The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC and the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi had organised a conference on US and Indian experiences in handling terrorism Asia last year and the result of this was a book “Counter Terrorism in South Asia” which was released by Dr Shashi Tharoor, MP in New Delhi on February 22, 2011. An audio-visual summary of the inauguration can be seen at http://bit.ly/eu6UCt
Speaking at the book release, I had made the following brief observations
Each country understands threats from terrorism according to its own experiences and there is now an understanding in the West that global terrorism can only be fought globally. Both India and the US have a closer understanding today of the problem that emanates from Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the Raymond Davis case illustrates the mindset of those that rule from Rawalpindi, the reaction to the killing of Salman Taseer shows how radicalised Pakistan has become and how weak the country’s liberal society is today. This has been evident to many of us who have watched Pakistan closely in recent years.
So while we understand partially that we can no longer distinguish between my terrorist and your terrorist, nor say my terrorist first, there are still differences on how the problem in Pakistan is to be handled. Ten years of US coddling of Pakistan and we cannot even get Raymond Davis released.
What is often not understood by those who push for talks, is that Pakistan’s hostility towards India is not just about Kashmir, Siachin or water. Hostility has been a doctrine of all regimes, especially the military, hatred is the fuel and jihadi foot soldiers the vehicle, that has been used for regime survival.
Terrorists don’t have to strike every day. The fear that they can and that is can be catastrophic, is a nightmare. The fear is that fissile material in Pakistan could disappear or the suspicion that material for mass extinction could have reached San Diego. For us, this is in our neighbourhood but no country can afford to believe that distance is security.
Counter terrorism is a long hard struggle and cannot be conducted in isolation any more.
Also given are extracts from Chapter 2 of the book which was written by me.
THE PROBLEM BRIEFLY STATED
Terrorism, in its present phase, seems to be about jihadi terrorism in the global context; but for countries like India the kind of threats faced by the state and the people vary from left wing extremism to ethnic separatism to religious causes. Asymmetric warfare as a policy option has been used by weaker states as a force equaliser as has been the case by Pakistan against India for most of the 60 plus years but more particularly so since the 1990s. Policies have to be evolved and capacities built and sustained, improved over time as terrorists innovate for countering this menace.
Very often there is a demand that root causes be addressed to solve the problem of terrorism. This is a mistaken notion as there is no justifiable root cause for killing innocents and there is no reason for trying to distinguish either between my terrorist and yours or asserting that killing of security forces or targeting government institutions and officials is a legitimate course of action in any society.
Terrorism, as a violent manifestation of present day disaffection and disenchantment, in the context of exploding expectations, is something the modern world will have to live with, in the sense that it can never be completely eradicated as new sources of conflict , real or perceived emerge. Ideally it should be prevented but this does not happen because states usually remain in denial till it is too late; the next best desirable objective is to defeat terrorism in a manner that it ceases to be a threat.
The threat that India faces from terrorism differs from the one faced by the US in two essential ways. In India the threats emanate principally on our own territory and there has been massive collusion by our neighbours Pakistan that continues and China in the past. Secondly, because for the US the source of terrorism is essentially thousands of kilometres away and the US has the ability it can strike at the source. In India it is it is believed that it is virtually impossible to resort the principle of hot pursuit for fear of escalation beyond calculation.
Broadly one would describe the various insurgencies and terrorism as follows:
· J&K: Islamist separatist movement that has become extremist with Pakistani assistance
· Punjab: Religious separatism
· North east: Mainly seeking independence with smaller groups seeking autonomy
· Left Wing extremism: As the name implies radical movement spreading across nine major states of India seeking overthrow of democracy to establish extreme left wing rule
Each has needed different policy and strategic options to tackle them.
Although two major terrorist/insurgency threats – Kashmir and spreading outwards to the rest of India (Mumbai for instance) and Left Wing Extremism in Central India, remain, India has successfully tackled other major terrorisms and insurgencies in the past. The notable phenomenon being that in all these it took decades of action to come to a positive conclusion. The Nagaland and Mizoram insurgencies lasted 19 years before being brought under control and had required concerted counter-insurgency operations involving the Army at some stages. The Punjab insurgency which too had external support, lasted 14 years. It was brought under control through effective counter terrorism actions by the state. Left Wing Insurgency, currently in its most virulent phase, has been with us almost from the beginning.
Thus it is clear that insurgencies tend to last for decades and can be controlled through a mixture of offensive counter terrorist methods accompanied by the cutting off foreign assistance – be it shelter, weapons, training and finances. It is a fallacy to assume that terrorism can be controlled by first offering politically expedient palliatives like development assistance without first overpowering the violent phase. Since such movements take decades to be controlled it requires sustained political will to continue with the campaign even when it seemingly looks unwinnable and politically unpopular. The start point of any counter terror policy is obviously a political will to tackle this problem in the face of reverses.
Terrorism has evolved over time and now includes suicide terrorism, maritime terrorism and even airborne terrorism, with the fear of WMD terrorism always present. Surrounded by failed or failing states, India has to contend with hostile policies of Pakistan which are threatening that country itself which increases the fear that faced with its own problems Pakistan will seek a diversion.
