Monday, December 22, 2008

We Must not Dither in Times of Crisis

The Mumbai massacres are undoubtedly a lesson about our vulnerabilities, our huge security gaps, our disjointed reaction and our weak response to Pakistan. Mumbai was high profile and in contrast, the Naxal movement with 236 security forces and 460 civilians killed this year is a reflection of how issues are swept away from the mainstream when they do not seem to affect most of ‘us’. A government in election year and politicians under a cloud for what happened in Mumbai or was allowed to happen, have got together to appear to be seen to be doing something. So the people have been presented with yet another police organisation. This marks the second time when an important issue was passed without much ado – the first being the budget. Another time, criminals were sprung from jails to help pass the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Having communalised terror and counter-terror we have now decided to tighten our anti-terror laws.

With a seven thousand five hundred kilometre sea frontier and porous land borders we will always be vulnerable to depredations. Talking peace with Pakistan will not change this because the sea frontier and the land borders cannot be guarded by peace talks and policies based on hope. States need to be respected, even feared and not just liked. They can only be protected by following what Sun Tzu prescribed, ‘Do not depend on the enemy not coming; depend rather on being ready for him.’ We must accept that there is a congruence of interests in Pakistan between the Army and the jehadis nurtured by them. The Pak Army dreams of balkanising India in revenge for 1971, keeps the issue of Kashmir alive which allows it to keep Pakistan under its control. The jehadis dream of establishing caliphates in India and are willing to die for this, which again suits the Pak Army.

Pakistan has been at this game for over 60 years; it has been fighting a proxy war especially after 1971 at places and time of his choosing. It is a total war against India and we must treat it so. Other than adopting defensive postures we have done precious little to handle this threat. We have done nothing to teach the perpetrator a lesson. Instead, we have chosen to pay a heavy financial price for this (the new agency is a price we are going to pay forever) and the fact that Pakistan is paying an economic price today should be of little consolation for us. Getting ready for Pakistan and its terrorists extends to beyond modernising the armed forces with the latest aircraft, tanks or submarines. It means equipping our specialised forces the most lethal and suitable equipment and keeping them agile, trained and mobile for all times. It means empowering the local state units adequately in every sense of the word to be the first respondents in a crisis.

In handling Pakistan-led terror, we must also remember that we cannot afford to continue to dither in times of crisis. If we do not react effectively in time, then the moment of international empathy is gone. As has so often happened in the past, the first hours are the most crucial; do not react and others will step in to restrain us promising us action against Pakistan. This time it was the same pantomime. The terrorists attacked, we fumbled and hesitated, the Pakistanis wiggled for room as they shifted stance, angels stepped in promising action and urging patience. The moment was lost so we made a virtue of restraint. The Pakistanis did one better this time. There was a mysterious attack in Peshawar where160 NATO and US vehicles were sent alight with match sticks and not flame throwers and grenades. The attackers took their time because there was no one to stop them. The message to the mighty US was simple - we can choke you in Afghanistan any time so please do not try to push us. There is a method in the madness.

Every major crisis has resulted in the creation of new agencies. The Kargil crisis led to the creation of the DIA, the NTRO and the Multi Agency Centre. The Army maintains a pretty formidable Sigint capacity too. One wonders how much intelligence these agencies fed in the system before the Mumbai attacks. None of our systems are going to work if we do not have a sharp pre-emptive intelligence system with an equally well organised downstream activity that is geared to take on the new emerging threats. To quote Sun Tzu again “Nothing should be regarded as favourably as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as intelligence.” Alas, in India, intelligence is a dirty word.

In order to win this battle we must accept that we have to fight our battles ourselves and make the adversary pay a price. Unless we do that, not even our smaller neighbours will respect us. We delude ourselves when we hope that the US or anyone else will fight our battles for us. No one else will do that for us.
Source : Mail Today , 22nd December 2008

Friday, December 5, 2008

Don't give intel agencies a RAW deal

What can we learn from the Mumbai tragedy? The first lesson is that we must never forget what happened. The second is to honour the innocent and the brave who died. Third, to prioritise national vulnerabilities and set about protecting them. Fourth, we need to admit to failures and mistakes, then go about remedying them. Spare no cost, upgrade intelligence capabilities, carry out the much delayed police reforms, increase the efficacy of our commandoes and keep doing this, spare the Army from routine counter-terror activities and above all, re-establish the rule of law. Sharpen covert capabilities. And not let Pakistan, which is a nuisance, become a threat.

A people get the government they deserve and a government gets the intelligence it deserves. Our rulers today are those who have learnt nothing and have forgotten that Pakistani leaders sent in soldiers masquerading as so-called 'freedom fighters', but who were actually terrorists, in 1947, 1965, 1999 and now. We cannot have this glib talk about fighting terror jointly with Pakistan. It is like investigating murder with the help of the murderer. We had tied ourselves up in knots when we agreed that both Pakistan and India were victims of terror and today we see a rapprochement between the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani Army on the western front as they shift their troops to the Indian borders. There is absolutely no need for grand magnanimous gestures -- magnanimity is a function of victory; otherwise it is appeasement.

As usual the Mumbai attacks brought forth comments from wet-behind-the-ears experts on TV with the regular chant of intelligence failure despite thousands of crores spent on intelligence collection. This is simply not true. Remember, intelligence organizations are known only by their failures and do not advertise their successes. Secondly, the amount spent must be seen from the perspective of the country's other major expenses on security like that on the paramilitary and the police. The Armed Forces had a budget of Rs 96,000 crore last year and the budget of the civilian intelligence is a miniscule percentage of the $1.1 trillion GDP of the country. India can afford to spend more as it gets economically powerful and more vulnerable to attacks.

Recent disclosures in the newspapers about RAW's inputs on September 18 and 22 would vindicate its position somewhat. These were based on intercepts and puritans would say that intelligence agencies should never disclose their source of information because this jeopardizes the future of the source --- human or technical. But this cacophony of ill-informed accusations seems to have forced this defensive action. The intelligence provided was actionable enough and armed with this any capable force should have been able to interdict the terrorists. These or other intercepts may not be available the next time because
it is simply not possible to intercept all the traffic and decipher or understand all that is intercepted. Intelligence collection is an intricate and imperfect skill and analysis is a difficult expertise which requires the ability to look and visualise behind the wall.

Inevitably at times like this we sprout experts of various hues. Some have suggested that the IB and RAW be merged. This is unworkable and ridiculous for several reasons. The two require totally different disciplines. Intelligence is a function of area, language and regional expertise and of operational skills honed over years of practical experience. It is not a function that can be professionally performed by birds of passage. External intelligence requires different skills in language, regions and issues. Its method of collection is different as it has to work in hostile surroundings, against the laws of the country to which its officers are assigned. Internal intelligence operates on home ground in accordance with local laws and has the backing of the state. The two functions are not interchangeable. Besides, no democratic country has one intelligence service.

Most of the accusations arise from prejudices simply because intelligence agencies function under secrecy and are, therefore, assumed to be sinister or incompetent. After one Prime Minister foolishly wrecked RAW in 1977 it has always been an endless struggle in the bureaucratic jungle of New Delhi. In 1999 RAW was a convenient whipping boy in the midst of command and systemic failure in Kargil. Even if we have the best intelligence in the world, it will be of no use without commensurate downstream systems.

Since intelligence does not function in a vacuum, mere changes in the intelligence organisations will not be enough. The Home Ministry has to develop its own cadre of experts given the intricacies of security and related problems. Regional and issue expertise rather like the MEA would be the need of the hour where officers rotate only between the MHA and the State. The so-called steel framework has degenerated over time into bureaucratic indolence and ignorance and must be made responsive and modern.

All this has to happen if we have to improve our chances of winning the battle against terrorism.
Source : Times of India, 5th December 2008

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Line of Control

The horror of Mumbai may be go off the screens in a few days and there may be reason for us to rejoice —especially for those who survived the ordeal. But the long term crisis for this entire episode has revealed that terrorism is ruthless and a determined gang of terrorist scan hold a world to ransom. It should also be a time for honest introspection.

