China is America’s strategic competitor, not partner
A 72-PAGE study conducted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, in 1995 had predicted that if India and China, two of the most heavily populated countries in the world, were to achieve a rapid level of development, it would have a significant impact on world economy. At the time, the Indian economy was barely waking up from its socialist slumber and not quite aware of its potential. But the rest of the world had begun to take notice. Often today, the question asked is whether or not India will catch up with China. But the more important question is whether China will catch up with the US. Since 1978, China has averaged 9.4 per cent annual GDP growth and today holds $ 252 billion in US Treasury Bonds (plus $ 48 billion held by Hong Kong). If the predictions made by Goldman Sachs that China will surpass the US economy by 2041 prove to be accurate, then this will happen in the lifetime of most Indians under the age of 25 today. This would obviously mean that India would be lagging behind unless China runs aground or India shows an unbelievably magnificent late spurt. The Chinese may not want to admit it but competition and rivalry for markets and resources in Asia are inevitable in the years ahead. But all this assumes that the world has factored in peak oil and declining production, which should be starting any time now, and global warming which scientists predict may hit us even by 2010. Should there be no cures, then all bets about global pre-eminence are off.
Today, in search of its pre-eminent role at least in Asia, as worked out by Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin in 1996, China is far more aggressively active in trying to shore up its position for the future. Alarmed at the post-9/11 moves by the Bush administration, the Chinese have begun to move into energy rich areas around the globe, reorganise the navy and strengthen relations in its periphery.
In recent months, they have repeatedly outmanoeuvred the Indians in their quest for oil and gas in Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Angola, Nigeria and even in India’s neighbourhood — Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar announced last January that its gas would be flowing east to China and not to India. China has upgraded its relations with Bangladesh and is today the largest supplier of military hardware to that country. It has access to Chittagong port. A road link from Bangladesh through Myanmar will help carry goods. It hopes to acquire gas. China would want to secure overland routes rather than be dependent only on sea routes for its energy supplies. China’s role in developing the Gwadar port on the Baloch coast has been described as its biggest harvest. Its consistent and clandestine assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile projects, over the last 20 years and more, must never be forgotten by Indian strategic thinkers when they work on India-Chinese amity. Despite occasional cooperation and joint investments, China is unlikely to give India space, out of magnanimity, to secure strategic supplies. India will have to create suitable incentives and interests through trade, aid and military support accompanied by strenuous and fleet-footed diplomatic efforts that could create economic and security dependencies in the supplier States. The Chinese say that they have to continue to grow at 10 per cent annually in order to be able to provide jobs for the 25 million people who ‘enter’ the market every year. China needs American markets for an economic growth that is essentially export-driven. Therefore, Beijing must maintain acceptable standards of political relations with its trading partners and has near-perfected this art.
Politically, China challenges Japan, reserves its venom for Japanese actions and opposes it, yet receives its maximum imports from that country. With the US, while the vitriol is substituted with histrionics, China does not hesitate to bring down a US reconnaissance aircraft — and then buys Boeing aircraft. China’s quest for energ y in areas that the Americans have long assumed to be their private preserve is most certainly viewed as a provocation in Washington. Beijing has aggressively and systematically pursued its search for oil and gas all across the globe into Latin America and Africa as well. In addition, Beijing’s support to Tehran in the recent uranium enrichment controversy and admission of Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member, coupled with what US leaders describe as China’s excessive militarisation, fuels suspicions in an atmosphere already surcharged because of North Korea and Taiwan. This is bound to put the two on a collision course.
American long-term strategy to prevent the rise of another centre of power is now back at the forefront for Pentagon planners after a four-year hiatus during which the Americans were fighting their Global War on Terror. China is back to being a strategic competitor and not the strategic partner of the Clinton era. The Americans have their annual National Security Strate g y and their Quadrennial Defence Reviews premised on a unipolar world of total dominance and unchallenged military power.
The Chinese too explained their national security strategy in a white paper ‘China’s National Defence in 2004’ released in December, which speaks of multi polarity and a bumpy road to globalisation. The posture of active defence implies that the Chinese are willing to be patient, peaceful and accommodating so long as world events turn out according to their expectations. If they do not, then they will change their attitude. And what China desires is total dominance in East Asia which means that the US must withdraw. President Hu may have come away from his recent US visit wondering if the wrong anthem at the welcome ceremony and the Falung Gong protest inside the Rose Garden, were typical US maladroitness or a sinister message.
China seeks a close strategic partner in Russia through purchase of state-of-the-art weaponry and energy from the Russians. Joint military exercises and their together ness in the SCO is designed to checkmate Americans and the Nato in Central Asia. There was a time when there was talk of a trilateral arrangement between Russia, China and India but this has not taken off yet. The Indo-US nuclear deal is likely to dampen forward movement of this tripartite arrangement as Beijing could view this as an attempt to use India to counterbalance it.
The Chinese economic miracle has some flaws. The development has taken place through wholly owned foreign enterprises and joint ventures; private Chinese fir ms have not played any significant role — with a maximum of 5 per cent in electronics and telecommunications and as low as 1 per cent in computers and peripherals. In India, the private sector is playing a much larger role. If there is disenchantment and impatience in India with the fallout of the development, it’s impossible to accept that there is none in China. Only, the rest of the world does not get to know. Unless political reform is attempted, political turmoil later is more or less inevitable. This reform is all the more necessary because China must now continue to seek economic prosperity at a rapid rate to keep rising expectations from blowing out of control. This would require it to seek, even more aggressively, markets and resources.
At the same time, China will strive to keep its image of a peaceful nation, speak the language of moderation till it feels that the Americans have begun to pull out, and then move in to fill the vacuum. Meanwhile, it will seek to strengthen its military muscle.
