effort that ours can because they are already on a plateau whereas Indian forces have to work uphill. The Qinghai-Lhasa rail network is a quantum jump in China's capability to deploy troops and equipment.

There are all weather roads parallel to the Himalayas in Tibet with laterals leading to the border. In all it has a 58,000 km network in the region. There are five functioning air bases in the Tibetan plateau at Gongar, Hoping, Pangta, Linchi and Gar Gunsa and a missile base in Qinghai with most North Indian cities within range.

The PLA has conducted Rapid Deployment exercises into Tibet, day and night air force exercises with its Sukhoi 27UKB and Sukhoi 30MKK aircraft. China now has the capability of moving 30 PLA divisions to the LAC within a month which could heavily outnumber Indian deployments.

There has been an Indian response to this upgradation, but it has just begun and some of it is still in the planning/implementation stage. Two squadrons of Sukhoi 30MKI have been located at Tezpur. We plan to deploy six C-130J Super Hercules for a strategic airlift in the eastern sector as also plans to deploy Akash and Brahmos missiles. There are plans to raise a mountain strike corps in the eastern sector after raising two mountain divisions. There are plans to build 72 tactical roads in the north east and have operationalised three air bases in the Ladakh region.

The point is that all this is still mainly on the anvil, or at the drawing board stage. Even the IRBM Agni-V will take a couple of years at least before it becomes operational. The IAF would have the advantage of being able to carry heavy payloads from lower altitudes as compared to PLA Air Force, but our ground troops will be at a disadvantage compared to the PLA ground forces who will have fewer terrain problems like our troops would.

What might actually happen on the border will be dependent on a number of factors. The Chinese perception of Indian intentions, internal situation in China and the very real possibility at a future date of a power struggle with the PLA, Chinese perceptions about the external situation.

Should China see that India is not willing to yield and assume that in the time ahead, India will gain strength militarily and economically and that the relationship with the US continues to grow, the Tibetan issue gets worse, it may wish to try a limited border war sooner than later.

Any worst case scenario would also have to take into account of Pakistan and China acting in tandem and leaving India in a two front situation simultaneously.

India will have to keep in mind the growing Chinese military capabilities and assess closely its intentions.

Considering that in recent years coercive diplomacy with India has centred around Arunachal Pradesh, and that their war rhetoric in some of their journals and think tanks has escalated, Indian strategists would need to watch the Chinese leadership's pronouncements and actions and that country's internal compulsions closely.

It is possible that China may want to plan a short and swift action of the Kargil type, except that the world would largely sit back in frozen horror, unable to intercede.

This makes Tawang the most vulnerable spot in the North East. Its capture by the PLA in a short bloody conflict with no intention of reverting to original positions would have a dramatic impact on India, damaging India's image as a prospective alternative to China, send the other neighbouring countries scurrying to Beijing for favours and establishing what China wants to convey - that India is no match, no rival, no alternative to China.

In this context, the recent findings of the Defence Standing Committee on India's manpower and defence equipment shortages are not very comforting.

Source : ANI , 1st May 2012,   The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood, former Secretary R and AW, Government of India. By Vikram Sood (ANI)

Story of Saltoro -- From Ababeel to Meghdoot

There has been considerable talk in Pakistan about the recent avalanche in Gyari west of the Saltoro Ridge and it is shown as having occurred in the Siachen area. Pakistan is nowhere near the Siachen Glacier. Please everybody, let us get the facts right. The glacier is at least two-three days march away from Gyari and is attainable after first climbing the heights of Saltoro. It lies to the East of the Saltoro Ridge which is manned by Indian troops at those heights and is lower than the Saltoro. It is therefore not visible from the forward most posts on the Pakistani side. Saltoro overlooks, in a manner of speaking, the land to the west that is the Skardu Astore regions of Gilgit and Baltistan which we assert is ours. Siachen’s northern tip is close to Shaksgam, a slice of J&K territory ceded by Pakistan to China, while its southern tip is the source of water to the Nubra.