It has revealed our pre-event weaknesses and vulnerabilities — the fact that we have been unable to find a remedy despite years of terrorism in the country. Nor have we learnt from the experience of others. The weaknesses are all pervasive and it is premature to exult about the triumph of the civil society. A strong and vibrant civil society helps post-event recovery. It does not prevent another attack. Terrorism succeeds incrementally not through one major battle.
Mercifully it has also shown us that there are still valiant men like Hemant Karkare, Ashok Kamte, Vijay Salaskar and Sandeep Unnikrishnan and scores of others who are willing to die for their country. And being Indians, we will soon forget our heroes and their sacrifices. In Raj Thackeray’s warped book Sandeep was an outsider who died fighting while his eminence was holed up somewhere safe and far.

It has revealed how slow our initial responses were and also the prevailing state of confusion. If the NSG seemed to have taken a while to get to the scene many were disappointed that that they did not storm the bastions in true Hollywood style. There was no Bruce Willis among the NSG but they seemed to have gone about their task systematically without being pushed by politicians as it normally happens in our country. We must remember that the terrorists had been living in the Taj for days and, unlike the commandoes, had a clear idea of its lay out.

Our media came out with a mixed result. We still need to learn to distinguish between what to report and what not to report. Self-restraint is a must before the authorities impose blanket bans. The yard stick is quite simple really. No glorification of the terrorist, no revelations that would aid the terrorist or hinder the operation, and no blame game — at least not when the operation is on. Maybe we could take a leaf from the US media and their coverage of 9/11. Maybe we could take a leaf from the excellent film A Wednesday and understand that the media has a role beyond mere reporting. We were very generous in giving the visiting Pakistan Foreign Minister prime time to prove his country’s innocence.

At moments like this, the State must appear to be doing something. Inviting the ISI chief was not the brightest of ideas. Anyone would have known that he would decline as PM Geelani’s assurance does not carry weight in Pakistan. It is General Kayani who matters. And if he did come he would bring with him a dossier of our so-called involvement in Balochistan and Afghanistan — something the Pak press and other India-baiters (of which there is no shortage in Pakistan) have been talking about endlessly. Were we going to give the “either you are with us or against us” line and if he had said “against you” then what would we do? Or if there is an incident of this kind in Pakistan would our intelligence chiefs be summoned to Islamabad?

The most important lesson is that this can happen again. There are so many vulnerable national assets all over the country and we are ill-prepared to protect them. Terrorists used aircraft in New York, trains and buses in London, trains in Mumbai and Madrid and they came by sea to Mumbai. They could target many of our national iconic sites like Vishakapatnam, Jamshedpur, Rourkela or Bhilai. They could target the IT industry in Bengaluru which has already seen what one might call trial runs. Damage to them would hurt our national pride and cause economic loss and lives but these are recoverable assets.

The boats or trawlers that brought in the terrorists to the Gateway of India also could have headed to Bombay High or Jamnagar where we have our gigantic hydrocarbon/petroleum complexes. Jamnagar represents investments over 150000 lakh crore rupees and contributes 6% of direct tax to the country. Any breakdown of this would be a total non-recoverable loss. Surely their protection is of vital national importance. We need to work on the premise that another dramatic terrorist attack could be repeated in the future. We have to be able to find out where and when. There is therefore so much to do and so little time

Source : Financial Express, 30th November 2008

Saturday, November 29, 2008

A Nation in Peril

Terror now stalks the country. As one watched the TV screens on the night of November 26 it seemed a re-run of past terrorist incidents in India. Yet these were different. India has not seen a terrorist attack of this kind where terrorists have stormed a hotel, taken people hostage, killed others and have made no ransom demand so far. Obviously they are playing for publicity and merely want to draw attention to themselves and whatever be their demands. Our hysterical response on TV channels and confused response of the authorities adds to the publicity.

Anyone watching the TV scenes would have noticed that the terrorists seemed calm, physically fit and had not even bothered to cover their faces. Their demeanour was that of well trained persons, familiar with their surroundings and the task to be accomplished almost commando like in their bearing. They were either planning to drop their weapons after the act and melt into the crowd or go down fighting. The game is simple – the longer the crisis lasts the greater the publicity and greater the pressure on the government to do something. It will require consummate skill and determination to overcome this crisis with minimal loss of innocent lives.

The present lot of terrorists are not the traditional suicide bombers ready to blow themselves up. Yet somehow the manner of their arrival by boats and the physical features of the terrorists brings to mind Mumbai March 1993. At that time too a part of the plot was to carry out killings at other selected targets after the simultaneous bomb explosions. The area of operation and the targets were also quite similar – upper class and affluent. Is there a Pakistani–ISI-Dawood hand in this? It is still early days but these questions need to be asked.

In India our tendency has been to make some post event superficial changes, pious declarations of intent and condemnations of the act accompanied by horrendous photographs of the event with knee jerk expert comments from media rookies. That is until the next attack takes place. We do not even have adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence, we do not even have national identity cards because it is politically inexpedient. Our border controls remain inadequate. Post event the investigating agencies should be allowed to operate in areas and societies from where the attack is suspected to have occurred or planned. There can be little success if exclusions are made on grounds of religion or region. Public indifference to terrorist incidents may indicate that the people may have overcome fear which is a positive development but if it is because of indifference to suffering based on the hope that “I” shall not be the target because tragedies are only meant for “the other”, then we have a problem. There is inadequate public response because it is generally assumed that prevention of terrorism is exclusively the task of the state. This attitude has to change and only the state can help this change. The average citizen must be encouraged and educated to help the state by providing clues, warnings and assistance in investigations.

It has to be acknowledged that the police force is inadequately prepared to deal with the menace and it is not their fault that this is so. The Governments of the day are responsible for this state of affairs. Ill equipped, ill trained, undermanned station houses they live in appalling conditions sometimes at the mercy of the very don against whom they are supposed to protect the society. Successive governments have taken away the authority and the dignity of the profession. The public has little confidence in the force and the force is unsympathetic to the public. The witness protection schemes are badly flawed and justice is indefinitely delayed. There is little incentive for the public to come forward with evidence and little incentive for the force to prosecute.
Invariably always each terrorist incident evokes criticism about intelligence failure. In India, there is a general lack of appreciation (one suspects at the highest level as well) that intelligence agencies are the sword arms of the nation (not the government) in the furtherance of its foreign security interests and the protection of the country. In normal times, when it is the best time for the agencies to be allowed to hone their skills, develop their sources and prepare for the future, they suffer from benign neglect. Posts remain unsanctioned, purchase of new equipment is postponed and upgrading is frowned upon, all because the powers- that- be assess that the threat has passed. Yet, when an incident takes place, intelligence agencies become the useful whipping boys with politicians and others ready to shift blame as they assess their political fortunes. The best and perhaps the only way to fight terrorism is to develop and sustain an effective intelligence system, not only at the centre but at every level down to the constable. Unless we have this we will continue to get surprised. What we have today is systemic failure. All systems have malfunctioned.

A terrorist event makes a good story or ‘breaking news’ but the media too needs some rules of conduct. It is important to report the truth but it is also sometimes important when we are fighting a war to sometimes not report or to modify the report without modifying the truth. Repeated telecast of pictures of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. And photographs of a prospective witness circulated widely would only help the terrorist. Often we glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen.

All this has to change too if we want to win the war on terrorism. India must get ready to detect, deter and destroy this menace before it destroys us.



Source : DAINIK BHASKAR , 28th November 2008.

To Secure India , All of Us Have to do More

TO SECURE INDIA, ALL OF US HAVE TO DO MORE

Eleven or twelve attacks in one night in different parts of Mumbai and hundreds killed while the hostage crisis continues. The entire unending episode is sinister and frightening in its implications. It is a direct assault on the state of India.

Strikes of this kind require considerable logistic support. It could not have been carried out by just a group of terrorists acting on their own. More than one agency or state could be involved. There also must have been local support and this could have come from the underworld of the kind that was involved in the 1993 bomb blasts. In the 1993 blasts, terrorists at that time had also planned to follow up the bomb blast s with random killings through gun attacks but were unable to do this after the Mumbai police accidentally discovered an arms cache which revealed the bigger conspiracy. It is possible that the same masterminds have been in play in carrying what was part two of the 1993 operation. Grenades were hurled at airport and fire was opened over innocent civilians in 1993. Some TV channels are reporting that terrorists may have sneaked into Mumbai through sea route which was also used by the 1993 terrorists. In which case the same leaders –are Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon and their mentors operating from Pakistan may be beginning to haunt us again?

