Pakistan pendulum

Is Musharraf sincere in taking the peace process forward?

Gen Musharraf was the perfect guest to a considerate host and there were several Kodak Moments. When he sang “Its now or never”, sections of the Indian Candlelight Brigade gushed -- come hold me tight. A similar sentiment is palpably lacking in Pakistan where reactions have varied from cautious optimism to outright criticism. Accusations of a climb down from the “Kashmir-first” position and allegations of a sell out by the General have been expectedly made by the jehadis and the right wing but also by the liberal intellectual class.

The General announced he has had a change of heart. But the question still remains whether this is a change of heart and therefore a change of goals or merely a change of tactics and no change of goals. The difficulty of dealing with dictators is that they attain power suddenly and depart equally suddenly.

There is no guaranteed order of succession in Pakistan, the constitution has been trampled under the jackboot, and the polity rendered weak, divided or exiled. Only two elements are strong – the Army and the Mullah. There is, therefore, no guarantee that in the years to come General Musharraf’s successor will feel honour-bound to respect the agreements Musharraf signs. His continuation in office will then become a vested interest for all, not just the USA.

The dethroning of Nawaz Sharif had been received with acclaim at home and disdain abroad. From the time when President Clinton refused to be seen with Musharraf in public during his five hour stop over in Islamabad in 2000 to being one of the chosen few at Camp David last year has been quite a leap forward for the General. The journey, begun in September 2001, has been long and perilous, involving several hairpin bends and fortuitous escapes.

At home Musharraf, however, has a number of problems but no ready answers. The Baloch are rebellious, the Waziris and the Afridis in Waziristan are angry as the USA pressurises Pakistan to hunt for the Al Qaeda, which in turn has angered a section of the Army. The MMA is engrossed in Talibanising the Pathans in NWFP, while the Northern Areas of J&K (which the Pakistanis now call the Northern Areas of Pakistan) resent the unending influx of Pathans and Punjabis and see it as demographic aggression to convert their Shia majority area into a Sunni-Wahhabi majority region. The locals refer to their area as Pakistan Occupied Baltistan.

Musharraf’s inability to reform the madrassas and uncontrolled sectarian strife threatens to engulf the country with a jehadi fervour that may be difficult to remove as time passes. Tens of thousands of these jehadis are jobless currently but no new assignments are available except maybe in Bangladesh where the HUJI have strong links with the Pakistani HUJI and Al Qaeda sympathisers. Some could even be sent to India where thousands of Pakistanis go missing anyway. Those among us, who dream of open borders, would do well to consider the enormity of what they are suggesting.

Actually, shorn of the “NOT INDIA” identity that the Pakistanis have given themselves and made Kashmir the lynch pin of their India policy, this problem may even be the one that Pakistan may find is the easiest to solve. The other two security issues, nuclear weapons and Afghanistan are strategically far more important. No leader in Pakistan can afford to lose the nuclear trigger. It is not only a symbol of sovereignty and power, it is also seen as a guarantee against India and even USA, especially after Iraq and plans against Iran. Afghanistan is a major problem because of the Pakhtoon factor. The Pathans straddle the Durand Line and if they are unable to rule Afghanistan there will be a spill over of the revolt in Pakistan as well. This could seriously destabilise Pakistan.

For Pakistan, Kashmir is a strategic issue only for the water (45% imported from ‘India-held Kashmir’) and an emotional issue created through years of sponsored hatred. The Pakistanis also know that unless provoked, the Indians are not going to unilaterally disturb the presently settled demarcations and even under grave provocation, as in the time of Kargil in 1999, did not violate the LOC. Nor would they violate the Indus Waters Treaty. It is the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) that are important for Pakistan through which the strategic Karakoram Highway passes into China.

In the days ahead Musharraf will campaign internationally for demilitarisation of J&K, release of prisoners, ensure human rights compliance and ask India to talk to the Hurriyat, send them to Pakistan, all designed to raise the comfort level of the Kashmiris and to find an early solution. Sheikh Rashid said the other day that a solution could be found by 2007-08.

What Musharraf will not do is to grant India MFN status till the textile tariff issue is resolved or transit rights to Afghanistan till there is forward movement on the Kashmir issue but will push for the gas-pipeline as this benefits Pakistan commercially. He will not support India’s bid for UNSC seat.

What Musharraf could still do is to raise the temperature in the Valley should he run out of patience, his hand is forced or he perceives that India is backtracking. He is supposed to have commented to the Indian media before leaving New Delhi –“unless we resolve the dispute it [military option] could erupt again under a future frame,” - sounds ominous. In terms of the joint statement this time, the two leaders pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process. In fact, he may not have to do much in the Valley as he could easily use Bangladesh or Nepal for this purpose and the talks will continue.

Ultimately, it will be Musharraf’s perception and his decisions largely that will determine how the talks progress. General Musharraf had said in Karachi in April 1999 that the best policy was to keep India bleeding in Kashmir till it falls into Pakistan’s lap. Around the same time his troops along with some Lashkar terrorists were scaling the heights of Kargil while Prime Ministers Nawaz and Vajpayee were talking peace. Let us never ever forget that.

In November 2004 Musharraf was showing signs of impatience when he told a group of visiting Indian journalists that he had found Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Jammu statement that Kashmir is an integral part of India, most disappointing, and had created suspicions about Indian intentions and maximalist positions. By January 2005 Musharraf was telling his Corps Commanders that there would be no more concessions to India, there would be no solution to the problem except plebiscite and Pakistan would give complete support to the armed struggle in Kashmir. Later in March he threatened another Kargil but was ready to come to India in April.

Something has happened recently that has made him change his mind and tactics, if not his heart. Was there some pressure or some enlightenment? Will it sustain over time? It is better to know that for sure before we give accolades and get too sentimental about the General, the peace process or the Hurriyat.

It is still early days into this change of heart. It is he who needs a quick remedy to the problems Pakistan has created in the neighbourhood and for itself - a kind of juvenile delinquent who wants instant pardon. One is not yet sure if the reformation is complete and irreversible. Surely India can wait for proof.

Source : Hindustan times 2nd may 2005