Afghanistan: The return of the warlords

So President Obama retains the White House and the power but the Party General Secretary Hu Jintao leaves his throne in March 2013. Nevertheless, the rest of the world is going to see continuity of foreign policy by the two strongest nations as they grapple for global control. The US elections, despite all the excitement here, were not about us.

They were about America and only America. This continuity, including the usual nuances, also means continuity in problems at home and abroad.

Iran and Syria, in fact the entire West Asia, loom large on the American screen and somehow, Afghanistan has to be taken off the list as another unhappy American story that is best forgotten. It can only be taken off the to-do- list if it can be described as a victory because even a stalemate for a superpower is tantamount to defeat.

 

The US had in fact minimised its chances of success the moment it began to concentrate on Iraq in 2002 without settling issues in Afghanistan. Thus at the best of times till Iraq was over, the US and NATO forces remained inadequate. The Taliban made a comeback and the liberators came to be seen as occupiers. It was also a mistake to force a form of governance on a conservative peasant society that had little understanding of democratic practices and that too with inadequate resources and time. This is particularly relevant when we remember that it took beheadings of monarchs, revolutions, civil wars and more than a hundred years to introduce democracies in the West in the backdrop of other earlier reformations, religious and secular. There has been no such thing in Afghanistan which has remained a tribal society with its own rules and practices of governance. Yet Barak Obama must leave a legacy of success in Afghanistan and midway through his second term, in 2014, this must happen. But there are several roadblocks along the way.

Nothing describes the limitations of military power in the present context than the reality that the US can no longer go it alone in Afghanistan. It could in the past intercede on its own but today extrication needs the cooperation of not only Pakistan but Iran, India, China and Russia. Pakistan has played a largely negative role in Afghanistan and has therefore acquired a larger than life profile as the chief spoiler.

There are seemingly insurmountable problems within Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces may have expanded to be about 3,50,000 strong but they remain poor in training, equipment and morale. While the Army has been able to show some resilience, the Police are reputed to be corrupt and loyalties are suspect. The economy, dependent on external infusions of funds, is in a mess and there is just not enough money available to run the country.

The political, constitutional and executive institutions required to run the country are weak. Elections to the Presidency will coincide with the departure of the US and ISAF forces. This is adequate ground for continued instability. The Taliban may be ascendant in parts of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan but in a situation where Kabul is weak, ethnicity and regionalism will rule and a return to warlords and regional satraps is a distinct possibility.

The US, because of its own reservations about Iran has tried to ignore Iran's interest in ensuring that the next regime in Afghanistan is not Talibanised under the influence of Sunni Wahhabism. Apart from wanting to reassert itself in the near abroad, Putin's Russia remains worried about the flow of heroin from Afghanistan into Russia and of Wahhabi influences in Central Asia spreading through the Taliban. China waits in the wings as it sees greater opportunities in Afghanistan in a post 2014 phase as a resource base and as a means to access Iran through Afghanistan, make room for itself in Afghanistan and step into a vacuum in Iran where the US is not even present.

China and Pakistan could cooperate in Afghanistan but at some point Pakistan must decide whether its negative role and patronising attitude towards Afghanistan will actually win it any friends in that country. Pakistan needs to change its tactics instead of perpetually battling to keep India out.
India’s role in Afghanistan is set to increase in the time ahead as it would need to step in with infrastructure assistance and military and police training.

Source : Mid Day , 29th November 2012, Vikram Sood, Former RAW Chief

The cost for staying on; price for leaving

''It is difficult to be optimistic about Afghanistan's future and the effects this will have on its neighbours.''

It is a given fact that the US wants to leave Afghanistan in a substantial manner. This would be President Obama’s legacy about a war that he concluded. The announcement that the date of departure would be 2011, later changed to 2014, was an indication for the Taliban and its supporters, Pakistan, that this was going to be a war they would eventually win. All they had to do was to hang in there till the US left. The announcement had also left those involved in the task of keeping Afghanistan secure with considerable misgivings about the future.

