Counter-Terrorism: The Indian Experience

COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

A JOINT PUBLICATION

BY HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTO DC

AND

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, NEW DELHI.

The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC and the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi had organised a conference on US and Indian experiences in handling terrorism Asia last year and the result of this was a book “Counter Terrorism in South Asia” which was released by Dr Shashi Tharoor, MP in New Delhi on February 22, 2011. An audio-visual summary of the inauguration can be seen at http://bit.ly/eu6UCt

Speaking at the book release, I had made the following brief observations

Each country understands threats from terrorism according to its own experiences and there is now an understanding in the West that global terrorism can only be fought globally. Both India and the US have a closer understanding today of the problem that emanates from Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the Raymond Davis case illustrates the mindset of those that rule from Rawalpindi, the reaction to the killing of Salman Taseer shows how radicalised Pakistan has become and how weak the country’s liberal society is today. This has been evident to many of us who have watched Pakistan closely in recent years.

So while we understand partially that we can no longer distinguish between my terrorist and your terrorist, nor say my terrorist first, there are still differences on how the problem in Pakistan is to be handled. Ten years of US coddling of Pakistan and we cannot even get Raymond Davis released.

What is often not understood by those who push for talks, is that Pakistan’s hostility towards India is not just about Kashmir, Siachin or water. Hostility has been a doctrine of all regimes, especially the military, hatred is the fuel and jihadi foot soldiers the vehicle, that has been used for regime survival.

Terrorists don’t have to strike every day. The fear that they can and that is can be catastrophic, is a nightmare. The fear is that fissile material in Pakistan could disappear or the suspicion that material for mass extinction could have reached San Diego. For us, this is in our neighbourhood but no country can afford to believe that distance is security.

Counter terrorism is a long hard struggle and cannot be conducted in isolation any more.

Also given are extracts from Chapter 2 of the book which was written by me.

THE PROBLEM BRIEFLY STATED

Terrorism, in its present phase, seems to be about jihadi terrorism in the global context; but for countries like India the kind of threats faced by the state and the people vary from left wing extremism to ethnic separatism to religious causes. Asymmetric warfare as a policy option has been used by weaker states as a force equaliser as has been the case by Pakistan against India for most of the 60 plus years but more particularly so since the 1990s. Policies have to be evolved and capacities built and sustained, improved over time as terrorists innovate for countering this menace.

Very often there is a demand that root causes be addressed to solve the problem of terrorism. This is a mistaken notion as there is no justifiable root cause for killing innocents and there is no reason for trying to distinguish either between my terrorist and yours or asserting that killing of security forces or targeting government institutions and officials is a legitimate course of action in any society.

Terrorism, as a violent manifestation of present day disaffection and disenchantment, in the context of exploding expectations, is something the modern world will have to live with, in the sense that it can never be completely eradicated as new sources of conflict , real or perceived emerge. Ideally it should be prevented but this does not happen because states usually remain in denial till it is too late; the next best desirable objective is to defeat terrorism in a manner that it ceases to be a threat.

The threat that India faces from terrorism differs from the one faced by the US in two essential ways. In India the threats emanate principally on our own territory and there has been massive collusion by our neighbours Pakistan that continues and China in the past. Secondly, because for the US the source of terrorism is essentially thousands of kilometres away and the US has the ability it can strike at the source. In India it is it is believed that it is virtually impossible to resort the principle of hot pursuit for fear of escalation beyond calculation.

Broadly one would describe the various insurgencies and terrorism as follows:

· J&K: Islamist separatist movement that has become extremist with Pakistani assistance

· Punjab: Religious separatism

· North east: Mainly seeking independence with smaller groups seeking autonomy

· Left Wing extremism: As the name implies radical movement spreading across nine major states of India seeking overthrow of democracy to establish extreme left wing rule

Each has needed different policy and strategic options to tackle them.

Although two major terrorist/insurgency threats – Kashmir and spreading outwards to the rest of India (Mumbai for instance) and Left Wing Extremism in Central India, remain, India has successfully tackled other major terrorisms and insurgencies in the past. The notable phenomenon being that in all these it took decades of action to come to a positive conclusion. The Nagaland and Mizoram insurgencies lasted 19 years before being brought under control and had required concerted counter-insurgency operations involving the Army at some stages. The Punjab insurgency which too had external support, lasted 14 years. It was brought under control through effective counter terrorism actions by the state. Left Wing Insurgency, currently in its most virulent phase, has been with us almost from the beginning.

