The war against terror

There is hardly anyone who does not want the US to succeed in this war against terror. Unfortunately, it is being fought in a manner that is bound to fail. The location is wrong, the tactics are wrong and the allies are not all the right ones. There is growing radical Islamic anger against the US. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, in the book Worlds in Collision ask, “Why is the United States hated in so many parts of the world? And why is Islam so feared? The answer at one level is easy: the United States is hated because it is feared, while Islam is feared because it is hated.” However, when one talks of dislike or hatred for the US one should be mindful that the reference is to US government policies.
Islamic radicalism/violent extremism of which Al Qaeda is a facet is very much a 20th Century phenomenon and not a throwback to some medieval stereotype. It is very much the global privatisation of terror. Radical Islam is a reaction to democracy and capitalism as practised by the West and thus a Christian concept. In that sense, the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations is taking place. We do not know where, when, in what form this Islamic rage will manifest itself next. Inevitably, we in India will get engulfed in this global phenomenon one way or other.
We have seen the might and power of US military and technology in recent years in Afghanistan and Iraq. But if you sit back and think about it, US actions are not about shock and awe, they are more about a powerful country acting out of fear. Fear of the unknown; and once fear takes over, rationality retreats. American actions in Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, Karbala and Najaf are bound to leave a strong sense of loss of dignity, hurt and anger in the Muslim world that will take generations to heal and only strengthen radical Islam.
US governments have traditionally adopted the moral high ground and built a self-image they stand for liberty, democracy, international law and peace. However, the pursuit of real politik has meant adopting policies that are contrary to these ideals. The problem is of too much power on one side and too little on the other; the problem of plenty on one side and nothing on the other. Muslims, especially in West Asia have felt that their land and resources have been misused and misappropriated by outsiders who have been manipulating their leaders. It’s a feeling of being at the receiving end of an unfair deal, of being the victims but being portrayed as the perpetrators.
The US and Islam represent two major and potent forces in world politics today. The former is politically unified and centralised, economically and militarily dominant, the latter is politically decentralised and weak, has vital economic assets but no control, but is strong in its ideology and sense of hurt and revenge. Ironically, it is the US pursuit of Cold War goals that led to the first unification of the Ummah in modern times. This was when the US sponsored a jehad against the Soviet Union and jehadis from all over the Muslim world got together in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Should the US pull away from Iraq, the jehadis will declare victory over the sole surviving super power. The rest of the world cannot let it happen (including the Islamic world), for then the radical mullah will assume that the rest of the world is his for the asking and taking. Since there is no territory to be won in a war against terror, and no knowing when the US will finally be able to say that all sleepers in all terrorist organisations have been found and taken care of, we cannot ever be able to declare that war against terror has been won. But it can only be fought against targets defined globally, not selectively, not through hard power of military might alone but also with soft power and not unilaterally but multilaterally.
If the 20th century was characterised by unprecedented global violence — two world wars, the bomb, partition of India, Vietnam, Algeria, the ethnic violence of the Balkans and the Hutu-Tutsi massacres, terrorism in India — the list is much longer — then the 1st century began no better. The attack on WTC and Pentagon was followed by Afghanistan and Iraq twice, with the backlash now having gathered momentum in West Asia and elsewhere. As Joseph S. Nye Jr points out, the US’s greatest mistake “would be to fall into one-dimensional analysis and to believe that investing in military power will ensure strength.” That, and the tendency to go it alone and ignoring international treaties and obligations.
With the eastward expansion of NATO and its presence now in Afghanistan and the US presence in Pakistan, a long-drawn-out war against terror, managing relations with the US in the next 10 to 15 years is going to be one of India’s major challenges. Should the Russians decide and should the Americans accept their joining NATO, the entire equation for India will change. Would India in that case need to get closer to the Chinese or be part of the encirclement of China? If Russia does not join NATO will India be the third leg of a Russia-China-India entente? Will the Americans allow that to happen? Probably not.
Understanding the US and making it understand India’s security needs and be able to safeguard India’s interests, which will be a variance with that of the US at times and without antagonising the hegemon, will be a major security and diplomatic challenge for India in the next decade.
Concluded

Source : Hindustan Times 1st may 2004