Traditionally, intelligence reforms in India have had two main characteristics. They have been episodic and have been carried out by the government, either through appointed committees or in house. The 1962 conflict with China was followed by the creation of new organizations like the ARC, the SSB and so on. The 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo insurgency led to the creation of R&AW. The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to the creation of the NTRO and DIA as recommended by the Intelligence Review Committee which was headed by former Governor and head of R&AW G C Saxena. Post Mumbai 2008, we have the NCTC and the National Intelligence Grid on the anvil. In house reviews have had limited mandates and were really cadre reviews. There has never been any reform which takes the long term security perspective and then work out what kind of an intelligence system would be required to meet such needs.
It is therefore refreshing to see that think tanks based in New Delhi have begun to examine this important matter and presumably their recommendations will reach the Government. This is a limited way of the outside looking in. The danger of course is that these exercises can be academic for instance, a comparison of intelligence supervision practices in Australia, New Zealand or Canada to act as some of the role models for what India should adopt would be misplaced. The security risks in these countries, the size of their population and its demographic mix and their neighbourhood are totally different. We have to evolve our own systems and not just copy other systems.
The discourse that seems to be current gives the impression that while the subject is intelligence reform the examples cited relate to the R&AW. Besides intelligence reforms have to be examined in their totality, including all intelligence services – IB, DIA, MI, NTRO (which remained headless for over five months, a reflection of the Government’s attitude towards intelligence organisations), and not restricting its review to one organisation. This needs to be corrected.
Intelligence is not available at the flick of a button. We all know that Intelligence networks are built in the fullness of time and not when the crisis is upon us. Development of an intelligence report is a painstaking effort requiring expertise of different kinds which includes humint and techint of different kinds. This has to be backed by area, language subject expertise built over a long time. It takes five to ten years to inculcate expertise in a young recruit at the junior level; there is no overnight expertise. Recruitment has to be at a young age so that he or she can be molded and before attitudes and mind sets firm up or the recruit is just too old to take chances in the field. Only this gives an intelligence officer the ability to analyse and assess. Operational intelligence requires different expertise and aptitudes. An intelligence agency must continue to have covert and psy-war capabilities which have long gestations cannot be empirically measured but have to be consistently pursued and continuously honed.
Any reform must examine the kind of human capabilities that will be required in the future, whether the existing pattern of recruitment and compensation is adequate today and will remain so in the times ahead. There has to be system that ensures the organisation continues to get the appropriate kind of human material that form the core of the organisation and the agency also has access to external expertise from time to time. It needs to look at the system of control and management and whether the secretariat system has been good for the organisations where career prospects are linked to career prospects outside the organisation and not within. Since intelligence agencies are specialised agencies and do not compete with general appointments they should have their own stream of career progression independent of the career paths in the rest of the civil service.
We live in a world that is seeing rapidly changing threat perceptions. Intelligence agencies have to be flexible to meet any evolving threat. At present there is hardly any surge capability where the agency can, on its own, shift manpower and resources to meet the new threat. The process that exists today is far too cumbersome and slow to allow any rapid redeployment. By the time any new system is put into place the quarry has moved on, either morphed into something different or has just become too big so that the changes originally proposed become inadequate. The head of an intelligence organisation must have the flexibility and authority to move men and material around. One cannot think of annual reviews of performance if the process of obtaining sanctions for even relocating manpower and acquiring additional equipment ranging that is governed by persons removed from the scene of action.
There cannot be accountability without a charter for the intelligence organisations and the empowerment of their Heads. Only when there is a legal charter accompanied by powers vested in the man leading the organisation to deliver the results can one think of accountability. Empowerment, trust and charter go hand in hand. Otherwise we will end up creating new power centres and vested interests that will act as a deterrent to the organisation and not serve any purpose. In our zeal to control and supervise we run the danger of creating multiple controls and stifle intelligence organisations. It would somewhat be like the Russian Babushka dolls – symbolic and very decorative but of little practical use. At least the dolls have some purpose; in the context of security multiplicity of organisations under multiple scrutiny would only hamstring the agencies. They will continue to be unable to deliver to the degree required or even worse, fail.
Merely stressing on accountability and oversight would be misplaced. This is perhaps based on the impression that Intelligence is generally considered evil because it is secret, therefore it must be controlled. This leads to the bizarre expectation among some wise people that intelligence agencies and their collection methods should be made transparent. In this context, intelligence agencies have to be protected against disclosures of locations of facilities, names of officers and personnel and other sensitive details that would help the adversary and harm the conduct of operations as well as security of the country.
So while oversight and co-ordination are good catchphrases the point is by who and to what extent. We thus have to be careful here and not follow the western example where the experience has been different. There too multiple controls have not been an unmitigated success and co-ordination among multiple agencies remains a problem despite all intentions. Intelligence agencies work best under a single chain of command and multiplicity of controls and supervisory agencies leads to confusion. They work even better when the Chief Executive of a country takes an active interest in their output and their well being.