Possibly more than one module was used. It seems that a separate module of terrorists planted IEDs at different places to spread panic, uncertainty and confuse the Police. Maybe the terrorists were grouped as different sabotage teams and unknown to each other; where some were involved in opening direct fire and engaging security forces while other teams planted IED's to make it difficult for administration to quantify the scale and gain an early upper hand.

These strikes seem more like well organised raids carried out by specialised armed forces. It is not possible for terror groups to organize and co-ordinate such operations on their own without active guidance of some professional government or private agency. The deliberateness of action and the demeanour of the terrorists seen on TV suggests a well-trained professional force and not a rag- tag suicide squad. The Mumbai attacks are the clearest example in recent times of how terrorists of the day are better trained and better equipped. Some say the terrorists in Mumbai are armed with Heckler and Koch guns and not just AK-47’s.

It is likely that indigenous as well as imported modules are involved. Terror groups active in India have bring together geographically distant modules in many previous strikes. Once again there will be questions about intelligence failures. That too but there are larger failures too and this is a failure of the system to appreciate adequately the threat and to have the determination to carry out the reforms or improvements in a non-partisan manner.

It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. They do not have any constituency in India that actively supports their cause. Globally, it has been found that despite all the State assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability to collect intelligence about non-State adversaries remains the most difficult and this includes not just the terrorist, but the mastermind, the arms smuggler, the safe house owner, the money launderer and other trans-national operatives. No single agency, no single country can provide this information and no one can still guarantee that every attack will be aborted or every terrorist cell unearthed on time. There has to be multi-level, multi-agency multinational co-operation acting in real time. We must understand that even the best intelligence can only minimise the threat or the forewarning will make the attack insurmountably difficult. And yet, all this kind of cooperation is the most difficult to achieve.

Heightened intelligence capability, sustained and built over a period of time, which is able to keep pace with the growing threat is the need today. This has to be accompanied by skilful investigation and forensics, particularly at the state level, rapid sharing of intelligence, provision of national identity cards, CCTVs at important places, speedy justice which is also seen to be fair, a system of governance that delivers what it is supposed to and a media that does not compete for TRP ratings over such issues.

The questions are why is it that we let it happen again and again and can we not do anything to win this war against an unscrupulous and invisible enemy? Why do we give the impression of being soft and confused? There is no short cut to improving the intelligence and security apparatus of the country. Spare no cost and accept no compromises on this. If the country has a well endowed and trained intelligence apparatus acting without political interference (as distinct from accountability) it could provide pre-emptive intelligence that could abort terrorist acts and lead to arrests. It would also prevent indiscriminate arrests and all that follows.

We could learn from the Americans – not completely but suitably – they tightened their laws even to extent that they were draconian, spent billions of dollars and improved intelligence collection and surveillance making them intrusive and they outsourced certain aspects of the work to maximise use of talent.

Each one of us must learn to give up some freedom to preserve that freedom.


Vikram Sood THE ASIAN AGE NOVEMBER 28, 2008

Mumbai 26... The Day That All Systems Malfunctioned

Two words come to mind when one thinks of Mumbai November 26. Horror and failure. Horror at the eleven terror attacks across Mumbai in one night and horror at the repeated failure of the state to protect its citizens.

Writing in these columns some months ago I said “Democracies are supposed to react to terrorism with determination and sensitivity. In India, however, each terrorist act brings forth the same tired clichés, the same repetitive promises and compensations, the same gory pictures on front pages, the same breathless TV channel reporting in shrill horror, the same allegations of intelligence failure in a trial by camera. Yet nothing is done to strengthen intelligence, the counter terrorist mechanism or enhancing the quality of the police force. There is no apparent determination to take this battle to the enemy.” And so today we have a Mumbai November 26 version of terrorism and the likes of which we have not seen but are likely to see again and again.
The mechanics of final execution seem very simple since they were the result of apparently detailed planning in the selection of targets, the timing and the manner. There must have been several reconnaissance missions to the hotels and other sites. Despite the known threat perceptions it is amazing that the terrorists were able to smuggle in the weapons. Or war there an insider?

Anyone watching the TV scenes would have noticed that the terrorists seemed calm, physically fit and had not even bothered to cover their faces. Their demeanour was that of well trained persons, familiar with their surroundings and the task to be accomplished almost commando like in their bearing. They were either planning to drop their weapons after the act and melt into the crowd or go down fighting. The game is simple – the longer the crisis lasts the greater the publicity and greater the pressure on the government to do something and the greater the chances that it will look more and more inept. It will require consummate skill and determination to overcome this crisis with minimal loss of innocent lives.

The present lot of terrorists are not the traditional suicide bombers ready to blow themselves up. Yet somehow the manner of their arrival by boats and the physical features of the terrorists brings to mind the serial bomb explosions of Mumbai March 1993. At that time too a part of the plot was to carry out killings at other selected targets after the simultaneous bomb explosions. The area of operation and the targets were also quite similar – upper class and affluent. An operation of this magnitude would need some state or agency support. Is there a Pakistani–ISI-Dawood hand in this? Have our fears that jihad has begun to spread from Pakistan to India come true. It is still early days but these questions need to be asked.

A familiar Pakistani strategy is unfolding in India where the attempt is to hoist all attacks in India outside Kashmir on the al-Qaeda banner or to pretend that things are not fully under the control of the army in Pakistan. Anyone who has studied Pakistan knows that this is not true. And if things are not under control in a military dictatorship of more or less 60 years standing, then that country is falling apart. We all know that it is the Pakistani — essentially the Punjabi Lashkar and the Jaish who operate from bases in Pakistan and are members of Osama’s International Islamic Front — who continue to target India They are not members of the al-Qaeda which is an Arab organisation but are ideologically akin.

The reports that terrorists were specifically asking hotel management about foreigners would indicate their intention to target them and simultaneously to scare away foreigners from India. Once the demands or results of interrogation of those who have surrendered or arrested are known will there be some idea of the origins of the attackers and the purpose. Till then one can only speculate whether this is an attack for revenge of some sort, an attempt to seek worldwide publicity or is it a reaction to antiterrorist policies of governments – notably US, British Israeli and ours.

Each terrorist incident is accompanied by criticisms of intelligence failure. In India, there is a general lack of appreciation (one suspects at the highest levels as well) that intelligence agencies are best instruments with a nation (not the government) in the furtherance of its foreign security interests and the protection of the country. In normal times, when it is the best time for the agencies to be allowed to hone their skills, develop their sources and prepare for the future, they suffer from benign neglect. Posts remain unsanctioned, purchase of new equipment is postponed and upgrading is frowned upon, all because the powers- that- be assess that the threat has passed. Yet, when an incident takes place, intelligence agencies become the useful whipping boys with politicians and others ready to shift blame as they assess their political fortunes. What we have today is systemic failure. All systems have malfunctioned.
The usual blame game will start accompanied by declarations of intent. As it is here, in New Delhi the Prime Minister and Home Minister are not able to agree which is the bigger threat – Naxals or jihadis. That being so, our response is going to be inadequate. The PM says he has given his security handlers one hundred days to reform and perform. So many hundred days have come and gone in the last four and a half years but security and anti terrorism has been dealt with partisan perceptions and studied indifference so that today we do not have any day left.

Yes Prime Minister the security grid needs drastic improvement and no Prime Minister we do not have the luxury of time.

Source : Mail Today , 28th November 2008

Sunday, November 23, 2008

The Obama moment and the challenges it brings

Barack Obama's win in the US presidential election is momentous but it is about America and because it took Americans 230 years after independence and 150 years after the Civil War to send an African-American to the White House. For Americans it seems to be the triumph of hope, and exult they must. After eight years of attempts at regime change the world over, the Republicans had handed over a regime change at home.

Paradoxically the strength of the victory, the natural exultation and excessive euphoria create dangers for America and Obama. The President-elect had sold dreams and the Americans bought them. And he may have sold one too many. Yet his predecessor has left him on top of the debris of disastrous foreign endeavours and an economic meltdown from where recovery will not be easy. The Obama moment may be over sooner than expected and collapse on a host of unfulfilled expectations.