Source : Hindustan Times 26th April 2006
A 72-PAGE study conducted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, in 1995 had predicted that if India and China, two of the most heavily populated countries in the world, were to achieve a rapid level of development, it would have a significant impact on world economy. At the time, the Indian economy was barely waking up from its socialist slumber and not quite aware of its potential. But the rest of the world had begun to take notice. Often today, the question asked is whether or not India will catch up with China. But the more important question is whether China will catch up with the US. Since 1978, China has averaged 9.4 per cent annual GDP growth and today holds $ 252 billion in US Treasury Bonds (plus $ 48 billion held by Hong Kong). If the predictions made by Goldman Sachs that China will surpass the US economy by 2041 prove to be accurate, then this will happen in the lifetime of most Indians under the age of 25 today. This would obviously mean that India would be lagging behind unless China runs aground or India shows an unbelievably magnificent late spurt. The Chinese may not want to admit it but competition and rivalry for markets and resources in Asia are inevitable in the years ahead. But all this assumes that the world has factored in peak oil and declining production, which should be starting any time now, and global warming which scientists predict may hit us even by 2010. Should there be no cures, then all bets about global pre-eminence are off.
Today, in search of its pre-eminent role at least in Asia, as worked out by Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin in 1996, China is far more aggressively active in trying to shore up its position for the future. Alarmed at the post-9/11 moves by the Bush administration, the Chinese have begun to move into energy rich areas around the globe, reorganise the navy and strengthen relations in its periphery.
In recent months, they have repeatedly outmanoeuvred the Indians in their quest for oil and gas in Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Angola, Nigeria and even in India’s neighbourhood — Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar announced last January that its gas would be flowing east to China and not to India. China has upgraded its relations with Bangladesh and is today the largest supplier of military hardware to that country. It has access to Chittagong port. A road link from Bangladesh through Myanmar will help carry goods. It hopes to acquire gas. China would want to secure overland routes rather than be dependent only on sea routes for its energy supplies. China’s role in developing the Gwadar port on the Baloch coast has been described as its biggest harvest. Its consistent and clandestine assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile projects, over the last 20 years and more, must never be forgotten by Indian strategic thinkers when they work on India-Chinese amity. Despite occasional cooperation and joint investments, China is unlikely to give India space, out of magnanimity, to secure strategic supplies. India will have to create suitable incentives and interests through trade, aid and military support accompanied by strenuous and fleet-footed diplomatic efforts that could create economic and security dependencies in the supplier States. The Chinese say that they have to continue to grow at 10 per cent annually in order to be able to provide jobs for the 25 million people who ‘enter’ the market every year. China needs American markets for an economic growth that is essentially export-driven. Therefore, Beijing must maintain acceptable standards of political relations with its trading partners and has near-perfected this art.
Politically, China challenges Japan, reserves its venom for Japanese actions and opposes it, yet receives its maximum imports from that country. With the US, while the vitriol is substituted with histrionics, China does not hesitate to bring down a US reconnaissance aircraft — and then buys Boeing aircraft. China’s quest for energ y in areas that the Americans have long assumed to be their private preserve is most certainly viewed as a provocation in Washington. Beijing has aggressively and systematically pursued its search for oil and gas all across the globe into Latin America and Africa as well. In addition, Beijing’s support to Tehran in the recent uranium enrichment controversy and admission of Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member, coupled with what US leaders describe as China’s excessive militarisation, fuels suspicions in an atmosphere already surcharged because of North Korea and Taiwan. This is bound to put the two on a collision course.
American long-term strategy to prevent the rise of another centre of power is now back at the forefront for Pentagon planners after a four-year hiatus during which the Americans were fighting their Global War on Terror. China is back to being a strategic competitor and not the strategic partner of the Clinton era. The Americans have their annual National Security Strate g y and their Quadrennial Defence Reviews premised on a unipolar world of total dominance and unchallenged military power.
The Chinese too explained their national security strategy in a white paper ‘China’s National Defence in 2004’ released in December, which speaks of multi polarity and a bumpy road to globalisation. The posture of active defence implies that the Chinese are willing to be patient, peaceful and accommodating so long as world events turn out according to their expectations. If they do not, then they will change their attitude. And what China desires is total dominance in East Asia which means that the US must withdraw. President Hu may have come away from his recent US visit wondering if the wrong anthem at the welcome ceremony and the Falung Gong protest inside the Rose Garden, were typical US maladroitness or a sinister message.
China seeks a close strategic partner in Russia through purchase of state-of-the-art weaponry and energy from the Russians. Joint military exercises and their together ness in the SCO is designed to checkmate Americans and the Nato in Central Asia. There was a time when there was talk of a trilateral arrangement between Russia, China and India but this has not taken off yet. The Indo-US nuclear deal is likely to dampen forward movement of this tripartite arrangement as Beijing could view this as an attempt to use India to counterbalance it.
The Chinese economic miracle has some flaws. The development has taken place through wholly owned foreign enterprises and joint ventures; private Chinese fir ms have not played any significant role — with a maximum of 5 per cent in electronics and telecommunications and as low as 1 per cent in computers and peripherals. In India, the private sector is playing a much larger role. If there is disenchantment and impatience in India with the fallout of the development, it’s impossible to accept that there is none in China. Only, the rest of the world does not get to know. Unless political reform is attempted, political turmoil later is more or less inevitable. This reform is all the more necessary because China must now continue to seek economic prosperity at a rapid rate to keep rising expectations from blowing out of control. This would require it to seek, even more aggressively, markets and resources.
At the same time, China will strive to keep its image of a peaceful nation, speak the language of moderation till it feels that the Americans have begun to pull out, and then move in to fill the vacuum. Meanwhile, it will seek to strengthen its military muscle.
Source : Hindustan Times 26th April 2006
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