Tolerating terror

In the preface to the revised edition of her autobiography, Daughter of the East, Benazir Bhutto begins by saying: “I didn’t chose this life; it chose me. Born in Pakistan, my life mirrors its turbulence, its tragedies and its triumphs.” She goes on, “Once again Pakistan is in the international spotlight. Terrorists who use the name of Islam threaten its stability. The democratic forces believe terrorism can be eliminated by promoting the principles of freedom. A military dictatorship plays dangerous games of deception and intrigue. Fearful of losing power, it dithers, keeping the forces of modernisation at bay while the flames of terrorism flourish.” She wrote this in April 2007.

Bhutto represented modernity to the increasingly obscurantist power-brokers in Pakistan and, therefore, a threat to them. She represented, in some ways, a democratic hope for ordinary Pakistanis. She was thus perceived as a threat to the entrenched khaki interests.

Bhutto ended her autobiography with prophetic words. She said, “So as I prepare to return to an uncertain future in Pakistan in 2007, I fully understand the stakes not only for myself, and my country, but the entire world. I realise that I can be arrested. I realise that like the assassination of Benigno Aquino in Manila in August 1983, I can be gunned down on the airport tarmac when I land... But I do what I have to do, and am determined to return to fulfil my pledge to the people of Pakistan, to stand by them in their democratic aspirations.” It almost happened this way on the day of her arrival.

Ultimately, her prophecy came true. Judging from the last video clips of Bhutto’s life, the assassin knew she was wearing a bullet-proof vest, so he aimed for her neck. He knew her route, and was waiting for her. The assassin or assassins were trained, skilled and the bomb blast was either a fall-back or a diversion to allow escape. We will never know.

It is reasonable to assume that there must have been an assessment about the threat to Bhutto’s life, especially after the October attack. Despite this, the assassin had easy access to his target. This can only mean that those involved in providing her security were lax, or just callous and careless or worse, they were complicit.

The assassination has occurred at a time when Musharraf’s approval rating and his credibility among Pakistanis is at its lowest — lower than that of Osama bin Laden and Bhutto. People are prepared to believe the worst about him and not willing to accept the best from him. There has been a constitutional breakdown and institutional collapse in the country. The former Chief Justice of Pakistan and other judges have been locked up, the media have been gagged, political parties emasculated and other centres of nationalist dissent, like Baloch leaders Akbar Khan Bugti and Balach Marri, killed by Pakistani authorities. Any judicial probe ordered now would lack credibility because the courts have been widely suborned by Musharraf.

It is interesting and worrying to read a recent report (November 2007) by SENLIS Council, a Britain-based international policy think-tank. The report is called ‘Afghanistan on the Brink’, but also discusses Pakistan. There is also a map that shows permanent Taliban presence in all of the NWFP, most of Punjab and northern Balochistan. Sindh is depicted as having substantial Taliban presence. Bhutto’s assassination only emphasises this growing Taliban presence and the support or sympathy they receive from various sections of the Pakistani establishment.

Repeated attacks in recent months on the army and the ISI in Rawalpindi by unknown assailants signify that there is something more sinister happening in Pakistan.

Yet, those who planned and executed this attack must have taken several aspects into consideration. Bhutto’s death leaves the PPP without an effective and acceptable leader. The immediate beneficiaries in an election now would be Musharraf’s boys in the PML(Q), while the blame for the killing falls on al-Qaeda. If the PPP does manage to win the elections riding on a sympathy vote, despite various efforts by the authorities to prevent this, its leadership will be divided and thus easy to handle. If, like the PML(N), the PPP too chooses to boycott the elections, then the PML(Q) will have a free home-run. The hope is that the agitation will eventually die down and the murder will become just another episode in Pakistan’s history.

It does not matter if the elections are described by every Pakistani as a farce, since approval from the US to go ahead with them has already been received. As of now, the elections are supposed to be held on schedule, but if the violence in the country escalates and the army has to be called in, it is possible that they may have to be postponed. The calculation probably is that the leaderless agitation and the anger on the streets will eventually subside. It has to be remembered that the last time elections in Pakistan were ordered by a dictator, the country split. And as already stated in these columns earlier (August 20, 2007), Pakistan faces a bigger crisis today than it did in 1971.

For American policy-makers, having messed around in the region for decades, salvaging US policy means protecting Pakistan.