There will be many expectations in America of immediate and magical relief. In our enthusiasm we sometimes forget that though it may be a melting pot, the US is also a country which has its divisions of race, of class and political beliefs. All these differences will get accentuated when Obama gets down to tackling the problems of a federal deficit that may touch $1 trillion and a mounting national debt that may reach $10 trillion. Abu Ghraib and less the Statue of Liberty now symbolises America in many parts of the world. This is the George W Bush legacy.
Obama spoke of change. So had Donald Rumsfeld when in September 2001 he said that America had a choice: either Americans changed the way they lived which was unacceptable or Americans changed the way others lived. The US chose the latter. According to the ultimate neo-con Douglas Feith, America's purpose was to transform the Middle East and the broader world of Islam generally. The biggest change in external policies would be how the so-called and the badly flawed global war on terror is going to be handled by the new administration.

The realities of governance are always vastly different from the pronouncements of election rhetoric. Judging from some of the names doing the rounds in DC as his prospective advisers, it seems that the President-elect is already discovering that change may not be all that easy nor that radical. He may have to rely on hardliners of the previous Democratic establishments. Obama will quickly discover the limitations of power and the resilience of the bureaucracy and flowing from this, that there are some things he can change and some things he cannot. All he now needs is the wisdom to know the difference between the two.

Yet in India we are naturally concerned what the new administration has in store for us. Since we had declared undying love for Obama's predecessor, it is not easy for us to change allegiance so quickly, and conversely we also need to give the President-elect some time to assess our fealty.

Besides there will be other more important issues on his plate. The economy would be the first priority and could take up most of his time in the first few months. This is going to be the most difficult part and any failure here will mean loss of lustre. Energy security, Russia and China, Israel and the Palestinian question, extrication from Iraq and the global war on terror (which means Afghanistan and Pakistan) will all push India off the table. This is because India is neither the centre for terrorism that threatens US interests nor an economic power which both helps and threatens US interests. In both cases there is a stronger likelihood of the US favouring its interests in Pakistan and China.

For India the worry is not who is appointed Secretary of State or that Bill Clinton might be a Special Envoy on Kashmir. So long as everyone remembers that the issue in Kashmir is not just about Kashmiri rights, it also about Gilgit and Baltistan, about the areas occupied by Pakistan which are all part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani obsession with Kashmir is not about the human rights of the people of the valley. It is also about the waters of the Chenab river that irrigate the farms of Pakistani Punjab but which do not flow from the valley. The worry is that an absentminded decision about US policy, without taking every aspect into consideration and at the prompting of some aide, could lead to a downslide in India-US relations.

Some of us in India are worried about what the new presidency might do or want to do on issues like NPT and CTBT that may affect us, or in Kashmir, or for Pakistan in preference to India. Already there was some heartburn in India that Obama chose to talk to Asif Zardari first rather than Manmohan Singh. Pakistanis are off the starting block and have begun their campaign with Ahmed Rashid along with Barnett Rubin leading the charge. Recently they suggested in an article in the influential Foreign Affairs that the Afghanistan problem is solvable provided India can be brought on board on the Kashmir issue. For a man keen to solve the Afghanistan problem for America's sake this could be a tempting argument.

Richard Haass in his essay in Newsweek has suggested to the new president that Pakistan and Afghanistan should be treated as one problem since Pakistan provides sanctuaries to the Taliban. This is fine but the solution, that assistance to Pakistan should continue; there should be additional economic and military aid to bolster the government, is flawed. It is difficult to understand how the Taliban in Afghanistan have to be punished while their sponsors in Pakistan have to be rewarded.

How often has the US administration not followed this carrot and more carrot policy in the past only to be double-crossed? So often that one begins to wonder if this really is the policy. The same mistakes of the past -- of offering dialogue and development assistance to delinquent regimes or to religious zealots will only make them stronger in their delinquency or zealotry -- will be repeated in this policy.

In dealing with the rest of the world it would be wise for the new administration to remember that America's unipolar moment is over. The rise of Asia is inevitable. The US is still the world's largest economy, with a global military reach and the highest technological development but it can no longer call nations to blind obedience nor lead it alone. After years of profligacy, the US owes it to the world to sort out its economic mess. Multi-polarity is the new route to security.
Thus one major lesson that the new establishment may want to carry is about the limitations of power. US forces as configured at present, despite the bases the world over and huge Pentagon and Intelligence expenditures, are not configured for goals of total dominance. Meanwhile, military control and intelligence collection and even operations have been increasingly outsourced both to establish greater deniability and circumvent Congressional control. Over time, the government will lose institutional memory, data, talent and experience and ultimately control.

Today the US military forces, whatever the strength, cannot overcome local resistance and therefore be the global guardian unless it is prepared to take countless body bags. The temptation thus would be to cajole surrogates into inhospitable regions in the pursuit of US interests. There are some, eager to prove India's self-proclaimed major power status, who recommend Indian troops being committed to Afghanistan. It would be naive to expect that Pakistan will not protest most shrilly about being encircled while seeing this as an opportunity to target Indian troops. The only way Pakistan would accept this (Indian troops in Afghanistan) is an iron-clad 'solution' of the Kashmir issue and then proceed to convert Afghanistan into India's Vietnam.

There has always been a continuity of foreign policy in the US based on the central theme of total control. John Kennedy spoke of 'America first' -- not if, not but, just first. Methods have varied and Bush followed the unilateral military route. Will Obama be different and acquiesce willingly to a multilateral multi-polar system? Or will the more things change, the more they remain the same?

For President-elect Obama the hard reality of governance is going to sink in rapidly. The world will wait to see if this triumph of hope, will transform into fulfilment of that hope.

Source : Rediff.com , 21st November 2008

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

Terrorism in India and its external ramifications: tackling the menace

India At The Receiving End

India possibly is the only country in the world that has faced insurgencies and terrorism of all kinds – ethnic, ideological and ethno-religious --for over sixty years. Yet despite this sustained onslaught on its very being India has survived this. And sixty years after independence, India and Pakistan – the main perpetrator of terrorism in India -- are on different trajectories.

India remains a secular democracy although our secular credentials are sometimes under some strain. After years of uncertainties, the fortune graph is now a steady upward curve as India positions itself to become a rising economic power. Pakistan, on the other hand, is on a downward slope, as it slips into a self-created jehadi abyss with the Taliban threatening to establish a radical Islamic regime in the country from its bases in FATA where all seven districts are under their control. While the world applauds India, it increasingly looks at Pakistan with suspicion as an irresponsible state.

In today’s context, international terrorism, invariably invokes references to jehadi terrorism. Unfortunately, the response to this, described as the global war on terror, was neither global, nor was it against terror. It remained restricted to handling the problem in only one part of the globe against targets that were unevenly defined. The ill planned war in Afghanistan or the unnecessary one in Iraq, were not about defeating terror because both created more terrorists than they destroyed. An over-militarised response gave it the wrong description of a war on terror whereas one should have been thinking and working in terms of counter-terrorism.

To the Muslim world, Osama bin Laden is not necessarily the devil incarnate that is perceived in the rest of the world. Osama had promised to deliver his followers from centuries of oppression and humiliation by the West and by their own rulers. Western media and propaganda to demonise Osama have made him into a cult figure. Many believe in him and his ideals and are willing to die for them. And there is no way you can kill a man who is willing to die.

As harsh extremist Islamic fires rage in Afghanistan and Pakistan it is no use exulting in this. There are varying estimates about the number of terrorists in FATA from 8000 to 40000. Those who have dealt with terrorism in Kashmir know what it takes to handle a terrorist force that numbers between 3000-3500 at any given moment. Pakistan does not have the ability or the inclination to take on this terrorist force. Almost surely these flames will singe us too, as they have begun to in Jaipur, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Delhi and Ahmedabad. It may not be long before we could see a Taliban regime in Afghanistan with all its implications for the neighbourhood. It is fine to say that no religion propagates violence and terror and therefore a terrorist has no religion. But our response to this cannot be communal either. We have to get prepared to deal with it now and regrettably we are not prepared to deal with the gathering storm.

In the West, the problem has been that socio-economic factors have lead to political-religious manifestations. In India, externally inspired political factors threaten India’s the already weak socio-economic fabric. In the West, the Muslim population is a result of immigrations after the Second World War and their succeeding generations. In India, the Muslims are indigenous. In fact, it is Pakistan where its Muslim immigrants from India – the Mohajirs –after independence, have had difficulty being accepted by the Punjabi-dominated society. In Europe, the original population and the host governments have had difficulty in accepting outsiders who are extremely aggressive about preserving their way of life. The challenge in the West is how to amalgamate; the challenge in India is how to preserve the amalgam.