The question is what will it cost Afghanistan to be on its own, both in terms of financial dependence, political stability, military freedom and internal security. Can it sustain itself in all these aspects. Secondly, what will be the price we - the free world - have to pay for this event which will inevitably be described as victory by some and defeat by others.
All four issues of internal security, political and military independence and economic development are interlinked, especially in Afghanistan as it has remained dependent on external sources in all aspects.

One of the foremost requirements for any government in Kabul post-2014 is going to be its ability to ensure internal peace and cohesion, maintenance of law and order and safe borders. The most important aspect of this will be the efficacy and reach of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) comprising the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). It is not just the numerical strength and the quality of manpower and equipment that will determine the ability of the ANSF to function effectively. It will be the financial resources to maintain these forces and their training. The second issue will be the attitude of the Pakistan government, especially in areas across Paktika, Paktia and Khost provinces that border the FATA region where the Haqqani Network has been most effective.

Numerically, the ANSF was said to be around 3,52,000 strong by October 2012 of which the ANA numbered 1,95,000 and the ANP 1,57,000. Numbers look impressive but the more important issue is how much and who will pay for these forces. The Chicago Summit of May 2012 had envisaged a provision of US $4.1 billion for a force of 2,28,500. If one takes into account that the essential budget of the Afghan government is barely US $2.75 billion, there is obviously a huge resource crunch.

Critics sceptic

There is another doubt and that relates to the discipline and training. Although NATO sources portray the ANSF has having attained acceptable standards of performance, other critics doubt this claim. Rapid expansion of the force has meant a decline in the standards of training and yardsticks for recruitment. In addition, recruitment has also been on a regional and ethnic pattern and there have been reports of what is now called ‘green over blue attacks’ where Afghan soldiers and policemen have attacked members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The state of the ANP is even worse as it is considered to be indisciplined and corrupt and faces infiltration and desertions.
The political scene does not give much comfort either. The handover of Afghanistan to the Afghans in 2014 will be at a time when Presidential elections would be due. One of the problems has been that there has been inadequate effort to help build political institutions in the short time available where strong regional ethnic interests dominate. Afghanistan just does not have state institutions, a developed civil society and a civil service, that will ensure legitimacy of the government once fresh elections are held.

US attempts to talk to the Taliban representatives from a position of strength have mostly been prevented by Pakistan’s recalcitrance and duplicity. Back home in America, and Europe there is declining interest and increasing exhaustion about Afghanistan, which means there is declining financial commitment to the country. The Tokyo summit of July 2012 committed only US $16 billion up to 2016, whereas Afghanistan needs about US $10 billion a year for ten years from 2014.

India’s role

Almost inevitably, Afghanistan will see a greater Indian involvement in developmental fields and skills training (including the ANSF) in the years ahead. A greater Chinese presence is already visible and Pakistan may hitch itself more closely to China in furthering its interests in Afghanistan. Iran would remain an interested player. But then there is nothing clear and in black and white in Afghanistan. Should things go wrong in Kabul and political fortunes swing, one could see a reversal to the ethnic and regional warlord days and chaos. This in turn could mean a strengthening of the Taliban hold in the Pushtun belt.

Source : Deccan Herald , 25th November 2012 , The writer, former chief of India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

First things first

There are no two opinions about the need and desirability of peace between India and Pakistan. It is the attainment of this that is the problem. Different panels, groups and Track 2s and Track 3s have, over the years, discussed all that can be done to lead to peace and normalcy. But nothing substantial has emerged from such endless talks at various venues.

Invariably, the Siachen Glacier issue is cited as the one that is urgent, resolvable and doable as an important confidence building measure (CBM). If the two countries could unlock this then there would be a cascading effect on the relationship. The issue seems to have been discussed recently at one of the think-tank meetings where the main participants were from the armed forces of the two countries. A series of meetings had earlier been organised by the Atlantic Council of the US and the University of Ottawa. There are two documents doing the rounds. One on India-Pakistan Military CBMs and the other called the Siachen Proposals.

