Khaki Diplomacy

General Musharraf’s latest proposal of October 21, which he says is his own brainchild, looks suspiciously similar to the Dixon plan and other such remedies thought up for J&K from time to time. The Indian reaction was a little hesitant to begin with but Musharraf was surprised and angry at the reaction of the Indian Prime Minister subsequently. The problem is that after five years as CEO, a few more as COAS and a few less as President, Musharraf has got used to the idea that once he has spoken everyone will stand and applaud. He is used to this in his own country where he has started getting nods of approval for his new approach but here things are a little different. If a non-starter of a proposal is floated to the media then it is only natural that the response will be through the media.

It seems that the old bad-cop-good-cop routine was followed. The rejection of the proposal led to the Musharraf outburst threatening reversal to the plebiscite demand and increase in violence. A few days later came the Kasuri balm. It would be good to remember that the bad cop routine was the real image; the good cop routine was only a virtual image.

The impatience that Musharraf shows periodically is not just the impatience of a military dictator unable to quite order the neighbourhood like a military parade. He has to continually ward off the jehadis snapping at his heels all the time. He cannot possibly afford an arrangement of the Sino-Indian model where normalisation of relationships is not hostage to one issue. Having promised the jehadis paradise on earth in their life-time, it is difficult to expect them to suddenly turn pacifists and wait for the peace process to mature in decades. Besides they have to be kept employed somewhere or they will surely lead the Pakistani state to self-destruct. Musharraf thus does not have the luxury of time and wants instant solutions.

This does not mean that the Indian state is willing to accept every scheme he throws at it. Another problem is the mindset but it would be good for the Pakistani establishment to remember what John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural address in Jan 1961, “civility is not a sign of weakness and sincerity is always subject to proof.” India will negotiate with Pakistan, not out of fear, but out of neighbourliness, and Pakistan must give proof of its sincerity. This refers, naturally, to the terrorist infrastructure in that country. Kennedy had also said “Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us.” Even though Kennedy spoke in the global context, this remains relevant today in the regional context.

If Musharraf is keen on extending the partition plan he could first try it in Balochistan and grant the Baloch some autonomy, stop the oppression of Sindh, give the Seraikis their own province by carving it out of Punjab, and he could accept renaming NWFP (a colonial usage) as Pakhtunkhwa – the demand of the Pathans for many years now.

The Pak Army began its operation against the Waziris and the Mahsuds in FATA in October 2003. This continues till today and helicopter gunships, artillery and aircraft have been pressed into service, something the Indian Security forces never used against the terrorists in Kashmir. There must be some reason that a battle begun so long ago cannot be terminated. Are the rebels so strong, so many or so determined? Those resisting the Pakistani onslaught are being increasingly referred to as heroes and martyrs in sections of the Urdu press in Pakistan.

For years now the Pakistani Army and its surrogates have used extreme measures to try and suppress their own people or those in the neighbourhood. The Islamic Army of Pakistan, with the Pak Air Force a useful ally, has never hesitated in the past to kill or arrange to kill fellow Muslims. Ask the Baloch, the East Pakistanis (now Bangladeshis), the Mohajirs, the Sindhis, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pathans in Afghanistan and now Pathans in Pakistan, and the Kashmiris in India.

One could say that we have brought it upon us ourselves over the years. Once elections had been held in Jammu and Kashmir and by all accounts they were free and fair, there was never any point in pandering to non-elected self-appointed representatives of the people. The Hurriyat members did not participate in the elections, aware that they represent only themselves and would thus not be able to attain legitimate political power. We cannot give prominence to non-elected self-appointed leaders of Kashmiris and ignore those who had the courage to put their faith in the system. The Farooqs, the Omars and the Muftis cannot be ignored however much we may disagree with their politics and style.

When Shaukat Aziz came on his unsmiling visit, Hurriyat representatives and a couple of other fence sitters, remained closeted with him for hours. One wonders how the Pakistanis would react if the Indian PM on a visit to Pakistan gets into a huddle with some obscure Pakistani leaders and talks to them about unity and how to plot against the country in which they live and so on.

General Musharraf has been successful in creating the impression that he is very flexible and imaginative but that it is the Indians who are obdurate and that there is tremendous scope for Indians to be flexible. In reality we know there are very many limitations on India and Indians on the Kashmir issue and there can be no settlement on the basis of religion. Essentially Musharraf wants to win on the negotiating table what he could not on the battlefront.

In his petulant outburst of November 16, General Musharraf also threatened that violence could revive in Kashmir. This only means that the tap could be turned on any time he likes. This then explains why the terrorist infrastructure has not been wound down in Pakistan. It also means that we could have another Parakram or worse. Is the General threatening us with nuclear warfare? Is this not state sponsored nuclear terrorism?

But the General does have a genuine problem. Musharraf could well be addressing his three constituencies – the Americans by saying that ‘I keep making these suggestions but these Indians are incorrigible;’ so if trouble erupts it is because of India’s obstinacy, the jehad-in-the-name-of-Allah types –‘I have tried my way now you get ready’ for he cannot possibly lock them up in dozens of Guantanamo type camps; and the Army more or less the same but ‘I got you more toys just in case the need arises.’ The people of Pakistan are not his constituency and do not seem to matter.

Our neighbourhood General feels he can be petulant and throw an occasional tantrum, now that the General who made him eat crow three years ago is on his way out. So also his Deputy who would occasionally shower praise on him and at other times hold him in a double nelson. Besides, the Big Three in Washington – the White House, the Pentagon, and Foggy Bottom, know very little about South Asia, care even less and are busy preparing to bequeath this world a legacy.

Musharraf must realise that public airing of his thoughts will invite similar responses. Quiet diplomacy would have been better unless the outburst was only a diversion from growing problems at home – the latest being the question of the Emperor’s New Clothes come December 31, 2004.


Source : Hindustan Times 27th Nov 2004