Thus it is clear that insurgencies tend to last for decades and can be controlled through a mixture of offensive counter terrorist methods accompanied by the cutting off foreign assistance – be it shelter, weapons, training and finances. It is a fallacy to assume that terrorism can be controlled by first offering politically expedient palliatives like development assistance without first overpowering the violent phase. Since such movements take decades to be controlled it requires sustained political will to continue with the campaign even when it seemingly looks unwinnable and politically unpopular. The start point of any counter terror policy is obviously a political will to tackle this problem in the face of reverses.

Terrorism has evolved over time and now includes suicide terrorism, maritime terrorism and even airborne terrorism, with the fear of WMD terrorism always present. Surrounded by failed or failing states, India has to contend with hostile policies of Pakistan which are threatening that country itself which increases the fear that faced with its own problems Pakistan will seek a diversion.

It is the sequencing of the counter terrorist actions that is important on the basis of five requirements - detect, deter, destroy and then develop and dialogue. Any attempt to dialogue before a reasonable semblance of the first three steps will be interpreted by the terrorist as appeasement. Therefore, the timing of the last two aspects has to be carefully nuanced.

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES – AND CO-ORDINATION

This then leads us to the ability to detect acts of terrorism – which means development of a first rate intelligence grid that combines both techint and humint capabilities. Absence of hard data, intelligence and therefore, inadequate follow up invariably leads to inability to prevent a terrorist act or if an act has been committed leads to inexact reactions that causes more grief than it solves. In federal structures such as India’s where law and order is a state subject it is imperative that there be co-ordination between the centre and the states because either the first intelligence information will emanate from the state or would need to be developed and pursued by the state agencies.

Attempts at rejuvenating and reorganising the Intelligence and Security set ups were part of the Kargil Review Committee recommendations. Apart from the creation of a DIA and a dedicated Techint collection facility, the NTRO, we also had the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) for collecting and co-ordinating terrorism –related information from all over India and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) responsible for conveying in real time intelligence information back to the States for action there. However, the implementation of the schemes remained inadequate and did not achieve d the desired goals. Since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks the government has been planning to set up a National Counter Terrorism Centre which is expected o be functional by the end of the year.

However, since the Mumbai attacks had shown up various weaknesses in the CI system, there have been several steps to revitalise the entire CI grid in other way. The MAC referred to earlier has been made functional, there is full online connectivity between the centre and its 30 important subsidiary units in the states; the National Investigation Agency has been established; the strength of the Intelligence Bureau has been augmented, decentralised hubs for the National Security Guards have been established in Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkota.

In a related development, it is proposed to establish a National Intelligence Grid, where Intelligence organisations like the Intelligence Bureau, National Investigation Agency and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence will be given access to 20 databases held by public authorities like banks, airlines, railways, insurance companies and immigration and income tax department. The project is ambitious, will have a long gestation period after it is approved, involves intricate systems of co-ordination, the data bases that are there will not cover the entire population, and yet there are bound to be privacy concerns in this regard in India

While the strength of the Central Reserve Police Force will increase from the present 267000 to more than 300000 the Force itself has been stretched greatly with anti-insurgency duties all over the NE, J&K and Central India where it has suffered considerable fatalities in recent months. There have been question marks about the appropriateness of using a force like the CRPF for specialised roles like anti-insurgency. Besides the Force is currently suffering from setbacks, inadequate training and equipment, frequent continued and diverse deployment all of which have affected morale.

It is not just the superstructures that are important. While intelligence co-ordination remains a challenge that each government handles in its own way, in India another problem has been low capacity levels; for instance even if we look at it statistically, India’s military to population ratio is 1:855 while in Pakistan it is 1:255 in China 1:591. Similar adverse statistics prevail for the police force making India one of the most under policed states in the world with an all India average of 125/100000 against the recommended UN figure of 222 and with some countries like the US having a figure of 315. Shortage of law enforcement representatives obviously leads to retreat of the state and the space vacated is taken over by anti state elements.