It is well known that Chinese workers, some say as many as 10,000 are in Gilgit and Baltistan working on infrastructure projects. Given the nature of Pakistan-China relationship and given that Pakistan is in all sorts of domestic difficulties with its vital relationship with the US soured, China’s value to Pakistan increases further.

Misleading: Pakistan is nowhere near the Siachen Glacier. The glacier is at least a two-three days’ march away from Gyari and is attainable after first climbing the heights of Saltoro

No Prime Minister, no General would want his troops to be there if it were not absolutely necessary. This is not an ego battle. It is a matter of preservation of our interests served best by ensuring that two countries hostile to us do not have another link up just north of Leh and Kargil. There is a famous Ladakhi saying which says that only the best of friends and the fiercest of enemies visit this barren land. Let it be known that the Indian Army makes the fiercest of enemies.

There are some other important issues about Siachen/Saltoro. One, there can be no piecemeal solutions with regard to Saltoro. Second, these are positions held by India justifiably even under the 1949 Karachi and 1972 Shimla Agreement, which says that from PT NJ9842 the line would run due north. Depictions on some maps including those in the West, that draw a straight line due east up to the Karakoram pass from PT NJ 9842 is deliberate cartographic misrepresentation. Third, let it never be forgotten that India holds an Instrument of Accession with the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the same manner in which Pakistan had with the princely states like Bahawalpur at the time of its independence. Therefore, Indian troops will be located wherever required for strategic and security reasons.

Some despatches have made out that India “after starting the war in 1984 occupies higher positions.” India did not start the war in 1984 but today occupies the heights. Pakistan started the war in 1947 and has continued that in different forms since then. Intelligence reports in 1983 had clearly warned that Pakistan had begun planning an assault on the Saltoro Ridge. A force called the Burzil Force would be launched from Skardu under ‘Operation Ababeel’. In a dramatic push, almost like the crossing of Zoji La in 1947, an Indian force under ‘Operation Meghdoot’ captured the heights of Saltoro barely 48 hours before the Pakistan operation got going. That is how it is and that is how it will be for the foreseeable future unless there is a dramatic shift in Pakistan’s attitude.

Pakistan has spent its entire existence seeking equality with, if not supremacy, over India. It invaded, and when unsuccessful sent in its jihadi foot soldiers described as its strategic assets. And now, exhausted, wants India to withdraw from its own territory, give up strategic heights, in the interests of peace. There is no logic in this. Logic will be had when Pakistan exhibits a desire to live in peace once it locks up its jihadis.

History has not been kind to our nations. Unfortunately, kindness in international relations is not bestowed by one nation to another by surrendering strategic advantage. Folly can achieve that. Let us not compound our folly by assuming that the other side is genuine when it masquerades magnanimity. Only verification and then trust will be proof of that and make for sound Indian statecraft.

Source : Mid Day , 26th April 2012 , The writer is a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

Why India cannot afford to give up Siachen

The strategic advantage accruing to India in Siachen should not be given up for apparent short-term political gains. Giving up Siachen as a gesture of friendship would also mean that its recapture would be extremely expensive to India in men and material, says Vikram Sood.


The venue: Badami Bagh, Srinagar , Headquarters of the Corps Commander 15 Corps, Lt Gen Prem Hoon

The year: 1983

The participants: The Corps Commander and the R&AW station chief.

The subject: Siachen and reported Pakistani activities in that region according to intelligence reports from across the LoC.


It would be untrue to suggest that this meeting led to the assault on the Soltoro Ridge which is actually west of the Siachen Glacier, but the fact is that the matter had assumed serious proportions and Indira Gandhi's government was deeply concerned.

The reports, that the Pakistanis were making probes ostensibly through tourism and mountaineering groups, were disturbing. The obvious aim of the Pakistanis appeared to be cross the Saltoro heights and head for the Karakoram Pass on the Jammu and Kashmir border with Tibet (China).