It is the sequencing of the counter terrorist actions that is important on the basis of five requirements - detect, deter, destroy and then develop and dialogue. Any attempt to dialogue before a reasonable semblance of the first three steps will be interpreted by the terrorist as appeasement. Therefore, the timing of the last two aspects has to be carefully nuanced.
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES – AND CO-ORDINATION
This then leads us to the ability to detect acts of terrorism – which means development of a first rate intelligence grid that combines both techint and humint capabilities. Absence of hard data, intelligence and therefore, inadequate follow up invariably leads to inability to prevent a terrorist act or if an act has been committed leads to inexact reactions that causes more grief than it solves. In federal structures such as India’s where law and order is a state subject it is imperative that there be co-ordination between the centre and the states because either the first intelligence information will emanate from the state or would need to be developed and pursued by the state agencies.
Attempts at rejuvenating and reorganising the Intelligence and Security set ups were part of the Kargil Review Committee recommendations. Apart from the creation of a DIA and a dedicated Techint collection facility, the NTRO, we also had the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) for collecting and co-ordinating terrorism –related information from all over India and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) responsible for conveying in real time intelligence information back to the States for action there. However, the implementation of the schemes remained inadequate and did not achieve d the desired goals. Since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks the government has been planning to set up a National Counter Terrorism Centre which is expected o be functional by the end of the year.
However, since the Mumbai attacks had shown up various weaknesses in the CI system, there have been several steps to revitalise the entire CI grid in other way. The MAC referred to earlier has been made functional, there is full online connectivity between the centre and its 30 important subsidiary units in the states; the National Investigation Agency has been established; the strength of the Intelligence Bureau has been augmented, decentralised hubs for the National Security Guards have been established in Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkota.
In a related development, it is proposed to establish a National Intelligence Grid, where Intelligence organisations like the Intelligence Bureau, National Investigation Agency and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence will be given access to 20 databases held by public authorities like banks, airlines, railways, insurance companies and immigration and income tax department. The project is ambitious, will have a long gestation period after it is approved, involves intricate systems of co-ordination, the data bases that are there will not cover the entire population, and yet there are bound to be privacy concerns in this regard in India
While the strength of the Central Reserve Police Force will increase from the present 267000 to more than 300000 the Force itself has been stretched greatly with anti-insurgency duties all over the NE, J&K and Central India where it has suffered considerable fatalities in recent months. There have been question marks about the appropriateness of using a force like the CRPF for specialised roles like anti-insurgency. Besides the Force is currently suffering from setbacks, inadequate training and equipment, frequent continued and diverse deployment all of which have affected morale.
It is not just the superstructures that are important. While intelligence co-ordination remains a challenge that each government handles in its own way, in India another problem has been low capacity levels; for instance even if we look at it statistically, India’s military to population ratio is 1:855 while in Pakistan it is 1:255 in China 1:591. Similar adverse statistics prevail for the police force making India one of the most under policed states in the world with an all India average of 125/100000 against the recommended UN figure of 222 and with some countries like the US having a figure of 315. Shortage of law enforcement representatives obviously leads to retreat of the state and the space vacated is taken over by anti state elements.
The tendency, to take shelter by settling ‘root causes’ and providing development assistance, without first controlling the territory, is flawed. It is a basic truth that one cannot develop something unless it is under one’s control. It is therefore not enough to improve superstructures but considerable effort has to be made in India to develop from the system from its roots and then move upwards.
Despite the best of arrangements at security that one can conceive, it is an accepted fact that a terrorist attack of smaller or greater magnitude can occur. The strongest deterrent at that juncture is always going to be the manner and sharpness of the response of the state, its people and the media. Therefore, Quick Response Mechanisms, which first seek to neutralise the attack through specialised forces and then restrict the fallout through administrative mechanisms, have to be in position all the time. This is not an easy task in a vast country like where the threat is diverse geographically and in its nature. Some of these weaknesses showed up in the Mumbai carnage in November 2008 although the Government has sought to remedy some of these since then as described earlier.
Initial responses to an outbreak of insurgency have to be force related and resort to discussions across a negotiating table with the insurgent even where the demands are known, should be non-negotiable for the state or simply unacceptable.
It is therefore necessary to discuss India’s experience in handling the three kinds of insurgencies that have afflicted the country – the Punjab insurgency, the North Eastern states and the Kashmir imbroglio.
THE PUNJAB
This has been a success story but after a long trial of initiatives that were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. The 1980s were marked by counter terrorism policies that showed confusion and indecision. After the tragic events of that period marked by extreme violence, attempts to suppress the movement through force were not only half hearted but also attempts to negotiate with the terrorists only confirmed the basic principle that premature negotiations not only strengthen the terrorist, stiffen his resolve but also weaken and confuse the counter terrorist forces. Each peace negotiation had given the terrorists that much breathing space to recoup and regroup.
Besides the terrorists continued to receive extensive support from Gen Zia ul Haq’s Pakistan at a time when all major powers were distracted by their own involvement against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Insurgency against the Soviets received wide support and the West was not in any position to ask ally Pakistan to curb its activities against India, long known to be a friend, or even considered an ally, of the Soviet Union.