The tendency, to take shelter by settling ‘root causes’ and providing development assistance, without first controlling the territory, is flawed. It is a basic truth that one cannot develop something unless it is under one’s control. It is therefore not enough to improve superstructures but considerable effort has to be made in India to develop from the system from its roots and then move upwards.

Despite the best of arrangements at security that one can conceive, it is an accepted fact that a terrorist attack of smaller or greater magnitude can occur. The strongest deterrent at that juncture is always going to be the manner and sharpness of the response of the state, its people and the media. Therefore, Quick Response Mechanisms, which first seek to neutralise the attack through specialised forces and then restrict the fallout through administrative mechanisms, have to be in position all the time. This is not an easy task in a vast country like where the threat is diverse geographically and in its nature. Some of these weaknesses showed up in the Mumbai carnage in November 2008 although the Government has sought to remedy some of these since then as described earlier.

Initial responses to an outbreak of insurgency have to be force related and resort to discussions across a negotiating table with the insurgent even where the demands are known, should be non-negotiable for the state or simply unacceptable.

It is therefore necessary to discuss India’s experience in handling the three kinds of insurgencies that have afflicted the country – the Punjab insurgency, the North Eastern states and the Kashmir imbroglio.

THE PUNJAB

This has been a success story but after a long trial of initiatives that were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. The 1980s were marked by counter terrorism policies that showed confusion and indecision. After the tragic events of that period marked by extreme violence, attempts to suppress the movement through force were not only half hearted but also attempts to negotiate with the terrorists only confirmed the basic principle that premature negotiations not only strengthen the terrorist, stiffen his resolve but also weaken and confuse the counter terrorist forces. Each peace negotiation had given the terrorists that much breathing space to recoup and regroup.

Besides the terrorists continued to receive extensive support from Gen Zia ul Haq’s Pakistan at a time when all major powers were distracted by their own involvement against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Insurgency against the Soviets received wide support and the West was not in any position to ask ally Pakistan to curb its activities against India, long known to be a friend, or even considered an ally, of the Soviet Union.

India’s counter terrorist policy in the Punjab changed fundamentally in the 1990’s. Striking political deals with terrorists, while trying to suppress them militarily, having been unsuccessful, was substituted for an active, concerted and co-ordinated policy to hunt down the terrorists. The policy began to show remarkable change with the appointment of K P S Gill as the police chief in Punjab in 1988 and the first success came when Operation Black Thunder in May 1988 flushed out the terrorists holed up inside the Golden Temple without much loss of life or damage to the Temple. This was joint operation involving the Army, elite forces like the National Security Guards and the Punjab police. There were several other measures taken in the counter terrorism effort.

One of the first steps taken was the revival of the Punjab police which had become demoralised after sustained attacks on them by the terrorists and the neglect by the political establishment. There were new recruits, new welfare measures for the men and their families and the response of the police force was quick.

Another step was to ensure close co-operation among the military, the police, the Punjab Armed Police and the para-military forces like the CRPF and the Border Security Force. There unified command centres, tactical headquarters and the communications were interlinked and shared. The police led most of the campaigns with the Army available for support and cordon.

This surge in the activity of the police had become possible because they were better equipped, not only in the weaponry, they were more mobile, and had better personal protection. In addition to this the training of the PAP and the Army units deployed was upgraded to focus on urban as well as rural terrorism, seizure search and rescue drills were conducted to give the counter terrorist units a decisive edge and self-confidence.

Once the earlier policy of striking political deals and negotiating with the various terrorist groups and their leaders was abandoned in favour of pursuit of terrorists the opportunity for the terrorists to play one against the other disappeared. Instead greater energy was devoted to protecting the population and providing better facilities to the police and paramilitary force. Alongside it was ensured that democratic elections were not abandoned. The initial response was poor but by the early1990s but by 1993 the local body elections recorded huge voter participation to more than 80%. The battle had been joined and largely won by then.

One other aspect was a change in the attitude of the Bhutto Government towards assistance to Sikh terrorists who had taken shelter in Pakistan and had been receiving substantial assistance. International indifference to the Indian government’s repeated requests that Sikh terrorists among the immigrant Sikh population in the West, notably the UK, the US and Canada were active participants in the terror campaign in India through fund raising and political support was a factor that delayed the outcome. For India terrorism had become an international phenomenon much before this.