But why is this bleak part of the mountainous region so important to India that we are prepared to retain it all these years. The Saltoro Ridge is a formidable ridge that runs roughly north-west to south-east. It overlooks Gilgit and Baltistan to its west and has to be crossed by any one seeking access from Skardu in the Gilgit and Baltistan area through to the Karakoram Pass which enters Tibet. This is not to be confused with the Karakoram Highway which enters Xinjiang through the Khunjerab Pass. Any Pakistani location in Karakoram would be a threat to India in Ladakh from the north in addition to Chinese locations in Aksai Chin.

The genesis of the problem lies in the way India-Pakistan agreements were worked out in Karachi (1949) and Shimla (1972). The ceasefire line or later the Line of Control was left undemarcated from point NJ 9842, and stated that it would run north from this point. This means that north was defined as the true geographical north and not an extension of the line in the direction which would take the line to the Karakoram Pass, something the Pakistanis claimed, wanted and were willing to assert this claim with perhaps an approving Chinese nod. North of Point NJ 9842 meant north to the Siachen and not to Karakoram.

Siachen in the possession of Pakistan would have meant Pakistan would have access from Skardu through to the Karakoram near the Aksai Chin and eventual linking with Shahidullah on the Kashgar-Xigatse road that runs parallel to the Tibet- India border.

Obviously, and given the aggressive manner in which Pakistan had begun to interfere in India, among other things actively inciting Sikh extremists, India could not afford to become vulnerable on another front.

There was no option but to launch Operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984. The Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army with cover from the Indian Air Force reached the glacier to occupy two mountain passes at Bilafond La and Sia La while the Pakistan Army could only reach Gyong La. The battle zone was a triangle with point NJ9842 at the bottom, Indira Col due west and Karakoram Pass due east. Indian troops today control two thirds of the area and the world's highest motorable road at Khardung La with a helipad at a place called Sonam, at 21,000 feet. Pakistan overlooks the Nubra and Shyok valleys from the north. Saltoro lies almost exactly due north of Leh and north west of Kargil .

The Saltoro was attained at considerable loss of life, equipment apart from the expenses involved. There were many lives also lost to the harsh climate and the attrition rate was indeed very high in the early days of the campaign. Over time these shortcomings have been removed, the attrition rate is much lower, logistics are nowhere near as nightmarish as they used to be nearly thirty years ago.

Following the avalanche in Skardu which killed 150 Pakistani soldiers, there seems to be renewed talk that India should withdraw from the heights attained with so much sacrifice and at great cost to the nation. Siachen has recently been sneeringly described as 'A struggle of two bald men over a comb' or 'an ego problem between the two armies' and has elsewhere been described by some journalists as a futile war. Let it be said here that no war over one's own territory that is futile.

It is certainly less futile than the US campaign in Iraq. The United States, unable to solve its own problems in the region or for that matter anywhere else, and seeking an early exit from Afghanistan by obliging Pakistan, has offered to assist India and Pakistan in a dialogue. There are reports that the two defence secretaries will meet shortly to discuss Siachen and Sir Creek.

It seems that there is some great urgency to strike a deal and this is more than the usual periodic urge to concede something to Pakistan to look good. There are some Indian commentators who have even argued that India should now forget 26/11 and move forward. Nations that do not remember their past can have no future.

One of the arguments being given is that the cost of retaining Siachen/Saltoro is prohibitive. This is rubbish. At approximately Rs two crores a day it means only Rs 730 crores annually out of a budget that is in the range of Rs 80,000 crores. Even if it were more than this, is there a fixed price for security and freedom? The loss of soldiers to harsh conditions has become minimal for the last many years and the hot war has long been over.

An agreement might have been possible but Pakistani refusal to sign the Agreed Ground Position Line on a specious argument only leads to the suspicion that they would want to alter the position at first dawn. General Pervez Musharraf's Kargil adventure in 1999 was Pakistan's last attempt to change the ground position militarily and politically and also to negate the advantage of Saltoro with India.

