Musharraf's exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis





From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush's buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush's endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.




So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late. Musharraf had to leave when the three A's deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.




The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.




The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.




Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh's offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.




Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America's choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.




Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf's ouster is, to that extent, Sharif's victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.
The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.




America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support. One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.



Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008