THE NORTH EAST

The North East of India has been characterised by a number of ethnicity based insurgencies for more than 50 years beginning with the revolt by A.Z. Phizo, the Naga leader who had taken shelter in the UK and demanded independence for the Nagas. Assam, Nagaland and Manipur are the main affected states today. The other main problem for the counterinsurgent forces in the north east was again the external support that was available to the Nagas to begin with and then to the other various groups that began operating later. The Nagas received training and weapons from the Chinese in the 1960s and later; East Pakistan and the ISI had provided them and other insurgent groups even subsequently assistance. This was something that continued to be available to the various insurgent groups even after 1971. This was possible because some years after independence, governments in Dhaka were hostile to New Delhi and were prepared to allow these activities to take place from Bangladesh territory. According to figures that were available with South Asian Terrorism Portal New Delhi, there were as many as 104 terrorist, militant or insurgent organisations of various strengths operating in the North East in 2002. Their numbers have substantially reduced but this indicates the intricacies of the problems for successive governments. Other organisations like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) continue their sporadic activities in the North east.

The typical reaction of the politician and the local bureaucrat has usually been to first deny the existence of a problem and then to offer economic and financial palliatives which only aggravated situations that had ethnic moorings. This political policy confusion continues even today. The approach of the central government has been a mixture of economic-aid packages, political adjustments, negotiations and military action.

Yet it was only the use of force and accompanied by effective border management to control illegal migration and weapons transfer that has brought the situation somewhat under control today although insurgent attacks continue even today. Another aspect has been the changed attitude of the Bangladesh government towards insurgents who had taken shelter in Bangladesh and towards its own Islamic extremist terrorists. International co-operation thus plays a significant role in controlling and eliminating terrorism.

Numerous problems remain – chiefly of illegal migration, which impinges on the socio-economic and demographic pattern of the region/district where these migrants reach, this spawns corruption and smuggling, thereby creating a criminal-terrorist nexus that operates on both sides of the border. The arrest and detention of important leaders of the ULFA and NDFB have had a debilitating effect on these organisations but these groups have not been completely subdued yet. The various movements continue and the state remains mostly under capacity especially in the local police force, which has been under trained and inadequate, in tackling these situations more effectively.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

This insurgency has in its present form lasted more than 20 years primarily because f the continued support it has received from Pakistan. This support has been of different kind throughout. Apart from the ideological content, the support has been financial, weapons and other logistical equipment like communication, training, and in the late 1990s and early in this decade, even Pakistan-based terrorists from the Lashkar-e- Tayyaba, Al Badr, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammed were inducted to fight alongside the primarily Kashmiri organisation the pro-Jamaat –e-Islami Hizbul Mujahedeen. The United Jehad Council, comprising various terrorist organisations is based in Muzzafarabad while organisations like LeT and JeM have linkages with the TTP and Al Qaeda.

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
1988 - 2010

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
1988 - 2010

'	Incidents	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1988	390	29	1	1	31
1989	2154	79	13	0	92
1990	3905	862	132	183	1177
1991	3122	594	185	614	1393
1992	4971	859	177	873	1909
1993	4457	1023	216	1328	2567
1994	4484	1012	236	1651	2899
1995	4479	1161	297	1338	2796
1996	4224	1333	376	1194	2903
1997	3004	840	355	1177	2372
1998	2993	877	339	1045	2261
1999	2938	799	555	1184	2538
2000	2835	842	638	1808	3288
2001	3278	1067	590	2850	4507
2002	NA	839	469	1714	3022
2003	NA	658	338	1546	2542
2004	NA	534	325	951	1810
2005	NA	521	218	1000	1739
2006	NA	349	168	599	1116
2007	NA	164	121	492	777
2008	NA	69	90	382	541
2009	NA	55	78	242	375
2010*	NA	19	45	144	208
Total	47234	14585	5962	22316	42863

* Data till July 12, 2010
Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional.

Data from South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi

Figures show a declining graph of violence and fatalities but this could be cyclical and t is still too early to conclude that the insurgency is over. More likely the tactics may have changed. As the figures indicate there was extreme violence in the 1990s up till about 2001 after which the trend shows a downward trajectory. There were a few reasons for this. In the 1990s the state’s response was heavily militaristic, partly because there seemed no other strategy at that time, and partly because there was inadequate intelligence available. Civilian casualties, both at the hands of the terrorists who wished to instil fear and of the security forces who had inadequate intelligence, were high.