There is a suggestion that operational details or secret service funds be subjected to external scrutiny. This means that there has to be scrutiny of the intelligence operations and sources by external agencies/bodies. This is absolutely unthinkable.
While trying to improve the inner working of intelligence agencies it would be dangerous adopt the human rights approach. Intelligence agencies in an autocratic regime act to preserve that autocracy. In a democracy they act to preserve democracy and the nation. But intelligence agencies cannot themselves practice democracy or human rights. It is not in the nature of their working ethos. The ideal among some is to have an intelligence agency that is as hard as nails on the outside and soft as chocolate from the inside. RTIs and PILs are best discouraged unless we are determined to expose all our working methods to those against whom these resources are used. This cannot be.
There are a few other misconceptions in the average person. Intelligence agencies do not conduct rescue operations of hostages nor do they make policies in democratic countries and nor should they. They only provide inputs but the ultimate decision to negotiate and the mandate of the negotiators is determined by political considerations. Intelligence agencies become all powerful in autocratic and military regimes, e.g. the Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan and others. In situations where the ‘civil society’ is concerned with the functioning of intelligence agencies surely there has to be a quid pro quo for the civil society toward intelligence agencies.
It would be unrealistic to state that intelligence agencies do not have their shortcomings, but they are not all of their own making. The rest of us have contributed by either being indiscreet, indifferent or even hostile. It is true that on occasions intelligence agencies have failed to deliver and that unfortunately is by what they are known – their failures. Their successes are left untold except to those who need to know.
Reform is essential in society and its instruments of governance. To deny this would be to live in bigotry. But there have to be some yardsticks to judge whether or not the reforms will abide and improve what they set out to do. The reform process must begin with empathy that seeks to improve and not suspicion that seeks to control.
A full and comprehensive review must therefore look ahead and assess the perceived threats to the country and then recommend what kind of an intelligence agency would best serve the security and national interests of the country in the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, the Head of the Organisation should be empowered to act to fulfill that charter. This means he must have the authority to hire and fire experts, fast track and discard, have the capacity to surge his deployment according to security needs and not be dependent on the wisdom or lack of it in some other corner of the government. The review should ideally address the needs of an organization in respect of personnel, materials and resources for the future. This should address the specialised needs of an organisation with different skill sets. If it merely concentrates on chopping and controlling, it is destined to fail.
Writing for the Indian Defence Review for their March 2009 issue, I had begun with the following quote from Sun Tzu’s famous treatise The Art of War
‘Nothing should be as favourably regarded as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as the work of intelligence.’
This remains valid for modern day statecraft as well.
This is an article I wrote for Hard News, New Delhi. They carried it in one of their subsequent issues April 10, 2011.
It is therefore refreshing to see that think tanks based in New Delhi have begun to examine this important matter and presumably their recommendations will reach the Government. This is a limited way of the outside looking in. The danger of course is that these exercises can be academic for instance, a comparison of intelligence supervision practices in Australia, New Zealand or Canada to act as some of the role models for what India should adopt would be misplaced. The security risks in these countries, the size of their population and its demographic mix and their neighbourhood are totally different. We have to evolve our own systems and not just copy other systems.
The discourse that seems to be current gives the impression that while the subject is intelligence reform the examples cited relate to the R&AW. Besides intelligence reforms have to be examined in their totality, including all intelligence services – IB, DIA, MI, NTRO (which remained headless for over five months, a reflection of the Government’s attitude towards intelligence organisations), and not restricting its review to one organisation. This needs to be corrected.
Intelligence is not available at the flick of a button. We all know that Intelligence networks are built in the fullness of time and not when the crisis is upon us. Development of an intelligence report is a painstaking effort requiring expertise of different kinds which includes humint and techint of different kinds. This has to be backed by area, language subject expertise built over a long time. It takes five to ten years to inculcate expertise in a young recruit at the junior level; there is no overnight expertise. Recruitment has to be at a young age so that he or she can be molded and before attitudes and mind sets firm up or the recruit is just too old to take chances in the field. Only this gives an intelligence officer the ability to analyse and assess. Operational intelligence requires different expertise and aptitudes. An intelligence agency must continue to have covert and psy-war capabilities which have long gestations cannot be empirically measured but have to be consistently pursued and continuously honed.
Any reform must examine the kind of human capabilities that will be required in the future, whether the existing pattern of recruitment and compensation is adequate today and will remain so in the times ahead. There has to be system that ensures the organisation continues to get the appropriate kind of human material that form the core of the organisation and the agency also has access to external expertise from time to time. It needs to look at the system of control and management and whether the secretariat system has been good for the organisations where career prospects are linked to career prospects outside the organisation and not within. Since intelligence agencies are specialised agencies and do not compete with general appointments they should have their own stream of career progression independent of the career paths in the rest of the civil service.