India’s counter terrorist policy in the Punjab changed fundamentally in the 1990’s. Striking political deals with terrorists, while trying to suppress them militarily, having been unsuccessful, was substituted for an active, concerted and co-ordinated policy to hunt down the terrorists. The policy began to show remarkable change with the appointment of K P S Gill as the police chief in Punjab in 1988 and the first success came when Operation Black Thunder in May 1988 flushed out the terrorists holed up inside the Golden Temple without much loss of life or damage to the Temple. This was joint operation involving the Army, elite forces like the National Security Guards and the Punjab police. There were several other measures taken in the counter terrorism effort.
One of the first steps taken was the revival of the Punjab police which had become demoralised after sustained attacks on them by the terrorists and the neglect by the political establishment. There were new recruits, new welfare measures for the men and their families and the response of the police force was quick.
Another step was to ensure close co-operation among the military, the police, the Punjab Armed Police and the para-military forces like the CRPF and the Border Security Force. There unified command centres, tactical headquarters and the communications were interlinked and shared. The police led most of the campaigns with the Army available for support and cordon.
This surge in the activity of the police had become possible because they were better equipped, not only in the weaponry, they were more mobile, and had better personal protection. In addition to this the training of the PAP and the Army units deployed was upgraded to focus on urban as well as rural terrorism, seizure search and rescue drills were conducted to give the counter terrorist units a decisive edge and self-confidence.
Once the earlier policy of striking political deals and negotiating with the various terrorist groups and their leaders was abandoned in favour of pursuit of terrorists the opportunity for the terrorists to play one against the other disappeared. Instead greater energy was devoted to protecting the population and providing better facilities to the police and paramilitary force. Alongside it was ensured that democratic elections were not abandoned. The initial response was poor but by the early1990s but by 1993 the local body elections recorded huge voter participation to more than 80%. The battle had been joined and largely won by then.
One other aspect was a change in the attitude of the Bhutto Government towards assistance to Sikh terrorists who had taken shelter in Pakistan and had been receiving substantial assistance. International indifference to the Indian government’s repeated requests that Sikh terrorists among the immigrant Sikh population in the West, notably the UK, the US and Canada were active participants in the terror campaign in India through fund raising and political support was a factor that delayed the outcome. For India terrorism had become an international phenomenon much before this.
THE NORTH EAST
The North East of India has been characterised by a number of ethnicity based insurgencies for more than 50 years beginning with the revolt by A.Z. Phizo, the Naga leader who had taken shelter in the UK and demanded independence for the Nagas. Assam, Nagaland and Manipur are the main affected states today. The other main problem for the counterinsurgent forces in the north east was again the external support that was available to the Nagas to begin with and then to the other various groups that began operating later. The Nagas received training and weapons from the Chinese in the 1960s and later; East Pakistan and the ISI had provided them and other insurgent groups even subsequently assistance. This was something that continued to be available to the various insurgent groups even after 1971. This was possible because some years after independence, governments in Dhaka were hostile to New Delhi and were prepared to allow these activities to take place from Bangladesh territory. According to figures that were available with South Asian Terrorism Portal New Delhi, there were as many as 104 terrorist, militant or insurgent organisations of various strengths operating in the North East in 2002. Their numbers have substantially reduced but this indicates the intricacies of the problems for successive governments. Other organisations like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) continue their sporadic activities in the North east.
The typical reaction of the politician and the local bureaucrat has usually been to first deny the existence of a problem and then to offer economic and financial palliatives which only aggravated situations that had ethnic moorings. This political policy confusion continues even today. The approach of the central government has been a mixture of economic-aid packages, political adjustments, negotiations and military action.
Yet it was only the use of force and accompanied by effective border management to control illegal migration and weapons transfer that has brought the situation somewhat under control today although insurgent attacks continue even today. Another aspect has been the changed attitude of the Bangladesh government towards insurgents who had taken shelter in Bangladesh and towards its own Islamic extremist terrorists. International co-operation thus plays a significant role in controlling and eliminating terrorism.
Numerous problems remain – chiefly of illegal migration, which impinges on the socio-economic and demographic pattern of the region/district where these migrants reach, this spawns corruption and smuggling, thereby creating a criminal-terrorist nexus that operates on both sides of the border. The arrest and detention of important leaders of the ULFA and NDFB have had a debilitating effect on these organisations but these groups have not been completely subdued yet. The various movements continue and the state remains mostly under capacity especially in the local police force, which has been under trained and inadequate, in tackling these situations more effectively.
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
This insurgency has in its present form lasted more than 20 years primarily because f the continued support it has received from Pakistan. This support has been of different kind throughout. Apart from the ideological content, the support has been financial, weapons and other logistical equipment like communication, training, and in the late 1990s and early in this decade, even Pakistan-based terrorists from the Lashkar-e- Tayyaba, Al Badr, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammed were inducted to fight alongside the primarily Kashmiri organisation the pro-Jamaat –e-Islami Hizbul Mujahedeen. The United Jehad Council, comprising various terrorist organisations is based in Muzzafarabad while organisations like LeT and JeM have linkages with the TTP and Al Qaeda.