There was a policy vacuum in the early years as the state tried financial and other incentives, dialogue and negotiations with some groups, but these did not succeed as these were considered as appeasement and in fact heightened the demands of various groups. Such moves are at best short term and usually counter-productive. At the same time excessive force defeats the very purpose of gaining superiority and the difficult trick is to use appropriate force in a democracy where the press has free access to events. It is no longer the print and electronic media but the Internet that have to be managed. It is imperative therefore to for the state to first attain high ground both in terms of physical superiority over the terrorist and to wean away the population from the grip of the terrorist. Another factor was that post 2002 the Pakistan government was wary of being seen to be too active in its support of terrorism, not only in J&K but elsewhere in the country. However, Pakistan has not yet given up its basic cult of violence as a means of resolving disputes with India as the Mumbai train blasts of July 2006 and the Mumbai massacre of November 2008 would indicate.

Infiltration of terrorists from Pakistan has been a major problem. It is not just that the India-Pakistan border has been used but also that infiltration takes place via Nepal and Bangladesh. Here too better border management and better intelligence along with co-operation with these governments that helps.

In the absence of the option for hot pursuit into Pakistan or of intelligence co-operation with Pakistan, the state’s reaction was considerably hampered in the early years. Border management was tightened with fencing along the border except that in the J&K region terrain was a hindrance for effective cover. Intelligence and counter strike capabilities improved after a semblance of security was available to the population, former terrorists were effectively turned around for counter strike and intelligence roles. Once specific intelligence was available the success rate of the security forces increased and with that the confidence of the people and this in turn to greater flow of intelligence. The reverse cycle sets in.

The other aspect that was difficult to break was the funds supply route of the hawala. Again this cannot be done without the co-operation with the country which is the source of the transfer, in this case of course Pakistan and the Gulf. This remains a big challenge for the Indian government.

Ultimately there has to be a political solution to the problem but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

Statewise Fatalities 2010*

*Source South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	6	0	7	13
Bihar	30	6	7	43
Chhattisgarh	58	135	69	262
Jharkhand	41	12	20	73
Karnataka	0	0	1	1
Maharashtra	6	2	2	10
Orissa	29	18	13	60
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	0	0
West Bengal	243	33	40	316
Total*	413	206	159	778

* Data till July 12, 2010
Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional

Statewise Fatalities 2009

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	10	0	18	28
Bihar	37	25	16	78
Chhattisgarh	87	121	137	345
Jharkhand	74	67	76	217
Maharashtra	12	52	23	87
Orissa	36	32	13	81
Uttar Pradesh	1	0	2	3
West Bengal	134	15	9	158
Total*	391	312	294	997

2008

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	28	1	37	66
Bihar	35	21	15	71
Jharkhand	74	39	50	153
Karnataka	3	1	3	7
Chhattisgarh	35	67	66	168
Maharashtra	2	5	7	14
Orissa	24	76	32	132
West Bengal	19	4	1	24
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	2	2
Tamil Nadu	0	0	1	1
Total	210	214	214	638

2007

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	24	4	45	73
Bihar	23	21	5	49
Jharkhand	69	6	45	120
Karnataka	1	1	6	8
Chhattisgarh	95	182	73	350
Maharashtra	9	2	8	19
Orissa	13	2	8	23
West Bengal	6	0	1	7
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	1	1
Total	240	218	192	650

2006

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	18	7	127	152
Bihar	16	5	19	40
Jharkhand	18	47	29	94
Karnataka	0	0	1	1
Chhattisgarh	189	55	117	361
Maharashtra	13	3	33	49
Orissa	3	4	16	23
West Bengal	9	7	4	20
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	2	2
Total	266	128	348	742

2005

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	132	21	167	320
Bihar	25	29	52	106
Jharkhand	49	27	20	96
Chhattisgarh	52	48	26	126
Orissa	13	1	3	17
Maharashtra	2	17	8	27
Karnataka	2	6	4	12
Uttar Pradesh	1	0	6	7
West Bengal	5	1	0	6
Total*	281	150	286	717

The tables above speak for themselves. A little over six months into the year and the fatalities indicate that the figure this year could well increase those of last year substantially.

