Stop Referring to terrorists as fidayeen
SIX years ago, many Indian MPs survived a sensational assassination bid in the heart of the city in a high-security zone. A combination of luck and the courage and fortitude of the security forces saved the day. Today, can one say with certainty that such an attempt will be pre-empted or prevented from taking place?
In a way it is an unfair question to ask because there is no magic formula by which a counter terrorist force can kill a man or a woman who is willing to die. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether we, as a nation and not just professionally, are better prepared to handle this threat which will not go away and will conceivably become bigger. The short answer may be 'afraid not'. Terrorist attacks all over the country have continued.
The terrorist strikes in Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and recently in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow show terrorist cells have existed in these cities and there must be similar cells elsewhere. Also, the jehadi terrorist seems to have moved out of the Valley and is now more visible through his actions in the rest of the country.
The jehadi terrorists may have been able to get international headlines through big-ticket urban attacks but they do not have the capacity to organise jail breaks of the kind that Naxalites had done in November 2005 when they sprung 341 prisoners from the district jail in Jehanabad. The other difference has been that the jehadi terrorist does not hold territory. The Naxals do — and places like Dantewada and Narainpur in Bastar district or the Saranda forest in Jharkhand are no-go areas for the state.
Terrorism in India has largely remained restricted to various states — J&K, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam — with each outfit operating independently in its own area. The Naxals, on the other hand, have now got a reach that is officially admitted to extend to 185 of India's 605 districts in the heart of the country. Others put this figure at 256 districts. Thus, while we may externalise the jehadi terrorist problem and may therefore be better able to tackle it knowing that its mentors realise that beyond a certain threshold it could escalate beyond their control, there is no such possibility in the Naxal case. It is a purely internal problem that has been inadequately addressed in every way.
The character of terrorism has changed more rapidly in its operating procedures. There is greater reliance on cyberspace and less on the cellphone and on sleeper cells among the jehadi networks while the Naxals retain a very strong hierarchical control mechanism. Both retain their element of surprise but the latter is also a reflection of poor ground, state-led intelligence. Both seem better trained, better equipped and extremely mobile. The counter terrorist lacks in all three spheres.
It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. Globally, it has been found that despite all the state assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability to collect intelligence about non-state adversaries remains the most difficult.
In India our tendency has been to make some post-event superficial changes. We do not even have adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence, we do not even have national identity cards. Our border controls remain inadequate.
A terrorist event makes a good story or 'breaking news' but the media too needs some rules of conduct. The other day it was all over the channels that police were looking for as bunch of terrorists in a white Ambassador. Surely the terrorists saw this too and abandoned their white Ambassador.
Repeated telecast of pictures of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. Often we glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen. All this has to change too if we want to win the war on terrorism.
Source : 13th December 2007, Mail Today
SIX years ago, many Indian MPs survived a sensational assassination bid in the heart of the city in a high-security zone. A combination of luck and the courage and fortitude of the security forces saved the day. Today, can one say with certainty that such an attempt will be pre-empted or prevented from taking place?
In a way it is an unfair question to ask because there is no magic formula by which a counter terrorist force can kill a man or a woman who is willing to die. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether we, as a nation and not just professionally, are better prepared to handle this threat which will not go away and will conceivably become bigger. The short answer may be 'afraid not'. Terrorist attacks all over the country have continued.
The terrorist strikes in Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and recently in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow show terrorist cells have existed in these cities and there must be similar cells elsewhere. Also, the jehadi terrorist seems to have moved out of the Valley and is now more visible through his actions in the rest of the country.
The jehadi terrorists may have been able to get international headlines through big-ticket urban attacks but they do not have the capacity to organise jail breaks of the kind that Naxalites had done in November 2005 when they sprung 341 prisoners from the district jail in Jehanabad. The other difference has been that the jehadi terrorist does not hold territory. The Naxals do — and places like Dantewada and Narainpur in Bastar district or the Saranda forest in Jharkhand are no-go areas for the state.
Terrorism in India has largely remained restricted to various states — J&K, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam — with each outfit operating independently in its own area. The Naxals, on the other hand, have now got a reach that is officially admitted to extend to 185 of India's 605 districts in the heart of the country. Others put this figure at 256 districts. Thus, while we may externalise the jehadi terrorist problem and may therefore be better able to tackle it knowing that its mentors realise that beyond a certain threshold it could escalate beyond their control, there is no such possibility in the Naxal case. It is a purely internal problem that has been inadequately addressed in every way.
The character of terrorism has changed more rapidly in its operating procedures. There is greater reliance on cyberspace and less on the cellphone and on sleeper cells among the jehadi networks while the Naxals retain a very strong hierarchical control mechanism. Both retain their element of surprise but the latter is also a reflection of poor ground, state-led intelligence. Both seem better trained, better equipped and extremely mobile. The counter terrorist lacks in all three spheres.
It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. Globally, it has been found that despite all the state assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability to collect intelligence about non-state adversaries remains the most difficult.
In India our tendency has been to make some post-event superficial changes. We do not even have adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence, we do not even have national identity cards. Our border controls remain inadequate.
A terrorist event makes a good story or 'breaking news' but the media too needs some rules of conduct. The other day it was all over the channels that police were looking for as bunch of terrorists in a white Ambassador. Surely the terrorists saw this too and abandoned their white Ambassador.
Repeated telecast of pictures of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. Often we glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen. All this has to change too if we want to win the war on terrorism.
Source : 13th December 2007, Mail Today
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