India - Pakistan Peace process : An Assessment

Successive Indian Prime Ministers in recent years have pursued the peace process with Pakistan from the time of Inder Gujral to A.B. Vajpayee and then to the current PM. They have stuck to the task even when this has appeared as appeasement to their critics.

As it has happened, overtures to Pakistan have often come during or after a major assault by Pakistan. In the late 1990s India made these moves even as the insurgency in Kashmir continued unabated, or soon after the Kargil adventure of Gen Musharraf. And now we have even permitted ourselves to believe or at least say publicly that Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism.

Ironically the Pakistan Army, which had convinced it self that the Indian were exhausted in Kashmir were suing for peace. So when Musharraf came to India in 2001 for his talks with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, he strutted on the stage like a victor little realizing that he had been carried away by his propaganda.

The Indian approach was based on greater long term possibilities. If there had to be peace, then things had to change. It was therefore necessary to engage the enemy or a friend according to one’s capabilities to change a situation to one’s advantage.

Vajpayee’s initiative

Although Vajpayee’s invitation to Musharraf for the Agra Summit and the subsequent collapse of the talks came in for the anticipated criticism, it has to be pointed out that there were new approaches to the entire India-Pakistan problem. This was the first high-level discussion between the two countries on all contentious issues, including cross-border terrorism and Kashmir. It was also the first dialogue held in the glare of media, giving diplomacy a new dimension of media management utilised by the General to full advantage and, as it turned out, the Indian delegation was left looking hapless. But the Summit clarified the issues – Kashmir, terrorism, nuclear weapons and security and economic and social exchanges - that needed to be discussed and negotiated if peace and cooperation were to be achieved.

The Vajpayee Government’s decision in April 2003, despite the setbacks, to re-engage Pakistan by announcing a unilateral ceasefire on the LoC and opening the doors for a composite dialogue, was prompted by a new, wider vista of India’s foreign policy outlook. The whole aim was to reach out globally beyond Pakistan, from a position of strength. Less than a year later, on January 6, 2004, both the countries decided, on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, to resume official talks and Pakistan accepted that cross border terrorism had to be stopped. Vajpayee was personally keen on engaging Pakistan, although it is hard to dispute that nudging from Washington did make a difference. The January 6 joint statement was followed by a three-day official-level `talk on talks` in Islamabad on February 18, 2004 where it was decided to begin a composite dialogue on eight issues, including Kashmir.

Manmohan Singh’s policy

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, assumed office in 2004 and decided to continue to build on the tenuous relationship with Pakistan where Vajpayee had left off. He opted for a continuation of the policy of rapprochement, even on Kashmir, a subject on which his party, the Congress, has held a divergent view for decades.

In his address to the nation, Manmohan Singh articulated his Pakistan policy thus: ``We desire to live in a neighbourhood of peace and prosperity. We will actively pursue the composite dialogue with Pakistan. We are sincere about discussing and resolving all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir…`` Without referring to Pakistan, Manmohan Singh was quite emphatic that his government would combat terrorism ``with all the resources at our command``. This resolve was later reflected in stronger tones in his comments at Washington in July 2005. The only difference was that he clearly referred to Pakistan, a hard line which he stuck to when, in his Independence Day speech, he accused Pakistan of ``half-hearted measures`` to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure.

The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan is at a critical juncture. There have been countless discussions on a wide variety of issues that have bedeviled the relationship between the two neighbours. These discussions have been ``fruitful`` but are yet to yield any fruits in terms of tangible resolutions.

An honest assessment of the situation will reveal three developing situations that need to be dealt with speedily. There is growing impatience in Pakistan about the lack of progress in the talks, especially on Kashmir. There is a visible move, not only among the religious extremist groups but also within the political and military establishment about bringing the focus of the dialogue back to Kashmir. There is no sign of any executive action to destroy the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan because the policy is quite simple. And as the Pakistani establishment insists, there are no terrorists in Kashmir, only freedom fighters.