We live in a world that is seeing rapidly changing threat perceptions. Intelligence agencies have to be flexible to meet any evolving threat. At present there is hardly any surge capability where the agency can, on its own, shift manpower and resources to meet the new threat. The process that exists today is far too cumbersome and slow to allow any rapid redeployment. By the time any new system is put into place the quarry has moved on, either morphed into something different or has just become too big so that the changes originally proposed become inadequate. The head of an intelligence organisation must have the flexibility and authority to move men and material around. One cannot think of annual reviews of performance if the process of obtaining sanctions for even relocating manpower and acquiring additional equipment ranging that is governed by persons removed from the scene of action.
There cannot be accountability without a charter for the intelligence organisations and the empowerment of their Heads. Only when there is a legal charter accompanied by powers vested in the man leading the organisation to deliver the results can one think of accountability. Empowerment, trust and charter go hand in hand. Otherwise we will end up creating new power centres and vested interests that will act as a deterrent to the organisation and not serve any purpose. In our zeal to control and supervise we run the danger of creating multiple controls and stifle intelligence organisations. It would somewhat be like the Russian Babushka dolls – symbolic and very decorative but of little practical use. At least the dolls have some purpose; in the context of security multiplicity of organisations under multiple scrutiny would only hamstring the agencies. They will continue to be unable to deliver to the degree required or even worse, fail.
Merely stressing on accountability and oversight would be misplaced. This is perhaps based on the impression that Intelligence is generally considered evil because it is secret, therefore it must be controlled. This leads to the bizarre expectation among some wise people that intelligence agencies and their collection methods should be made transparent. In this context, intelligence agencies have to be protected against disclosures of locations of facilities, names of officers and personnel and other sensitive details that would help the adversary and harm the conduct of operations as well as security of the country.
So while oversight and co-ordination are good catchphrases the point is by who and to what extent. We thus have to be careful here and not follow the western example where the experience has been different. There too multiple controls have not been an unmitigated success and co-ordination among multiple agencies remains a problem despite all intentions. Intelligence agencies work best under a single chain of command and multiplicity of controls and supervisory agencies leads to confusion. They work even better when the Chief Executive of a country takes an active interest in their output and their well being.
There is a suggestion that operational details or secret service funds be subjected to external scrutiny. This means that there has to be scrutiny of the intelligence operations and sources by external agencies/bodies. This is absolutely unthinkable.
While trying to improve the inner working of intelligence agencies it would be dangerous adopt the human rights approach. Intelligence agencies in an autocratic regime act to preserve that autocracy. In a democracy they act to preserve democracy and the nation. But intelligence agencies cannot themselves practice democracy or human rights. It is not in the nature of their working ethos. The ideal among some is to have an intelligence agency that is as hard as nails on the outside and soft as chocolate from the inside. RTIs and PILs are best discouraged unless we are determined to expose all our working methods to those against whom these resources are used. This cannot be.
There are a few other misconceptions in the average person. Intelligence agencies do not conduct rescue operations of hostages nor do they make policies in democratic countries and nor should they. They only provide inputs but the ultimate decision to negotiate and the mandate of the negotiators is determined by political considerations. Intelligence agencies become all powerful in autocratic and military regimes, e.g. the Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan and others. In situations where the ‘civil society’ is concerned with the functioning of intelligence agencies surely there has to be a quid pro quo for the civil society toward intelligence agencies.
It would be unrealistic to state that intelligence agencies do not have their shortcomings, but they are not all of their own making. The rest of us have contributed by either being indiscreet, indifferent or even hostile. It is true that on occasions intelligence agencies have failed to deliver and that unfortunately is by what they are known – their failures. Their successes are left untold except to those who need to know.
Reform is essential in society and its instruments of governance. To deny this would be to live in bigotry. But there have to be some yardsticks to judge whether or not the reforms will abide and improve what they set out to do. The reform process must begin with empathy that seeks to improve and not suspicion that seeks to control.
A full and comprehensive review must therefore look ahead and assess the perceived threats to the country and then recommend what kind of an intelligence agency would best serve the security and national interests of the country in the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, the Head of the Organisation should be empowered to act to fulfill that charter. This means he must have the authority to hire and fire experts, fast track and discard, have the capacity to surge his deployment according to security needs and not be dependent on the wisdom or lack of it in some other corner of the government. The review should ideally address the needs of an organization in respect of personnel, materials and resources for the future. This should address the specialised needs of an organisation with different skill sets. If it merely concentrates on chopping and controlling, it is destined to fail.
Writing for the Indian Defence Review for their March 2009 issue, I had begun with the following quote from Sun Tzu’s famous treatise The Art of War
‘Nothing should be as favourably regarded as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as the work of intelligence.’
This remains valid for modern day statecraft as well.
This is an article I wrote for Hard News, New Delhi. They carried it in one of their subsequent issues April 10, 2011.
0 comments:
Post a Comment