The documents read like an official agreement on India-Pakistan Military CBMs. True, there has been some forward movement and the list appears impressive as it discusses various military issues. But Saltoro is more than just a military issue. It is a strategic issue that involves various other matters. Here is why.

Earlier, in an article in this newspaper titled The Height of Folly on May 11, 2006, I had begun by saying “The story doing the rounds in Delhi is that in another exhibition of generosity, India is about to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachen Glacier) in the interest of peace but without securing the country’s strategic interests.” One fears something similar is in the air once again.

There are some important questions we need to ask ourselves. Is the Saltoro Ridge not important in the context of a China-Pakistan collusion north of the Line of Control (LoC) and into the Karakoram Pass? If the Saltoro Ridge is part of territory that belongs to us as defined by the agreement that states the Cease-Fire Line (now LoC) runs north towards the glacier from point NJ9842, then what are we negotiating with Pakistan? Are we negotiating to demilitarise what is in our territory? Is this part of a general CBM to Pakistan? If so, what is it that Pakistan has done to give us comfort on terror, counterfeit currency and on handing over wanted terrorists? Where is the evidence of Pakistani goodwill and resolve on other issues? If the answer to the first three questions is yes and the remaining three is negative, then we have a problem.

As usual, the Indian side seems more willing to concede ground than the Pakistanis. This is because the Indian psyche seems to feel that adhering to the official position is following a hard line and there is need for independent approaches. Therefore, so goes this logic, there is need to be more accommodating to the Pakistani positions. While discussing the Military CBMs it is mentioned that there was an agreement on joint patrolling and non-opening of new posts. This is wonderful news, but what about the tunnels that might have been dug under the border fence? We discovered one, which does not mean there are not others along our long border or on the LoC.

As for Pakistani CBMs for India are concerned, trade concessions or visa concessions are not CBMs. This is being done by Pakistan for itself. There is a problem in granting India transit rights to Afghanistan or with the Urdu nomenclature of most-favoured nation (MFN).

The main CBM that India needs is with regard to terrorism. There has never been any forward movement on this. There has not been any move to even acknowledge the presence of Dawood Ibrahim whose daughter is married to the son of one of Pakistan’s most famous cricketers, Javed Miandad. Or Masood Azhar or any of those involved in the 26/11 Mumbai terror carnage. This, along with the issue of counterfeit currency emanating from Pakistan, was raised by one of the Indian participants, Mohan Guruswamy at one of the previous sittings. One understands that even the Indian contingent gave only half-hearted support to this demand. The irony is that we are preparing grounds for a climb down just four years after Mumbai 26/11 without any satisfaction on this issue.

The reference to the need to exchange advance intelligence and report movement of or sharing information on cross-border movement, sharing databases and so on are naive at best. Pakistan and India do not even agree on what is terrorism and who is a terrorist. Pakistan equates itself or has been allowed to equate itself with India as a victim of terrorism slurring over the reality that Pakistan is a victim of its own terrorism and India has been a victim of Pakistani terrorism.

Military CBMs may be essential but they cannot be the final word. There has to be strategic salience that encompasses the entire issue. The wording of the Siachen proposal is flawed when it describes Siachen as a “dispute”, and adds in bold italics “notwithstanding the claims of each country” and both sides agree to “withdraw from the conflict area while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege”.... Thus, we now have an acceptance that it is a dispute, a conflict zone and that each side can take punitive action. It is now a matter of time when this document will become the basis of future negotiations and mark our climbdown from these strategic heights.

Saltoro is strategically important for us and we need to put it on the table last after we have received satisfaction on vital security interests like terrorism. Exhibitions of intent rather than declaration of intent is needed.

Source : Hindustan Times , 20th November 2012,Vikram Sood is former Secretary, Research & Analysis Wing