India is not a global power and our interests remain essentially regional. The country does have a higher profile than it did a few decades ago but to say that India is a global power or has risen is stretching the truth. India remains a country with a high rate of growth with an enormously large population that lives on the edge of poverty with all the socio-economic problems this poverty and increasing disequilibrium brings. Today, globalisation is the mantra that is supposed to be the panacea for all our problems and the new road to global salvation and prosperity.
Globalisation is supposed to mean the international flow of ideas and knowledge, the sharing of cultures, global civil society and the global environmental movement. Among the benefits of globalisation was the promise that poor countries would have access to overseas markets, allow foreign investment that would make manufacturing cheaper and open borders would allow for free movement of populations for jobs and education.
This is not exactly how it eventually turned out for there has been a downside to this. Economics has been driving globalisation but politics has shaped it. As in the past the rules of the game have been largely set by the advanced industrial countries but these have not been a fair set of rules which is an anachronism when 50 % of the global GDP is now from developing countries. Here lie the seeds of confrontation if not conflict.
There has been evidence that the emerging new world order does not allow for US unilateralism, much less a unipolar system, and the growing evidence of the limitations of military power, the decline of the dollar, the rise of China and India, the rise of technology, information and communication, the world has become more integrated, more trans-national and also more uncertain. This is because the old order does not want to give in to the new. The cold certainty of the Cold War has been replaced by the evolving uncertainty of a new multilateralism. In this uncertain future, India will have to work out its chart according to how we see the evolving world.
As we all know, global security has a much larger meaning for all of us not just in terms of military and political security; it means the security and well being of a country and its people from hunger and want and to ensure a continuous improvement in the way of life; in other words continued prosperity, which a country derives not from its own resources but from outside its borders in this interconnected world.
In the evolving world order and with the US still the most powerful country, it is imperative that India has an abiding relationship with the US. Very often we hear words like parallel interests, natural allies, democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-religious nations and the common beliefs in the liberty of man to describe India-US relations. India has a lot to gain from an association with the US that is deep and mutual. So does the US.
While the past does not have to be a millstone it does provide lessons for India US relations and we all know that it has not always been pleasant. India and the US have often viewed problems and aims from the same prism but it is the means to achieve this that the differences have appeared. Some of these will never disappear given different interpretations of priorities and interests so the two must learn to live with these and work around them. That the two countries have begun to do this in earnest was when President George Bush visited India and the conclusion of the CNE deal. For many of us in India, one touchstone of US interest in India was always whether or not an American President visited India in the first four years of his office or in the last four. In that context alone, President Obama’s visit was satisfying in its important symbolism to many. Since we are not a global power but have strong regional strategic interests we look at US attitudes and moves in the region in particular sometimes with dismay, because even as a friend, the US in pursuit of its larger interests can hurt its friends.
The other aspect that we need to remember when assessing Indian moves is that while the relationship with the US is perhaps of the utmost importance, India’s relationship with China is of immense importance too. China is the resident power in the neighbourhood ultimately with whom we have a boundary problem. It is a thermo-nuclear ICBM power, the second largest standing army in the world and one that has steadily supported Pakistan in every possible way as a hedge against India. The US is, in the final analysis, a distant power with its interests in the region that have been at variance with those of India. And sometimes even today are not congruent, merely remain parallel.
India is situated in a troubled neighbourhood – troubled in various ways. It is poor, unstable, poorly governed and undemocratic. India is surrounded by failing states and sits astride the vital sea lane communications of the Indian Ocean.
We have two nuclear armed neighbours one of whom is openly hostile to us while the other seems in no hurry to settle outstanding issues, like the boundary dispute. We do not see China lowering its profile in Pakistan, we do not see the China-Pakistan nuclear, missile and military collaboration, weakening, with or without North Korea. China will continue to have an abiding interest in Gwadar, the new Pakistani sea port that abuts the Straits of Hormuz, in the strategically relevant and vital Gilgit Baltistan areas under Pak occupation. For China not only is Pakistan a strategically vital piece of real estate, its policies make it a low cost hedge against India. We do not see any US interest in breaking this alliance/dependency.
Yet as India’s economy grows exponentially it needs to reach out not only for a stable neighbourhood but the region beyond from where it needs its resources and markets. It needs to secure the global commons and to protect itself from extraterritorial terrorist attacks trans-border, maritime or even by air and the cyber. It needs investments in education and health to manage a burgeoning young population; it needs technology and it needs state of the art military armament to protect itself.
