Before meeting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in New York next Sunday September 29, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would have met President Obama and the two would have discussed Pakistan among other issues. The Indian leader may well be on his last visit in his current assignment while his Pakistani counterpart is still learning to cope with new problems of office. When they meet, both prime ministers will undoubtedly assert their desire for improved relations despite the latest terrorist attack in Samba which killed an officer of the Indian Army and two other soldiers. However, neither jingoist rhetoric nor sentimental gibberish can deliver peace. Only cold pursuit of the national interest can succeed and until two quarreling neighbours get this right there will be no closure. Have India and Pakistan got this right and at the same time?
Prime Minister Sharif has the obvious problems of a floundering economy, a foreign currency crunch and an ever growing terrorism that has spread all over the country except that the Punjab is quiet, for the present. In fact, in the period up to September 24, Pakistan had over 350 terror attacks, big and small with Pakistanis killing more than 1100 Pakistanis. The country faces multi-faceted Sunni Islamic terrorism of various hues exhibiting a new level of intolerance against other religions or Islamic sects. There has been tension on the LOC but fortunately has not escalated beyond local exchanges.
Nawaz has still to find an equation with the power that matters, the Army, which is expected to see General Ashfaq Kayani end his extended tenure of office in November. It is unlikely that the Pakistan Army will cede ground at a time when there will be uncertainties in Afghanistan and continuing suspicions about India generally and more specifically, in the unfolding Afghan situation. Supremacy over the Army is thus still a distant dream for Pakistan’s political leaders and this will remain a limiting factor in any India-Pakistan dialogue.
Nawaz meanwhile must select Kayani’s successor and choose either on the basis of seniority which could mean Lt General Haroon Aslam or Lt. General Rashad Masood , currently CGS and conceivably Kayani’s preference or go down the list in which case Lt. Gen Tariq Khan currently GOC 1 Corps at Mangla emerges the strongest candidate. His acolytes describe him as a hard task master who leads from the front with wide military experience and could be Nawaz’s choice.
The Americans would like that too especially at this juncture when they are preparing to leave Afghanistan. Some say that General Khan’s daughter is married to his nephew who lives in the US and whose mother is a born American. If true, the daughter’s sasural is American. However, Nawaz would be haunted by his disastrous experience the last time when he chose Pervez Musharraf. The other possibility could be another year for General Kayani. This too would please the US and there could be rewards for this statesmanship.
India cannot run away from geography. This means having to deal with one’s neighbours. In the India-Pakistan context case, the lesson for India has been that a country cannot fight terror only with good intentions and grand statements. A state is a state that demonstrably protects itself and its people at all times. No other state will protect our interests if we are not willing or able to do this.
Our effort to deal with the terrorist threat has been erratic. It swings from empty jingoism, mostly on TV, or statements promising the fire next time to peace overtures and concessions that are not reciprocated. We get confused with Pakistan’s seeming rationality in an irrational stance that threatens nuclear war at the first opportunity and answer it with our irrationality with a seemingly rational stance which offers peace based on the hope of good behaviour.
The political psychology of our leaders is defensive and takes great moralistic pride in saying we have never attacked any other country. Thus good wars are defensive wars fought on our soil. This is flawed and defeatist. Our Armed Forces and security agencies must be encouraged to be able to take the war to enemy territory, in pre-emption if necessary but usually in retaliation. For this, they need a doctrine backed by means and political will.
For Pakistan, the lesson is that supporting terror mixed with religion as an instrument of foreign policy is a deeply flawed weapon. From its early days, Pakistan, fearful of a stronger India, sought security in excessive militarism that led over time to militancy, later religious militancy that eventually turned inwards. This has spread cancer within the body politic of the nation from which a return to normalcy is never easy. Pakistan needs reinvention that only Pakistanis themselves can do. So, reinvention includes redefining identity away from a radical sectarian Islamic one and readjustment to realities of geography, history and culture. Pakistan also cannot escape from geography which is Indo-Gangetic, not Arab and where India happens to be the larger country. It will stay like that.
Today’s cold reality is that as the constant transgressor, it is up to Pakistan now to show faith and rethink. India cannot be seen to move forward without some visible irreversible forward movement by Pakistan on terrorism aimed at India, including action against the 26/11 perpetrators.
Together India and Pakistan can achieve their own destinies. Separately, India still can but Pakistan cannot. If Pakistan is unable to reinvent itself, the fear is that it will get reconfigured. For the moment there does not seem to be any possibility of this reinvention happening. Instead, Pakistan’s military and jihadi leaders are getting ready for a multi-front jihadi war, with India and Afghanistan and with its own jihadis the TTP along with nationalists in Balochistan.
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s unfolding tragedy is that for every sane and brave Pakistani patriot who sees and writes about what is happening there are ten bigots who will want to silence him or her. Patriotism to Pakistan is defined in harsh and very narrow Islamic terminology and only loyalty to this extremist creed is accepted as loyalty to the country. Unable to evolve a coherent policy on tackling the jihadi terrorist threat, recourse is invariably to dangerous denial by the authorities. Repeated attacks on Christians, Hazara Shias that kill them in scores and brutal killings of Baloch nationalists throughout the year have been reported. The government is unable to control the TTP and vacillates between overtures to them or talks of overpowering them.
Jihad, under the cover of a nuclear umbrella, may have been useful options for Pakistan in its policy towards India and the US but this obviously has diminishing marginal returns. Once the US has left Afghanistan, these very issues will become millstones around Pakistan. This is the ultimate result of Pakistan’s outlaw policies of blackmailing the international community and simultaneously pushing its own people towards obscurantist beliefs in the 21st century.
For America, Pakistan has been the dearly beloved enemy. The US assisted Pakistan in the hope that it will behave according to US interests and Pakistan misbehaved knowing that the US will assist Pakistan in trying to make it behave. This game has been going on for decades and Pakistan has won each time in a manner of speaking. Actually, the gains were essentially restricted to the ruling elite who benefited throughout from American largesse. This has had a devastating effect on the state itself and the people.
All is not very certain in the Indian political scene as we get into the pre-election mould, with grand promises by political aspirants, bitter battles and a faltering economy. This is still far better than the system Pakistan’s leaders have evolved for their people and Nawaz has to tackle his internal demons before he can secure an India-Pakistan normalcy. However, for us to assume that concessions to the political establishment in Pakistan will help strengthen democratic processes in that country is monumental folly. We have no such influence in Pakistan. Only Pakistanis can help themselves once they understand and accept the advantages of peace with India. It does not have to be over weaning cordiality, just normal relations for normal interactions will do nicely.
So, while talking to a neighbour is often unavoidable, a solution is not necessarily attainable. At the same time, Nawaz has to choose between applying the seniority principle, accepting the recommendation of General Kayani or doing a deep selection. It is only after this, that a new equation between the politician and the soldier can be worked out, by which time it could be election time in India.
Source : Niti central, 26th September 2013
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