There was a time in history – about 800 AD – when Tibet’s influence extended westward up to Samarkhand and Ferghana in Central Asia and eastward up to Xian in China and northwards up to Xinjiang and Mongolia. Tibetans had contacts in Varanasi and exchanges up to the banks of the Brahmaputra. The Tibetan King Trisong Detsen extended his empire north into Qinghai and Gansu and eastwards towards Mongolia at the expense of what in now modern China in the latter half of the eighth century. Detsen promoted Buddhism, but it was in the 16th century that the Mongol King Altan Khan who gave the Mongol title of Dalai (Ocean) to his Buddhist monk, Sonam Gyatso. In deference to his two predecessors and also to his guru, the First Panchen Lama, Sonam Gyatso called himself the 3rd Dalai Lama.
By 1720 the power equation had changed. Tibet had succumbed to the Qing dynasty in Beijing although the extent of control in the years that followed varied. Today, the Tibetan nationalists claim that ‘Po Cholkha Sum’ which seeks the unity of three regions of ethnic Tibet: Amdo, Kham and U-Tsang. Today’s Tibetan nationalists living away from their homes think of the past, especially since the past has been glorious and the present is uncertain. The new government in Beijing ended its nebulous relationship with Tibet when its forces marched into Tibet in 1950 to ‘liberate’ it.
There were many good reasons for the Communist government to take over Tibet. They did not want the existing arrangements in Tibet that guaranteed an Indian presence. They feared that this created the possibility of another Younghusband turning up in Lhasa to assert imperial control. And India was presumed to be still in the imperialist camp. An assertive Tibet would have threatened Bejing’s access to Xinjiang too, just as any talk of Greater Tibet does today.
The 14th Dalai Lama fled home in 1959 to seek shelter in India. He has remained here ever since and his presence in India and “government in exile” have been China’s chief grouse against India. 1962 followed and then the Pakistan and China friendship blossomed into an everlasting, deeper-than-the oceans all-weather friendship. Control of Tibet and from Tibet into Xinjiang gave China a boundary with Pakistan, and through the Gilgit-Baltistan portion of J&K occupied by Pakistan, access to the Arabian Sea.
When the Chinese talk of the ‘splittist activities’ of the Dalai Lama, they have in mind his hold on the Tibetans in Tibet and Tibetan–dominated areas, not so much his hold on the Tibetans outside China. The ordinary Tibetan still draws spiritual sustenance from the Dalai Lama. The Chinese would much rather he remained in India because were he to return he would most surely draw an overwhelming Tibetan response as a religious leader. This could have political implications. The Chinese seem to have assessed that India will not do much more than it is already doing nor can the Tibetans. Thus, it is strategically and tactically better for the Chinese if the Dalai Lama continues to remain in India. The Chinese can then continue to put India on the back foot on this issue, make us repeat every now and then that Tibet is a part of China without reciprocating on Sikkim and prevaricate on the border issue.
Meanwhile, there could be a problem as China moves away from strict Marxist-Maoist principles and adopts capitalist economic methods. The ideological underpinnings will weaken and a substitute has to be found. One can almost feel that the State has appropriated to itself the right to propagate religion. Buddhism is allowed to be practiced but there must not be any display of the Dalai Lama’s photographs in Tibet. Over time, the Chinese authorities will seek to use Buddhism with Chinese characteristics as a means to exercise greater control on South East Asia and the Himalayan belt. It is difficult to predict whether it will be Buddhism or Confucianism that will ultimately prevail but some ideology will have to replace Maoist thought.
Both Tibet and Xinjiang are China’s largest provinces, are resource-rich and under populated. Both have had sections of their population that has sought to move away from China’s control. Tibet secures China’s southern border and provides access to South Asia while Xinjiang does likewise in Central Asia and Russia. Xinjiang means New Territory (as the Manchu Qing dynasty had named it) while Tibet or Xizang means the Western Treasure House. There was a Soviet interest in Xinjiang till 1949 when Stalin eyed the region’s mineral deposits, which today includes gas and oil and the West-East pipeline from Kazakhstan to Shanghai.
