Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Musharraf's exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis

From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush's buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush's endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.

So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late.
Musharraf had to leave when the three A's deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.

The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.

The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.

Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh's offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.

Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America's choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.


Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf's ouster is, to that extent, Sharif's victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.


The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.

America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support.

One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.


Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008

Musharraf's exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis





From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush's buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush's endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.




So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late. Musharraf had to leave when the three A's deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.




The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.




The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.




Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh's offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.




Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America's choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.




Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf's ouster is, to that extent, Sharif's victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.
The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.




America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support. One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.



Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Musharraf’s exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis




From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush’s buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush’s endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.





So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln’s determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late.
Musharraf had to leave when the three A’s deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.





The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.



The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.





Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh’s offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.





Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America’s choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.





Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf’s ouster is, to that extent, Sharif’s victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.



The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.





America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support.





One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.




Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008

Sunday, August 10, 2008

As Kashmir boils , it's time to be firm, fair , consistent

The action in the valley is not about demography or ecology. It is about the convergence of interests between the PDP,the terrorists and the Hurriyat. It is about hitting at Kashmiriyat. Fortunately , the reaction in Jammu is not communal ; reports even till date say that all communities in Jammu are protesting jointly.
Amid all the anger and violence that we have seen in Srinagar and then in Jammu, most of us have forgotten the genesis of the problem. There is something quite mysterious about the entire ugliness. On the one hand, it appears strange that the PDP ministers of law and forests had piloted the proposal for the transfer of land and it was the PDP that pulled out of the government, then used the militants and the Hurriyat to raise the temperature in the Kashmir Valley. On the other hand, it is not too strange if one remembers that this is just another case of opportunistic politics.

A few months just short of the October elections, the PDP needed some excuse to dump the government and challenge its main rival, the National Conference. The Hurriyat, which was becoming irrelevant, needed something to regain lost ground. This was at a time when its chief mentor, Pakistan, was temporarily distracted and had little time for the likes of Mirwaiz Farooq and Syed Gilani. Thus, the Amarnath shrine board issue was a heaven-sent opportunity for the PDP and the Hurriyat. Or, if one wants to give Mufti extra credit, then this was a highly Machiavellian move where he got his own ministers to pilot the proposal, using the governor’s desire for this allocation, and then walked out, pretending horror. The Hurriyat used a very willing PDP to recreate scenes that were a rerun of 1990 in the aftermath of the Rubaiyya Sayeed kidnapping case. So with our clumsy handling of the situation, along with clever management of the media by the militants and pronouncements by the bleeding hearts, we ended up shooting ourselves in the foot.

The PDP’s so-called high moral ground was that the construction would damage the ecology and demographic changes would follow. The PDP has never shed any tears for the way the beautiful Dal Lake, the Wullar, the Nagin and so many other water bodies have all shrunk through a combination of official greed and public neglect. What has the PDP done about them? The PDP did not protest when the railways extended into the Valley, destroying forests and using land. Forest land has been used to construct power projects and set up telecom towers. It is also known that Kashmiri terrorists and their friends have denuded the magnificent deodar forests and used the money for themselves and to fund the movement.

As for fears about demographic change, this is equally laughable. Baltal is under snow for eight months in a year and it is inhospitable even for the nomadic Bakarwals. No one lives there permanently, certainly not the yatris, who are Hindus primarily, but obviously the twist is to give this a communal overtone. In an amazing show of convenient amnesia and duplicity, the likes of Mirwaiz were mouthing grave concern about demographic changes. He of course forgot that 500,000 Kashmiri pandits have become refugees in their own country. What has the Mirwaiz done to bring them back?

The role of the Congress-led government has been difficult to understand. Obviously somewhere in their calculation there must be the hope that this transfer of land short of elections would fetch them some seats from Jammu. Policies based on hope and not on reality have a tendency to rebound. The point is: did the state government act on its own, in a vacuum? Did it consult the security agencies about the likely repercussions before taking the decision? Did the government act regardless of the advice? Or was the advice in agreement with the government’s desires? Did the government have any assessment that the reactions in Srinagar would be ugly, and that Jammu would follow? Did the government think this through? A yes or no to any of these questions would give a different complexion to the entire episode.

The action in the Valley is not about demography or ecology. It is about the convergence of interests between the PDP, the terrorists and the Hurriyat. It is about hitting at Kashmiriyat. Fortunately, the reaction in Jammu is not communal; reports even till today say that all communities in Jammu are protesting jointly. They are simply tired of the appeasement that goes on in Srinagar in the name of magnanimity. They have also seen the benefits of the politics of violent protest. Baltal was simply the last straw.

Magnanimity as state policy is a function of strength and victory; otherwise it is appeasement. And periodic appeasement, as in 1989 and now, will only lead to increased terrorism. When we think we are magnanimous by letting Syed Ali Shah Gilani talk secession and not lock him up, we are actually practising appeasement.. When we let Yasin Malik roam around freely after he and his henchmen murdered six Indian Air Force personnel, we are not magnanimous; we are again practising appeasement. And appeasement only breeds delinquency.