The Use of Islam by the Mullahs.

While discussing roots of terrorism in his book “No End to this War,” Walter Laqueur says that Muslims have had a problem adjusting as minorities, be it in India, the Philippines or Western Europe. Similarly, they find it difficult to give their own minorities a fair deal, Muslim or non-Muslim in their own countries — the Berbers in Algeria, the Copts in Egypt or the Christians or Shias in Pakistan or the Sudan. This has in turn led to what Olivier Roy calls globalised Islam – militant Islamic resentment at Western domination or anti-Imperialism exalted by revivalism. State sponsorship of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and strategy to negate military and other superiority, has been another facet of this problem.

Since religion is becoming centre stage in our country in the last few years, it is time we looked at this head on. A person’s religion is more often an accident of birth and sometimes an act of faith. The Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the Lourdes in Spain, the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem, the Amarnath Yatra in Kashmir and the Ram Setu in Rameshwaram are all a matter of faith and not a matter of cold scientific logic. In a country like ours, with all our religions and languages, with our tempers on a short fuse for any number of reasons, the best way to keep our secular identity and sanity intact is to say, “My religion but our country.”

In our country, Salman Khan celebrates Ganesh Chaturthi; the Indian cricket team’s speed attack could, on a given day, be led by Zaheer, Irfan and Munaf; like cricket, Bollywood is India’s great unifier and is dominated by the Khans; and, some of the best music has come from Naushad and A.R. Rehman. The finest dhrupad has been rendered by the Dagar brothers -- Fahimuuddin and Rahimuddin. Yet no one bats an eye lid because they are all Indians and do India proud. But some fundamentalist mullah from Mumbai s served Salman Khan with a fatwa. Salman’s father was brave enough to reject this and we need to acknowledge his conviction. Ours is and has to be a composite culture. There is no other way.

In Pakistan they teach them that jihad is the only way. Years ago they solved their problem by getting rid of their minorities and today even Shias are kafirs in a country that never tires itself of proclaiming that it is a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. In Pakistan the present day purveyors of religion teach their children that theirs is the Only Faith which must overcome the Idol Worshiping Hindus, the Christians and the Jews. In one of his Friday sermons, the ISI-backed Pakistani Jamaat ut Dawa leader, Hafiz Saeed urged that “The solution to all your problems and that of the Muslim ummah lies in jehad.”

In dealing with Pakistan, we must remember that there is another Pakistan beyond the chic and elegant salons of Lahore. And these “other” wield considerable clout. In the words of Pervez Hoodbhoy, a well known Pakistani academic, “The Talibanisation of Pakistan’s tribal areas has caused alarm, but it is the rapid developments in the heart of nation’s capital, Islamabad that have stunned many.” Hoodbhoy quotes several incidents to say that he feared that the stage for transforming Islamabad into a Taliban stronghold was being set. Hoodbhoy’s paper adds that women nurses will not be able to attend to male patients. Male doctors will not be allowed to perform ECG or Ultra sound on women for fear that women may lure men away. After the 2005 earthquake girls under debris in Balakot were not allowed to be rescued by a male ambulance team. In April 2006, 21 women and 8 children were crushed to death in a stampede in a Karachi madrassa because the ambulance team comprised men. This is the way the Pakistani society is headed. The mullahs are winning and this will have repercussions for us.

In India we have shadowy organisations like the Indian Mujahedeen sending off letters to the Press that spew hate and venom against others and misquoting the Quran in support of this. In Pakistan’s increasingly intolerant sections, a similar letter by a minority would have resulted in massive reprisals against that minority. In India we let it pass, because the majority of Indians wants to be secular and believes in it although we do have aberrations like Raj Thakeray in Mumbai and fringe elements elsewhere. It is also unfair that a Muslim in India should have to prove his loyalty to the country each time there is a terrorist incident or a Hindu be accused of being a fundamentalist each time he owns up to being a Hindu.

Hafeez Saeed and others like Abdul Rehman Makki in Pakistan routinely quote from the Quran when they exhort their followers to launch jihad against India. They cite verse 9.5 from the Quran “Fight and kill the disbelievers wherever you find them, take them, captive harass them, lie in wait and ambush them using every stratagem of war” or verse 9.14 “Fight them (the disbelievers) Allah will punish them by your hands and bring them to disgrace and give you victory over them and He will heal the hearts of those who believe.” This was also quoted by the Indian Mujahedeen in their fax after the Ahmedabad bombings. The point is that these are selectively used out of context both in time and space. It is against this misuse of religion that the moderate Muslim majority must speak out both against those who spread hate and also to educate that Hindu majority that only gets to read or see the wrong side of the story.

Recently M. J. Akbar wrote about this in the Times of India when he distinguished between the fasadis and the jihadis. The point is that he knows this, a lot of us understand this but those who get killed in terrorist blasts do not know and those they leave behind do not understand. Nor do those uneducated unemployed youth understand this for they are fed carefully edited portions from the Quran written in a language that they do not know. Is it not time that we translated the Quran into Indian languages so that most of us can read it and understand? In this age of the Internet this should be easier and would help counter the hate that is pasted on the Net. Asghar Ali Engineer (“Making a Mockery of Jihad”) and Tahir Mahmood, (“If Hindus are ‘mushrik’ what are we?”) have recently written on this. The Muslim needs to hear the voice of the moderate and not just that of the extremist-fundamentalist. Otherwise the voice of the likes of Hafeez Saeed will prevail.

The Two Great Obsessions

Internationally, the battle has really between globalised capitalism versus global Islam. The clash is between two Great Obsessions – one obsessed to retain its declining super power global dominance and the other obsessed with the ambition to become the dominant religion. One is affluent, powerful, politically empowered mainly Christian but running out of resources; the other is poor, politically un-empowered and Muslim, and resource rich. Both find nationalistic politics an obstacle to their progress because nationalism impedes economic domination and theological control. The former wants unhindered access to finance, markets and resources required to retain its primacy while the other strives for Islamic Caliphates, which practice a puritan Islam and return to former glory.

There is a naive assumption that if local grievances or problems are solved, global terrorism will disappear. The belief or the hope that, if tomorrow, Palestine, or Kashmir or Chechnya or wherever else, the issues were settled, terrorism will disappear, is a mistaken belief. There is now enough free floating violence and vested interests that would need this violence to continue. There has been a multifaceted nexus between narcotics, illicit arms smuggling and human trafficking that seeks the continuance of violence and disorder.

International terrorism as a Way of Life

Modern terrorism thrives not on just ideology or politics. The main driver is money and the new economy of terror and international crime has been calculated to be worth US $ 1.5 trillion (and growing), which is big enough to challenge Western hegemony. This is higher than the GDP of Britain, ten times the size of General Motors and 17 per cent of the US GDP (1998). Loretta Napoleoni refers to this as the New Economy of Terror.

All the illegal businesses of arms and narcotics trading, oil and diamonds smuggling, charitable organisations that front for illegal businesses and the black money operations form part of this burgeoning business. Terror has other reasons to thrive. There are vested interests that seek the wages of terrorism and terrorist war.

Narcotics smuggling generates its own separate business lines, globally connected with arms smuggling and human trafficking, and all dealt within hundred dollar bills. These black dollars have to be laundered, which is yet another distinctive, secretive and complicated transnational occupation closely connected with these illegal activities and is really a crucial infusion of cash into the Western economies.

In today’s world of deregulated finance, terrorists have taken full advantage of systems to penetrate legitimate international financial institutions and establish regular business houses. Islamic banks and other charities have helped fund movements, sometimes without the knowledge of the managers of these institutions that the source and destination of the funds is not what has been declared. Both Hamas and the PLO have been flush with funds with Arafat’s secret treasury estimated to be worth US $ 700 million to 2 billion.
Our main problem has been in dealing with Pakistan-inspired terrorism.

