Bizarre shadow boxing in Pak

It is safe to assume that what is happening in Pakistan is mostly noora Kushti. This means that the politicians are free to say what they like and the Army is free to do what it likes.

Pakistan’s latest experiment with democracy — the seventh, beginning with Zulfiqar Bhutto after the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, not counting the sham democracy of Pervez Musharraf — is turning out to be quite bizarre. Three months after the February elections, people now find that two of their unelected leaders prefer to confabulate in secret under the fond tutelage of American bureaucrats, in Dubai and London, and proclaim divergent aims in public. Asif Ali Zardari, a leader by inheritance, which is a strange enough phenomenon, is weighed under heavy obligations. Multiple cases against him had not disappeared by magic and he had to be more sympathetic to Musharraf. The other "leader of the people," Nawaz Sharif, originally a creation of the all-powerful "establishment", is driven by an unfettered desire for revenge against Musharraf. Both are feudal in their own ways and both are ambitious.

There were many who hoped that democracy had arrived in Pakistan in February and that the Army would recede. This has not happened as politicians squabble, lawyers protest, Musharraf remains adamant, the Frontier burns and the government is essentially dysfunctional. In the post-election euphoria many also forgot that the real crowning in Pakistan had taken place some months ago when General Musharraf reluctantly passed the baton to General Ashfaq Kayani. The President of Pakistan retains Article 58(2)(b), which can be used to dissolve the government, and the military-packed Super Cabinet, the National Security Council, is still in position.

The Pakistan Army is unlikely to give up its pre-eminent status. This means giving up its huge corporate interests, lose out fertile and valuable acreage in Pakistan, urban properties in prime locations, its right to control policy on Afghanistan, Kashmir and India, or its hold on strategic assets. More than anything else, these fabulous perks cannot be withdrawn at the stroke of a pen and may never be done. The trick would be to let the Army have its perks minus the primacy. The first test will be when the Budget is presented, and it would be interesting to know if in a break from the past the armed forces budget will actually be discussed. Even so, it will take several decades for the Army to withdraw completely and become a "normal" military force.
It is safe to assume that what is happening in Pakistan is mostly noora kushti — a favourite Pakistani sport of political shadow-boxing. Essentially, this means that the politicians are free (more or less) to say what they like and the Army is free to do what it likes.

The United States, alarmed at the peace deal that the Pakistan government had struck with the terrorists in FATA and Swat would adversely affect its war on terror, has rushed in its minders to assess and advise. Unfortunately, micro-management by remote control is always a dangerous policy and will only add to American unpopularity in the country. Added to this, Nato’s unhappiness about the fact that the Pakistan Army was not doing enough on the border and Baitullah Mehsud’s threat that his Islamic warriors would carry out raids into Afghanistan from Pakistani soil could ultimately lead to a greater American involvement in Pakistan. All the three A’s are going to be active.

Musharraf’s tactics must await judgment. Either he is playing a long-term game of attrition, with support from the Army and the US, where his adversaries will shadow box themselves to exhaustion. The hope is that people, tired with the endless soap opera starring Zardari and Sharif that debates the fate of the judiciary and Musharraf, will demand redressal of their economic and other grievances.

On the other hand, it is possible that Musharraf continues to be under an extreme self-delusion that he is indispensible to Pakistan but has lost the support of the Army and perhaps America. There was immediate and colourful speculation that Musharraf was on his way out when General Kayani first replaced the Musharraf-appointed commander of the 111 Brigade in Rawalpindi (also called the Coup Brigade and always manned by the COAS’ own man) and then had a long late-night dialogue with him.

In the immediate aftermath of the Bhurban Declaration, Sharif appeared to be diligently following the people’s mandate by insisting that Musharraf be impeached and the judiciary of pre-November 3, 2007 be restored before any other business could be transacted. But Zardari’s repeated obfuscation on this and his insistence that this be done constitutionally has led to some impatience among the people. Sharif’s critics are saying that he may have boxed himself into a corner by pursuing a very narrow agenda. Besides, Sharif is not exactly a favourite in Washington and more an acolyte of the Saudi royals.

On the other hand, Zardari is where he is largely due to the deal his wife had worked out with the help of the United States and Musharraf. He cannot be seen to be reneging on this. So what at one stage appeared to be a statesmanlike approach to keep the flock together in Pakistan’s march to democracy may only be the usual opportunism. The occasional reference to Musharraf as a relic of the past is seen by sceptics as a ploy to silence criticism.

As conspiracy theories abound, there are also fears among the people they are going down a road that had been taken before.

Zardari’s latest offer of a 62-point constitutional package is precisely this — an act of masterly procrastination. The package circumscribes the tenure of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and favours Hameed Dogar, the Musharraf appointee.

Zardari has his own scores to settle. It was Iftikhar Chaudhry who had refused to hear Zardari’s bail petitions but it was Chief Justice Dogar (and Musharraf) who allowed all cases to be dropped under the NRO (National Reconciliation Ordnance).

In case Iftikhar Chaudhry were restored, the fear is that he would repeat earlier actions — declare the November 3 actions of then General Musharraf, including the NRO, to be illegal, stop the sale of Pakistan Steel Mills or any other similar scheme to sell national assets cheap. He had infuriated the mullahs by striking down the Hisbah Bill (introduced in the NWFP to oversee the implementation of Sharia). He upset the Americans by demanding that "missing persons" be produced in court. Iftikhar Chaudhry’s return does not suit the rich and powerful, the mullahs and the Americans. Besides, Zardari is not going to shoot himself in the foot.

Three months ago the people of Pakistan believed they stood at the crossroads of destiny. Today, they are caught in a labyrinth. Unless a compromise is achieved quickly which includes Musharraf’s departure or a substantial downgrading of his role, prolonged discussions on the constitutional package will give Musharraf enough time to regroup.

Source : Asian Age , 4 June 2008