This means that this policy must stop. If a decision had been taken to hand over the land by one governor, even if wrong, we should have had the courage and tenacity to abide with it. The first requirement today is to defuse the situation, and for this the PDP and the Hurriyat are not the best-equipped groups. The battle for hearts and minds will not be won by the bullet alone, but by being firm, fair and consistent. It will also require continued psy-war, to counter the terrorists’ propaganda and which will increase along with violence in the months ahead. Pakistan simply cannot allow free and fair elections which would make the Hurriyat and all the other outfits it has nurtured for so long become irrelevant. Whatever be the level of its preoccupation on its western border, Pakistan has neither the courage nor the vision to change its policy on Kashmir.
Source : Asian Age , 11th August 2008

Friday, August 1, 2008

Terrorists leave their Visiting Cards

It has been a bad and bloody month for all of us. Four Indians including a Brigadier and a senior diplomat and two soldiers were among those killed in suicide attack in Kabul. At about the same time terrorists in Kashmir struck against the Indian army twice and there were border violations. After the Jaipur serial blasts we now have bombings in Bengaluru and Ahmedabad. Interspersed with this was the mauling of the nation’s soul in Parliament by people we had sent to represent us. Did anyone lose sleep this time? Probably not. And, that is the outrage, because after the usual handwringing, denunciations, compensations and pontifications, we will revert to what we are – callous and uncaring because terrorism is considered to be a disease that afflicts ‘the other’.

We forget though that terrorism has been with us for decades and casualties have become statistics. The killings we have seen recently are not an expression of anger for no anger justifies killing innocents who are not the cause of this anger. The bombings are carefully selected acts against soft targets meant to spread fear, to provoke a reaction; they are meant to undermine the economy and to send a signal to India’s majority --- the poor and helpless – that their lives are not safe. If the anger is about poverty, denial of opportunities, discrimination and miscarriage of justice then why kill the blameless? Obviously they go beyond bread and butter issues.

There is as yet no evidence about who was responsible for these acts and as usual various names are afloat. The essential truth is that we have brought this upon ourselves over the years. We are victims of terrorism that is spreading outwards from Pakistan. Instead of dealing this with single mindedness, we have sought appeasement and instead of sharpening the state instruments of investigation and intelligence we issued caveats to investigators. Pakistan may or may not be responsible for the current spate of terrorism but a certain mindset has been let loose and these clones are now roaming around free to act. We have been seemingly unable to catch the signals.

People like Osama say that the West led by the US and Britain are the champion Crusaders of the modern world who have occupied the Holy Lands and have to be thrown out. They are aided in this by the Israelis, Indians and even Russians while the worst offenders are the ‘apostate’ Muslim kingdoms and governments in West Asia. These lands can be freed through defensive jehad -- the duty of every Muslim when an enemy enters a country and occupies it. These are also the sounds that one hears in FATA and Swat these days. In his 1996 Declaration of Jehad against the US, Osama had mentioned Kashmir and Assam as some of the places where there was injustice, repression and aggression by Christians, Jews and their agents. To achieve their goal, all methods are considered fair. Alliances with the ungodly, the atheist, or the sinful – the drug traffickers and the weapons smugglers may be necessary and Osama and his kind justify this for the greater cause. He also justifies killing of innocents and children so long as this was not intended, or necessary, if the circumstances so demanded. Bin Laden has cited Nagasaki and Hiroshima often in his speeches and has said that possession of weapons of mass destruction to counter those of the infidels was a religious duty. And to carry on with the jehad, it was best to recruit the young and the unattached in the age group of 15 to 25. In February 1998, Osama had exhorted Muslims “to kill all Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it...”

This is not to suggest that every Muslim everywhere believes in this. But there are many in Pakistan today who believe in Osama. They are afflicted by the Lal Masjid syndrome. There are also those in the armed forces and in the intelligence who have trained young men and women for jehad who are now suffering from advanced signs of reverse indoctrination. The battles that rage in Waziristan and in the NWFP today have left large tracts of territory around Peshawar in the hands of the jehadis. Training camps in the hinterland and fulminations from the pulpit continue. In his Friday sermon on July 11, the Amir of Jama’t ud da’wa, Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed who is known for his extreme views urged Muslims to prepare themselves for sacrifices in order to defend Muslim lands, to protect their honour and dignity. Two days later, Saeed declared that it was obligatory upon every Pakistani to wrest Kashmir from Indian occupation adding that India should not dream of peace in the region as long as the Kashmir issue remained unresolved. Extremists in Pakistan, encouraged by the intelligence, the army and even politicians, have long targeted India and not just Kashmir.

This is very similar to what Osama preaches to his jehadis. If jehad in northwest Pakistan is curbed, it will spread to the eastern border because the jehadi foot soldiers have to be kept employed elsewhere. Jaipur, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and now Surat are warnings about a growing capability and ideology extending beyond Kashmir. They were dropping visiting cards. More such attacks will take place in the months ahead.

Unfortunately, terrorism cannot be countered by noble intentions, compensations to the victims’ families and platitudes. Battling terror is a long and arduous task; it can be highly frustrating especially when the investigator sees the terrorist escape punishment on technical grounds. The most important capability that has to be constantly upgraded is the ability to prevent an attack with the knowledge and acceptance that not all attacks can be prevented. Even with the present system there are many attacks that do get aborted but when intelligence is inadequate or weak, there is incomplete follow up. Indiscriminate arrests follow, which lead to further alienation.

When terror struck in America and Britain they introduced draconian laws and the Bush Administration has introduced the controversial surveillance act which would allow warrantless eavesdropping. We did away with POTA without an adequate substitute. Heightened intelligence capabilities, sustained and built over a long period which is able to keep pace with evolving threats, smarter investigations and forensics, especially in the states, rapid sharing of intelligence, national identity cards, CCTVs at important places, speedy justice seen to be fair, a system of governance that delivers what it is supposed to deliver and a media that does not compete for TRP ratings over such issues, will all need to be put together for us to succeed. We must have all it takes to detect, deter and destroy this menace before it destroys us.
Source : The Asian Age , August 1, 2008