Unfortunately, the Joint Terror Mechanism lets Pakistan off the hook. Pakistan need no longer deliver on cross-border terrorism. With some variation, Pakistan will continue to follow the same principles as on the western frontier – where the one-liner is – do not touch the Taliban and do not spare the Al Qaeda. In India there are no terrorists in Kashmir and India had to prove each case in the rest of the country while India was assisting in the terrorists in Balochistan.

General Musharraf has been throwing a number of Kashmir linked proposals and has felt frustrated at the response or the lack of it. There is one thing that has to be remembered though in dealing with the various proposals of joint sovereignty or division of territory and so on. Musharraf does not view the many proposals that he keeps throwing at India as solutions to the problem but only a process for the solution. The goal remains unchanged, which is self-determination in the Valley. Many of us tend to confuse what Musharraf offers as suggestions with possible final solutions and this lends to premature and misplaced enthusiasm

There is growing disenchantment with the progress made so far in the Composite Dialogue. This is reflected in the popular media, seminar circuits, speeches made by religious and political leaders, including President Musharraf and his Cabinet colleagues. Pakistani diplomats, journalists and academics in India do not hesitate to express their disillusionment. The return of terrorist leaders like Syed Salahuddin to the front pages of Urdu newspapers and magazines and the growing reference to the activities of the Muzaffarabad-based United Jehad Council are a pointer to this impatience.

Although the Kashmir issue has been treated as part of the Dialogue, there has been an increased attempt by Islamabad to take it back to top of the agenda. The common refrain in Pakistan today is that without a resolution in Kashmir first, there cannot be any progress in the peace process and that a majority of the Pakistanis were getting impatient about what they perceived as India’s deliberate attempts to sideline the Kashmir issue and resolve other issues, which only benefit the latter.

Pakistan is not inclined to keep the dialogue going only if there were some semblance of a resolution in its favour and will not accept any suggestions that might benefit India. This posturing should be read in the context of India’s categorical statement that there would not be any redrawing of the boundaries. This neutralises any possibility of the much talked about Musharraf plan to divide Kashmir into five zones being considered. Pakistan is unwilling to accept the Indian option for soft borders, as it would mean de facto acceptance of the Line of Control as the International Border.

Left with limited options, Pakistan is resorting to some desperate manoeuvres to extract some concessions. The insistence on co-opting the All Party Hurriyet Conference in the talks on Kashmir is one such tactic. New Delhi for reasons that have never been clear has allowed the secessionist group to visit Pakistan and also to meet visiting Pakistani political and even bureaucrats. This is a tacit admission that India accepts Pakistan’s hold on the Hurriyet and that Pakistan now has a direct role in the peace process even when the Indian Government talks to Kashmiri leaders and other unelected individuals belonging the Hurriyet. That Prime Minister Manmohan Singh then invited not only the Hurriyet, but also marginal leaders like Sajjad Lone for interactions reveals India’s attempt to prevent Pakistan from exploiting its hold over the Hurriyet leadership.

In the last three years the peace process has in some ways moved beyond the issue of terrorism, where we have lost ground unnecessarily, it must not be forgotten that the Pakistanis have all along used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and as a force equaliser. It is important to have a look at the Pakistani policy and changes if any

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been scripted and sustained by the Pakistan Army since 1947. It was originally more than just a religious issue or unfinished part of the Partition. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, writing in his book The Military and Politics in Pakistan said that in the Army’s perception “Kashmir is so strategically situated that it can be used to cripple Pakistan economically and militarily.” Such statements were also based on the fact that the Indus River the lifeline for Pakistan, flowed from Jammu and Kashmir, which, Pakistan’s strategic planners believed, gave India an omnipotent weapon against the former in future. Over the years, the Army exploited these fears to turn Kashmir into a question of identity, an “unfinished task of Partition”. Over the years, the Army leadership has vested Kashmir with explosive emotional potential. One of the most recent and telling remarks was made by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002 in his address to the nation: “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir.” This statement represents the official policy of Pakistan on Kashmir.

