Is there an endgame in Afghanistan?

New Delhi, Mar.21 (ANI): The visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's visit to Kabul had been greeted by two suicide attacks on March 9 that left 18 dead. The Taliban were obviously leaving their calling card.

But the visit was a fiasco, as President Karzai insisted that U.S. Special Forces leave Wardak because of allegations of human rights violations and not only was the ceremony for the handing over of Bagram prison to Afghan authorities on March 10 cancelled, the press conference was also not held, ostensibly for security reasons.

President Karzai then threatened that his government would take unilateral action to take over control of Bagram Prison. This outburst had followed an earlier attack by Karzai when on March 10 he charged that the Taliban were killing Afghan civilians who were "in the service of America."

As was to be expected, these comments evoked a sharp American rebuke with the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Gen Joseph Dunford commenting that U.S.-Afghanistan relations were at a rough point.

He even feared that such remarks by Karzai could trigger insider attacks by disgruntled or radical elements against U.S. troops. Even the Taliban had mocked on Wednesday, saying that the U.S. was ignoring Karzai's demands, and their spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, triumphantly said that "Poor Karzai is not guilty. His masters have put him in a very tough spot. Such talk from him is a sign of desperation."

Indeed, there may be an element of truth in both the U.S. and Taliban comments about the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Many Afghan leaders, and members of political parties also sought to distance themselves from President Karzai's comments attributing this outburst to an attempt to show that he was not a U.S. puppet at a time when anti-US feelings in the country were on the rise.

On the other hand, the Afghan Ulema Council urged that the US military hand over Bagram prison to Afghan control and withdraw from the gateway to Kabul, the Wardak province otherwise the US presence would be regarded as an "occupation force".

Meanwhile, the security situation in Afghanistan has not shown any great improvement. The father and two brothers of the former governor of Kunduz province, Abdul Latif Ibrahimi, and the present speaker of the Afghan Parliament, Abdul Rouf Ibrahimi, were killed in a suicide attack on March 13 in Kunduz. There have been several similar lethal attacks against senior officials in Kunduz and Takhar provinces in the last two years.

All the main actors in the drama in Afghanistan - President Karzai and his government, other Afghan political and regional leaders, the Taliban and their Pakistani backers, and the Americans themselves - await the finale of 2014.

On his third visit to Afghanistan in March, Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, and Chairman of the House Armed Forces Services Committee, has recommended that the US retain 13,600 troops beyond December 31, 2014 along with a coalition force of 6000.

President Karzai is of course worried about his future beyond 2014 when the country goes in for fresh elections and his second term expires.

The U.S. dilemma is that it cannot completely leave Afghanistan for that country to once become a source of terrorist threat to the U.S., it cannot leave the region so long as Pakistan is unstable and home to Islamic radicals and the country holds nuclear weapons, Pakistan's relations with India remain sour and Iran is a problem.

At the same time, there is exhaustion among Americans about the war in Afghanistan especially after the elimination of Osama bin Laden. This is probably reflected in the skirmishes in Washington D.C. among the various stake holders in the campaign in Afghanistan.

Apart from that, the Afghan government is worried about it is concerned about its own security with an inadequate Armed Force and an inimical Pakistan. Karzai's recent outbursts against the US are part of the endgame which may buy him political space in Afghanistan post 2014.

There is suspicion in Kabul about what might be Karzai's intentions regarding the Taliban and that he may come to a deal with them to buy his security and even longevity.

It makes sense for Karzai to work out a direct deal with the Taliban instead of something that the Taliban might work out with the Americans without keeping Karzai in the picture. The Afghan President may well be playing high stakes here, assuming that the U.S. largesse is unlimited and would keep flowing endlessly. He may be underestimating American fatigue and its budgetary constraints.

The tangled web also says that dealing with the Quetta Shura means in effect dealing with Pakistan. Pakistan, with a virtual veto to US options in Afghanistan, has steadily strengthened its position in Afghanistan despite setbacks in the US Pakistan relations.

At a time in 2009 when the US was negotiating with a section of the Taliban, Pakistan picked up a number of senior Taliban commanders from the Quetta Shura which clearly sent the message that no negotiations could be possible without taking Pakistan on board.

Pakistan has had the Afghan Quetta Shura, the Haqqani Network and even the Hekmetyar Group on its side, but in a post-2014 situation, it would need to work with the Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks of Afghanistan, especially if the Taliban are not able to establish complete control in Kabul and Kandahar, leaving the outlying areas beyond its control. It would thus be necessary to have these ethnic groups on board to prevent Indian, Russian or Iranian presence among these groups, or a Pukhtun versus the rest civil war. However, the Pakistani stock with the ethnic minorities is not a great source of comfort for the Pakistan Army seen as the mentor of the Taliban.