Countering Terror
When terror struck America and Britain, they introduced draconian laws. The Bush administration even introduced controversial surveillance laws. In India, we did away with the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), but did not consider it important to have an adequate substitute. Battling terror is a long and arduous task: the capability to prevent attacks has to be upgraded constantly, with the knowledge and acceptance that not all attacks can be prevented. It is hard battle where there are no rules for the terrorist and no scruples. Democracies have their inhibitions. Terrorism will never be overcome through good intentions. It will be overcome or managed through exercising hard options. There cannot be communalising of counter-terror and there cannot be compromises till the terrorist I son the run. Otherwise it is appeasement, in the terrorist’s lexicon.
Sharpening Intelligence Capabilities
Even with our present system there are many attacks that get aborted. But when intelligence is inadequate and follow-ups incomplete, indiscriminate arrests follow which lead to further alienation.
Heightened intelligence capability, sustained and built over a period of time, which is able to keep pace with the growing threat, skillful investigation and forensics, particularly at the state level, sharing intelligence, national identity cards, CCTVs at important places, speedy justice which is also seen to be fair, a system of governance that delivers what it is supposed to and a media that does not compete for TRP ratings over such issues: All this and more will have to be put in place for us to succeed. The character of terrorism has changed more rapidly in its operating procedures. There is greater reliance on the cyber and less on the cell phone and on sleeper cells among the jehadi networks while the Naxals retain a very strong hierarchical control mechanism. Both retain their element of surprise but the latter is also a reflection of poor ground state led intelligence. Both seem better trained, better equipped and extremely mobile. The counter terrorist lacks in all three spheres.

It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. Globally, it has been found that despite all the State assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability to collect intelligence about non-State adversaries remains the most difficult and this includes not just the terrorist, but the mastermind, the arms smuggler, the safe house owner, the money launderer and other trans-national operatives. No single agency, no single country can provide this information and no one can still guarantee that every attack will be aborted or every terrorist cell unearthed on time. There has to be multi-level, multi-agency multinational co-operation acting in real time. We must understand that even the best intelligence can only minimise the threat or the forewarning will make the attack insurmountably difficult. And yet, all this kind of cooperation is the most difficult to achieve.

The questions are why is it that we let it happen again and again and can we not do anything to win this war against an unscrupulous and invisible enemy? Why do we give the impression of being soft and confused? There is no short cut to improving the intelligence and security apparatus of the country. Spare no cost and accept no compromises on this. If the country has a well endowed and trained intelligence apparatus acting without political interference (as distinct from accountability) it could provide pre-emptive intelligence that could abort terrorist acts and lead to arrests. It would also prevent indiscriminate arrests and all that follows. We could learn from the Americans – not completely but suitably – they tightened their laws even to extent that they were draconian, spent billions of dollars and improved intelligence collection and surveillance making them intrusive and they outsourced certain aspects of the work to maximise use of talent.

In its latest White Paper on Defence and National Security the French Government has stressed that the world has become “more unstable, more unforeseeable. New crises, in particular from the Middle East to Pakistan have come to the fore and have become interconnected. Jihadism-inspired terrorism aims directly at France and at Europe, which are in a situation of greater direct vulnerability.” The Paper defines its national security strategy as something that provides response to “all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation.” In another key finding, the White Paper says “Knowledge and anticipation represent a new strategic function and have become a priority. In a world characterized by uncertainty and instability, knowledge represents our first line of defence. Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in decision making and enables France to preserve its strategic initiative. It is knowledge which must be provided as early as possible to decision makers, military commanders and those in charge of internal and civil security in order to go from forecasts to informed action. Intelligence of all kinds, including from space and prospective studies, take on major importance.” Yet we in India show no urgency of this kind.

One cannot forever blame the foreign hand. The French for instance realized quite early that terrorist networks are multi-layered and they routinely infiltrate them to try and stay a step ahead of their adversary. It was the French external intelligence – the DGSE-- that had picked up signals of Al Qaeda attacks on the US including about airplane hijackings as early as January 2001. After 9/11, the British MI5 were able to prevent a major terrorist attack across the Atlantic through a combination of telephone, cyber and physical surveillance along with human intelligence

In India our tendency has been to make some post event superficial changes, pious declarations of intent and condemnations of the act accompanied by horrendous photographs of the event with knee jerk expert comments from media rookies. That is until the next attack takes place. We do not even have adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence, we do not even have national identity cards because it is politically inexpedient. Our border controls remain inadequate. Post event the investigating agencies should be allowed to operate in areas and societies from where the attack is suspected to have occurred or planned. There can be little success if exclusions are made on grounds of religion or region.


Lack of Public Awareness, Overzealous Media And Bureaucratic Lethargy

Public indifference to terrorist incidents may indicate that the people may have overcome fear which is a positive development but if it is because of indifference to suffering based on the hope that “I” shall not be the target because tragedies are only meant for “the other”, then we have a problem. There is inadequate public response because it is generally assumed that prevention of terrorism is exclusively the task of the state. This attitude has to change and only the state can help this change. The average citizen must be encouraged and educated to help the state by providing clues, warnings and assistance in investigations.

It has to be acknowledged that the police force is inadequately prepared to deal with the menace and it is not their fault that this is so. The Governments of the day are responsible for this state of affairs. Ill equipped, ill trained ,undermanned station houses they live in appalling conditions sometimes at the mercy of the very don against whom they are supposed to protect the society. Successive governments have taken away the authority and the dignity of the profession. The public has little confidence in the force and the force is unsympathetic to the public. The witness protection schemes are badly flawed and justice is indefinitely delayed. There is little incentive for the public to come forward with evidence and little incentive for the force to prosecute.

A terrorist event makes a good story or ‘breaking news’ but the media too needs some rules of conduct. It is important to report the truth but it is also sometimes important when we are fighting a war to sometimes not report or to modify the report without modifying the truth. Repeated telecast of pictures of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. And photographs of a prospective witness circulated widely would only help the terrorist. Often we glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen. All this has to change too if we want to win the war on terrorism. India must get ready to detect, deter and destroy this menace before it destroys us.

It is amazing that after sixty years of struggling with terrorism, we still say that each terrorist is new experience for us. The one institution that needs major reforms is the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has simply become too big and amorphous. It is manned by transient bureaucrats forever looking for greener pastures elsewhere and by junior staff who have no other future. Like the Ministry of External Affairs we should think in terms of a Ministry on Internal Security that is manned by a permanent cadre of regional, subject and language experts. Further, that this running and control top down should belong to this cadre and not left to those who qualify for life on the basis of an exam they passed decades ago.

The Shape of Things to Come

A familiar Pakistani strategy is unfolding in India where the attempt is to hoist all attacks in India outside Kashmir on the al-Qaeda banner or to pretend that things are not fully under the control of the army in Pakistan. Anyone who has studied Pakistan knows that this is not true. And if things are not under control in a military dictatorship of more or less 60 years standing, then that country is falling apart. We all know that it is the Pakistani — essentially the Punjabi Lashkar and the Jaish who operate from bases in Pakistan and are members of Osama’s International Islamic Front — who continue to target India. They are not members of the al-Qaeda which is an Arab organisation but are ideologically akin

There are many in India, Pakistan and the West who remain in a state of denial about the march of Islamic forces in Pakistan. The manner in which the FATA episode has been dealt with, the manner in which the Lal Masjid episode was handled, or the innumerable suicide attacks that have taken place highlighted by the Marriott bombings in Islamabad, are some of the symptoms of the disease in Pakistan. Islamic radicalism is not seen in the chic salons of Lahore but at Miramshah and Wana in the NWFP and FATA and Faisalabad and Jhang in Punjab. One has to do some sustained reading of the radical Urdu press, which has a much larger circulation than the English newspapers, to assess the mood. And, it is Islamic radicalism backed by the gun. India should worry that this fire in Pakistan will spread to India as well. In fact one can see the signs of this happening already.
The truth is that the Pakistani security system still treats India and its own nationalists as the biggest threat. Perennially fearful of the India’s presence in Afghanistan, the Pakistani establishment feels it not only needs the Taliban but even nurtures them just as it nurtured elements like the Punjabi Lashkar-e Tayyeba in Kashmir. It cannot therefore be serious about curbing the Taliban. But the Pakistan army, no matter who rules and because of their own proclivities, cannot take action against the fundamentalists and extremists and also rely on them for survival. Yet, unless the Pakistan Army moves beyond looking for patchwork solutions to ensure its own primacy and decides to eradicate this menace, a spectre of total radicalism haunts Pakistan. The fear is that the Pakistan Army is now sufficiently and dangerously radicalized to want to change the system. We also need to remember that the US has given US $ 10 billion in military aid to Pakistan in recent years, ostensibly to tackle terrorism.

