Wednesday, February 29, 2012

The age of the midnight knock

Within the space of three years after September 11, 2001, the US had set up its National Counter Terrorism Centre when the Congress enacted the "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act" on December 17, 2004. The Act also created the office of the Director National Intelligence (DNI) to supervise and coordinate the functioning of the various intelligence organisations in the US and also advise the President. The NCTC is a part of the office of the DNI but independent of other intelligence organisations. It operates in partnership with the CIA, FBI, Departments of State, Defence and Homeland Security and with agencies abroad. It is the principal adviser to the DNI on intelligence operations and analysis relating to counterterrorism.

The British Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre is slightly different but like the US NCTC, is not empowered to have any operational activity, seize and arrest, as has been wrongly claimed by some in authority here. The CIA, however, continues to maintain its own Counter terror centre for operations abroad. In India, the R&AW does not have a counter terror centre for operations abroad.



No one is safe: Fears of a secret agency being empowered to arrest,
search and interrogate are real and are an anathema to a democratic
dispensation
Our proposed NCTC, after more than 60 years of terrorism, is the creation of an executive diktat without any parliamentary debate or legislation. It is a successor to the Multi Agency Centre, which never really took off because of turf rivalries. This new centre, which will be subordinate to the Intelligence Bureau, will have indirect powers to arrest, search and interrogate. The caveat that the suspect would have to be produced without any unnecessary delay is an elastic concept.

Arrests and detentions on the basis of suspicion under the supervision of an intelligence agency run the risk of misuse and overuse especially when our data banks about individuals are still inadequate. At the same time, the high powered and state-of-the-art NCTC will have to continue to rely on inexact human intelligence provided by ill trained and under manned forces in the field. The IB and not the NCTC, thus becomes ultimately responsible for follow up action. This would include action relating to international terrorism or acting purely on its own intelligence at other times. Thus, nearly four years after the Mumbai 2008 terrorist attacks, we are not sure when and what kind of NCTC we will have.

The NCTC is meant to be a service agency feeding the government as an interface and coordinating intelligence efforts without running those operations. Logically, the proposed NCTC should not become a super intelligence agency and following from this, take over the operational role of intelligence organisations. On the other hand, intelligence agencies should not become part of the NCTC or even subordinate to it. This would not only hamper intelligence effort that extends beyond intelligence on terrorism, and even warp results, which is far more dangerous.

Modern terrorism transcends multiple frontiers, languages and religions. Counter-terrorism needs human intelligence derived from a high level of multiple skills and expertise. This would mean skills in languages Indian and foreign, cyber and communication skills, knowledge about international banking, use of WMDs and CBW.

Countering modern day terrorism needs more than just guns and bullets or fancy trappings. The urge and, at times, the need to curb freedoms in the name of security is always there although we should accept that there would have to be some limits to liberties in this ruthless war.

Intelligence agencies are not human rights organisations. Their game is ruthless, requires a high level of deviousness, tenacity and the ability to subvert by whatever means. It is always dangerous to give such agencies the power to arrest and seize. Fears of a secret agency being empowered to arrest search and interrogate are real and are anathema to a democratic dispensation. It is not enough to declare that the present government does not have any authoritarian ambitions but the system proposed must have permanent inbuilt safeguards. Finally, the proposed NCTC should not be located in any of the Ministries or its departments.
Perhaps the NSCS under the NSA would be the best location.



One would shudder to think of all the possible misuses that this provision in the executive order allows. 'The dark age of the midnight knock' and 'enforced disappearances' would have arrived.

Source : Mid-Day Mumbai , 29th February 2012 ,Vikram Sood , a former chief of Resesrach and Analysis Wing (RAW)

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