The last three decades have been epochal in many ways. The Iranian revolution brought a Shia regime in a Sunni Arab neighbourhood which gained further strength after the inexplicable Iraq War. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a gain for the west in its Cold War but the legacy of jehad was ultimately a major setback for the region and the globe. China gained from both. We have since seen collapsing states and the rise of what we now call Non-State Actors spawned, sponsored supported by rogue regimes. Rising economies also seek resources, markets and safe passage across land and sea. We have seen China seeking to achieve this in our neighbourhood. Trade issues, energy issues and climate change, and for the developing world, even water, will be reasons for debate, competition, confrontation and even conflict.
Off shore, India’ interest in the next decade will grow in the areas stretching from the rim of Indian Ocean in the west to the Malacca Straits; on shore it will include Iran, Afghanistan, and up to Myanmar and Indonesia in the east. It will also include the larger Central Asia and Middle East. There would be need for calibrated engagement with Japan, Russia and the EU.
It is often argued that the Chinese are not planning their moves in Asia with India in their mind and that the US is the primary target. This is probably true to an extent but the impact of China’s growth and assertiveness will be felt by us in India more simply because it is the capacity building that is important Intentions can always change depending upon capacities.
There is inevitably that comparison between India and China. The comparisons are inexact and the truth is that India will never catch up with China in GDP or military terms or numbers. Yet together China and India could become the richest countries in the years ahead but with large percentages of their populations still poor and with regions of extreme disparities. In 2010, the break up of the global GDP for some major regions was something like this
US 20% EU 21% China 13% India 5%
In 2020 the figures are expected to be
US 16% EU 15% China 19% India 9%
China would exceed US and EU separately and the combined GDP of India and China be almost on par with the combined GDP of the US and EU. Various estimates from Price Waterhouse and Goldman Sachs predict China will overtake the US between 2020 and 2027. By 2020 China will be a US $ 13 to 15 trillion economy, (will have grown 16 times since 1980) and will be three times the size of the Indian economy of US $ 4 to 5 trillion. China may account for 20% of the GDP by 2020 but it will also account for 20% of the global population so will India as compared to the US which will account for 4% of the population. The disparities between individuals in each country will remain enormous. China has to grow at a certain pace merely to prevent a social upheaval; given the structural imbalances that exist but are rarely acknowledged. In pursuit of a sustained double digit economic growth, the Chinese leadership seeks new areas in Africa and has wielded increasing influence in Iran and Myanmar.
Chinese activities in its periphery have been assertive in recent months as we all know. The target of this is primarily the US and also China’s efforts to strengthen its position in Asia for the next decade and to stake its claim for exclusivity in the Western Pacific. The assumption may have been that the US was a power on the decline and China’s moment may have come.
It is perhaps unwise to over analyse China and assume that every move the Chinese make has some mystique as the entire exercise may have been just a result of miscalculation or underestimation of this US resolve despite pre-occupations elsewhere and the economic problems at home.
China has also pursued a more vigorous policy in highlighting problem areas with India in recent times than in the past as part of this assertiveness and partly perhaps to remind India that China matters in the region as it makes attempts to break into areas where India has been traditionally influential .
Terrorism and extreme radical thought that instigates violence and anarchy is a threat to India and to the rest of the world. The mindset that persists with this policy is a threat to Pakistan itself. It is this that gets reflected into Afghanistan and endangers both countries. It is feared in New Delhi that US policies in Afghanistan being pursued with Pakistan as its main and indispensable ally will not succeed.
We may give a positive spin to a situation to convince ourselves and the rest of the world about a false victory but what is important is the perception such a development has in the region. And the perception this time will be that Islamist radicals (the Taliban) were victorious over the remaining superpower through the force of the faith just as it was convinced that it was the faith of the Mujahedeen, and not the billions and the guns, that had pushed the Soviets out from Afghanistan two decades ago. This perception of victory for a radical belief that wishes to spread its creed globally means that they will not rest with their perceived victory in Afghanistan.
It is imperative, therefore, for an early success that Pakistan’s indispensability to the US aims has to be reduced by relying on other routes and countries that are just as much threatened by the wave of terrorism and radicalism that a Taliban/Al Qaeda success would mean.
Success in Afghanistan is not easy as it is more than just broad ethnic loyalties there are clan and tribal loyalties and rivalries at interplay here. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are on the dole. We may end up with two seriously dysfunctional states in our neighbourhood. We may not want it, we may not like it but if it does happen, then this only means more trouble for us at a point in our evolution as a major state, poised to make the breakthrough.
There are other issues that are important for India, as indeed for all of us. These are terrorism and how to handle this globally; energy and its availability for developing countries; and maritime security, related both to security from terror and energy security and safe passage for trade. Here too we have differing perspectives which are related not only to the issue itself but to other factors.
Take Iran and Myanmar for instance, both of whom are directly related to India’s geo-political and energy security and policies with these two countries differ even though it is agreed that Iran should not be allowed to make the N bomb and that Myanmar should become democratic as soon as possible. We do not believe that sanctions have or can work; if engagement is indeed the policy with Pakistan and China then why not with these two countries?