This, in turn, means bolstering Musharraf under all circumstances, even when it was known that there is institutionalised double-crossing of benefactors in the hunt for terrorists and in the use of largesse supplied. This has been America’s Magnificent Obsession.

The current American blind spot for the generals of Pakistan is similar to that for the Shah of Iran and other surrogates in the past. Unfortunately, instead of persuading the US towards our perceptions of policy towards Pakistan, we are now seen to be following the US in putting all our eggs in a leaking Musharraf basket.

Second, all countries have an army, while in Pakistan, it is the army that has a country. No one denies the importance of the armed forces or intelligence agencies, but unless Pakistan adopts a system of governance where the army retains its special perks and privileges, yet remains subservient to the civil authority, Pakistan will never start to move towards being a ‘normal’ country.

Third, very often, Pakistanis refer to the ‘root cause’, meaning Kashmir, in the context of improving Indo-Pak relations. There is a larger issue here. Pakistan must address its own ‘root cause’ first — its increasingly jehadi mindset. The mullahs are winning in Pakistan thanks to what is taught to its children not just in madrasas but even in mainstream schools. A curriculum of hatred and bigotry only leaves the young with warped notions about the rest of the world as some of them find their way into the corridors of power.

Bhutto’s assassination may make some difference internally in Pakistan but will have little immediate impact on Indo-Pak relations. Her assassination in Rawalpindi, the unofficial capital of Pakistan, only heightens the fact that terrorists have the ability to strike at symbols of power and their own mentors in that country. The extent to which power in Pakistan is being wielded by an intolerant section, in league with some in centres of power, is frightening. The drift towards radicalism and intolerance that began with the jehad in the 1980s has now become a tidal wave which many outside Pakistan fail to recognise or accept.

Source : 30th Dec 2007, Hindustan Times

Al Qaeda does not have a mailing address

It was her finest speech they say when Benazir spoke at Liaquat Bagh on December 27. Little did the Daughter of the East know that this was her swansong. But those who killed her did not just kill her -- they killed the hopes for democracy in Pakistan. Weeping Pakistanis have been heard saying, 'Ab kuchh nahi bacha is mulk mein (there's nothing left in this country).'

Benazir had seen a lot of life in her 54 years. Born to utmost luxury and a privileged upbringing, Benazir of Harvard and Oxford was blooded into politics quite early in her life when she accompanied her father to Simla in 1972 for talks with then prime minister Indira Gandhi [ Images].

She was just out of college and 24 years old when General Zia-ul Haq hanged her father and imprisoned her along with her mother; 32 years old when her younger brother Shah Nawaz was poisoned in Cannes [Images ]; and 43 when her other brother Murtaza was murdered in Karachi. She was already in her second term as prime minister when Murtaza was killed, and was dethroned soon after that.

Those were turbulent times and the Punjabi political cliques, the army and the feudals could not accept the idea of a Sindhi woman ruling over them. She simply had to go. Soon after this she was harassed out of Pakistan and she chose to live in exile in Dubai and London [ Images] with her three children and ailing mother Nusrat.

Yet, none of these adversities dampened her resolve or her ebullient spirit. Those who knew her, remember her as somebody who retained her ability to laugh at herself, will to fight for the cause of Pakistan. She had the fortitude to bring up her three children mostly on her own as her husband spent long years in jail without trial. Benazir had the courage to return to Pakistan knowing that there would be assassins waiting for her. She had the largeness of heart to admit that in her two incarnations as prime minister she was unnecessarily hostile to India and strident on Kashmir.

On the first occasion because she also half-believed in this, but the second time she knew she had to deal with the army who called the shots on India, Afghanistan and strategic nuclear issues. She probably felt obliged that as the first woman prime minister in the Islamic world, she had to prove herself as tough as they come in a male dominated, conservative, India-bashing Punjabi milieu. Yet the army kept a watch on her, tapped her telephone and did not let her visit the Kahuta nuclear complex.

The mutual animus can be traced back to the way her father treated Zia and how Zia eventually had his revenge when he hanged him. The Bhutto-army relations were tenuous throughout and remained so till the end. Although she negotiated with Musharraf for her return, she never really trusted him. She accepted that the pressure on her to negotiate with Musharraf was not because there was urgency to install her as prime minister but to give Musharraf's rule some legitimacy.