In February this year Chinese geologists announced they had discovered more than 600 new sites of copper, iron, lead and zinc ore deposits on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau since 1999. Preliminary estimates show that there are reserves of 30 to 40 million tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead and zinc and billions of tons of iron. China will be able to increase its copper concentrate output by 30% by exploiting the three copper mines with an annual production of 250,000 tons. There are three large high-grade iron ore deposits on the plateau and one of them, in Nyixung, has reserves of 300 to 500 million tons. Chinese geologists also predict that the oil shale deposits could be turned into oil. The Qinghai-Golmud-Lhasa train will help in the transportation of these minerals.
Environmentalists in Europe and elsewhere, along with Tibet nationalist groups gave been pointing out that the railway line is an environmental hazard. Sections of the railway line have been built on permafrost; the railway track and pillars has to be lined with ammonia to prevent the permafrost from melting. The construction of this rail link has been done at an enormous cost. It is an engineering feat that required grit and determination as well. The utility of this must have been enormous for the Chinese government to undertake this task. It is obvious to any casual visitor also that there has been economic progress – measured in basic terms in the number of cars on the roads, the kind of shops that are open and the general environment that exists – in Lhasa.
The building of modern infrastructure is essential for any development to take place. It has been argued that these infrastructures in Tibet – roads, rail links and airports along with modern communication systems that are being put in place by China – have strategic implications for India. This is true. All such infrastructure facilities are obviously usable for military purposes also.
The response to this is to construct our own infrastructure facilities for the economic and development of our border regions which not only facilitate economic growth, tourism but also greater integration of these parts to the rest of India. Otherwise these regions will economically and socially integrate with Tibet. It must also be remembered that China has developed these facilities in its other outlying province – Xinjiang, which provides it greater access to the energy rich Central Asia and from there road connections will eventually take Chinese goods to Europe. Management and running of these facilities will require ‘import’ of population from the rest of the country.
There is another vital natural resource in Tibet. Almost all the major rivers of China, Northern India and South East Asia originate from the Tibetan-Qinghai plateau. The Yangtse (Jinsha), Yellow (Huang Ho), Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo), Indus and Sutlej, Kosi into Nepal, Mekong and Salween, are some of the important rivers. China’s water resources are mainly in the south while droughts and floods alternate in the arid north and west. Apart from pollution, there is inefficient use of water.
In China, one ton of water produces barely $2-3 of GDP while in the US one ton produces $28-30 worth of GDP. The reduction in the water flow in the main rivers has affected the power output from the hydroelectric power plants. Many of China’s industries like paper, iron and steel, textile dyeing and petrochemicals that depend on large quantities of water supplies, have been similarly adversely affected. Declining rainfall and continuous years of drought in the Northern China plains since 2000 along with drying reservoirs in provinces like Guangdong are the kinds of shortages that will affect China’s growth pattern. Wen Jiabao, then deputy Prime Minister in 1999, warned of the looming crisis.
There has been periodic talk of harnessing the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) at the Yarlung Gorge where it flows around the Namcha Barwa Mountain at Pe and drops nearly 2700 metres before entering Arunachal Pradesh. Since India too has similar problems of water shortages and water management, any talk of harnessing the Brahmaputra should worry India. Given the Chinese penchant for mega projects like the Three Gorges and Golmud-Tibet Railway, a scheme to produce 70,000 kilowatts of electricity (four times as much as the capacity of the Three Gorges), should not be ignored nor any scheme to divert or harness the waters from rivers that flow into India. The Yarlung Gorge scheme may appear to be an unattainable dream but water is going to be the world’s most political and precious resource in the decades ahead. It is necessary for India to have a river waters agreement with China as the lower riparian just as we have one with Pakistan as the upper riparian.
Three of China’s largest provinces – Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet – constitute about 37% of the total area but have only 2% of the population. Given the vast differences in the density of populations where some of the smaller provinces on the coast have the largest population densities, it makes good sense to treat these three areas as the lebensraum for the rest of the country. It is inevitable that as infrastructures develop, along with other industrial and commercial bases, these areas will get progressively ‘Hanised.’ Building these facilities seems to be the main thrust of the Chinese government. The empty highways and large infrastructure facilities in these provinces that seem underused explains this. They are building for the future.
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