Later, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Asfaq Pervez Kayani, was apparently able to convince the Americans in his discussions in 2010 that an Afghan force of 400,000 was both unviable, as this would cost USD nine billion annually, and, that unable to sustain itself, it would break up into small groups that would resort to terror and crime for its survival.

In reality, Pakistan does not want a strong, predominantly Pukhtun force on its western borders with the Indian Army staring down at it on the eastern border.

Added to this, the Pakistan insistence has been the U.S. should ensure that Afghanistan formally accepts the Durand Line before leaving Afghanistan. There has been greater realisation and acceptance in DC that Pakistan has been duplicitous in its dealings, but it is now too late to correct that given that the date of withdrawal is irrevocable.

The Taliban game seems fairly simple. Lie low and wait it out with an occasional violent foray to remind others of their presence and keep their own morale high.

The problem for the US in assuring an orderly withdrawal and to decide on how much force to leave behind is the utter lack of trust between Afghanistan, Pakistan and itself. It is difficult to accurately anticipate how the situation will evolve in 2015 after the Americans go home, but whatever it is, it will not be a simple uncomplicated situation and may not be all that warm and friendly for Pakistan. However, this will not bring any cheer to India's security interests either. We may have to contend with larger numbers of jihadi foot soldiers redeployed on our border. (ANI)

Source : Yahoo.com 21st March 2013 , Vikram Sood, former Secretary, R and AW, Government of India. (ANI)

China rises, India falters

In a recent conversation with President Zardari, China’s newPresident, Xi Jinping declared that his country supported Pakistan in its efforts to maintain national sovereignty and independence and spoke about China and Pakistan being all weather friends.

Contrast this all weather affair to the tempestuous US Pakistan relationship that lurches from one trough to another but neither can call it off. Since Pakistan considers India a primary enemy to its national sovereignty and independence, it is no rocket science to conclude that the Chinese reference is mostly to India but could even be stretched to include the US.

It is tempting to over interpret Chinese intentions, but maybe the Chinese were telling both the US and Pakistan leadership that they too have an interest in the stability of Pakistan and that they could get more interested in Pakistan once the US lower their profile.

Reaching out: Pak President Asif Ali Zardari expressed hope that the ‘all-weather friendship’ would be further strengthened under his new Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping

 

The underlying message could be that a US apprehensive of increased Chinese presence in AfPak would decide to stay on and rebuild this unstable region while China reaps the benefits of popularity without having had to fire a single bullet, lose a single man or spend a single dollar as aid. The simplest explanation could be that President Xi was merely repeating old formulations.
In his replies to a question recently, President Xi repeated old formulations that the border issue was complicated, it was necessary to resolve this through discussions while maintaining peace and tranquillity on the border and that the two sides should co-operate and accommodate each other’s concerns.

His reported reference to the need for the two countries to keep their relations on the right track, mutual co-operation in infrastructure and other areas, cultural ties and tackling global challenges were the usual platitudes. Yet some of us here have tried to interpret this as a deep path breaking statement.

Despite our hopes, China India relations are unlikely to see any dramatic upturn. China wants an all or none political relationship with India. This means that India must send the Dalai Lama away even though India has repeatedly and loudly pronounced that it has accepted Tibet to be an integral part of China.

However, China is unwilling to create conditions that are amenable for the return of His Holiness to Tibet. China does not accept that India has no intention to destabilise China through Tibet. It therefore routinely transfers its frustrations with the continued protests and self immolations (102 by February) in Tibet by blaming the Dalai Lama and, by implication, India.


   Meanwhile, there is a slight dichotomy in its understanding of what India can do or its intrinsic strength. It pretends to disregard Indian competition as anything serious yet worries both about the nature of India-US relationship and Indian moves to strengthen relationship with China's neighbours.
Like Pakistan, it believes that India has big power interests in developing relations with Afghanistan. The Chinese leadership assesses that no Indian leadership will accept a compromise that repudiates the McMahon Line. This suits China and overtime, it has once again extended its claim to Arunachal Pradesh (Southern Tibet), keeping the border quiet and tranquil, unlike the volatile India Pakistan border, increase mutual trade giving hope to many Indians that this would be the route to better China India relations.