It was during this second term and her exile that she began to rethink about Pakistan and the subcontinent. She realised that this business of jihad was taking Pakistan downstream rapidly and bringing Pakistan into direct confrontation with the West. This had to be curbed; also that the peace dividend with India would be much higher than the war dividend.

Benazir had great hopes for the region and spoke of soft borders in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images]. She was not, however, sure how she would restrain the army and make it answerable to a civilian leadership. And this, in the end, proved to be the most difficult aspect of her homecoming.

Benazir's assassination is not the first political assassination in Pakistan and like all previous assassinations, will remain unsolved. It was not just a terrorist act and to describe it thus is to evade the real issue. It is very convenient to have the Al Qaeda claim that they killed her; but then Al Qaeda [Images ] does not have a mailing address.

In all such cases of assassinations, the opportunity to act, and access to the target, are the most important aspects. Once these two are available and there are guns for hire, the rest is easy as a matter of patient waiting, or a speedy arrival and quick escape.

Benazir used to say that unless she went back to the people they would never believe in her. And now many in Pakistan and on the subcontinent grieve for her. Her brother Murtaza returned to Pakistan and was killed and she returned to Pakistan and she was killed as well.

Benazir represented modernity and tolerance in a society whose controllers are becoming increasingly intolerant and bigoted while the small civil society looks on, helpless and afraid.

From today, in Garhi Khuda Bux in Larkana, she will forever lie next to her father -- the man she admired and loved the most. She will sleep in peace and no longer be touched by the turbulence of her life.

Is this the end of the Bhutto era, or should one say 'Jiye Bhutto (Long live Bhutto)'?

Source : 29th Dec 2007 , Rediff.com

Terror Lessons not learnt

Stop Referring to terrorists as fidayeen

SIX years ago, many Indian MPs survived a sensational assassination bid in the heart of the city in a high-security zone. A combination of luck and the courage and fortitude of the security forces saved the day. Today, can one say with certainty that such an attempt will be pre-empted or prevented from taking place?

In a way it is an unfair question to ask because there is no magic formula by which a counter terrorist force can kill a man or a woman who is willing to die. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether we, as a nation and not just professionally, are better prepared to handle this threat which will not go away and will conceivably become bigger. The short answer may be 'afraid not'. Terrorist attacks all over the country have continued.

The terrorist strikes in Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and recently in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow show terrorist cells have existed in these cities and there must be similar cells elsewhere. Also, the jehadi terrorist seems to have moved out of the Valley and is now more visible through his actions in the rest of the country.

The jehadi terrorists may have been able to get international headlines through big-ticket urban attacks but they do not have the capacity to organise jail breaks of the kind that Naxalites had done in November 2005 when they sprung 341 prisoners from the district jail in Jehanabad. The other difference has been that the jehadi terrorist does not hold territory. The Naxals do — and places like Dantewada and Narainpur in Bastar district or the Saranda forest in Jharkhand are no-go areas for the state.

Terrorism in India has largely remained restricted to various states — J&K, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam — with each outfit operating independently in its own area. The Naxals, on the other hand, have now got a reach that is officially admitted to extend to 185 of India's 605 districts in the heart of the country. Others put this figure at 256 districts. Thus, while we may externalise the jehadi terrorist problem and may therefore be better able to tackle it knowing that its mentors realise that beyond a certain threshold it could escalate beyond their control, there is no such possibility in the Naxal case. It is a purely internal problem that has been inadequately addressed in every way.

The character of terrorism has changed more rapidly in its operating procedures. There is greater reliance on cyberspace and less on the cellphone and on sleeper cells among the jehadi networks while the Naxals retain a very strong hierarchical control mechanism. Both retain their element of surprise but the latter is also a reflection of poor ground, state-led intelligence. Both seem better trained, better equipped and extremely mobile. The counter terrorist lacks in all three spheres.

It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. Globally, it has been found that despite all the state assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability to collect intelligence about non-state adversaries remains the most difficult.

In India our tendency has been to make some post-event superficial changes. We do not even have adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence, we do not even have national identity cards. Our border controls remain inadequate.

A terrorist event makes a good story or 'breaking news' but the media too needs some rules of conduct. The other day it was all over the channels that police were looking for as bunch of terrorists in a white Ambassador. Surely the terrorists saw this too and abandoned their white Ambassador.

Repeated telecast of pictures of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. Often we glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen. All this has to change too if we want to win the war on terrorism.


Source : 13th December 2007, Mail Today