The continuing mindset is depicted not only in the rants of Lashkar-e-Tayiba chief Hafiz Saeed [ Images ] but also by what appears in the English press in Pakistan, which include songs in praise of The Hafiz. The Nation in an editorial on March 12 said "We must never lose sight of the fact that Kashmir is a left over issue of the Partition, gifted to us by the British. Unless it is settled in accordance with the Partition Plan, neither the division of India would be complete, nor would the state of Pakistan be complete."

There has not been any evidence of a change of heart in the Pakistan Army -- the institution that calls the shots in Pakistan especially on issues relating to India. Everyone knows that. Thus withdrawal from these strategic heights without any iron clad guarantees that do not extend beyond declarations of intent would be the height of folly. This strategic advantage in Siachen should not be given up for apparent short-term political gains.

The China factor cannot be ignored in this cockpit of the world. It was not so evident in 1984 although the Karakoram Highway had been built by the Chinese by then and Pakistan had illegally ceded a portion of the territory under their control, Shaksgam to them. Today, the Chinese footprint is much larger. In its own strategic interests in the region, China would be interested in greater Pakistani control over Gilgit and Baltistan.

It has been investing $150 million (abour Rs 750 crore) for widening the KKH from 10 metres to 30 metres, to be used by all weather heavy vehicles, the kind that brought strategic material for Pakistan through the Khunjerab.

A rail link was also planned, to be connected with Pakistan's main rail grid, and fiber optic cables were being laid in 2007. If China had a port in Gwadar that they could use, this would cut down the distance from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea to merely 2,500 km. Today Xinjiang is 4,500 km away from the east coast of China. Gas and oil pipelines through from Gwadar and Xinjiang make sense only if Gilgit and Baltistan is secured. It is not a question of a glacier in the Himalayan heights; it is a question of India's security.

The nation cannot afford to repeat the strategic mistakes of the past -- like halting our advance at Uri in 1948 or not capturing Skardu; or giving up Haji Pir in 1966; or returning 93,000 troops and territory in 1972.

Giving up Siachen as a gesture of friendship would also mean that its recapture would be extremely expensive to India in men and material. Today, as the other side continues to arm itself with newer nuclear weapons, has not called off its jehadi hordes and the only 'concession' it can offer us is an MFN at a future date or lunch at Lahore and dinner at Islamabad.

Pakistani hospitality is legendary but beware of the poisoned chalice.

Source : Rediff.com, 13th April 2012, Vikram Sood, former R&AW Chief

WELCOME MR PRESIDENT

Benazir Bhutto made five pilgrimages to the Dargah Sharif of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin
Chisti, the last being in 2005. She wanted to visit one more time in 2007 but this did not materialise. Instead, she went home to Pakistan to a tumultuous welcome but ultimately to become yet another Bhutto martyr. Her friends had cautioned her that her return to
Pakistan could be dangerous for her but Benazir insisted that the country needed her. Quite apparently, there were powerful figures in her country who did not want her alive. So she became the fourth Bhutto to die a violent unnatural death.

Four days after the 32nd death anniversary of her father, Zulfiqar's hanging, Benazir's
son Bilawal and husband Asif Ali Zardari will be in Ajmer paying homage at the Shrine that Benazir could not do in 2007. This is a private and poignant moment for husband and son but the euphoria in India is misplaced and intrusive. Hospitality is a well accepted part of our culture in the subcontinent. One could even say that no one can match the Pakistanis for their
hospitality. Hospitality is a tradition; it is not in lieu of policy and national interests.

There is the usual sense of euphoria and the urge to concede something to look good. We
are conjuring visions of eternal peace, breakthroughs and settling old issues. Peace is of course desirable, after all nations have fought bloody wars and killed innocents to impose peace. But peace will endure only if it is not seen to have been attained by surrendering vital interests. Jammu and Kashmir and Siachen/Saltoro Ridge included are some of our vital interests. In that sense it is a relief that the Pakistanis have announced that this visit does not mean
that Pakistan has given up on the 'core' issue of Kashmir. This only means that there will be no deal on this.

