Normally there would be very little reason for Indians to lose sleep over events in Georgia other than the knowledge that Georgians won three gold medals at the recently-concluded Beijing Olympics. But there have been other reasons that Georgia has been making the headlines in Russia, Europe and, sporadically, in the United States. Important lessons in statecraft flow from this.
Things had been brewing in the Caucasus for some time as the Americans played their game of encircling Russia. A regional summit of Guam (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was held in Batumi, Georgia, in July 2008. Guam is ostensibly an organisation for democracy and economic development, but in reality it is a military agreement and a de facto appendage of Nato to be used to extend its zone of influence into the Russian heartland. A US-Guam summit was also held on the sidelines, with Poland participating.
While the world awaited inauguration of the Beijing Olympics, the Georgians, following Washington-injected adrenalin, pushed their troops into South Ossetia, a region within Georgia that has been demanding independence and merger with North Ossetia in Russia. This happened a week after extensive US-Georgia wargames.
The Russians reacted the only way they could — with speed and force. The message for the outside world was that the Russians would do anything to protect their national interest and global opinion was not going to deter them. Lesson one: If a state wants to be recognised as a regional/global power, it must be willing and able to do what it must in national interest in its neighbourhood.
Georgia was not a helpless little country trying to defend itself against the giant next door as has been reported in the Indian press, drawing its information from Western mainstream media. In reality, Georgia was provoking Russia through a mixture of effective media management and Western sympathy. When the Russians reacted with force, there was very little the Americans could do except shake their heads, wring their hands and ask the European Union to join them in admonishing the Russians. Neither the Americans nor Nato was about to go to war with Russia on behalf of Georgia, and certainly not after Iraq and Afghanistan. They had encouraged Georgian adventurism, but had not anticipated Russian reaction. Lesson two: Adventurism, at the behest of distant powers against the local power, can be suicidal.
The third lesson is for the Americans. Intent on creating American clones in Russia's periphery, they systematically induced various colour revolutions in what was once Soviet territory. The Georgians were promised democracy as a solution to all their problems and as redemption from all their socialist sins. After some initial upheavals, Washington grafted an American citizen, Mikheil Saakashvili, as Georgia's President. They equipped the Georgian armed forces, Nato trained their men and the US pushed for Nato membership for Georgia, alarming the Russians.
In the 1990s, the Russians had watched helplessly after they dismantled the Warsaw Pact only to find Nato extending its eastern frontiers and the energy giants moving in as Boris Yeltsin and his groupies sold off national assets on the cheap. This was till Vladimir Putin arrived on the scene to reclaim history and geography. Obviously, there are limitations to power and Russia is not yet a write-off. Lesson three, therefore, is: Do not meddle around and do not promise if you cannot deliver. Finally, a lesson for all those involved in realpolitik.
Mr Saakashvili had led an effective media campaign personally and, in the initial days, the Georgians were portrayed by western TV and press as the innocent victims of Russian bullying. There were no takers for the Russian narrative of events. There is no Russian version of the BBC or CNN; nor, for that matter, is there an Indian version. The Russians accused CNN of telecasting footage of Georgian attacks in South Ossetia as Russian attacks in Georgia.
So, if you want to assert yourself, make sure the media is on your side; make sure your voice is heard far and wide and initial imagery is vital too. Soft power is as important as hard power. The question one might ask is why EU, Nato and the US are so keen about a tiny little Republic tucked away in the Caucasian mountains, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, whose unnatural borders had been created by another Georgian, Joseph Dzhughasvilli, better known as Stalin. The real issue is not democracy or human rights. The real issue is pinning Russia down and freeing energy resources from Russian control.
The conflict in Georgia is not about its resources (it has few) but about its geographical location. The struggle is for control of energy and transport corridors from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to bypass Russia and thus reduce Western dependency on Russia. The gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian and Central Asia have to go through the Caucasus to reach Europe if consumers want to avoid crossing either Russia or Iran.
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, from Azerbaijan on the Caspian coast to the Eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, has been an expensive and a controversial project that was completed in 2006 and has been disrupted by Kurdish separatists. The Russian response has exposed Georgia's vulnerability and more pipelines through Georgia are unlikely. With winter around the corner, a West Europe that is dependent on Russian gas supplies would want a quick settlement of the dispute. Georgia could thus be the choke point.
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, on the eastern coast of the Caspian, has offered more gas to China (40 billion cubic metres per year, instead of 30 bcm) through another pipeline. The Kazakhs are constructing a pipeline all the way from the Caspian Sea into China. The pipes, when completed, will stretch more than 7,000 km from Turkmenistan, cross Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and enter China's Xinjiang province. The Russians plan to hold a conference of gas exporters in November, possibly to discuss the creation of a gas charter similar to Opec. Gas and oil, instead of flowing westward through routes the West wants, could end up flowing eastward. It could be a long hard winter and a Cold War, Version 2, in George W. Bush's fading months and Dmitry Medvedev's early days.
Source : Deccan Chronicle , 5th September 2008
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