It is not easy but the civilised world must counter the scourge of terrorism. In a networked world, where communication and action can be in real time, where boundaries need not be crossed and where terrorist action can take place on the Net and through the Net, the task of countering this is increasingly difficult and intricate. Governments are bound by Geneva Conventions in tackling a terrorist organisation, whatever else Bush’s aides may have told him, but the terrorist is not bound by such regulations in this asymmetric warfare.

It has to be accepted that there can be no final victory in any battle against terrorism. Resentments, real or imagined, and exploding expectations, will remain. Since the state no longer has monopoly on instruments of violence, recourse to violence is increasingly a weapon of first resort. Terrorism can be contained and its effects minimised but cannot be eradicated any more than the world can eradicate crime. An over-militaristic response or repeated use of the Armed Forces is fraught with long-term risks for a nation and for the Armed forces. Military action to deter or overcome an immediate threat is often necessary but it cannot ultimately eradicate terrorism. This is as much a political and economic battle and also a battle to be fought long-term by the intelligence and security agencies, and increasingly in cooperation with agencies of other countries.

Ultimately the battle is between democracy and terrorism. The fear is that in order to defeat the latter, we may have to lose some of our democratic values.

Source : Eternal India , Ed by India First Foundation

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Terrorists innovate, but Govt response is unchanged

THE terror attack in Delhi on Saturday was the 14th such incident — among both big and small – since April 1999 ( about the time Kargil was taking place). It was also the 12th attack on a major urban civilian target since the Mumbai train blasts on July 11, 2006. Other bomb attacks have taken place in Mumbai, Malegaon, the Samjhauta Express, Hyderabad ( twice), Ajmer Sharif, Ludhiana, Lucknow, Varanasi, Faizabad, Jaipur, Bengaluru and Ahmedabad. In the last three years more than 600 persons have been killed in various terrorist attacks.

Democracies are supposed to react to terrorism with determination and sensitivity. In India, however, each terrorist act brings forth the same tired clichés, the same repetitive promises and compensations, the same gory pictures on front pages, the same breathless TV channel reporting in shrill horror, the same allegations of intelligence failure in a trial- bycamera.

Yet nothing is done to strengthen intelligence, the counterterrorist mechanisms or to enhance the quality of the police force. There is no apparent determination to take this battle to the enemy.

Vote-banks

Each time there is an incident we are that much closer to what the terrorists want to achieve — fissures in the Indian community. And today, terrorism in India, thanks to our soft policies, is more or less on autopilot. Terrorism is about murder, not about any great cause or freedom struggle. But for years our leaders have played the Muslim card in vote bank politics, whether it was the Shah Bano case or the Babri Masjid issue. Even in our dealings with Pakistan we have let this feeling creep into our sub- conscious.

We have not realised that the Indian Muslim does not want to be linked with Pakistan in that manner.

All he wants is his place in the sun and not promised quotas at election time.

The terrorists have learnt this game and now it is play back time for them just a few months before elections.

What has happened in Delhi or in Ahmedabad, Bengaluru and other cities before is not mindless violence.

It has been carefully planned, executed to perfection and almost at will. They either want to terrorise and get the majority to react or to drive away prospective investors.

Some of the messages that the terrorists have been mailing are distinctly Islamic in character and are thus more inspired by the Al Qaeda mindset than with ethnic or regional aspirations. Of course seeds for all this were sown all these years in the nursery of terrorism — in Pakistan.

Pakistan

Years ago the ISI would have started placing “ sleepers” in India as saboteurs and talent- spotters for new recruits. Many of the Pak- sponsored terrorist groups like the Lashkar- e - Tayyaba and Harkat ul Jehadi ( Bangladesh) are signatories to Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front. HUJI’s contacts with the ISI are well known and so also the fact that Bangladesh has been the conduit for arms and terrorists operating in India. HUJI volunteers have been trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There have been reports indicating linkages between SIMI, HUJI, LeT and ISI and this could be a reworking of the Afghan Jehad in another place and another time. The Indian Mujahedeen could be a surrogate for any one of these organisations but nothing can be said until the identity of the leadership is established.

Unfortunately, we gave this battle away to glib talk by agreeing that Pakistan too was a victim of terrorism.

We did not point out that Pakistan was a victim of its own terrorism.

The truth is that we have misread Pakistan’s leaders. They need India as an enemy for their survival and Kashmir is the excuse not the cause. Even if Kashmir were solved to Pakistan’s “ satisfaction” they would invent other causes for continued animus. Make no mistake; Kashmir is important for its water that irrigates the Punjab. The will of the people is not important either in Kashmir or Pakistan.

The questions are why is it that we let it happen again and again and can we not do anything to win this war against an unscrupulous and invisible enemy? Why do we give the impression of being soft and confused? There is no short cut to improving the intelligence and security apparatus of the country. Spare no cost and accept no compromises on this. If the country has a well- endowed and trained intelligence apparatus acting without political interference ( as distinct from accountability) it could provide preemptive intelligence that could abort terrorist acts and lead to arrests. It would also prevent indiscriminate arrests and all that follows. We could learn from the Americans — not completely but suitably — they tightened their laws to the extent that they were draconian, spent billions of dollars and improved intelligence collection and surveillance, making them intrusive, and outsourced certain aspects of the work to maximise use of talent.

Policing

This would not be enough. The state apparatus up to the thana level have to be similarly educated and strengthened and placed on the same grid as the national agencies. We need a rapid action force located in the states to follow intelligence trails. We need political will to sustain this campaign over years and changes in governments.

Above all, we need a lot of luck because there is no certified method of spotting a would- be terrorist.

Nearly three years ago in an article, I wrote: “ Many in India are given to wishful thinking that peace between India and Pakistan is possible and .... that this would lead to an end to terrorism in India. It will not, given the mindset that prevails in Rawalpindi and Islamabad along with the madrassa culture which collectively dreams of a destabilised, if not balkanised, India. If Pak- inspired terrorism in India were to come to an end where would all these jehadis be sent? To the rest of India, perhaps? Or to Afghanistan, Central Asia or even further into Europe? Keeping them in Pakistan would be suicidal for the Pakistani establishment. Islamic radicals and terrorists may not have yet developed a replica of the Comintern but they do seem to have a Jehad’s Rapid Deployment Force as a counter to Centcom.” And so it came to pass.

The war is long, arduous and also ruthless. It is a war we cannot afford to lose. Ultimately there is no real choice between security and liberty — for a people to have the second they must have the first.