Surely the Pakistan President is not coming here to strike a deal; we all know he cannot. We also know that there is political turmoil in the country with various instruments and institutions grappling with each other for supremacy. If the visitor wants to discuss issues with his Indian hosts, that's fine. We should also not hesitate to discuss current events in Pakistan which although their internal affair, do impinge on us and we need to be concerned. The fate of the Mohajirs, who are migrants from India, in Karachi; the fate of the Sindhis and the Balochi are similar humanitarian issues which concern us.

We should never ever forget that there is a powerful multi-group radical right movement
called the Difa e Pakistan led by persons like Hafiz Saeed and Sami ul Haq who stand for everything that Indians do not and even many Pakistanis do not. So long as these groups have official patronage even when they talk of eternal jehad against India, a rational approach
to issues is not just difficult but impossible. The core issue is not Kashmir but the mindset of
such groups and the Pakistan Army who have the same slogan - Jehad Fisabilillah
- Jehad in the name of Allah.

Pakistan's 'establishment' has tried this threat - of jehad and annihilation - for far too long. This may fool the Americans but this does not work on India. Terrorism is a nuisance, it is costly in terms of human lives, but the Indian State will not wither away. Pakistan's warped policies remain a clear and present nuisance but they are not the ultimate threat. Pakistan has to travel considerable distance within to be able to convince its neighbours that it really wants to live in
peace. Granting concessions to Pakistan despite its policies or because of these policies is similar to giving concessions to those who take innocents hostage. Both are called appeasement and this never works.

We need to remember this when we are warm and pleasant to our guests.

Wrote this for ANI, New Delhi

WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE – Well, Not Quite

April 6, 2012

Once again, Pakistan's most treasured jehadi jewel, Hafiz Saeed the leader of the Jamat ut Dawa, listed by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation, and the ideological patron of the rabidly anti-Indian terrorist organisation, Lashkar e Tayyaba (LeT) is in the limelight. This follows the US announcement that there would be a US$ 10 million reward (one of the highest ever although not as high as for Osama, Mullah Omar or Ayman al Zawahiri) ) for any information that would lead to Saeed's arrest or prosecution in the US or elsewhere. There was immediate and premature exultation in some sections in India as if the US had put out a "Wanted - dead or alive" kind of
bounty on Saeed's head. There was no such demand unlike what had been in the case of Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar – this one merely sought information that could lead to his arrest or prosecution.

The US action was in the pursuit of US interests and not for Indian interests. Any benefit that accrues to India is our good luck and if it does not, then hard luck. The most logical explanation for this is that this is another milestone in the downhill journey of US Pakistan relations, ever since the Raymond Davis episode last year. There is considerable American frustration at Pakistan's reluctance to participate in or obvious duplicity about the US campaign in
Afghanistan.

US Pakistan relations had suffered acutely after the US Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, which had angered and embarrassed the Pak Army and there was a resurgence of anti-American sentiment on the streets. Pakistan had imposed this ban following the
NATO attack on Pakistan's Salala post in FATA last November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

While the transport mafia largely controlled by the Pathans in Karachi would be anxious to make money for the trucks, there is another rabidly anti-US militant section led by Hafiz Saeed and the Difa e Pakistan, where he is a leading luminary, have been leading protests against the reopening of the routes until there is a ban on drone attacks.

Hafiz Saeed's reaction to the US announcement was immediate and expectedly belligerent. Speaking on Wednesday to journalists in Rawalpindi (the headquarters of the Pakistan Army), Saeed declared, “I am here, I am visible. America should give the reward money to me. I will be in Lahore tomorrow, America can contact me whenever it wants to. He added “I am ready to face any American court or wherever there is proof against me.”

The Difa has now announced that it will organise country wide protests against the US decision about Hafiz Saeed. Commenting on this development, Sami ul Haq, the leader of the Jamaat e Ulema Islami (S) Sami ul Haq, protested against US interference adding that, the US was “trying to please India and Israel.” At another press conference in Lahore the Difa e Pakistan demanded that President Zardari to call off his private visit to India scheduled to begin April 8. At a rally today (April 6) Hafiz Saeed, with AK 47 wielding bodyguards, taunted America “Come to us. We will teach you the meaning of jihad… The time to fight has come,” he exhorted America.