Unlike the Pakistan rulers, the Myanmar authorities, left to themselves and with an option, would not want to be so close to the Chinese as they are perceived today and this is because the Chinese have stepped into a vacuum that the western world has left there. Besides, sanctions in an authoritarian regimes work against the very people on whose behalf they are imposed. In the next ten years or more, India’s dependence on imported energy (90% by the end of the next two decades) will grow exponentially. Both Iran and Myanmar are potential sources for this - the closest and the most accessible. An isolated Myanmar or Iran, will seek allies elsewhere, as we have seen it happen in the last two decades.
It has been our belief and our conviction that Pakistan with its rulers steeped in their mindset will never be willing to assist fully in the war on terror. Past and present US policies have only strengthened conviction in Pakistan that they are free to do as they please and as long as they make token and timely concessions to the US while they pursue their own agenda in the region.
US predicament in Afghanistan is the most recent proof of this. Past policies, in my opinion, shared by any number of Indians is that the US needs to try new tactics and strategies. There has to be greater interaction between the US and the region’s other powers including Iran and Russia so that Pakistan’s sense of being an indispensable nation to US interests is brought down.
If there can be punishment for Myanmar which has done little to hurt US interests then the logic demands that there should be something similar for Pakistan. If the US is in Pakistan because of the fear that the Chinese would move in then the same logic also applies to Myanmar. It is here that the US and India continue to have differences and I do not see them receding in the near future.
India abuts one of the most vital trade and energy routes by sea. US $ 3 trillion worth of trade and energy passes through the Indian Ocean. With a coast line that is 7500 kilometres, and having faced a sea borne terror attack, maritime security will remain an important priority for India. No matter how much China may want to use continental routes as an offset against the possible uncertainties of the sea lanes controlled by other powers, the critical importance of the sea lanes cannot be negated. It is argued that it is in the global interest to keep all sea lanes open all the time but a powerful country like China which needs assured access to energy and essential raw materials, markets and trade, the need for establishing bases/ports of call/interest has its own logic. India would need to strengthen its maritime capabilities in the decades ahead and more, vital locations like the Andaman Islands need to be strengthened in their tri-service capabilities to meet the challenges of the future.
India will have to continue to strengthen against the growing presence of China in the neighbourhood. India needs to engage with its own periphery with much vigour and determination as it must with China’s periphery. The need to engage India’s periphery more enthusiastically and China’s periphery more energetically will be India’s endeavour in the next decade. Not just to counter China but to ensure our national security in its broadest connotation.
While one may talk of the importance of US and China in India’s strategic considerations, the continuing role of Russia cannot be overlooked in ant such considerations. Russia has been a steady supplier to India’s vital defence requirements and it has done this without any fear in the Indian mind of a stoppage of these for other considerations a fear that invariably lurks in the Indian mind whenever defence deals with the US are discussed. Both these perceptions are borne from experience and the stringent US laws. The Russians have no equivalent to ACSA or EUMA. And Russia is not a force that Indians are willing to write off as a spent power.
The next decade and beyond will see technological changes many of which we still cannot visualise. But quite apparently communication, manufacturing capabilities and military hardware, will be increasingly miniaturised, faster, highly networked, more powerful and cheaper, accessible to friend and foe.
For this alone, apart from the need to have a young growing and socio-economically useful population will be India’s biggest challenge. Quality primary and higher education, along with high quality and accessible health facilities in a country where both of these are inadequate is a big challenge that we often ignore.
It is not so much a direct armed assault that countries like India have to factor in their security preparations but also the terrorist, the cyber terrorist, the demographic pressure from failing states, disease and pandemics that will occur. A strong modernised military power is necessary; but is not enough. Regional security mechanisms are to be created which may belike NATO. However, Afghanistan has also shown that outside its own theatre, NATO remains highly ineffective. as are security mechanisms which Asia unfortunately does not have. NATO was presumed to be one such arrangement. However, Afghanistan has shown that outside its European theatre NATO highly inadequate. In the absence of this, India continue lay emphasis on modernisation of its military force especially the Navy and the Air Force to meet the modern day challenges.
Along with this, India’s voice needs to be heard. By this at least I do not believe it has to be the UNSC. It has to be India’s soft power – economic, cultural education and health facilities, abilities to protect itself and friends or to provide for them in their need , to be their markets and resource base that will make India powerful.
There is a great deal India and the US can do together but it is the first half that has been harder as the democracy bonus that Indians expected never came while the recalcitrant neighbourhood was rewarded. Our interests did or do not converge and if Wikileaks are anything to go by then it will be sometime before this happens. They may never fully converge. We must learn to live with that, work around them and move forward.
Source : Transcript of talk by Vikram Sood at the Heritage Foundation Washington DC on December 8 2010
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