Source : Mail Today, 18 September 2008

Sunday, September 7, 2008

Georgia Lessons : Do not fight for others

Normally there would be very little reason for Indians to lose sleep over events in Georgia other than the knowledge that Georgians won three gold medals at the recently-concluded Beijing Olympics. But there have been other reasons that Georgia has been making the headlines in Russia, Europe and, sporadically, in the United States. Important lessons in statecraft flow from this.
Things had been brewing in the Caucasus for some time as the Americans played their game of encircling Russia. A regional summit of Guam (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was held in Batumi, Georgia, in July 2008. Guam is ostensibly an organisation for democracy and economic development, but in reality it is a military agreement and a de facto appendage of Nato to be used to extend its zone of influence into the Russian heartland. A US-Guam summit was also held on the sidelines, with Poland participating.
While the world awaited inauguration of the Beijing Olympics, the Georgians, following Washington-injected adrenalin, pushed their troops into South Ossetia, a region within Georgia that has been demanding independence and merger with North Ossetia in Russia. This happened a week after extensive US-Georgia wargames.
The Russians reacted the only way they could — with speed and force. The message for the outside world was that the Russians would do anything to protect their national interest and global opinion was not going to deter them. Lesson one: If a state wants to be recognised as a regional/global power, it must be willing and able to do what it must in national interest in its neighbourhood.
Georgia was not a helpless little country trying to defend itself against the giant next door as has been reported in the Indian press, drawing its information from Western mainstream media. In reality, Georgia was provoking Russia through a mixture of effective media management and Western sympathy. When the Russians reacted with force, there was very little the Americans could do except shake their heads, wring their hands and ask the European Union to join them in admonishing the Russians. Neither the Americans nor Nato was about to go to war with Russia on behalf of Georgia, and certainly not after Iraq and Afghanistan. They had encouraged Georgian adventurism, but had not anticipated Russian reaction. Lesson two: Adventurism, at the behest of distant powers against the local power, can be suicidal.
The third lesson is for the Americans. Intent on creating American clones in Russia's periphery, they systematically induced various colour revolutions in what was once Soviet territory. The Georgians were promised democracy as a solution to all their problems and as redemption from all their socialist sins. After some initial upheavals, Washington grafted an American citizen, Mikheil Saakashvili, as Georgia's President. They equipped the Georgian armed forces, Nato trained their men and the US pushed for Nato membership for Georgia, alarming the Russians.
In the 1990s, the Russians had watched helplessly after they dismantled the Warsaw Pact only to find Nato extending its eastern frontiers and the energy giants moving in as Boris Yeltsin and his groupies sold off national assets on the cheap. This was till Vladimir Putin arrived on the scene to reclaim history and geography. Obviously, there are limitations to power and Russia is not yet a write-off. Lesson three, therefore, is: Do not meddle around and do not promise if you cannot deliver. Finally, a lesson for all those involved in realpolitik.
Mr Saakashvili had led an effective media campaign personally and, in the initial days, the Georgians were portrayed by western TV and press as the innocent victims of Russian bullying. There were no takers for the Russian narrative of events. There is no Russian version of the BBC or CNN; nor, for that matter, is there an Indian version. The Russians accused CNN of telecasting footage of Georgian attacks in South Ossetia as Russian attacks in Georgia.
So, if you want to assert yourself, make sure the media is on your side; make sure your voice is heard far and wide and initial imagery is vital too. Soft power is as important as hard power. The question one might ask is why EU, Nato and the US are so keen about a tiny little Republic tucked away in the Caucasian mountains, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, whose unnatural borders had been created by another Georgian, Joseph Dzhughasvilli, better known as Stalin. The real issue is not democracy or human rights. The real issue is pinning Russia down and freeing energy resources from Russian control.
The conflict in Georgia is not about its resources (it has few) but about its geographical location. The struggle is for control of energy and transport corridors from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to bypass Russia and thus reduce Western dependency on Russia. The gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian and Central Asia have to go through the Caucasus to reach Europe if consumers want to avoid crossing either Russia or Iran.
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, from Azerbaijan on the Caspian coast to the Eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, has been an expensive and a controversial project that was completed in 2006 and has been disrupted by Kurdish separatists. The Russian response has exposed Georgia's vulnerability and more pipelines through Georgia are unlikely. With winter around the corner, a West Europe that is dependent on Russian gas supplies would want a quick settlement of the dispute. Georgia could thus be the choke point.
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, on the eastern coast of the Caspian, has offered more gas to China (40 billion cubic metres per year, instead of 30 bcm) through another pipeline. The Kazakhs are constructing a pipeline all the way from the Caspian Sea into China. The pipes, when completed, will stretch more than 7,000 km from Turkmenistan, cross Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and enter China's Xinjiang province. The Russians plan to hold a conference of gas exporters in November, possibly to discuss the creation of a gas charter similar to Opec. Gas and oil, instead of flowing westward through routes the West wants, could end up flowing eastward. It could be a long hard winter and a Cold War, Version 2, in George W. Bush's fading months and Dmitry Medvedev's early days.

Source : Deccan Chronicle , 5th September 2008

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Musharraf's exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis

From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush's buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush's endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.

So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late.
Musharraf had to leave when the three A's deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.

The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.

The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.

Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh's offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.

Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America's choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.


Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf's ouster is, to that extent, Sharif's victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.


The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.

America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support.

One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.


Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008

Musharraf's exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis





From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush's buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush's endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.




So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late. Musharraf had to leave when the three A's deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.




The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.




The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.




Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh's offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.




Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America's choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.




Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf's ouster is, to that extent, Sharif's victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.
The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.




America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support. One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.



Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Musharraf’s exit will not make Pak mend its ways

Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the Jihadis




From being a pariah with whom Bill Clinton did not even want to be seen, Pervez Musharraf had a spectacular rise to fame by becoming George W. Bush’s buddy at his Crawford ranch. Musharraf had been a beneficiary of the post-9/11 equations and the Americans had spoiled him silly by doting on him. Bush’s endless hyperbole about the stalwart ally jarred many Pakistani nerves but Musharraf mistook this indulgence as an acknowledgement of his "statesmanship", whereas it was only an opportunistic use by a superpower that felt it had little choice.





So despite his sharply declining popularity at home and the debacle of the February 18 elections, Musharraf refused to see the writing on the wall. His own ego came in the way. In his autobiography he describes the story of his life coinciding with the story of Pakistan — "a biography not only of a man but of Pakistan as well." Musharraf says he found Abraham Lincoln’s determination to preserve the American Constitution inspirational, yet he himself indulged in constitutional convolutions and claims of political indispensability until it was too late.
Musharraf had to leave when the three A’s deserted him. He had upset the Islamic right-wing by siding with the Americans and he could not annihilate those he had nurtured for so long so assiduously. As a result, he could not keep the Americans happy in his half-hearted campaign against the terrorists in the FATA and against the Taliban. He was increasingly seen as an American stooge and attempts on his life started early in his presidential career.





The writing was on the wall when the Americans started saying that impeachment was a internal matter for the Pakistanis, and that Musharraf would not be granted asylum in the United States. It was obvious that, like other US favourites from Manuel Noriega of Panama, other Latin American dictators and the Shah of Iran, he had become a dispensable commodity, maybe even a liability. Musharraf had played his double game on the global war on terror for far too long and the US had run out of patience. Besides, the US had to choose between the ally of choice, Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai, and an ally of circumstance, Musharraf.



The Army, the final arbiter of political destinies in Pakistan, seems to have stepped in last. Its image already battered after the Lal Masjid episode, the several suicide attacks in the Punjabi heartland and successive failures in FATA with the Taliban extending its sway in the North-West Frontier Province, the Army would not have wanted their former chief indicted by a bunch of civilians. That would have destroyed the Army as the strongest institution of the country. It was Gen. Parvez Ashfaq Kayani who would have advised his predecessor to resign to save the Army and, by implication, the nation.





Surely there were other pressures at work. The arrival of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, on August 15, was no coincidence. There were reports that Riyadh’s offer of the desperately-needed Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) worth $5 billion for Islamabad was linked to a political deal, under which the present PPP-PML(N) coalition government would allow Musharraf an honourable exit. The SOF would save Pakistan the ignominy of going to the International Monetary Fund to seek assistance to get over its balance of payments problems. It is possible that the Saudis, anxious to keep Pakistan on their side because of Iran, and the fear of what the Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda might do, may have seen a congruence of interests with the US and agreed to be the dealmakers.





Nawaz Sharif is an old friend of the Saudis, having spent long years in exile in the kingdom. It was the Saudis who sent Nawaz Sharif back to Pakistan just about the time Benazir Bhutto was making her re-entry. If Ms Bhutto was America’s choice, Sharif was obviously the Saudi preference. He had the right credentials — a male, from the Punjab, with Jamaat connections, who had promised the introduction of the Shariat and the Nizam-e-Mustafa and whose political career had been launched by the Army to tackle Benazir Bhutto.





Yet it was Nawaz Sharif who had been leading the charge against Musharraf in recent months, while Asif Ali Zardari prevaricated. Musharraf’s ouster is, to that extent, Sharif’s victory. This would leave him stronger to tackle Zardari. Now that the common enemy has gone, there is very little glue left to keep the two together. Sooner rather than later the battlelines will be drawn.



The first battle will be on the choice of a new President. The PPP has its nominees as Prime Minister and Speaker. Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) will obviously stake a claim to the presidency. Sharif is likely to be supported by the Islamic parties, the Punjabis, the Army and the MQM. The question will be whether the President will be allowed to retain the powers to dissolve Parliament as at present, or will this power be withdrawn. There is likely to be a tussle on this and over the restoration of judges. It is possible that Sharif may develop presidential ambitions with full powers, otherwise we are looking at early elections.





America will judge the government on how it fights the war on terror on the western front and how it handles an increasingly Talibanised region, but the people of Pakistan will judge it on how the government revives the ailing economy. The problem is that no government in Pakistan can deliver on the second without American assistance. Even though at present it would seem that the Saudi influence in Pakistan has increased, Pakistan as a country on the dole will remain dependent on American financial and material support.





One would not expect any great change with regard to India beyond the usual polite promises. Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir will surely remain with the Army/ISI, but the civilians will take the fall should things go wrong. Democracy in Pakistan provides no magic wand that will wish away the jihadis.




Source : Asian Age , 20th August 2008