Driven primarily by the Army’s grip on Pakistan’s destiny and a national psyche under siege, this policy is implemented through para-state actors like terrorist groups tutored and funded by different state agencies to operate in Kashmir. When three wars and more than four decades of diplomatic offensive failed to achieve much, the Pakistan Army, supported by the political establishment, swung their terrorists, after their victory in Afghanistan to the Kashmir theatre. Within years of their involvement in Kashmir, terror-strikes were given the respectability of jihad, and thus remained outside the purview of international scrutiny for long, till they became “terrorists” for the West. Not only did Pakistan train secessionists from Kashmir but also terror volunteers from other groups and countries in carrying out acts of sabotage and killings in Kashmir, linking the cause with an emerging global jihad.

Various terrorist and extremist groups were incorporated in the new jihad for Kashmir, some already existing, others created anew, by the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan with several well-known objectives: to continue to internationalise the Kashmir issue as a potential conflict zone in a nuclear environment, to keep India involved in a low-cost but damaging proxy war; to keep a large number of Indian troops occupied in Jammu and Kashmir, to aid and abet Kashmiri militants to force the secession of Jammu and Kashmir; and to gainfully employ the guerilla bands returning from Afghanistan to prevent an internal law and order problem for Pakistan

All these years terrorism has remained an essential part of Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy primarily because of the immeasurable dividends it brought forth. Continued acts of terrorism not only brought global attention on Kashmir but also gave the Pakistan Army an opportunity to project the region as a nuclear flashpoint. Besides, these groups provided Pakistan with a strategic depth in India and early warning capabilities. The Kargil conflict of 1999 proved that these groups could also be effectively used to camouflage offensive operations and protect regular troops from the first line of fire. No less significantly, the Kashmir conflict justified the military’s growing expenditure. In overall strategic terms the tactic of using terrorist groups in Kashmir to foment terrorism exerted considerable pressure on India, undermining New Delhi’s right over Kashmir.

Is there any policy change?

Since it is the Chief of the Army Staff or the President who dictates policies on “vital national interests” like Kashmir in Pakistan, it is entirely feasible to assess changes in the policy by analysing the recent statements of General Musharraf. In his address at Muzaffarabad on Kashmir Solidarity Day on February 5, 2006 he made it clear when he said: “I want to repeat it in this gathering that our agenda is the same as before -- the right of self-determination and plebiscite for the Kashmiri people.” This is an unequivocal affirmation of the past policy. His reiteration that “Kashmir runs in Pakistan’s veins and my veins” is no different either, whether in letter or spirit, from his Address to the Nation on January 12, 2002 confirming that despite talks of reconciliation and solution, the establishment in Pakistan, the Army, has not altered its historical stand on Kashmir. In 2004 Musharraf said that “Kashmir and strategic assets are our national interests and we will not give them up…. there is no sell out. I have said a hundred times, I am not a man to sell out.” (Dawn, January 20, 2004)

The past is further affirmed by President Musharraf’s consistent reference to the “Indian Held Kashmir” as the “nation fighting for their freedom”, a view consistent with what he said in February 2005: “…a freedom struggle is not terrorism…this should be clear to all.” His clarification that without the “struggle of Pakistan forces”, Kashmir would not have been in the limelight only strengthens his subsequent view that “our original agenda is the same as it was before.”

These views are consistent with what others in the Pakistan establishment have been stating in the last three years. Making a presentation at the Roundtable Conference on the Kashmir issue, on January 11, 2005 Masood Khan, the Foreign Office spokesman, said Kashmir was an issue on which the entire nation of Pakistan was united. It was an issue, he said, on which Muslims across the world demand justice. “There is historical continuity in our stand on Kashmir. It has been resolute and consistent. There is no abandonment of the resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir. They are still on the table. Up to this day, they constitute the requisite legal framework.” More vocal has been the Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhary Pervaiz Elahi who said: “Pakistan’s territorial boundaries are incomplete without liberation of the Held Kashmir.”

Jihadi strategy

This “historical continuity” in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy should be read with General Musharraf’s consistent refusal to deal sternly with terrorist groups within the country. Giving up jihad could mean giving up Kashmir. By Musharraf’s own admission on July 21, 2006 terrorist groups, during his regime, have “mushroomed in cities which recruit people openly, train them, collect donations and publish and distribute jihadi literature.” What he did not say was that it could be a conscious decision on the part of his government to keep the jihadi infrastructure alive as an insurance policy on Kashmir in case the peace process, especially the dialogue on Kashmir, gets mired in bickering and protests, and fails to yield any tangible results for Pakistan within a visible time frame.

