We Must not Dither in Times of Crisis

The Mumbai massacres are undoubtedly a lesson about our vulnerabilities, our huge security gaps, our disjointed reaction and our weak response to Pakistan. Mumbai was high profile and in contrast, the Naxal movement with 236 security forces and 460 civilians killed this year is a reflection of how issues are swept away from the mainstream when they do not seem to affect most of ‘us’. A government in election year and politicians under a cloud for what happened in Mumbai or was allowed to happen, have got together to appear to be seen to be doing something. So the people have been presented with yet another police organisation. This marks the second time when an important issue was passed without much ado – the first being the budget. Another time, criminals were sprung from jails to help pass the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Having communalised terror and counter-terror we have now decided to tighten our anti-terror laws.

With a seven thousand five hundred kilometre sea frontier and porous land borders we will always be vulnerable to depredations. Talking peace with Pakistan will not change this because the sea frontier and the land borders cannot be guarded by peace talks and policies based on hope. States need to be respected, even feared and not just liked. They can only be protected by following what Sun Tzu prescribed, ‘Do not depend on the enemy not coming; depend rather on being ready for him.’ We must accept that there is a congruence of interests in Pakistan between the Army and the jehadis nurtured by them. The Pak Army dreams of balkanising India in revenge for 1971, keeps the issue of Kashmir alive which allows it to keep Pakistan under its control. The jehadis dream of establishing caliphates in India and are willing to die for this, which again suits the Pak Army.

Pakistan has been at this game for over 60 years; it has been fighting a proxy war especially after 1971 at places and time of his choosing. It is a total war against India and we must treat it so. Other than adopting defensive postures we have done precious little to handle this threat. We have done nothing to teach the perpetrator a lesson. Instead, we have chosen to pay a heavy financial price for this (the new agency is a price we are going to pay forever) and the fact that Pakistan is paying an economic price today should be of little consolation for us. Getting ready for Pakistan and its terrorists extends to beyond modernising the armed forces with the latest aircraft, tanks or submarines. It means equipping our specialised forces the most lethal and suitable equipment and keeping them agile, trained and mobile for all times. It means empowering the local state units adequately in every sense of the word to be the first respondents in a crisis.

In handling Pakistan-led terror, we must also remember that we cannot afford to continue to dither in times of crisis. If we do not react effectively in time, then the moment of international empathy is gone. As has so often happened in the past, the first hours are the most crucial; do not react and others will step in to restrain us promising us action against Pakistan. This time it was the same pantomime. The terrorists attacked, we fumbled and hesitated, the Pakistanis wiggled for room as they shifted stance, angels stepped in promising action and urging patience. The moment was lost so we made a virtue of restraint. The Pakistanis did one better this time. There was a mysterious attack in Peshawar where160 NATO and US vehicles were sent alight with match sticks and not flame throwers and grenades. The attackers took their time because there was no one to stop them. The message to the mighty US was simple - we can choke you in Afghanistan any time so please do not try to push us. There is a method in the madness.

Every major crisis has resulted in the creation of new agencies. The Kargil crisis led to the creation of the DIA, the NTRO and the Multi Agency Centre. The Army maintains a pretty formidable Sigint capacity too. One wonders how much intelligence these agencies fed in the system before the Mumbai attacks. None of our systems are going to work if we do not have a sharp pre-emptive intelligence system with an equally well organised downstream activity that is geared to take on the new emerging threats. To quote Sun Tzu again “Nothing should be regarded as favourably as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as intelligence.” Alas, in India, intelligence is a dirty word.

In order to win this battle we must accept that we have to fight our battles ourselves and make the adversary pay a price. Unless we do that, not even our smaller neighbours will respect us. We delude ourselves when we hope that the US or anyone else will fight our battles for us. No one else will do that for us.

Source : Mail Today , 22nd December 2008

Don't give intel agencies a RAW deal

What can we learn from the Mumbai tragedy? The first lesson is that we must never forget what happened. The second is to honour the innocent and the brave who died. Third, to prioritise national vulnerabilities and set about protecting them. Fourth, we need to admit to failures and mistakes, then go about remedying them. Spare no cost, upgrade intelligence capabilities, carry out the much delayed police reforms, increase the efficacy of our commandoes and keep doing this, spare the Army from routine counter-terror activities and above all, re-establish the rule of law. Sharpen covert capabilities. And not let Pakistan, which is a nuisance, become a threat.

A people get the government they deserve and a government gets the intelligence it deserves. Our rulers today are those who have learnt nothing and have forgotten that Pakistani leaders sent in soldiers masquerading as so-called 'freedom fighters', but who were actually terrorists, in 1947, 1965, 1999 and now. We cannot have this glib talk about fighting terror jointly with Pakistan. It is like investigating murder with the help of the murderer. We had tied ourselves up in knots when we agreed that both Pakistan and India were victims of terror and today we see a rapprochement between the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani Army on the western front as they shift their troops to the Indian borders. There is absolutely no need for grand magnanimous gestures -- magnanimity is a function of victory; otherwise it is appeasement.

As usual the Mumbai attacks brought forth comments from wet-behind-the-ears experts on TV with the regular chant of intelligence failure despite thousands of crores spent on intelligence collection. This is simply not true. Remember, intelligence organizations are known only by their failures and do not advertise their successes. Secondly, the amount spent must be seen from the perspective of the country's other major expenses on security like that on the paramilitary and the police. The Armed Forces had a budget of Rs 96,000 crore last year and the budget of the civilian intelligence is a miniscule percentage of the $1.1 trillion GDP of the country. India can afford to spend more as it gets economically powerful and more vulnerable to attacks.

