Our weakest link is the disappearance of the beat policing system in the states
BANGALORE and Ahmedabad in July 2008 appear to be Jaipur May 2008 rewind, only upgraded, while Surat sends shivers down the national spine. The nation is going through its familiar “ whodunit” act. There are the usual accusations of intelligence failure, resolve to punish the guilty ( if they can be found that is), demands to reintroduce POTA or some such law, learned discourses on TV channels, calls for setting up yet another organisation and angry comparisons between the RAW and the ISI. Until the next terrorist act takes place when we will rewind this tape again.
Intelligence failure is a frequent and often justified point of criticism. In India, there is a lack of appreciation that intelligence agencies are the sword arms of the nation ( not the government) in the furtherance of its foreign security interests and the protection of the country. In normal times, when it is the best time for the agencies to be allowed to hone their skills, develop their sources and prepare for the future, they suffer from benign neglect. Posts remain unsanctioned, purchase of new equipment is postponed and upgrading is frowned upon, all because the powers- that- be assess that the threat has passed. Yet, when an incident takes place, intelligence agencies become the useful whipping boys with politicians and others ready to shift blame as they assess their political fortunes.
Any organisation is as strong as its weakest link. In India, the weakest link in the states is the disappearance of the beat constable system — the man who knew who or what was new on his beat and what was happening. It was this man who would generate, confirm or refute, new information. He used to be the lowest common denominator. Today, the police force is undermanned, undertrained, underpaid and overworked.
Urban ghettoes have become the preserve of mafia dons and are no- go areas for the constable in search of suspects. In the districts and rural areas, a perennial resource crunch of all kinds and political interference designed to keep the system weak, means the ability and urge to perform even the normal functions has been severely impaired.
Challenge
So while we may all talk of new specialised agencies, co- ordination between the state and the Centre and rapid communications, the real problem is that we are not equipped to execute all this. Any new agency will surely be formed by cannibalising existing agencies, take a few years to get organised after the existing organisations reluctantly give it some space and it will remain understaffed and under- equipped. These are problems that we are not prepared to address adequately.
Terrorism has changed face. The terrorist is now “ one of us” — he is the boy or girl next door who may even be the mastermind and a computer buff upgrading the nature of the attack. This can be tackled by having another boy or girl next door as the counter terrorist. There are many citizens who would be willing to offer information but an inadequate witness protection programme and the fear that they would get involved in never ending court cases, deters many from offering information that an intelligence agency or an investigation agency needs. Long drawn out trials frustrate the investigator, and provide the terrorist the hope that he would escape punishment. In that context a special law and special courts would help provided the other systemic corrections are made. The witness protection scheme has to be strengthened and speedy justice ensured for information to begin flowing. POTA alone will not do.
ISI
One of the other angry outbursts after a terrorist incident is to compare the R& AW with the ISI. The short answer to this is that if Indian media and politicians have built the reputation of the ISI, the Pak press and accusations by persons like former army Chief Gen Aslam Beg provide enough cause for the R& AW to feel satisfied with its achievements! However, the important thing to remember is that in Pakistan the defence budget is beyond any review by any civilian authority, including parliament. The ISI thus has unlimited access to funds; it can draw money from any bank including, the Askari Bank, owned by the Army.
If this is not enough, it has drug money to fall back upon and if that does not work, then there is largesse from the US. In India we have migratory bureaucrats with little or no understanding of intelligence functions who sit in judgement on agencies’ needs.
In Pakistan, the ISI is multifunctional, combining the role of the R& AW, IB, MI, and the CBI. Its National Accountability Bureau is controlled by the ISI and its favourite past time is to keep errant or dissident politicians and bureaucrats in check. Besides it can arrange disappearances, and worse.
Foreign policy control and domestic political skulduggery has been the domain of the ISI. This is what makes it the most powerful institution in the country. It started off as being answerable to the Army and was what the Army chief wanted it to be. The Indiafactor had always provided the Army with its reasons to run the country its own way. Unable to tackle India militarily, recourse to terrorism had become the other foreign policy option. It was cost effective and did not need the Army to die for the nation. That was the privilege of the Kashmiri or the Punjabi underclass. The execution of this policy option strengthened the Army’s special status in Pakistan as the only functioning system, which arrogated to itself huge corporate interests for its services to the nation, lowered its nuclear threshold against India and raised the banner of terrorism in the name of Islam so that any escalation by India would mean using the nuclear option in the name of the nation and Islam.
Desperation
As Pakistan’s options began to reduce with the rest of the world glowering at Pakistan’s rulers, the Army became more desperate to retain its primacy as the Protector of the Faith and Defender of the Realm without losing out on being America’s stalwart ally. Over time, the Army became increasingly dependent upon the ISI for its actions in Afghanistan and India and the ISI graduated from being a State within a State to being the State.
Come September 2001 and things began to spin out of control for the Pakistan Army and the ISI. It became more and more difficult for Pakistan to be seen as the provider of foot soldiers and support to the jehad in Kashmir. It was probably around this time that the ISI began to recruit Indians for its jehad and began to spread it to the rest of India. Growing American pressure to come clean has begun to take its toll in Pakistan even though the ISI continues its double game with the CIA in the NWFP. Anticipating increased American pressure, the ISI has begun shifting that pressure to India.
We may be in the midst of one such shift and more will most certainly follow.
Source : Mail Today , 1st August 2008
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