Demonstrations elsewhere in Pakistan have also been reported from Faisalabad and Muzzafarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir where the demonstrators burnt an America flag and the slogans heard were “Al Jihad, al Jihad.”

Officially however, Pakistan has reacted on expected lies when its spokesman commented
that Pakistan would not accept any pressure on this issue and that Pakistan had asked the US to give concrete evidence to take legal action. Responding to opposition criticism in parliament, Prime Minister Gilani called the U.S. announcement of a $10 million bounty for information leading to the arrest of Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Hafeez Saeed “unfortunate,” saying it would “increase trust deficit at a time when the parliament was engaged in framing new rules of engagement with the US.”

The Parliamentary Committee on National Security Chairman Raza Rabbani warned that the move could have an “extremely negative fallout”. Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the JUI-F walked out of the April 5 session of the Parliamentary Committee saying he would not accept the
reopening of NATO supply routes; later (on April 6) he accused the government of having already decided to do. Joining the chorus in Parliament was the PML-N opposition leader Nisar Chaudhry who threatened to quit his office if the supply routes were opened.

Meanwhile, it is expected that the campaign against the US will become harsher in the days
ahead. Hafiz Saeed along with his close relative and confidante, Abdul Rehman Makki, (with a reward money of US $ 2 million) a ranking member of the Difa e Pakistan, have said they are determined to carry on with their campaign. Even though officially LeT, the militant wing of the Jamat ut Dawa is banned Saeed says he is now associated with the rapidly rising Falah e
Insaniyat Foundation which many believe is the old LeT in disguise, and which is establishing educational institutions, hospitals and primary health care centres all over the country.

Many Pakistanis are convinced that the US administration’s decision to announce a reward for information about Hafiz Saeed is nothing but a conspiracy against Pakistan. Even though organisations like the rabidly Sunni militant Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan and the LeT may be
banned, the mood in the interior of the Punjab is becoming disturbingly radical. This radicalisation is especially noticeable in the cities of southern Punjab - Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur, Bahawal Nagar, Muzaffargarh, and others. Roadside slogans boast of the finances required for jihad to defeat America, India and Israel; hate slogans urging Pakistanis to become true Muslims by hating Hindus are common. One should also remember that this is the part of the Punjab where many of the jehadis come from is also the region from where the Pakistani army gets most of its recruits. It is ironic that Hafiz Saeed is now projected as being
associated with plans to deradicalise the youth

It is possible that despite the deadlock on the issue, some US-Pak negotiations continue
suggesting that the government hoped to strike a deal on renewed cooperation, including the reopening of the routes in exchange for a cessation or reduction of the U.S. drone campaign

The US would naturally want to get out of Afghanistan with as much honour intact as possible. The Pakistanis probably feel that this is the best chance to extract maximum mileage by being appropriately difficult with the US. Pakistan remains reluctant or unable to lift the ban on NATO trucks plying through Pakistan for logistic supplies to Afghanistan.

At the same time, the US would have assessed that Pakistan is in dire straits, economically and financially. Pakistan has a festering sore in its largest province Balochistan where the nationalists have stepped up their demand for freedom and there is increasing bloodshed. In addition, Karachi is becoming increasingly violent with very obvious Pathan versus Mohajir ethnic
overtones. The usual Pakistani tactic of pushing the US to the edge with its recalcitrance may have some limitations now.

The Pakistan government would seem to have very limited options but it is unlikely to relent on core (i.e. India related) issues. Simultaneously, it will continue to depict to the West that much though they would like to help, the mood on the street was hostile. The basic unaltered truth is that while the civilian government has not got the ability or the courage to deal with Hafiz Saeed and his cult, the Pakistan Army has no intention.


Wrote this for ANI