What can we learn from the Mumbai tragedy? The first lesson is that we must never forget what happened. The second is to honour the innocent and the brave who died. Third, to prioritise national vulnerabilities and set about protecting them. Fourth, we need to admit to failures and mistakes, then go about remedying them. Spare no cost, upgrade intelligence capabilities, carry out the much delayed police reforms, increase the efficacy of our commandoes and keep doing this, spare the Army from routine counter-terror activities and above all, re-establish the rule of law. Sharpen covert capabilities. And not let Pakistan, which is a nuisance, become a threat.
A people get the government they deserve and a government gets the intelligence it deserves. Our rulers today are those who have learnt nothing and have forgotten that Pakistani leaders sent in soldiers masquerading as so-called 'freedom fighters', but who were actually terrorists, in 1947, 1965, 1999 and now. We cannot have this glib talk about fighting terror jointly with Pakistan. It is like investigating murder with the help of the murderer. We had tied ourselves up in knots when we agreed that both Pakistan and India were victims of terror and today we see a rapprochement between the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani Army on the western front as they shift their troops to the Indian borders. There is absolutely no need for grand magnanimous gestures -- magnanimity is a function of victory; otherwise it is appeasement.
As usual the Mumbai attacks brought forth comments from wet-behind-the-ears experts on TV with the regular chant of intelligence failure despite thousands of crores spent on intelligence collection. This is simply not true. Remember, intelligence organizations are known only by their failures and do not advertise their successes. Secondly, the amount spent must be seen from the perspective of the country's other major expenses on security like that on the paramilitary and the police. The Armed Forces had a budget of Rs 96,000 crore last year and the budget of the civilian intelligence is a miniscule percentage of the $1.1 trillion GDP of the country. India can afford to spend more as it gets economically powerful and more vulnerable to attacks.
Recent disclosures in the newspapers about RAW's inputs on September 18 and 22 would vindicate its position somewhat. These were based on intercepts and puritans would say that intelligence agencies should never disclose their source of information because this jeopardizes the future of the source --- human or technical. But this cacophony of ill-informed accusations seems to have forced this defensive action. The intelligence provided was actionable enough and armed with this any capable force should have been able to interdict the terrorists. These or other intercepts may not be available the next time because
it is simply not possible to intercept all the traffic and decipher or understand all that is intercepted. Intelligence collection is an intricate and imperfect skill and analysis is a difficult expertise which requires the ability to look and visualise behind the wall.
Inevitably at times like this we sprout experts of various hues. Some have suggested that the IB and RAW be merged. This is unworkable and ridiculous for several reasons. The two require totally different disciplines. Intelligence is a function of area, language and regional expertise and of operational skills honed over years of practical experience. It is not a function that can be professionally performed by birds of passage. External intelligence requires different skills in language, regions and issues. Its method of collection is different as it has to work in hostile surroundings, against the laws of the country to which its officers are assigned. Internal intelligence operates on home ground in accordance with local laws and has the backing of the state. The two functions are not interchangeable. Besides, no democratic country has one intelligence service.
Most of the accusations arise from prejudices simply because intelligence agencies function under secrecy and are, therefore, assumed to be sinister or incompetent. After one Prime Minister foolishly wrecked RAW in 1977 it has always been an endless struggle in the bureaucratic jungle of New Delhi. In 1999 RAW was a convenient whipping boy in the midst of command and systemic failure in Kargil. Even if we have the best intelligence in the world, it will be of no use without commensurate downstream systems.
Since intelligence does not function in a vacuum, mere changes in the intelligence organisations will not be enough. The Home Ministry has to develop its own cadre of experts given the intricacies of security and related problems. Regional and issue expertise rather like the MEA would be the need of the hour where officers rotate only between the MHA and the State. The so-called steel framework has degenerated over time into bureaucratic indolence and ignorance and must be made responsive and modern.
All this has to happen if we have to improve our chances of winning the battle against terrorism.
A people get the government they deserve and a government gets the intelligence it deserves. Our rulers today are those who have learnt nothing and have forgotten that Pakistani leaders sent in soldiers masquerading as so-called 'freedom fighters', but who were actually terrorists, in 1947, 1965, 1999 and now. We cannot have this glib talk about fighting terror jointly with Pakistan. It is like investigating murder with the help of the murderer. We had tied ourselves up in knots when we agreed that both Pakistan and India were victims of terror and today we see a rapprochement between the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani Army on the western front as they shift their troops to the Indian borders. There is absolutely no need for grand magnanimous gestures -- magnanimity is a function of victory; otherwise it is appeasement.
As usual the Mumbai attacks brought forth comments from wet-behind-the-ears experts on TV with the regular chant of intelligence failure despite thousands of crores spent on intelligence collection. This is simply not true. Remember, intelligence organizations are known only by their failures and do not advertise their successes. Secondly, the amount spent must be seen from the perspective of the country's other major expenses on security like that on the paramilitary and the police. The Armed Forces had a budget of Rs 96,000 crore last year and the budget of the civilian intelligence is a miniscule percentage of the $1.1 trillion GDP of the country. India can afford to spend more as it gets economically powerful and more vulnerable to attacks.
Recent disclosures in the newspapers about RAW's inputs on September 18 and 22 would vindicate its position somewhat. These were based on intercepts and puritans would say that intelligence agencies should never disclose their source of information because this jeopardizes the future of the source --- human or technical. But this cacophony of ill-informed accusations seems to have forced this defensive action. The intelligence provided was actionable enough and armed with this any capable force should have been able to interdict the terrorists. These or other intercepts may not be available the next time because
it is simply not possible to intercept all the traffic and decipher or understand all that is intercepted. Intelligence collection is an intricate and imperfect skill and analysis is a difficult expertise which requires the ability to look and visualise behind the wall.
Inevitably at times like this we sprout experts of various hues. Some have suggested that the IB and RAW be merged. This is unworkable and ridiculous for several reasons. The two require totally different disciplines. Intelligence is a function of area, language and regional expertise and of operational skills honed over years of practical experience. It is not a function that can be professionally performed by birds of passage. External intelligence requires different skills in language, regions and issues. Its method of collection is different as it has to work in hostile surroundings, against the laws of the country to which its officers are assigned. Internal intelligence operates on home ground in accordance with local laws and has the backing of the state. The two functions are not interchangeable. Besides, no democratic country has one intelligence service.
Most of the accusations arise from prejudices simply because intelligence agencies function under secrecy and are, therefore, assumed to be sinister or incompetent. After one Prime Minister foolishly wrecked RAW in 1977 it has always been an endless struggle in the bureaucratic jungle of New Delhi. In 1999 RAW was a convenient whipping boy in the midst of command and systemic failure in Kargil. Even if we have the best intelligence in the world, it will be of no use without commensurate downstream systems.
Since intelligence does not function in a vacuum, mere changes in the intelligence organisations will not be enough. The Home Ministry has to develop its own cadre of experts given the intricacies of security and related problems. Regional and issue expertise rather like the MEA would be the need of the hour where officers rotate only between the MHA and the State. The so-called steel framework has degenerated over time into bureaucratic indolence and ignorance and must be made responsive and modern.
All this has to happen if we have to improve our chances of winning the battle against terrorism.
Source : Times of India, 5th December 2008
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