Even though IMF figures for economic indicators put China way ahead of India in 2012 with a per capita GDP of US$ 9416 for China and US$ 3851 for India, GDP growth rate of 7.7% and 5.3%, inflation at 2.6% and 7.5% respectively with an investment rate of 48% compared to India’s rate of 36%, China has continued to strengthen its footprint in India’s neighbourhood as it endeavours to restrict India’s influence to its national boundary. Its latest arrangement in Gwadar testifies to this and is among the first long term and long distance forays into the Arabian Sea.

China’s big game is not against India but primarily the US. China has been making fervent efforts to increase its power projection capabilities through military modernisation, cyber capabilities and use of its deep pockets to extend influence through investment and infrastructure development in the countries on its periphery. It seeks to keep the US out of the Western Pacific. Chinese actions from the Sea of Japan to the South China Sea is designed to test US resolve and warn the neighbours about the resident power as against the distant power. It would want to send a similar message to India.

Source : Mid Day , 21st march 2013 , Vikram Sood  is a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

Could Iran be Obama's legacy?

Various battles rage in the region from Pakistan to the Maghreb and where once civilisations flourished in the Indus Valley, in Persia, Mesopotamia and Egypt we today see intolerance and violence that together seem to be putting the inheritor nations on the road to self destruction. Maybe this is an exaggeration but the daily killings and destruction as a form of political expression that encompass nationalism, sectarian beliefs, human aspirations and dictatorial regimes is becoming an epidemic without any obvious cure.

There are three main players in West Asia today — Israel, Iran and the US. Israel, surrounded by hostile regimes and their proteges, is increasingly concerned about Iran’s nuclear plans and determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability and ‘all options are on the table’. Iran itself feels surrounded by Israel, the strongest military force in the region and hostile Sunni regimes backed by a huge CentCom US force. The US itself is today unable to assert itself as it thought it could a decade or more ago.

Keep‘em guessing: Being a potential nuclear power has greater bargaining opportunities than acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Iranians watched Moammer Gaddafi become vulnerable after Libya gave up the nuclear option. File Pic/Getty Images

 

As the super power with a declining credit rating, the US has to manage its conflicting interests in West Asia as well. It seeks a semblance of balance between Israel and the Palestinians; that Iran does not acquire the bomb without Israel having to resort to the military option; that the Arab Spring flourishes yet Shia protesters seeking political freedom in Bahrain do not provide a precedent for Saudi Arabian citizens; while Syria remains the shining example of protest even though al-Qaeda clones seem to be gaining and Egypt does not become an Islamic state without becoming another military dictatorship. The list is much longer.

Among all the issues the one that endures is about the Iranian bomb. Around this time last year, US intelligence estimates affirmed that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons. US military officials had cautioned against exercising the military option. The fear was also that many of the Iranian facilities were widely dispersed deep underground and beyond the reach of the Israeli military. The subject is again on many front pages and in strategic circles after the Munich Security Conference and the Kazakhstan P5+1 conference last month.

The thinking now is that the Iranian leadership may not even have decided to go nuclear. Ambiguity is useful and the Iranians watched Moammer Gaddafi become vulnerable after Libya gave up the nuclear option and the success of North Korean nuclear adventurism. Being a potential nuclear power has greater bargaining opportunities than acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

Steadily tightening sanctions are seen as the best alternative to war in making Iran give up the nuclear option. In reality, sanctions only hurt the people it is meant to help and strengthens the regime and there is the great danger that this hurt becomes the measurement of the success of the sanctions. The real test whether or not this is changing policy is forgotten. There is no evidence that Iran is changing its policy of insisting that it is merely exercising its right under the NPT and maintaining ambiguity about its intentions for the future. By its tactics, Tehran has bought time and obtained incremental concessions from the West.

Since war is an unrealistic option especially after Iraq and sanctions are at best an uncertain weapon, it is time to think of other options. In reality what the US has been seeking is a regime change in Iran for the last 30 years and more. These changes are no longer possible through the use of military force. There has been excessive mutual US-Iran demonisation with Iranian leaders speaking of annihilating Israel. This rhetoric needs to be eased. Instead Israel must be given security against Iran and its surrogates while Iran must be allowed to break through its isolation which, if continued, will surely make it more truculent.

US actions in the past decade have not endeared itself to the Muslim world. If America wishes to continue to exercise a measure of control and dominance without conceding space to a resource hungry China whose energy dependence on the region is bound to grow, it needs to come to terms with conflicting interests between Iran and Israel. If Richard Nixon sought a breakthrough in China after failure in Vietnam, George Bush had a breakthrough with India after failure in Iraq, Barack Obama could work on a legacy that is a breakthrough with Iran after failure in Afghanistan without having to give up close US bonds with Israel.

Source : Mid Day , 7th march 2013 , Vikram Sood  is a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)