Recent disclosures in the newspapers about RAW's inputs on September 18 and 22 would vindicate its position somewhat. These were based on intercepts and puritans would say that intelligence agencies should never disclose their source of information because this jeopardizes the future of the source --- human or technical. But this cacophony of ill-informed accusations seems to have forced this defensive action. The intelligence provided was actionable enough and armed with this any capable force should have been able to interdict the terrorists. These or other intercepts may not be available the next time because
it is simply not possible to intercept all the traffic and decipher or understand all that is intercepted. Intelligence collection is an intricate and imperfect skill and analysis is a difficult expertise which requires the ability to look and visualise behind the wall.

Inevitably at times like this we sprout experts of various hues. Some have suggested that the IB and RAW be merged. This is unworkable and ridiculous for several reasons. The two require totally different disciplines. Intelligence is a function of area, language and regional expertise and of operational skills honed over years of practical experience. It is not a function that can be professionally performed by birds of passage. External intelligence requires different skills in language, regions and issues. Its method of collection is different as it has to work in hostile surroundings, against the laws of the country to which its officers are assigned. Internal intelligence operates on home ground in accordance with local laws and has the backing of the state. The two functions are not interchangeable. Besides, no democratic country has one intelligence service.

Most of the accusations arise from prejudices simply because intelligence agencies function under secrecy and are, therefore, assumed to be sinister or incompetent. After one Prime Minister foolishly wrecked RAW in 1977 it has always been an endless struggle in the bureaucratic jungle of New Delhi. In 1999 RAW was a convenient whipping boy in the midst of command and systemic failure in Kargil. Even if we have the best intelligence in the world, it will be of no use without commensurate downstream systems.

Since intelligence does not function in a vacuum, mere changes in the intelligence organisations will not be enough. The Home Ministry has to develop its own cadre of experts given the intricacies of security and related problems. Regional and issue expertise rather like the MEA would be the need of the hour where officers rotate only between the MHA and the State. The so-called steel framework has degenerated over time into bureaucratic indolence and ignorance and must be made responsive and modern.

All this has to happen if we have to improve our chances of winning the battle against terrorism.

Source : Times of India, 5th December 2008

Line of Control

The horror of Mumbai may be go off the screens in a few days and there may be reason for us to rejoice —especially for those who survived the ordeal. But the long term crisis for this entire episode has revealed that terrorism is ruthless and a determined gang of terrorist scan hold a world to ransom. It should also be a time for honest introspection.

It has revealed our pre-event weaknesses and vulnerabilities — the fact that we have been unable to find a remedy despite years of terrorism in the country. Nor have we learnt from the experience of others. The weaknesses are all pervasive and it is premature to exult about the triumph of the civil society. A strong and vibrant civil society helps post-event recovery. It does not prevent another attack. Terrorism succeeds incrementally not through one major battle.
Mercifully it has also shown us that there are still valiant men like Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte, Vijay Salaskar and Sandeep Unnikrishnan and scores of others who are willing to die for their country. And being Indians, we will soon forget our heroes and their sacrifices. In Raj Thackeray’s warped book Sandeep was an outsider who died fighting while his eminence was holed up somewhere safe and far.

It has revealed how slow our initial responses were and also the prevailing state of confusion. If the NSG seemed to have taken a while to get to the scene many were disappointed that that they did not storm the bastions in true Hollywood style. There was no Bruce Willis among the NSG but they seemed to have gone about their task systematically without being pushed by politicians as it normally happens in our country. We must remember that the terrorists had been living in the Taj for days and, unlike the commandoes, had a clear idea of its lay out.

Our media came out with a mixed result. We still need to learn to distinguish between what to report and what not to report. Self-restraint is a must before the authorities impose blanket bans. The yard stick is quite simple really. No glorification of the terrorist, no revelations that would aid the terrorist or hinder the operation, and no blame game — at least not when the operation is on. Maybe we could take a leaf from the US media and their coverage of 9/11. Maybe we could take a leaf from the excellent film A Wednesday and understand that the media has a role beyond mere reporting. We were very generous in giving the visiting Pakistan Foreign Minister prime time to prove his country’s innocence.

At moments like this, the State must appear to be doing something. Inviting the ISI chief was not the brightest of ideas. Anyone would have known that he would decline as PM Geelani’s assurance does not carry weight in Pakistan. It is General Kayani who matters. And if he did come he would bring with him a dossier of our so-called involvement in Balochistan and Afghanistan — something the Pak press and other India-baiters (of which there is no shortage in Pakistan) have been talking about endlessly. Were we going to give the “either you are with us or against us” line and if he had said “against you” then what would we do? Or if there is an incident of this kind in Pakistan would our intelligence chiefs be summoned to Islamabad?

The most important lesson is that this can happen again. There are so many vulnerable national assets all over the country and we are ill-prepared to protect them. Terrorists used aircraft in New York, trains and buses in London, trains in Mumbai and Madrid and they came by sea to Mumbai. They could target many of our national iconic sites like Vishakapatnam, Jamshedpur, Rourkela or Bhilai. They could target the IT industry in Bengaluru which has already seen what one might call trial runs. Damage to them would hurt our national pride and cause economic loss and lives but these are recoverable assets.

The boats or trawlers that brought in the terrorists to the Gateway of India also could have headed to Bombay High or Jamnagar where we have our gigantic hydrocarbon/petroleum complexes. Jamnagar represents investments over 150000 lakh crore rupees and contributes 6% of direct tax to the country. Any breakdown of this would be a total non-recoverable loss. Surely their protection is of vital national importance. We need to work on the premise that another dramatic terrorist attack could be repeated in the future. We have to be able to find out where and when. There is therefore so much to do and so little time

Source : Financial Express, 30th November 2008