The Maoists’ ideology is hostile to the Indian Constitution and democracy and seeks to replace this with an extreme left form of government. Inspired by Mao’s thoughts leftist guerrillas exploit the economic and governance grievances of the tribals and use violence and terror to achieve their goals. The main areas of Central India that are affected are Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal and the Maoists speak of a north south Red Corridor from Kathmandu to Andhra Pradesh. Government forces operating in Chhattisgarh have faced serious reverses in recent months indicating simultaneously the growing abilities of the Maoists, and the limited capacities of the state forces to handle this growing menace. Intelligence has been poor, interstate co-ordination slack and there just has not been enough trained specialised counter terror force of any kind that is available for action. There has also been policy confusion in that there seems to be stress on providing economic and social support to the population. There is not enough acceptance of the principle that infrastructure and economic benefits without security are unworkable and security is essential to enable infrastructure and socio-economic benefits to reach the people for whom they are intended. The tendency is to make politically popular gestures but without any certainty that the benefits will actually reach for those it is intended.

· Violence in general and terrorism in particular is the creed of the Maoists and at least 194 districts in 22 states have been variously affected by Left Wing Extremism.

· The Maoists have elaborate plans to co-ordinate their armed struggle with other groups in India in J&K, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and other parts on NE India.

· They seek a broad United Front with other religious minorities, open and mass organisations among peasants and workers, students and women.

· Maoists also plan to create a peoples’ militia in the villages in the guerrilla zone to prepare for an armed class struggle.

· For this they have urban targets in the infrastructure such as highways, and in the industrial and mineral rich belt of Central India, special economic zones and so on.

· They have been imparting justice, and administering law and order in the remote no go areas in the forests from where civil administration has faded away.

The problem that the Indian state faces is current, vastly spread out and growing. The response it requires is different from the other insurgencies that the state has faced so far. There is no foreign hand, and almost all the arms and ammunition acquired have been stolen from government forces and armouries. The Maoists have established ‘liberated zones’ and it would be futile to launch operations into the free the zones. The casualties to the counter terrorist force as well as the civilians would excessive. They have to be contained first and then inroads made into their strongholds with adequate force. These are projects that have long gestation periods as forces are readied and above all, roads and communications under constant security have to be built for troops and support to move in. Since the problem is spread over several states, there is need to have instant and real time co-ordination, modernised police stations and civil-military co-ordination under a unified command in each state.

What is needed is a new policy formulation and strategy that incorporates the following broadly:-

First, we need to reinvent our police forces, one of the most neglected, underpaid, overworked and maligned forces in the country. Its faith and pride in itself has to be restored and when its ability to interact with the population is recreated, intelligence will flow. For decades this country has talked of police reforms but nothing seems to move.

Second, the police must be equipped and trained in the latest techniques, an aspect that gets neglected due to shortage of manpower, funds and political indifference. It is possible that in some cases and some states there would be need to incorporate expertise from the armed forces for training police in counter-insurgency techniques.

Third, mere deterrence and destruction of the insurgent force is not enough. It is the rebuilding of the destroyed lives and shattered economy and the end of exploitation which will be key. This must happen more or less simultaneously with the overpowering of the insurgency. If this does not happen, the insurgency will resurrect. What is needed is a multifaceted approach that involves all arms of the government, especially the infrastructure and economic agencies of education, health, agriculture and communications that extend beyond just the law and order aspect.

Fourth, since the insurgents say they are fighting a peoples’ war, we should take this to them by involving the people on the side of the government — the media being the most important component in this battle. Media coverage is oxygen to the terrorists, whether or not a particular operation succeeds. Creation of fear is also terrorist/insurgent victory; reports of massive deployment massages the insurgents’ ego and they will seek to replicate their acts. Media management is, therefore, important for they must report but not reveal.

Fifth, what is needed is a functioning National Counter Terrorism Centre to coordinate the anti-insurgency operations.

Sixth, terrorism went global decades ago. Unless there is close international co-operation among the international intelligence agencies and counter-terrorist establishments across national frontiers, it will be impossible to counter the threat effectively. There has to be a common definition of the word terrorism before any effective co-operation can emerge. Co-operation has been below the desired levels because of usually short term political and perceived strategic considerations which have only helped the terrorists/insurgents.