Although Musharraf has been claiming action against terrorist groups, security forces have only been targeting either al Qaeda leaders (on the US list) or sectarian and religious extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (whose target is Musharraf himself). There are credible reports in the Pakistan media about large-scale recruitment carried out by the group from rural areas in the Punjab, Balochistan and North West Frontier Province and the huge amount of donations and contributions garnered from various national and international sources. The group has recently set up 54 al Dawa schools in Punjab, 11 in Sindh and one in Quetta, Balochistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leader Hafiz Saeed is free and conducts prayers at a Lahore mosque every Friday. According to the vernacular media, Saeed has also been openly entertaining several opposition leaders in his new house in Lahore. His headquarters, where young students are first indoctrinated in jihad before being sent for three-phase guerilla warfare training, is located close to Lahore.

These are unambiguous indications that Pakistan has not given up its strategy of using terrorists to implement its foreign policy objectives, particularly on Kashmir. According to the Indian government, it has “fail-proof and fool-proof evidence” about the existence of terrorist training camps across the border.

In fact, by all indications, a new terror strategy along with peace initiatives has been put in place by Pakistan’s state agencies with the following objectives:

1. To keep India on the defensive through the jihadi option
2. To help the Pakistan Army disengage, temporarily from the Kashmir front, to concentrate on the insurgency in Balochistan and the new Taliban emerging in Waziristan and;
3. To encourage Kashmiri terrorist groups to rise in revolt in the interior in case of a direct military confrontation;
4. To continue to hoodwink the international community with the assurances to reign in terror groups.

The Future

India is likely to witness terrorist incidents not only in Kashmir but also in other parts of the country especially in areas, which are becoming India’s emerging icons of progress like Bangalore, Hyderabad and Mumbai or try to instigate communal violence after incidents in Varanasi and Malegaon.. There are equally grave possibilities of the Capital, New Delhi coming heavily under terrorist focus in view of the forthcoming Commonwealth Games (2010) and the expansion of the Metro railway network.

The challenge before India, therefore, is how to calibrate the next sequence of moves if the peace process has to be kept on line? Can we afford to make unilateral concessions on Siachen and the Kishenganga project when Pakistan resolutely refuses to meet the fundamental promises on which the peace process began on April 22, 2003? The key question is: With Pakistan keeping a studied silence on its jihadi network, how long can India ignore the existence of virulent anti-India terrorist groups like the LeT, especially if attacks like Varanasi, Delhi and Mumbai bomb blasts were to be repeated anytime in the near future.

Pakistani politicians, unable to handle their new country, let the reins slip into the Army’s hands. And the Army, after each war it fought and lost, went back to proclaim that the threat to the country had increased. In the process it acquired the country for itself. Each General is today estimated to be worth thirty crores in personal wealth. The well-known corporate interests of the Pakistan Armed Forces are immense and are derived from its present privileged status which in turn is derived from the perceived threat perceptions from India.

Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha has calculated that the Pak Armed Forces own seven to ten per cent of the private sector assets, controlled business worth Rs 200 billion and if the real estate owned by the military were added, then this figure is about Rs one trillion. With such a lucrative occupation and all the power and the glory, it is difficult to accept that the Pakistan Army, the final arbiter on Pak-India relations, will ever be serious about solving Kashmir. It is only when the Pak Army’s corporate interests dictate that the peace dividend is higher than the war dividend will the attitude change. Till then we have to learn to live with a jehadi mindset where the Army’s slogan remains ‘jehad fi’isbillah’ – jehad in the name of Allah and even the mainstream schools apart from the madrassas keep teaching jehad to their young.

Besides, can Pakistan, with its present drift towards Islamic radicalism, accept a successful secular India on its borders? Would it not attract the query ‘Why Pakistan?’ Till we are able to solve these riddles or till Pakistan solves itself, the Kashmir issue will not fade away.


VikramSood
Gurgaon
December 2, 2006
Source : Agni